Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted defendants-appellants Leopoldo Chavez and Edward Elias of two counts of first degree murder, and found true special circumstances of robbery-murder and multiple murders. The jury further found that Chavez and Elias were armed with a firearm. Following their convictions, the court sentenced Chavez and Elias to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment each, without the possibility of parole, plus an additional consecutive year. The court later recalled the sentences to consider whether to impose a lesser punishment because Chavez and Elias were under the age of 18 at the time of their offenses. After a further hearing, the court declined to modify the sentences. Chavez and Elias appealed, contending that the evidence was insufficient to convict them of first degree murder or to support the special circumstances findings. Furthermore, they argued: (1) the court erred in instructing the jury using a modified version of CALCRIM No. 376; (2) the court erred by not instructing the jury regarding the natural and probable consequences doctrine; (3) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during closing arguments; (4) the sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole violated the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution because they were juveniles at the time of their offenses; and (5) the court erred by imposing parole revocation fines. The Court of Appeal concluded there was sufficient evidence to support Chavez's and Elias's murder convictions as well as the jury's felony-murder and multiple-murder special circumstances findings. The Court rejected defendants' claims that they were prejudiced by instructional error and that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. Because defendants were sentenced before "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S.Ct. 2455) and "People v. Gutierrez" (58 Cal.4th 1354 (2014)) were decided and, because the record did not show that the trial court had the opportunity to directly consider the ultimate issue presented in those cases, the Court of Appeal reversed the life sentences without possibility of parole and remanded for resentencing in light of Miller and Gutierrez. The Court also agreed the trial court erred in imposing parole revocation fines. View "California v. Chavez" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Darrell Chenault appealed his convictions on 13 counts of lewd acts on a child under 14 years of age, and two counts of forcible lewd acts on a child under 14 years of age. On appeal, he argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a support dog to be present during the testimony of two child witnesses without individualized showings of necessity; and (2) the presence of the support dog was inherently prejudicial and violated his federal constitutional rights to a fair trial and to confront the witnesses against him. Because the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the support dog to be present during the testimony of the two child witnesses, it affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Chenault" on Justia Law

Defendant Kenneth Wesley Brown was convicted of possession of a "short-barreled shotgun." Defendant had been found in possession of the weapon in his home. California's statutory definition of "short-barreled shotgun" includes a shotgun with a barrel less than 18 inches long or with an overall length of less than 26 inches, regardless of the length of the barrel. The barrel of defendant's shotgun was one quarter inch longer than the minimum length of 18 inches, but the overall length was 25 and a half inches - too short by half an inch. He appealed, contending the statute, on its face and as applied, violated the Second Amendment's right to bear arms and equal protection. He also claimed the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal due to the insufficiency of evidence, and made instructional errors. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded that California's ban on shotguns with an overall length of less than 26 inches did not violate the Second Amendment or equal protection. The Court also rejected defendant's other contentions. View "California v. Brown" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with reckless driving a vehicle under Vehicle Code section 23103 because he collided with a pedestrian while intoxicated and riding his bike and seriously injured her. The People filed a felony complaint for arrest that alleged reckless driving causing specified injury under Vehicle Code 23105, subd.(a). Vehicle Code section 21200, subd.(a) subjects a bicyclist to all the provisions applicable to the driver of a vehicle. The court concluded that, where as here, it is alleged that a reckless, intoxicated driver of a bicycle inflicted one of the injuries listed in section 23105, section 21200 provides notice that the bicyclist could be subject to the same criminal penalties as a reckless driver of a motor vehicle. Therefore, petitioner was properly charged with violating sections 23103 and 23105. View "Velasquez v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Lincoln and Dowdell were tried before dual juries for offenses arising out of a robbery/carjacking/kidnapping incident in Sunnyvale. The jury trying Lincoln found him guilty as charged: Count One—kidnapping for ransom or extortion; Count Two—kidnapping during a carjacking; Count Three—carjacking; Count Four—kidnapping for robbery; and Count Five—criminal threats. (Pen. Code, 209 (a), 209.5, 215, 209 (b)(1), 422.) The trial court found two prior prison term allegations true and sentenced Lincoln to two concurrent terms of life with the possibility of parole, consecutive to four years. Dowdell was charged with the same counts as Lincoln, except she was not charged with Count Five––criminal threats. The jury trying Dowdell found her guilty of kidnapping for ransom or extortion and kidnapping for robbery. The jury hung on Counts Two and Three. The trial court sentenced Dowdell to life in prison with the possibility of parole. The court of appeal stayed Lincoln’s sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole for Count Two and struck the conviction for carjacking on Count Three is stricken. As to Dowdell, the trial court was ordered to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that the trial court stayed the sentence on Count Four. The court otherwise affirmed View "People. v. Dowdell" on Justia Law

The United States and California Supreme Courts explored the constitutional limits of government’s power to punish minors tried as adults. Responding to these decisions, the California Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 260, adding section 3051 to the Penal Code, which provided minors sentenced to a determinate term of years or a life term an opportunity to prove their rehabilitation and secure release on parole after serving a prescribed term of confinement. Xeng Saetern, who was serving a 100-years-to-life sentence for a murder he committed at age 14, argued on appeal of his sentence that in imposing a sentence that is the functional equivalent of life without possibility of parole, the trial court failed to consider the factors of youth set forth in the Supreme Court cases, and thus he should be resentenced. The question of whether section 3051 had the effect suggested by Saetern was pending before the California Supreme Court; ultimately, Saetern’s arguments and his fate would be resolved by the higher court. "Conscious of the ephemerality of our decision and that we are writing on shifting sands, we conclude that even assuming the trial court’s sentencing process failed to comport with the requirements of Miller, the violation was rendered harmless with the enactment of section 3051, which affords Saetern more favorable relief than the sentencing court could provide." View "California v. Saetern" on Justia Law

Povio pleaded no contest to unlawful possession of a controlled substance, Vicodin (Health & Saf. Code 1350(a)); false representation and identification to a peace officer (Pen. Code 148.9); and possession of 28.5 grams or less of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code 11357, subd. (b)). He admitted a prior strike conviction for attempted second degree burglary (Pen. Code 667.5(b), 459, 460(b), 664). The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Povio on three years of formal probation with conditions that he serve nine months in county jail; stay 300 yards away from any playground; and pay a laboratory analysis fee of $50 per count, a probation supervision fee not to exceed $110 per month, a $150 drug program fee, and a $70 AIDS education fee. Povio appealed his sentence. The court of appeal reversed and remanded, with instructions that the court determine, in light of mandatory penalty assessments, Povio’s ability to pay the probation supervision fee under Penal Code 1203.1b; the drug program fee under Health and Safety Code 11372.7; and the AIDS education fee under Health and Safety Code 11377(c). The trial court is to modify the laboratory analysis fee and to modify the 300-yard playground stay-away probation condition to prohibit knowingly coming within 300 yards of a playground. View "People v. Povio" on Justia Law

Fiore was convicted him of second degree murder with an accompanying enhancement of personal and intentional discharge of a firearm resulting in great bodily injury or death; two counts of attempted murder, with one accompanied by an enhancement of personal and intentional discharge of a firearm; and two counts of first degree robbery. The jury was unable to return verdicts on attempted murder, first degree burglary, resisting an executive officer, and personal use of a firearm that accompanied both robbery counts. Fiore was sentenced to 68 years and eight months to life, plus three additional life sentences, with a term of 15 years to life for the murder, plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the enhancement of personal and intentional discharge of a firearm; a life sentence for both attempted murders, plus a consecutive term of 20 years for one of them based on the personal-discharge enhancement; a term of six years for the first robbery count; a term of two years for the second robbery count; and a term of eight months for evading an officer. The court of appeal reversed the second robbery conviction for cumulative error, but otherwise affirmed, rejecting arguments based on failure to instruct the jury that duress is a defense to felony murder; instructing the jury on the intent necessary to establish an aider and abettor’s liability for robbery; and permitting lay opinion testimony that there was “possible brain tissue and bone matter” on the inside of a vehicle’s front passenger-side door. View "People v. Fiore" on Justia Law

Anthony S., then 15 years old, admitted an assault with a firearm, in which he and a co-defendant seriously wounded Houston, resulting in a hospital bill of more than $400,000. The hospital has not attempted to collect from Houston, having determined that he was indigent and the debt was uncollectable. At a hearing to set restitution, a hospital representative testified that after a debt is written off as uncollectable, the hospital generally makes no further attempt to recover it. Nevertheless, the juvenile court t set restitution at 20 percent of $412,546.89 with a credit of $1,000 for the amount that Anthony had already paid to the victim restitution fund, with Anthony and his parents jointly and severally liable. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the restitution order was contrary to Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 because there was insufficient evidence of economic loss to Houston. View "In re Anthony S." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Reginald Bradford was convicted by a jury of three counts of second degree burglary and four counts of petty theft with a prior. The offenses were based on incidents in which Bradford took merchandise from various stores. The jury acquitted him of robbery. The trial court found he had five prior felony convictions for which he had served prison terms, including two residential burglaries that were strikes under the three strikes law. Bradford received four consecutive terms of 25 years to life pursuant to the three strikes law, and an additional four years for the enhancements. He appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. Following the enactment of Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, Bradford filed a petition to recall the sentence and for resentencing. The trial court denied the petition, finding him ineligible for relief based on a statutory exclusion that applied if a firearm or other deadly weapon was involved in the commission of the underlying charge. The question this case presented on appeal was whether the trial court erred in finding defendant ineligible for resentencing based on evidence he had a pair of wire cutters at or near the time defendant committed the burglaries/thefts. The Court of Appeal found the trial court's conclusion that the wire cutters were a deadly weapon and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Bradford" on Justia Law