Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Kenneth Elder filed what he titled a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to try and recall his 1995 indeterminate life sentence. The statute, enacted pursuant to a November 2012 initiative measure, provides retrospective relief under narrow criteria from indeterminate life sentences imposed for recidivism. Defendant alleged that the crime of which he was convicted (for being a felon unlawfully possessing a gun) was not a "serious" or violent felony and did not otherwise come within any exception to section Penal Code 1170.126, and therefore he was entitled to be considered for resentencing to a determinate sentence of double the term that would otherwise apply to his offense. Treating the filing as a recall petition under the statute, the trial court denied the petition without a hearing, finding defendant did not qualify for relief. Defendant argued on appeal that as a matter of statutory interpretation he could not be armed while committing the crime of unlawful possession of a gun; alternately, he argued that the prosecution had to plead and prove this circumstance in the proceedings underlying his commitment offense. Disagreeing with both claims, the Court of Appeal found the trial court properly concluded that defendant was ineligible for resentencing. View "California v. Elder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, was found not guilty of attempted murder by reason of insanity. At issue was whether petitioner could refuse antipsychotic medication. The court held that persons who are found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI's) have the same constitutional rights as mentally disordered offenders (MDO's) and sexually violent predators (SVP's) to refuse antipsychotic medication. Therefore, the court issued an order for writ of habeas corpus and directed the Department to refrain from administering antipsychotic medication to petitioner against his will in a nonemergency situation unless the trial court has determined that he is incompetent to refuse the treatment or a danger to others. View "In re Greenshields" on Justia Law

Eric Speight appealed after a jury convicted him of two counts of premeditated, willful, and deliberate attempted murder and found true various enhancements. Speight argued on appeal: (1) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct when she misstated the law concerning homicide and the error was compounded by the trial court’s statements and omission of an instruction on the interaction between attempted murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter; and (2) his sentence was cruel and unusual punishment and he received ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to object to part of his sentence. The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial court erred in instructing the jury but concluded Speight was not prejudiced. With respect to his sentencing claim, the Court concluded defense counsel’s performance was deficient regarding sentencing. The judgment was affirmed, Speight's sentence reversed, and the case remanded for a new sentencing hearing. View "California v. Speight" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of second degree robbery of a motel. The court concluded that evidence of a prior robbery was admissible to show a common design or plan. The court also concluded that oral testimony of the contents of a surveillance video showing the robbery did not constitute inadmissible hearsay where it showed the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "People v. Myers" on Justia Law

Police were dispatched to "Julie N.'s" high school after she presented a personal essay explaining that a family member had sexually assaulted her. Julie was 15 at the time of her interview; she was 11 or 12 when the assault allegedly occurred. An information charged defendant Randy Huynh with committing a felony lewd act on a child under 14 years old. The complaint alleged he committed the offense against Julie N., and again against more than one victim. Huynh filed a demurrer to the information on the grounds the information alleged only one victim. The prosecutor conceded, and the trial court sustained the demurrer. An amended information charged Huynh with committing a forcible lewd act on a child under 14 years old, and this time alleged "that prior to the commission of the above offense," Huynh suffered a conviction of violating section 288, subdivision (b) (Penal Code sec. 667.61, subds. (a), (d)(1)). Huynh filed a motion to dismiss the section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1), allegation pursuant to section 995. The court concluded section 667.61 was a recidivism statute. The District Attorney appealed the order dismissing the section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1), allegation. The issue this case presented to the Court of Appeal was what the term "previously convicted" meant with respect to section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1). The Orange County District Attorney argued "previously convicted" meant a defendant was convicted of a qualifying offense but it was immaterial whether the qualifying offense occurred before or after the currently charged offense and the trial court erred in dismissing the section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1), allegation. Defendant argued "previously convicted" meant a defendant was convicted of a qualifying offense before the commission of the currently charged offense and the court properly dismissed the section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1), allegation. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant and affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1), allegation. View "California v. Huynh" on Justia Law

Defendant sought to have his indeterminate sentences recalled and be resentenced to a determinate term under Penal Code section 1170.126, subdivision (f). The court held that defendant's prior attempted forcible oral copulation serious felony conviction did not bar him from seeking resentencing. Therefore, upon remittitur issuance, the trial court must exercise its discretion and determine whether defendant, if released, poses an unreasonable risk of danger to the public. If he does, his petition must be denied. View "People v. Jernigan" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Michael DeVaughn of 16 counts of identity theft, nine counts of money laundering, two of which involved sums greater than $50,000 and less than $150,000, two counts of causing a false financial document to be filed, four counts of operating an unlicensed escrow agent, three counts of recording a false document, six counts of grand theft, and two counts of elder abuse. The jury further found that Michael had committed more than one felony, an element of which was fraud or embezzlement, involving sums in excess of $500,000. The same jury convicted Stepfon Macey of two counts each of money laundering and possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, and one count of possession of ammunition by an ex-felon. In bifurcated proceedings, the trial court found Macey had suffered four strike priors, three of which were later stricken. Although all three defendants were tried together, Anthony DeVaughn, Michael’s younger brother had a jury different from the one that determined the guilt of Michael and Macey. Anthony’s jury convicted him of four counts of money laundering. Michael was sentenced to prison for 33 years, 4 months, Macey to 14 years and Anthony to 3 years, 4 months. They appealed, arguing, inter alia, the evidence presented against them was insufficient to support their convictions, in ineffective assistance of trial counsel. some of which we accept, some of which we reject. The Court of Appeal affirmed some of the convictions, reversed others, reversed an enhancement finding, stayed some of the terms imposed, directed the trial court to correct credits awarded to Anthony, to resentence him and Macey and to recalculate Michael’s sentence in light of the conclusions the Court drew in this opinion. View "P. v. DeVaughn" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for carjacking, claiming that the trial court erred when it permitted the parties to present additional argument after the jury indicated it was having difficulty reaching a verdict. The court concluded that, while the trial court did not directly inquire if the jury had reached an impasse, the existence of an impasse was the only reasonable conclusion the trial court could reach on these facts, and therefore the trial court did not err in thereafter permitting additional argument; there was no error in the trial court's limitation allowing the attorneys to focus on the issue troubling the jury, thus ensuring the attorneys an opportunity to provide assistance to the jury; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecutor a rebuttal argument; and even if error occurred regarding the rebuttal argument, defendant could not establish prejudice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction. View "People v. Salazar" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from an incident in which defendant Emmanuel Juarez fought with the victim, John Doe. Prior to the fight, Emmanuel handed a gun to defendant Gerardo Juarez. During the fight, Gerardo handed the gun back to Emmanuel. Emmanuel then shot John Doe. John Doe’s companion, Jane Doe, attempted to flee, but defendants caught up with her and Gerardo shot her in the thigh. In June 2011, the State filed its initial complaint against defendants, alleging, among other things, two counts of attempted murder. After defendants were held to answer, the State filed an information alleging two counts of attempted against both defendants, and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon against Gerardo. Nearly eight months later, in June of 2012, the State filed an amended information that added counts for assault with a firearm. For reasons not disclosed in the record, in July 2012 the court granted the State's motion to dismiss the case. That same day, the State refiled the same charges. In November 2012, the State was not ready to proceed to trial and requested a continuance. The court granted the continuance to December 10, 2012, but warned that December 10 would be day 10 of 10. On December 10, the State was again not ready to proceed, so the court dismissed the case in its entirety. The State then filed a third case against defendants, this time alleging two counts of conspiracy to commit murder. The facts recited in the complaint indicated the charges were based on the same incident as the previous complaints. Defendants moved to dismiss this complaint. The magistrate denied the motion without comment. The issue before the Court of Appeal centered on Penal Code section 1387 and how many times the State could file a complaint for the “same offense.” In the case of a felony, the State may file twice. Here, twice the State filed attempted murder charges, and both cases were dismissed. The State then filed a third complaint. Instead of filing charges of attempted murder, which would be barred under section 1387, the People alleged conspiracy to commit murder, which arose out of the same underlying incident. The trial court held this was the “same offense,” for purposes of section 1387, and dismissed the complaint. The People appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed: "Defendants may attempt murder without conspiring to murder, and may conspire to murder without attempting to murder. Thus, they were not the same offense, and section 1387 did not bar the filing of the third complaint." View "California v. Juarez" on Justia Law

In 2000, a jury convicted Davis of first degree burglary and found that he had four prior first degree felony burglary convictions. The trial court imposed a sentence of 25 years to life in prison. The court of appeal affirmed. Davis is currently serving his sentence. In 2012, the San Francisco District Attorney’s office sought discovery of the personnel file of a police officer who testified at the Davis trial. The superior court conducted an in-camera review and issued an order finding that the officer’s records were not material to Davis’s case, either as evidence bearing on guilt or sentencing or as impeachment evidence. Although not a party to the 2012 motion, Davis sought independent appellate review of the records to determine whether they contain material that should have been produced pursuant to Brady v. Maryland and sought an order compelling the trial court to conduct a new hearing at which Davis would have the opportunity to be heard. The court of appeal held that Davis failed to establish that he has a right to appeal the post-judgment Brady order or that he is entitled to a writ of mandate. View "People v. Davis" on Justia Law