Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a member of the University of California faculty, was prosecuted under Government Code section 1090 for participating in a decision to hire his wife as a program assistant for a four-week summer study abroad course. The trial court dismissed the information under Penal Code section 995. The district attorney, on behalf of the People, argued that defendant committed a felony under section 1090 because he was "financially interested" in a contract made by him in his official capacity to hire his wife. Finding no grounds for forfeiture, the court concluded on the merits that neither the plain language nor the legislative history of section 1090 reflect an intent to include the University and its employees within the ambit of the statute; there is no case law applying section 1090 to the University; and the Williamson rule does not apply in this case. The court further concluded that this contract does not involve a matter of statewide concern and its application impinges upon exclusively internal University affairs and municipal home rule cases do not apply. Allowing the People to prosecute defendant under section 1090 would impair the Regents' ability to govern and would contravene article IX section 9 of the California Constitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order dismissing the information. View "People v. Lofchie" on Justia Law

Police officers contacted and detained not only an individual in the driveway in front of a house, whom they observed stripping copper wire from an air conditioner, but also the occupant of the house, suspecting that "maybe possibly" a burglary was in progress. The officers were aware of no facts particular to the occupant of the house suggesting that he was a burglar, rather than a resident. And they made no reasonable attempt to ascertain such facts until after he was detained. It was later determined he was in fact a resident. "The Fourth Amendment does not countenance warrantless intrusion by police into a private home and detention of a resident under the circumstances of this case. The police had no probable cause with respect to the resident of the house (who was the defendant in this case) so suspected exigent circumstances do not justify the officers' actions." As such, the detention was unlawful, and defendant's motion to suppress the fruits of that unlawful detention should have been granted. View "California v. Lujano" on Justia Law

While imprisoned after being convicted of several offenses, defendant J.S. was declared a Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO) pursuant to Penal Code1 section 2962. In Spring 2012, J.S. was placed on parole and began her initial one-year term of involuntary treatment. After the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) rejected her challenge to her MDO classification and initial commitment, she filed a petition requesting counsel and judicial review, pursuant to section 2966 (b). That petition, however, was not heard within the initial year of commitment. A year later, the trial court granted the People's motion to dismiss the petition as "moot" on that basis. Defendant argued on appeal to the Court of Appeal that she was entitled to have her petition heard on the merits, because it was filed during the initial year of commitment, and even though the initial term was already completed, her petition was not moot. The Court of Appeal agreed, and therefore reversed the order dismissing defendant's petition. View "California v. J.S." on Justia Law

Petitioner pled no contest to battery, a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 242, and subsequently filed a petition under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) prohibits the possession of firearms by those convicted of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." The court concluded that a Penal Code section 242 misdemeanor, which defines battery as "any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another," has, as an element, the use of physical force for purposes of the prohibition dictated by section 922(g)(9). Therefore, petitioner's conviction under California's battery statute, section 242, is a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence within the meaning of section 922(g)(9). Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's contrary finding. View "James v. St. of CA" on Justia Law

Defendant, a founding member of a medical marijuana cooperative, was charged with a sale of marijuana and possession of marijuana for sale. The first jury was unable to reach a verdict, splitting six to six on the sales charge and nine to three for not guilty on the possession for sale charge. Defendant was permitted a defense under the Medical Marijuana Program Act. On retrial, he was denied the defense. The second jury was still unable to reach a verdict on the sales charge, but convicted defendant of possessing marijuana for sale. Because the Court of Appeal found he was entitled to a defense under the MMPA and the error in precluding the defense was prejudicial, the Court reversed. View "California v. Baniani" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant-appellant Jose Sanchez of grand theft of copper wire. He was sentenced to three years in county jail. On appeal, defendant argued that four statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial in two respects: (1) the prosecutor erred by implicating defendant’s failure to testify; and (2) the prosecutor made inflammatory statements about defendant and the jurors. The Court of Appeal held that one comment constituted error and another amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. However, the Court held that the errors, individually and cumulatively, were harmless. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

The trial court denied Appellant-defendant Ronald James Adair's petition for certificate of rehabilitation and pardon and motion for reconsideration of the denial of his petition for certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion because the timelines set forth in section 4852.03. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Adair" on Justia Law

In the November 2012 General Election, voters prospectively amended recidivist sentencing provisions for a defendant with two or more previous felony convictions. If a commitment conviction was not for a “serious” or violent felony (subject to a number of qualifications), the prescribed sentence now was double the term otherwise provided, instead of the formerly prescribed indeterminate term of life with varying minimums (generally 25 years). The voters simultaneously created a retrospective process for a qualified recidivist defendant who was “presently serving” a former indeterminate life term. A defendant could petition the original sentencing court for a recall of the sentence, and be resentenced to a determinate sentence of double the term that would otherwise apply to the commitment convictions (i.e., what a trial court would impose under the prospective amendments to the recidivist sentencing statutes) if this would otherwise not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to the public. Defendant Sidney Scott Hubbard filed a recall petition in December 2012. He alleged that in September 1996, a jury had found him guilty of attempted robbery and reckless evasion of a police pursuit, and sustained multiple allegations of prior convictions for serious felonies. The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive indeterminate terms of 25 years to life for the convictions, along with six years for the enhancements. Defendant requested that the trial court resentence him on his conviction for reckless evasion because it was not a serious or violent felony and did not otherwise come within an exception. The trial court denied the recall petition without a hearing, finding defendant did not qualify for relief because one of his two commitment convictions was a serious and violent felony. On appeal, defendant challenges this interpretation of section 1170.126. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court’s interpretation of the statute. As a result, the Court affirmed the order, or in the alternative treated the appeal as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and denied it. View "California v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Harquan Johnson and KeAndre Windfield of first degree murder, intentionally discharging a firearm causing death, and personally discharging a firearm causing death. Furthermore, the jury convicted defendants of attempted premeditated and deliberate murder, during which they personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury, and used and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury. Johnson and Windfield were members of the Ramona Blocc Hustla gang; an altercation between Johnson, Windfield and the victims gave rise to murder and weapons charges. As to both offenses, the jury found that defendants committed them for the benefit of the gang. Both were sentenced to prison for 90 years to life. They appealed, claiming the preliminary hearing testimony of a prosecution witness should not have been admitted into evidence at trial, the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions of attempted murder, and the jury was misinstructed. Defendants also claimed that the firearms allegation findings as to the attempted murder should have been stricken. Upon review, the Court of Appeal agreed in part and directed some to be stricken. Both defendants also asserted that the abstracts of judgment should have been corrected. The Court agreed with this, and directed the trial court to correct Windfield’s, and, upon the resentencing of Johnson, to ensure that his abstract and the minutes of the hearing correctly reflect the year the crimes were committed and the award of pretrial custody credit. Each defendant claimed that the sentence imposed upon him, without consideration of his individual characteristics, was a violation of the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. To this, the Court disagreed as to Windfield and agreed as to Johnson. Therefore, the Court affirmed Windfield’s judgment except as to a few corrections. As to Johnson, the Court affirmed his convictions and remanded to the sentencing court for resentencing. View "California v. Windfield" on Justia Law

Sacramento Police received a call from Kennedy High School that there was "an uncontrollable, irate student in the hallways." While in the principal's office, the minor called his mother; he became more and more irate as he talked, "screaming [and] yelling" and pacing the floor. The responding officer asked the minor to sit down and calm down, but the minor did not listen. The minor slammed or threw the phone down on the table. About three to five seconds after the minor failed to obey the order to sit down and calm down, the officer detained him "based on [the officer's] safety and safety of the school and also the [minor]'s." The officer advised the minor he was being detained and ordered him to put his hands on his head with his fingers interlaced. In an attempt to put a control hold on the minor by grabbing the minor's interlaced hands with one hand and grabbing the minor's elbow from underneath with the other hand, the minor turned, pulled away, and started to walk away. The officer performed an arm bar takedown on the minor and detained him on the floor; he then handcuffed him and took him out to his squad car. After obtaining briefing from the parties on the legal and factual issues, the juvenile court issued a ruling sustaining both charges. As to the resisting charge, the court found that the minor's conduct before his detention was sufficient to justify the detention. The minor appealed the order of the juvenile court declaring him a ward of the court, arguing that one of the two allegations the court sustained was supported by sufficient evidence and that the other was founded on an unconstitutional statute. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re J.C." on Justia Law