Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

While defendant was out on bail after comitting a felony narcotics offense, he committed two additional felony offenses. The trial court imposed a two-year sentencing enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.1, subdivision (b) in the second case. Section 12022.1, subdivision (b) applies when a defendant commits a second felony while out on bail on an earlier felony. The trial court in the first case granted defendant's petition to reduce his narcotics offense to a misdemeanor after voters passed Proposition 47. Then the trial court in the second case reduced one of defendant's felonies to a misdemeanor. At issue on appeal was whether Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (k), enacted as part of Proposition 47, precluded the trial court from reimposing the on-bail enhancement in Penal Code section 12022.1 in the second case after the felony in the first case had been reduced to a misdemeanor. The court concluded that, because defendant was subject to a full resentencing in his second case, the trial court was required to evaluate the circumstances as they existed then, and by that time defendant’s prior felony had been reduced to a misdemeanor. Consequently, defendant was ineligible for the section 12022.1 enhancement and the trial court erred by reimposing it. Accordingly, the court strikes the on-bail enhancement and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "People v. Buycks" on Justia Law

Defendant Grey Woods appealed after a jury convicted him of 16 counts related to sexual misconduct involving his girlfriend's underage daughter. Woods pled guilty to a 17th count, for possession of child pornography. Woods contended that his convictions on counts 1 through 15 should have been reversed on either of two grounds: (1) that the trial court failed to instruct the jury sua sponte on lesser included offenses to the charged offenses of forcible rape, forcible oral copulation of a minor over the age of 14, and forcible oral copulation in concert of a minor over the age of 14; and (2) that the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury on the meaning of "consent" as it related to his case. The State conceded, and the court of Appeal agreed, that the trial court had a duty to instruct the jury regarding the lesser included offense of nonforcible oral copulation with a minor with respect to the charges of forcible oral copulation of a minor over the age of 14 and forcible oral copulation in concert of a minor over the age of 14. The State argued, however, that the error was harmless. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court of Appeal could not conclude that there was no reasonable probability that Woods would have received a more favorable result if the court had provided the instructions on the lesser included offense. Further, the Court disagreed with Woods that the trial court had a duty to instruct the jury regarding the offense of statutory rape as a lesser included offense of the offense of forcible rape; the statutory rape offense that Woods identified was not a lesser included offense of the substantive offense of forcible rape, even under the accusatory pleading test. The Court rejected the remainder of Woods's arguments for reversal. The Court reversed Woods's convictions on counts 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, and 15. Woods could be retried on these counts. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Woods" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of seven violations of Penal Code section 484e, subdivision (d) – unauthorized acquisition or retention of access card account information of another, and was sentenced to two years in county jail on each count where the terms run concurrently. Section 490.2, adopted as part of Proposition 47, states that notwithstanding any other provision defining grand theft, the theft of money, labor or property valued at $950 or less shall be considered misdemeanor petty theft. The court concluded that section 490.2 does not incorporate the "acquisition" or "retention" language of section 484e(d). Nor does it refer specifically to section 484e(d) or any part of the "'comprehensive statutory scheme which punishes a variety of fraudulent practices involving access cards.'" Therefore, the court concluded that there was no intent to apply section 490.2 to section 484e(d) to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor, and that the trial court properly determined that defendant was ineligible for reduction of his sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Grayson" on Justia Law

Defendant was a juvenile court dependent from 2007 to 2015. In 2014, a petition alleging violations of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a), for lewd or lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14 was sustained against him. In August 2014, defendant was committed to a period of confinement with the DJJ. After defendant turned 18 years old, the juvenile court terminated its dependency jurisdiction over him. The court affirmed and rejected defendant's contention that the juvenile court should have maintained dependency jurisdiction over him and provided him with services under the California Fostering Connections to Success Act, Assembly Bill No. 12. The court concluded that the juvenile court did not err in terminating its dependency jurisdiction; DCFS's reports met the requirements of Welfare and Institutions Code section 391; and the juvenile court did not fail to make orders maintaining general jurisdiction over defendant. View "In re Andrae A." on Justia Law

Rivas-Colon pled guilty to felony second degree commercial burglary (Pen. Code 459). The trial court placed him on probation. Rivas-Colon later petitioned for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.18 and section 459.5(a), which classifies shoplifting as a misdemeanor where the value of the property taken or intended to be taken does not exceed $950. The court denied the petition, concluding Rivas-Colon was not eligible for resentencing because the value of the property exceeded $950. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Rivas-Colon’s claims that the prosecution, not the defendant, has the burden of proof on a petition for resentencing brought pursuant to section 1170.18; that the court erred by considering the police report and store receipt when determining his eligibility for resentencing; and that he had a right to a jury trial on the value of the property. View "People v. Rivas-Colon" on Justia Law

Penal Code 1041(3)-1042 provides for the right to a jury trial on factual issues underlying a plea of once in jeopardy. Defendants entered pleas of once in jeopardy, based on their claim that the prosecutor at the first of their two trials intentionally goaded them into requesting a mistrial. The Attorney General argues that sections 1041(3) and 1042 apply to some, but not all, pleas of once in jeopardy. The court concluded that the Attorney General's interpretation is foreclosed by the plain language of the statutes. Accordingly, the court reversed defendants' convictions and remanded. On remand, the prosecution or trial court may move to strike defendants' pleas of once in jeopardy. View "People v. Bell" on Justia Law

Edwards, age 17, and his friends from East Palo Alto drove to a high school house party in San José. Following an argument, members of his group fired gunshots at a crowd on the lawn in front of the house. A bullet struck DeJesús in the head, fatally wounding him. This incident followed a similar shooting at a Sunnyvale party three weeks earlier in which a teenager was shot but survived. The prosecution charged Edwards as an adult with: murder for the death in San José; shooting at an inhabited dwelling in San José; assault with a firearm in Sunnyvale; and shooting at an inhabited dwelling in Sunnyvale. All counts included firearm and gang-related enhancements. The jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder and shooting at an inhabited dwelling in Counts One andTwo. The jury hung on the counts related to the Sunnyvale shooting and returned no findings on any of the enhancements. The court sentenced Edwards to 22 years to life. The court of appeal affirmed, finding harmless error in contentions that the court erroneously excluded expert testimony offered to impeach the prosecution’s gang expert and erroneously admitted testimonial hearsay through the prosecution’s gang expert. View "People v. Edwards" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Bryan Watt of receiving stolen property and he was granted probation. He appealed, claiming there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict, the jury was misinstructed and two of his probation terms were invalid. After review, the Court of Appeal disagree with Watt's first two contentions, agreed with the third, and, therefore, struck the probation terms at issue while affirming the remainder of the judgment. View "California v. Watt" on Justia Law

Defendant Rudy Francisco De La Rosa appealed an order committing him to the trial competency program at Napa State Hospital. He contended insufficient evidence supported the finding that he was not competent to stand trial. He also contended that after the court decided his placement at Napa State Hospital, the trial court erred in denying him an opportunity to be heard. While defendant’s appeal was pending with the Court of Appeal, defense appellate counsel advised the Court that on April 2, 2013, the trial court terminated defendant’s commitment, finding that defendant had been restored to competency, and reinstated criminal proceedings. Defendant then entered a plea and the court granted probation. The State argued the issues on appeal were rendered moot due to defendant’s restoration to competency and the resumption of criminal proceedings during which defendant entered a plea and was granted probation. Defendant disagreed the issues were moot, arguing that State ignored post-"Lindsey" cases discussing the continuing stigma of a wrongful commitment. The Court of Appeal found that the issues on appeal were not moot, and that sufficient evidence supported the trial court's order finding defendant incompetent to stand trial. View "California v. De La Rosa" on Justia Law

The State alleged that defendant Ricardo Chaides had a prior felony conviction under Penal Code section 12025, subdivision (b)(3) and that this conviction constituted a strike for purposes of the three strikes law. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the strike prior allegation; it ruled that defendant’s prior conviction constituted only a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (a). The State appealed. After review of the matter, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer. "In ruling on the demurrer, it had to accept the allegations of the complaint as true; those allegations indicated that defendant had been convicted of an offense that would also constitute a felony violation of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (a). On remand, however, the evidence may show that Defendant’s offense of carrying a concealed firearm would constitute only a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (a). In that event, defendant would be entitled to have the strike prior allegation found not true." View "California v. Chaides" on Justia Law