Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with one count of violating Penal Code section 247.5, discharging a laser at an occupied aircraft, after he shined a laser at an L.A. County Sheriff's Department aircraft. The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint based on double jeopardy for a prior payment of a civil penalty to the federal government. The court held that defendant did not suffer an earlier criminal punishment in the form of the FAA penalty. Therefore, the court concluded that the state Constitution does not preclude the imposition of punishment in this case if defendant is convicted. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "People v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Convicted for a lewd act committed on a minor, DeLeon was released to parole, with conditions, including prohibitions against possessing pornographic material or devices for viewing sexually explicit programming. On August 23, DeLeon’s parole agent conducted a compliance check and found DeLeon with a mobile phone, containing pictures of adults exposing themselves and engaged in sexual acts. He was charged with parole violation, booked into jail, and given written notice on August 26. The petition to revoke was referred to the court on August 30, and a petition to revoke parole was filed in court on September 4. A judicial officer revoked DeLeon’s parole on September 6. DeLeon appeared at a September 11 hearing and moved to dismiss on grounds that he did not get a probable cause hearing within 15 days of arrest (Penal Code 3044_. On September 25, the court determined that, given the Department of Corrections’ authority to subject a parolee to flash incarceration for up to 10 days, the petition was not unreasonably delayed. The motion was denied. At a merits hearing on October 3rdm the court concluded that DeLeon violated parole. The court of appeal affirmed. Given the judicial probable cause determination within 14 days of DeLeon’s arrest, his appearance on the 20th day and the other procedural protections afforded to DeLeon, the hearing within 45 days of arrest afforded him constitutionally adequate process. Because he suffered no prejudice, any error was harmless. View "People v. DeLeon" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder in the first degree (counts 1 and 2), as well as one count of active participation in a criminal street gang (count 3). In the published portion of the opinion, the court addressed defendant's argument that the trial court prejudicially erred when it failed to apply Maryland v. Shatzer, which held that law enforcement must wait 14 days before it may resume questioning (absent initiation by the suspect or with the presence of counsel) after a suspect has invoked his or her right to counsel and is released from custody. The court concluded that the trial court erred in not applying Shatzer because the requisite 14-day break-in-custody did not occur in defendant’s case, and the error was prejudicial. Accordingly, the court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial. View "People v. Bridgeford" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of assault on a peace officer with force likely to produce bodily harm after he threw a metal showerhead at reinforced glass with sufficient force to shatter the glass, causing particles to hit peace officers on the other side. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant where defendant did not have to specifically intend to inflict a particular injury to be guilty of assault because there is no requirement that defendant be subjectively aware of the risk that a battery may occur. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. White" on Justia Law

After defendant stole a packaged steak from the meat department of a grocery store, he was convicted of second degree robbery and acquitted of petty theft. The jury found that defendant had two prior residential burglary convictions under the “Three Strikes” law and Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1). Because the parties agreed that the robbery conviction could be reduced to petty theft with a prior, the court modified defendant’s conviction to petty theft with a prior and remanded for resentencing. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a “finding of factual innocence for the erroneous Robbery conviction” under section 1485.55, subdivision (b), arguing that he had “spent 18 years wrongly imprisoned.” The trial court denied the motion. The court held that, where, as in this case, a conviction is modified to reflect conviction of another offense, the defendant would not have been unlawfully imprisoned for that period of time he or she would have served for the offense as modified. In this case, defendant was innocent of robbery, but guilty of petty theft with a prior and, under the Three Strikes Law, he was subjected to 25 years to life. Defendant had been incarcerated for 18 years, which is less than the 25-year minimum term of the indeterminate third-strike sentence he likely would have received had he been convicted of petty theft with a prior instead of robbery. The court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Etheridge" on Justia Law

In 2007, defendant was charged with grand theft embezzlement (Pen. Code 487(a)). While working at Bank of America (BofA), she had accessed customer accounts, changed the addresses to the address of Nation, a former BofA employee, sent new ATM cards to Nation’s address, and then updated the customers’ information again to reflect their true addresses. Nation used the ATM cards to withdraw over $20,000. BofA covered the customers’ losses, and filed a victim impact statement, claiming a loss of $20,800. In 2008, defendant pled no contest. In reciting the plea agreement, the prosecutor stated defendant would pay restitution in an amount to be determined. When the court placed defendant on three years of probation, it only ordered her to pay a $200 fine. In 2011, the court terminated probation as successfully completed. In 2013, defendant sought reduction of her felony conviction to a misdemeanor (section 1203.4). The probation department noted victim restitution had not been ordered, even though BofA had requested $20,800. At a 2014 hearing, defense counsel stated defendant would stipulate to restitution of $20,800. The court stated the 1203.4 petition would not be granted unless restitution was paid. Defendant withdrew her stipulation and contested the amount. The court set restitution at $20,800. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the lower court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in ordering restitution after completion of probation. View "People v. Waters" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Kimberly Mendoza was charged with four drug-related offenses. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on three years’ probation in connection with the case. Nearly two years later, defendant was convicted of a new felony in a different county. Defendant was sentenced to 16 months imprisonment, to be served in the county jail. Defendant filed a request in the first case to terminate probation and to impose sentence in absentia under Penal Code section 1203.2a. Defendant waived her right to be present and her right to an attorney. A petition to impose sentence in absentia, when a prison sentence has been ordered to be served in the county jail, has never been expressly provided for by the terms of Penal Code section 1203.2a. In addition, the “petition” defendant filed lacked attestation by the prison warden, or the warden’s designate, as required under the statute. The trial court called for hearing. The prosecutor was present, but defendant was not. When the court found that defendant was not present, it stated, “We’ll just drop it.” The court never acted on defendant’s request for sentencing. Several months later, defense counsel filed a motion in the first case for termination of probation under Penal Code section 1203.2a, because of the court’s inaction. The trial court apparently viewed the motion to terminate probation as inconsistent with the plea agreement to admit violations of probation and to reinstate probation. The court ordered the motion to terminate probation withdrawn, and proceeded to accept the negotiated disposition of the violation of probation allegations. Defendant admitted the violations, and was reinstated on probation. Counsel did not join in defendant’s waivers and admissions. Defendant filed a notice of appeal, alleging that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the violations of probation, because it had failed to act on defendant’s demand under 1203.2a. The Court of Appeal concluded after review of the provisions of Penal Code section 1203.2a, that the trial court’s failure to act on defendant’s petition for over 60 days after it was filed in January 2013 deprived the court of jurisdiction to impose any sentence or reinstate probation on the first probation offense. The trial court should have granted defendant’s motion to terminate her probation. Accordingly, the order reinstating probation (and requiring defendant to withdraw her motion for dismissal as a condition of her plea bargain) was reversed. The matter was remanded with directions to the trial court to terminate defendant’s probation and to discharge her from probation. View "California v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

Inmate Steven Williams,housed at the R. J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Williams alleged the appeals coordinators at Donovan abused their discretion and violated his due process rights and his rights under California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) regulations by improperly cancelling his inmate appeal in which he requested that prison officials "accept liability" for various items of his personal property he claims were lost or damaged when he was transferred to Donovan from the Correctional Medical Facility (CMF). The Court of Appeal concluded Williams failed to demonstrate he has a protected liberty interest in the prison's administrative lost-property appeal process, and he failed to satisfy the habeas corpus jurisdictional requirements under California law. View "In re Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant Timothy Page pled guilty to several charges, including one count of unlawfully taking a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). Subsequently, California voters enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, which among other things established a procedure for specified classes of offenders to have their felony convictions reduced to misdemeanors and be resentenced accordingly. In this appeal, defendant challenged the denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Proposition 47 with respect to his Vehicle Code section 10851 conviction. He argued that the trial court erred by determining that he was not eligible for relief. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Page" on Justia Law

Ricardo P. appealed a juvenile court order finding that he committed first degree burglary, declaring him to be a ward of the court, and placing him on probation. One of his probation conditions required him to submit to warrantless searches of his “electronics including passwords.” He challenged the condition on grounds that it allowed illegal eavesdropping under Penal Code section 632; was not reasonable; and was unconstitutionally overbroad. The court of appeal modified the order, so that the phrase “electronics including passwords” was stricken from the condition permitting warrantless searches. The court noted several pending appeals involving similar conditions. The juvenile court may choose to impose a probation condition permitting searches of a narrower range of electronic information related to the court’s supervisory concerns. Such a condition could, for example, limit searches of Ricardo’s cell phone and other devices to electronic information that is reasonably likely to reveal whether Ricardo is boasting about his drug use or activity, such as text and voicemail messages, photographs, e-mails, and social-media accounts. The court also noted that state and federal statutes, including the recently enacted California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (Stats. 2015, ch. 651), impose limits on the government’s ability to obtain private electronic information. View "In re Ricardo P." on Justia Law