Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of unauthorized taking of a vehicle. Defendant asked the trial court to reduce his third-strike 25-to-life sentence and resentence him as a second-strike offender. The trial court denied relief impliedly finding that defendant was outside the "spirit" of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, Pen Code 1170.126(f). On appeal, defendant facially challenged the Reform Act, contending that the phrase "pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety" is unconstitutionally vague. The court concluded that the word "unreasonable" is not permissibly vague; the court rejected defendant's contention that the trial court erroneously required the People to prove dangerousness by a preponderance of the evidence where there is no constitutional requirement that the facts be established to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; and the record contained no evidence that the shackling of defendant impaired or prejudiced his right to testify. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction. View "People v. Flores" on Justia Law

In 2006, Chamberlain was arrested for possession of child pornography. Three weeks days later, inmates in Theo Lacy Jail in the City of Orange (TLJ) beat Chamberlain to death because they believed he was a child molester. As waves of inmates hit, kicked, stomped, and did other violent things to Chamberlain over the course of about 30 minutes, three Orange County Sheriff’s Department (OCSD) personnel were in an enclosed guard station approximately 68 feet away. OCSD was the lead investigating agency and interviewed hundreds of people, after which Guillen, Petrovich, Aguilar, Carlstrom, and Villafana were convicted of second degree murder of Chamberlain. The appeals court affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and upholding that the court properly denied a motion to dismiss based on outrageous conduct by the government. While the court committed two evidentiary errors and erred in telling the jury to resume deliberations where it ended before a juror (who had become ill) was replaced, the defendants were not prejudiced by the errors. The court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on one theory of involuntary manslaughter because insufficient evidence supported giving the instruction. View "People v. Guillen" on Justia Law

In 1992, applicant Michael Hansen was convicted by jury on one count of second degree murder, and one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling. The Supreme Court affirmed Hansen's conviction. The Supreme Court rejected Hansen's argument that shooting at an inhabited dwelling merged with a homicide that resulted from such a shooting. As such, the offense of shooting at an inhabited dwelling could have formed the basis for a second degree felony-murder conviction. Fifteen years later, the Supreme Court reconsidered the scope of second degree felony-murder and expressly overruled its earlier holding. Relying on "California v. Chun" (45 Cal. 4th 1172 (2009)), Hansen petitioned for the writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the Supreme Court's holding in "Chun" applied to the theory of second degree felony murder presented at his trial, that it was therefore error for his jury to have been instructed that second degree felony murder was a valid theory for a conviction, and that his conviction for second degree murder should have been reversed. The trial court agreed and granted Hansen's petition. The State argued on appeal that the trial court erred in giving "Chun" retroactive effect, and as such, erred in finding reversible error. The Court of Appeal found that the trial court did not err in giving Chun retroactive effect, and affirmed the trial court's order. View "In re Hansen" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Aaron Campbell met Silvester Leyva at a bar where they exchanged telephone numbers and discussed buying and selling marijuana. A few days later, Campell and defendant-appellant Xavier Fort (among others) went to Leyva's house to get the marijuana. Leyva and his friend, Samuel De La Torre, met Campbell in Leyva's front yard. After De La Torre handed marijuana to Campbell, Campbell pulled a gun and began to back away toward two waiting vehicles. Fort, who was standing near the vehicles, fired his gun in the direction of the house. Leyva was killed by one of the bullets. A jury convicted defendants of first degree murder and two counts of robbery, and found true a robbery special-circumstance allegation. Defendants appealed their convictions: Fort argued that based on the accusatory pleading, the trial court erred in instructing the jury in his case on first degree felony murder only (with robbery as the underlying felony); the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on lesser included offenses. Both defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against them at trial. The Court of Appeals, in the published portion of its opinion, agreed that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on lesser included offenses. In the nonpublished portion, the Court held that the instructional error was harmless, and we rejected defendants' argument that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions of the robbery of Leyva. Furthermore, the Court also concluded that the court's stay of a sentence enhancement term as to Fort constituted an unauthorized sentence, which was corrected. View "California v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Tonna and Nevarez were in a dating relationship for five years. They lived together from 2008 to 2010. Following their 2011 breakup, Tonna continued to try to persuade Nevarez to get back together with him, and went Nevarez’s workplace, a Safeway supermarket, almost daily. Nevarez sometimes responded to his communications and sometimes met with Tonna. Nevarez claims that at one point, Tonna pushed Nevarez against a wall and tried to take her clothes off; another time, he grabbed her arm. Tonna contacted Nevarez’s mother. Nevarez obtained a work transfer and changed her phone number before seeking a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, Fam. Code, 6200. The restraining order contained personal conduct orders and stay-away orders Tonna claimed that there was insufficient evidence that he committed “abuse” and insufficient evidence that Nevarez feared future abuse. The appeals court affirmed.View "Nevarez v. Tonna" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree residential robbery, assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, and kidnapping. On appeal, defendant contended, inter alia, that because he received life sentences as a result of the Three Strikes law, the trial court erred in imposing a consecutive 10-year term for the gang enhancement on each count rather than the 15-year minimum parole eligibility requirement found in section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5). The court concluded, based upon People v. Jones, that because defendant's life sentences are the result of a penalty provision (the Three Strikes law), they are life sentences within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5). The trial court erred in imposing the 10-year gang enhancement pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C) and, instead, should have imposed the 15-year minimum parole term. The court modified the judgment to correct the error and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

In 1995, Smith was charged with three counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child of 14 or 15 by a person at least 10 years older; five counts of oral copulation with a person under the age of 16 by a person over the age of 21; four counts of sexual penetration of a person under age 16 by a person over age 21; and two counts of sexual intercourse between a person under the age of 16 and over the age of 21. He was then 34 years old; the victim was 14 years old. Smith pleaded no contest to four counts and the prosecution moved for dismissal of the remaining charges. Smith’s probation expired successfully in 1999. In 2013, Smith unsuccessfully moved to dismiss pre-1997 sex offenses under Penal Code section 1203.4, which provides that in any case “in which a defendant has fulfilled the conditions of probation,” the defendant “shall” be permitted to withdraw his plea and enter a plea of not guilty, whereupon the court “shall” dismiss the accusations. Based on amendments to section 1203.4 while and after Smith’s probation, the appeals court reversed as to some counts and affirmed as to others. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law