Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The People appealed from the trial court's grant of defendant's writ of habeas corpus. The court agreed with the People's contention that the reclassification of defendant's 2009 felony conviction of petty theft with a prior as a misdemeanor, which occurred after his original sentence, does not preclude its use to support his Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement. The court explained that the redesignation under Proposition 47 of a prior felony conviction to a misdemeanor operates prospectively, from the date of the redesignation forward, and not retroactively, as if the conviction always had been a misdemeanor. Therefore, the court reversed the order and reinstated defendant's prison sentence. View "People v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs John and Jane Doe appealed an order granting the State Department of Justice's special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. In their lawsuit, the Does alleged civil rights violations, negligence, false/wrongful arrest, defamation, and loss of consortium, against the State as well as the City and County of San Diego. Over many years, State agents allegedly caused John Doe to register as a sex offender through threats of enforcement, maintained him on California's sex offender registry, and publicly disseminated his name as a registered sex offender, including via the Megan's Law Web site. In 2014, John was arrested and charged with failing to register as a sex offender. Subsequently, John allegedly determined for the first time that he was not required to register as a sex offender because his prior sex offense convictions had been reversed on appeal. The State DOJ contended the Does' causes of action arose from protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 and the Does did not show a probability of prevailing. The Court of Appeal agreed with the state: agents' threats to arrest/prosecute John involved and furthered protected speech and petitioning activity. The protected activity also involved public issues or issues of public interest. The Does did not show a probability of prevailing on their causes of action. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted the special motion to strike. View "Doe v. California" on Justia Law

During defendant’s 19th birthday party, a confrontation occurred between defendant’s father and Barcenas. Defendant observed two men hitting her father; she claims they pushed her when she attempted to separate the men and stated they were gang members. Defendant was handed a gun by her boyfriend, approached the truck to which the men had retreated, and fired into the truck, piercing Barcenas’s spinal cord. About a half hour after police responded to the scene, defendant approached an officer and acknowledged that she had shot Barcenas. As the officer was handcuffing her, she explained that “she was defending her father.” At trial she testified that Barcenas “was coming outside of the truck towards me.” The defense objected to admission of statements made during an interrogation at the police station, which seemingly contradicted her testimony. Defendant was sentenced to 27 years to life following her conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter, shooting at an occupied vehicle and mayhem. The court of appeal affirmed the conviction, rejecting defendant’s argument that she did not voluntarily and knowingly waive her right to remain silent when she spoke to the police after having been advised of her Miranda rights. The court vacated the sentence as constituting cruel and unusual punishment. View "People. v. Cuiriz" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested following an undercover sting operation. Officers contacted a 16-year-old female offering sexual services through an online advertisement. The minor agreed to meet at a hotel and have sexual relations for $500. She was arrested after making sexual advances toward an officer. Defendant, who drove the minor to the hotel, was waiting in the parking lot. He admitted dropping off the minor. Defendant was charged with human trafficking of a minor, Penal Code 236.1(c). Represented by retained counsel, defendant entered an open no contest plea, declining the prosecution‘s five-year statutory minimum prison term offer. The court indicated that it would suspend execution of an eight-year sentence and place defendant on three years‘ probation including one year in county jail. Defendant signed a waiver of rights on which he initialed the statements: I understand the court is not required to follow any tentative, indicated sentence; If I am placed on probation or mandatory supervision, I understand the Court will impose additional conditions that are reasonably related to the charges to which I am pleading guilty …; and I understand I must register … with the police as a sex offender. The court of appeal affirmed denial of Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, rejecting claims of ineffective of counsel and that Defendant would not have accepted the plea had he been aware of the sex offender management conditions. View "People v. Dillard" on Justia Law

This case stems from the arrest of Joshua Corbett in Sandra Bullock's home where he was charged with 26 offenses, including stalking, burglary, and firearm offenses. The People seek a writ of mandate compelling the trial court to vacate its ruling and to deny a motion to suppress evidence. In this case, the parties agree that the police had probable cause to obtain a search warrant before they entered Corbett's home, and there is no dispute that officers had the opportunity to seek a warrant but elected not to do so. The People argued that because the police later obtained a warrant after the initial search, the evidence in his home would inevitably have been discovered. The court concluded that the police violated the Fifth Amendment by failing to honor Corbett's unambiguous invocation during custodial interrogation of his right to remain silent; the police violated Corbett's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable governmental searches and seizures when officers seized firearms and ammunition from his home during a warrantless search; and thus the trial court properly suppressed the evidence seized during that search. Furthermore, the People's contention that the search warrant was validly issued upon independent evidence that is unaffected by the prior unlawful entry into defendant's residence, making it inevitable that the items illegally seized the day before would have been seized eventually, is without merit. The court concluded that, in the absence of exigent circumstances, if the police could have obtained but did not obtain a warrant to search a person's residence, and entered the person's residence illegally based on an invalid consent, the fact that they could have obtained a warrant, or later obtained a warrant when they wanted to return to search the home again, does not excuse their failure to obtain a warrant before the initial entry. The court further explained that, even if the police had sought the search warrant on the basis of Corbett's purported violation of the emergency protective order, the People have not established that a search warrant could properly have been issued on this basis due to problems of notice and the absence of an opportunity to comply with the protective order's firearms relinquishment obligations. The court rejected the People's remaining arguments and denied the petition. View "People v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Presley, certified as a mentally disordered offender (MDO), was placed into an outpatient conditional release program (CONREP) in 2013. He was initially housed at a board and care facility, with weekly drug screening, group therapy, and individual counseling. After he moved to his family’s home CONREP visited him and stayed in contact with family members. Presley went to the CONREP facility for group therapy and twice-monthly drug screening. In 2014, CONREP recommended that Presley’s commitment be terminated. The state conceded that Presley should be discharged based on a psychologist’s opinion that he no longer met the MDO qualifications and that, although the issue was moot, under Penal Code 2972.1, Presley would have been entitled to a jury trial on his MDO status. Before the court ruled, Presley’s psychologist requested revocation of Presley’s outpatient status because he had “gone AWOL,” leaving his medications behind. The court revoked Presley’s outpatient status, issued a bench warrant, and set a hearing. Presley did not appear, although his counsel was present. The court ordered that Presley be confined in a state hospital. The court of appeal affirmed. While Presley was improperly deprived of a jury trial, his absconding from outpatient treatment before the court ruled on his commitment status forfeited the claim of error. View "People v. Presley" on Justia Law

Acting pro se, Clay Jones sued his former attorney, Alan Whisenand, for legal malpractice and civil rights violations allegedly committed in the course of civil commitment proceedings under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). The trial court sustained Whisenand’s demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend on the grounds that: (1) Jones failed to allege actual innocence of all charges in the underlying criminal case or post-conviction exoneration; and (2) Jones failed to show that Whisenand was a “state actor” acting “under color of state law.” After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the actual innocence requirement did not apply to SVPA proceedings. However, public policy considerations underlying the actual innocence requirement (namely, judicial economy and the desire to avoid conflicting resolutions) compelled the conclusion that alleged SVPs should not be able to pursue causes of action for legal malpractice in the course of their SVPA proceedings unless and until such proceedings have been terminated in their favor. "[O]ur conclusion does not leave alleged SVPs without a remedy while proceedings are ongoing, as they may still seek relief for ineffective assistance of counsel in the SVPA proceedings themselves. Jones does not, and cannot, allege that the pending SVPA proceedings have been terminated in his favor. We therefore conclude the trial court properly sustained Whisenand’s demurrer to Jones’s cause of action for legal malpractice." The SVPA proceedings against Jones were still pending, raising the possibility that he might be able to comply with the favorable termination requirement in the future. Accordingly, the Court concluded the demurrer should have been sustained with leave to amend. With respect to his civil rights claim, the Court concluded the trial court properly sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. View "Jones v. Whisenand" on Justia Law

Khary Watson challenged his sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for committing felony murder when he was only four months shy of his 18th birthday. Watson's offense occurred after he chased down a woman who tried to run away while Watson was robbing her. Watson shot her in the back. He argued his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. He also contended California's sentencing scheme as well as specific Penal Code provisions violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeal concluded Watson's arguments lacked merit; thus, affirmed. View "California v. Watson" on Justia Law

In 2009, Giovanetti told police checks had been stolen from her business. Lowery tried to cash one of the checks in the amount of $1,047. The cashier suspected the signature was not genuine and called Giovanetti, who told him not to cash the check. The cashier kept it and a copy of Lowery’s driver’s license. Lowery pleaded no contest to possession of a fictitious check. (Pen. Code 476.) In 2015, he petitioned to designate the offense a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 (Pen. Code, 1170.18(f)). The prosecution stipulated to his eligibility to have the offense designated a misdemeanor. The trial court, however denied the petition, reasoning that the check was written for $1,047.85, exceeding the $950 limit under Penal Code 473. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the term “value” in section 473 refers to the actual monetary worth of the check, not the amount for which it was written. While the written value of a forged check may be substantial evidence of its monetary worth, a defendant may be able to show an uncashed check was worth less than its written value—e.g., by presenting evidence that the check was unlikely to be cashed. The court noted that the issue is currently before the California Supreme Court. View "People v. Lowery" on Justia Law

Defendant Melissa Nichols was charged in an information with the murder of James Payne, gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury to Payne and Kandis Maddox, and driving with a 0.08 percent blood-alcohol level causing injury. It was also alleged as to counts III and IV that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury upon Maddox and that defendant proximately caused death or bodily injury to more than one victim. Count I was dismissed, and the case proceeded to trial on the remaining counts. A jury found her guilty of one count of driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury. She was sentenced to two years in prison. Defendant appealed a resulting victim restitution order following the judgment of conviction. The trial court awarded full restitution to the parents of the victim for travel expenses and lost wages related to the parents’ attendance at court proceedings. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred in declining to apply the doctrine of comparative negligence to reduce the restitution award. The Court of Appeal concluded that the doctrine of comparative negligence did not apply to reduce Penal Code section 1202.41 restitution to which the parents of a direct victim are entitled as reimbursement for their own economic loss. View "California v. Nichols" on Justia Law