Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Restitution for crime victims is a California constitutional right; Penal Code 1203.2 (a) provides that restitution shall be consistent with ability to pay and that probation cannot be revoked for nonpayment of restitution unless the defendant has willfully failed to pay and has the ability to pay. The length of felony probation may not exceed the maximum possible sentence, except that where the maximum sentence is five years or less, probation may last up to five years. Defendant was placed on probation for three years in January 2004 after pleading no contest to felony welfare fraud. Her original probationary term would have expired in January 2007. Based on an allegation that defendant had not paid victim restitution of more than $60,000, her probation was summarily revoked in November 2006. She implicitly admitted that she had willfully not paid in full. Her probation was formally revoked in April 2007. The superior court kept defendant in revoked status until January 2013, while monitoring her restitution payments/. When defendant’s attorney questioned the legality of her status, the court reinstated probation and extended it through July 2015, so that defendant would be subject to probation for 11½ years on a felony whose maximum sentence is three years. The appeals court reversed, concluding that the order was unauthorized by the probation statutes. Defendant is not estopped by long acquiescence from challenging the extension of her probationary status. View "People. v. Sem" on Justia Law

Defendant Larry Jason Batchelor appealed his conviction (from two separate trials) of implied malice murder (count 1) and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (count 2).As to the first trial, defendant argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of gross vehicular manslaughter, and (2) the prosecutor improperly commented on defendant’s exercise of his right to a jury trial and improperly vouched for the State's case. As to the second trial, defendant argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of implied malice murder; (2) the statute under which he was charged violated principles of due process because it authorizes disparate treatment for the prosecution and defense with respect to the admission of evidence of voluntary intoxication to prove implied malice; (3) the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to read or present to the jury section 188 and case law regarding implied malice; (4) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on gross vehicular manslaughter and/or to inform the jury that defendant had been convicted of that offense in the first trial; (5) the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing to the jury that if it did not convict defendant of murder he would be a free man and by appealing to the passion and prejudice of the jury; (6) he was denied due process by being sentenced by a judge who had not presided over either trial and who had failed to read the trial transcripts or the defense sentencing memoranda; and (7) the cumulative error doctrine requires reversal. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred by instructing defendant’s second jury in a manner that gave the jury the false impression that defendant would be left entirely unpunished for his actions if the jury did not convict him of murder. Moreover, the trial court’s error was compounded by the prosecutor’s argument to the jury: “And now is the time that you have to hold this person accountable. Now is the time that you have to send the message that you drink and drive and kill someone, you’re going to be held accountable. There is only one count in this case that you have to decide on. This is it. Hold him accountable for killing someone.” The Court reasoned: "[a]lthough perhaps the argument was technically correct, in that only one count remained for the jury to decide in the second trial, the argument certainly created the misleading impression that unless the jury found him guilty of the murder charge, he would not be held accountable at all for [the victim's] death." The Court concluded, therefore, the error required reversal. View "California v. Batchelor" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of receiving stolen property and one count of identity theft. Defendant was sentenced to ten years eight months imprisonment. Defendant raised several issues on appeal. The court concluded that defendant was "sidetracking," by avoiding or delaying trial by diverting from the pending issue of guilt or innocence to some other issue, any issue, and then keeping the prosecution or trial court so occupied in litigating the side issue that the hearing of the accusation itself comes to a halt. In this case, defendant's sidetracking is striking in terms of the expenditure of time, public funds, and judicial resources. The court rejected defendant's numerous arguments on appeal and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "People v. Peyton" on Justia Law

Defendant Melvin Anderson appealed the denial of his petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. The Court of Appeal appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and asked the Court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. Counsel also advised defendant that he had a right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed and the Court received no communication from defendant. It therefore concluded defendant was not entitled to Wende review on an appeal from the denial of his petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to the Act. Because appointed appellate counsel filed a brief indicating that there were no arguable issues on appeal, the Court dismissed the appeal. View "California v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Defendant-petitioner Larry Steven Schinkel, Jr. had prior strike convictions (specifically, he had six prior burglary convictions), when he engaged in sexual intercourse with a minor. After he was arrested on the charges related to the minor, he solicited another inmate to have the minor killed so that she could not testify against him. Convicted of four counts of sexual intercourse with a minor and solicitation of murder, defendant was eventually sentenced under the Three Strikes law to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life for solicitation of murder with two consecutive 25-year-to-life terms for two of the sexual intercourse counts, for an aggregate term of 75 years to life. Two 25-year-to-life terms for the other sexual intercourse counts were imposed concurrently. In November 2012, California voters passed Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, amending 667 and 1170.12 (relating to Three Strikes sentencing) and added section 1170.126 (relating to resentencing of defendants previously sentenced under the Three Strikes law). Defendant, representing himself, filed a petition for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act. Without a hearing, the court denied the petition. The court held that defendant was not eligible for resentencing because, with respect to the solicitation of murder conviction, defendant intended to cause great bodily injury. The Court of Appeal treated defendant's appeal of the order denying his petition for resentencing as a petition for writ of mandate and concluded: (1) the trial court properly determined that defendant was ineligible for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 because his conviction for solicitation of murder necessarily included the intent to cause great bodily injury; (2) defendant was not eligible for resentencing on other nondisqualifying current convictions because the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 excluded defendant's class of dangerous criminals from the benefit of resentencing; and (3) defendant was not entitled to a jury trial on whether he is eligible for resentencing. Having found no merit in defendant's contentions, the Court denied the petition for writ of mandate. View "Schinkel, Jr. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Olsen was committed for an indeterminate term to the California Department of Mental Health after a jury determined defendant to be a sexually violent predator within the meaning of the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600). Olsen argued that the indeterminate term of commitment violated equal protection, due process, and the ex post facto and double jeopardy clauses. After remand proceedings, the trial court again ordered him committed for an indeterminate term under the SVPA. The appeals court affirmed. The trial court later denied Olsen’s petition for conditional release as frivolous. The appeals court reversed, directing the trial court to reconsider whether the petition for conditional release is based upon frivolous grounds within the meaning of section 6608(a). The court did not determine whether the petition was based upon frivolous grounds because any reasonable attorney would agree that the petition on its face and any supporting attachments are totally and completely without merit; “it was not for the trial court to decide the issue … it was only to determine whether [the defendant] had presented a petition based on nonfrivolous grounds so as to entitle [the defendant] to a hearing on the matter. View "People v. Olsen" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for shooting and assault convictions. The court held that the trial court did have the authority to strike or dismiss the section 186.22(b)(4) allegation in count 1, shooting at an inhabited dwelling. However, the court affirmed in all other respects. The court reversed defendant's conviction and remanded to allow the trial court to consider defendant's motion to enter an open plea. If the trial court denies the motion, defendant's conviction is ordered reinstated. View "People v. Venegas" on Justia Law

Defendant, a ward of the juvenile court, appealed his conviction for charges related to his participation in a gang. The court reversed the convictions for two counts of active participation in a criminal street gang (counts 3 & 6) because substantial evidence did not establish that defendant promoted, furthered, or assisted in the perpetration of felonious conduct by at least two gang members. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Orange County District Attorney appealed the dismissal of robbery charges against defendants Daniel Alvarez, Jr., Juan Jose Renteria, and Michael Abel Cisneros. The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the case based primarily on "California v. Trombetta," (467 U.S. 479 (1984)), arguing the prosecution and the police had failed to preserve evidence from two police controlled cameras in the vicinity of the robbery. The trial court determined on the night of the incident in question, Cisneros, specifically asked the senior officer on the scene, to check any relevant video. The detective replied, "If I had video cameras of what took place, that’s part of my job. My job is not to arrest people that aren’t guilty of something." Yet the detective later admitted he had never reviewed the video himself, nor asked anyone else to do so. He asserted it was not his responsibility. The court also found the issue of retaining video was raised during a hearing shortly after the defendants’ arrest, giving the prosecution notice the defense wanted to review any available video evidence. Given these facts, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeal concluded the court correctly dismissed the cases of defendants Cisneros and Alvarez, but substantial evidence did not support the court’s factual findings as to Renteria. The Court therefore affirmed as to Cisneros and Alvarez and reversed as to Renteria. View "California v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

Defendant Scott Christensen was convicted of multiple counts of lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14. In his first trial, he was convicted with respect to his acts against one victim, Spencer S., but the jury deadlocked with respect to his acts against another victim, Joshua K. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court made various errors in the retrial on the counts pertaining to Joshua. He says the court erred in admitting both the testimony Joshua gave in the first trial and the evidence of the prior offense against Spencer. He also argued that his convictions should have been reversed due to prosecutorial misconduct and that his sentence of 27 years to life was excessive. After review, the Court of Appeal disagreed as to both of defendant's contentions and affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "California v. Christensen" on Justia Law