Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

M.G. was charged in a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 with felony carrying of a concealed firearm on his person. After the juvenile court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence, M.G. entered an admission he committed the charged offense, but declined to stipulate the offense was a felony rather than a wobbler. The trial court rejected his argument, declared a wardship, and placed M.G. with his parent subject to conditions of probation. The court of appeal reversed and remanded for proceedings to determine whether M.G. is suitable for deferred entry of judgment and, if not, whether the offense is a felony or misdemeanor. View "In re M.G." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for violating Penal Code section 290.011(b), failure to register as a transient sex offender. The court concluded that the homeless shelter defendant frequented, a National Guard Armory emergency winter shelter - was a residence within the meaning of the statute where the shelter could be located by address. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "People v. Deluca" on Justia Law

Ebertowski was granted probation after he pleaded no contest to criminal threats (Pen. Code, 422) and resisting or deterring an officer (section 69) and admitted a gang allegation (section 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B)). He challenged two of the probation conditions imposed by the trial court that required him to “provide all passwords to any electronic devices, including cell phones, computers or notepads, within your custody or control, and submit such devices to search at any time without a warrant by any peace officer” and “provide all passwords to any social media sites, including Facebook, Instagram and Mocospace and to submit those sites to search at any time without a warrant by any peace officer.” The court of appeal affirmed, finding that the conditions are not unconstitutionally overbroad or unreasonable and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing them. View "People v. Ebertowski" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Humberto Quinones of two counts of possession for sale of heroin, one count of transportation of a controlled substance, and possession by a convicted felon of a firearm, and found he was personally armed with a firearm during the drug offenses, and had two prior strike convictions for two 1981 robberies. In early 2013, defendant filed this petition, alleging his current felonies were not serious or violent. Regarding the arming allegation, he argued that the sentencing judge "did not just strike the punishment; rather, it struck the enhancement allegations completely." Defendant argued the arming allegation was not part of his record of conviction and he was eligible for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act. The State opposed the motion, arguing the arming allegation had been found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury, and had been stricken for sentencing purposes only, and therefore defendant was disqualified from relief. The trial court denied the petition, finding defendant ineligible under the Act because he possessed a firearm during the current offenses, notwithstanding that the sentencing judge struck the arming enhancement at defendant’s 1996 sentencing. Defendant then appealed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeal concluded after review that the arming enhancement found by the jury but dismissed for sentencing purposes indeed disqualified defendant for resentencing purposes.View "California v. Quinones" on Justia Law

The two petitions for writ of mandate/prohibition involved in the present proceeding arose from a felony domestic violence case. At issue was whether, in fulfilling its federal constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant under Brady v. Maryland, the prosecution was entitled to direct access to peace officer personnel files. Petitioners argued that such access is barred by Penal Code section 832.7(a). Section 832.7(a) provides, in part, that peace officer personnel records are confidential and may be disclosed in a criminal proceeding only pursuant to a motion under Evidence Code section 1043. The court denied the writ petitions to the extent they challenge the respondent superior court's order requiring the SF Police Department to provide the prosecution access to personnel files to allow for identification of any Brady materials in those files. The court concluded that Section 832.7(a) does not create a barrier between the prosecution and the performance of its duty under Brady. The court's construction of Section 832.7(a) makes it unnecessary to consider the constitutionality of barring prosecutorial access to officer personnel files for the purpose of identifying Brady materials therein. The court granted the writ petitions to the extent they challenged the respondent superior court's refusal to consider any request for disclosure of Brady materials pursuant to a motion under Section 1043. The court concluded that, prior to disclosure to the defendant of any Brady material identified by the District Attorney, the prosecution must seek an order authorizing such disclosure under Section 1043. View "People v. Super. Ct. (Johnson)" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of sex crimes and declared mentally incompetent to stand trial based on his developmental disability, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his continued placement in the county jail is not proper under Pen. Code 1370.1 and violates his right to due process. The court agreed that petitioner may not be placed in the county jail for the purpose of receiving competency services, and, absent a determination that there is a substantial likelihood that he will recover his competency in the foreseeable future, petitioner's continued confinement violates his right to due process. The court concluded, however, that in light of the clear and unequivocal language in Welfare and Institutions Code section 6510.5, the court rejected the contention that the trial court may order petitioner placed at Porterville Developmental Center if the DDS continues to maintain that he cannot be safely served at Porterville. The trial court may take steps to ensure that the DDS fulfills its statutory obligation to ensure the regional center meets its duty to provide placement options for the treatment of petitioner. Accordingly, the court granted the petition with instructions to the trial court. View "In re Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant filed a petition to recall his sentence under the provisions of Penal Code section 1170.126, which was enacted by Proposition 36 in 2012. The trial court denied the petition on the ground that defendant was ineligible because his current offense fell under subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iii) of section 667. The court held that the trial court correctly concluded that defendant was ineligible for resentencing under section 1170.126. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Soto" on Justia Law

Defendant was a prisoner at Pelican Bay State Prison. Officers escorted him to the showers and placed him in a stall with a steel mesh security screen. After defendant finished showering, officers handcuffed him while he was still in the stall and asked whether he had a cellmate, because protocol required certain precautions when another inmate was present. Defendant responded with a vulgarity and spit through the screen, hitting two officers. Defendant spit at officers who came to assist. Found competent to stand trial, he was convicted of three counts of aggravated battery by gassing, Penal Code 4501.1, “intentionally placing or throwing, or causing to be placed or thrown, upon the person of another, any human excrement or other bodily fluids or bodily substances ... results in actual contact with the person’s skin or membranes.” Defendant had a prior conviction under the Three Strikes law; he was sentenced to an aggregate term of 11 years. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that: the court should have declared a doubt as to his competency and suspended criminal proceedings before trial began, even though he had been found competent; denial of his motion for self-representation under Faretta v. California was effective to show doubt as to his competence to stand trial; the court should have held a hearing on his right to substitute counsel; and the court erroneously believed it was required to impose consecutive sentences. View "People v. Hojnowski" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Guilford appealed an order denying his petition to recall his sentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. The Act sets forth a mechanism for relief for some existing three strikes inmates, creating a two-step process: (1) the trial court determines whether a defendant is qualified or disqualified from seeking a recall of sentence; (2) if and only if a defendant is found to be qualified, the trial court conducts a hearing, and then applies certain standards to determine whether the defendant’s sentence should be lessened. This appeal involved only the first step. Defendant contended: (1) the trial court improperly considered our prior opinion on direct appeal from defendant’s convictions in finding him ineligible for resentencing under the Act; (2) the Court of Appeal's prior opinion did not show he was ineligible under the Act; and (3) he was entitled to have a jury determine his eligibility under the Act. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order finding defendant ineligible for resentencing under the Act. View "California v. Guilford" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant-appellant Christopher London guilty as charged of cultivating marijuana and possessing marijuana for sale. He was sentenced to three years’ probation, subject to terms and conditions including that he serve 60 days in jail. At trial, defendant claimed he was lawfully growing 100 marijuana plants for a medical marijuana collective under the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 and the Medical Marijuana Program Act (the MMPA) and was therefore not guilty of unlawful marijuana cultivation, possession for sale, or the lesser included offense of marijuana possession. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal addressed defendant’s claims that the trial court erred in refusing to allow his cannabis expert to give opinion testimony critical to his lawful cultivation defense, including that defendant was lawfully cultivating the marijuana under the MMPA and that a $20,000 sum he expected to be paid for his 100 marijuana plants, when fully grown, did not include an unlawful profit. The Court of Appeal concluded the expert’s testimony on these and other points was properly excluded because the expert lacked sufficient evidence to render the opinions. With regard to defendant’s additional claim that the court erroneously instructed the jury on his lawful cultivation defense under the MMPA., the Court agreed the instructions misstated the applicable law under the MMPA, but concluded defendant did not produce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt he was lawfully growing the 100 marijuana plants for himself and other qualified patients, and he was not earning a profit. Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence to support instructing the jury on defendant’s MMPA defense. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment. View "California v. London" on Justia Law