Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Price, then age 20, Fells, and Brown participated in a robbery during which one of them shot and killed 22-year-old Merrill. The Contra Costa District Attorney entered into plea agreements with Fells and Brown that resulted in convictions for voluntary manslaughter and robbery and 15-year sentences. At Price’s trial, Fells testified with immunity. The jury convicted Price of robbery and first-degree murder and found a robbery-murder special-circumstance, but rejected allegations that Price personally discharged a gun. The court sentenced Price to life without parole as required by Penal Code section 190.2. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the state, by representing that her co-defendants committed voluntary manslaughter and prosecuting Price for murder, adopted versions of the law and facts that were irreconcilable and deprived Price of due process. Assuming that the prosecution’s factual contentions contained inconsistencies, they were justified in light of evidence available when they were made. The court also rejected arguments that: the prosecutor should not have been permitted to pursue an uncharged conspiracy theory; the instruction on robbery-murder special circumstance was unconstitutionally vague; the instruction on flight as a basis for inferring consciousness of guilt was inconsistent with the statute and lightened the prosecution’s burden of proof; and the prosecutor vouched for Fells. View "People v. Price" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Jose Martinez of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14. The court sentenced him to twelve years in prison. The court separately ordered him to pay the victim $150,000 in restitution for noneconomic damages (noneconomic restitution). Martinez appealed, arguing his conviction should have been reversed because the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to suppress his statements to police, by admitting the recorded forensic interviews of the victim, and by declining to give the jury his entire proposed special jury instruction on innocuous touching. In addition, Martinez argued the restitution order should have been reversed because the court lacked statutory authority to award the victim noneconomic restitution. In the published portion of the opinion the Court of Appeal held the trial court did not err in awarding the victim noneconomic restitution. In the remaining portions of the opinion, the Court of Appeal explained why it was unpersuaded by Martinez's other contentions and, consequently, affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "California v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Defendant, serving 25 years to life for a commercial burglary, filed a petition under the Three Strikes Reform Act, Penal Code section 1170.126, alleging that commercial burglary was not a serious or violent felony and therefore could not be the basis of a third-strike sentence under the law as amended by the Act. The trial court denied the petition. The court concluded that defendant's prior conviction for assault with intent to commit rape is not necessarily committed with force or one of the other listed features, so that a defendant whose prior strikes include that offense is always necessarily ineligible for resentencing based on that prior conviction alone. The court explained that it is possible for an assault to be completed before any force has been applied and also without the use of threats or fear. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with directions to the trial court to consider whether defendant's prior assault with intent to rape was committed by force, fear, or threats. View "People v. Cook" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon (count 1), possession of a firearm by a felon (count 2), and misdemeanor resisting or obstructing a peace officer (count 3). As to count 2, the jury additionally found defendant was personally armed with a firearm during commission of the offense. Defendant admitted to two prior serious felony convictions that were also strikes under Penal Code 667, subds (a)(1)-(b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), and serving five prior prison terms. On appeal, defendant argues that the finding with respect to count 2, that he was armed with a firearm pursuant to section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(C)(iii), must be stricken as an illegal sentence, because it is inapplicable to a conviction under section 29800, subdivision (a)(1). The court affirmed the judgment, rejecting defendant's claim that possession of a firearm by a felon is not inherently dangerous, and concluding that voters intended the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, Pen. Code, 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A), to subject a third strike offender to an indeterminate life term. View "People v. Frutoz" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, battery resulting in great bodily injury, and involuntary manslaughter. The jury found true an enhancement alleging defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the assault, causing the victim to become comatose. Defendant was involved in an argument with the victim and another individual in the parking lot of a grocery store. Defendant struck the victim once in the head and the victim fell down, fracturing his skull on the pavement. The court concluded that the great bodily injury enhancement was properly attached to defendant's conviction for felony assault where the injury occurred in the commission of the assault and great bodily injury applies to felonies whose elements do not require touching. The court also concluded that the great bodily injury enhancement attached to count 2 was not barred by Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (g). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Lamb" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to a felony grand theft involving property with a value exceeding $950 and admitted having served three prior terms, one of which resulted from his 2010 conviction for three counts of second degree commercial burglary. The court held that a previously imposed sentence enhanced by Proposition 47, Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), prior to prison term is not altered by the granting of a Proposition 47 application reducing the felony that gave rise to that prior prison term to a misdemeanor. In this case, although the trial court should have formally designated defendant's 2010 convictions as misdemeanors, the court concluded that it correctly refused to alter defendant's current sentence. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for first degree murder and kidnapping. Defendant initially waived his right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona, but then invoked the right prior to confessing to the murder by saying, "I refuse to talk to you guys." Defense counsel forfeited defendant‘s challenge to admission of the confession on this ground by failing to specifically and timely object at trial. The court held that counsel's inaction resulted in a prejudicial denial of effective assistance of counsel as to the murder conviction because the prosecutor relied upon the confession heavily in her arguments to the jury. The court concluded, however, that defendant was not prejudiced with respect to the kidnapping conviction where evidence of the offense consisted of the victim's testimony, surveillance video capturing the crime, and corroborating testimony from two independent witnesses. Furthermore, defendant did not mention the kidnapping in his confession, nor did the prosecutor rely on it when arguing the kidnapping charge. Therefore, the court reversed the murder conviction, affirmed the kidnapping conviction, and remanded. View "People v. Bichara" on Justia Law

In 1998, petitioner was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. The court of appeal affirmed and, in 2007, denied a habeas petition. In 2015, petitioner sought post-conviction production of “discovery materials” from the Alameda County District Attorney, Penal Code 1054.9. Petitioner stated that he could not obtain the documents from his trial counsel. The court denied the motion, finding that he had not made good faith efforts to obtain the documents, although his trial counsel was deceased. Petitioner filed another motion to which he attached a letter from appellate counsel saying she did not have the materials. With the motion pending, the district attorney agreed to address the request, stating that petitioner would be required to pay for copying. Petitioner moved for waiver of copying costs, with a declaration attesting that he is “indigent.” “The court denied the motion, stating that the statute requires copying costs be “borne or reimbursed” by petitioner. The district attorney advised that copying would cost $122.80 and declined to waive the cost. The court of appeal denied a mandamus petition. The California Supreme Court returned the case. The court of appeal then held that if a moving party demonstrates entitlement to postconviction discovery but is unable to pay copying costs, the court must determine if he is indigent and, if so, fashion a reimbursement plan or other means to permit discovery to proceed. View "McGinnis v Super. Court" on Justia Law

Q.R. recorded photographs and video on his cellular phone of consensual sexual activity between himself and Jane Doe, both under 18 years old. He later extorted money from Doe by threatening to disclose the recordings to other students at their high school. After Doe told her father, who reported to the police, Q.R. was charged with forcible rape. He later admitted to felony possession of child pornography (Pen. Code 311.11(a)) and extortion (Pen. Code 518, 520) and was placed on juvenile probation. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that a probation condition requiring Q.R. to submit all electronic devices under his control to warrantless search by the probation department and to provide passwords necessary to access information on those devices is unconstitutionally overbroad. Given the direct relationship between Q.R.'s offenses and his use of an electronic device, the search condition is appropriately tailored. View "In re Q.R." on Justia Law

Defendant attempted to fill a forged prescription that was written on a prescription pad stolen from a physician. She was charged, in 2013, with second-degree commercial burglary (Penal Code 459) and attempted possession of a narcotic by a forged prescription. The complaint alleged an on-bail enhancement and four prior convictions. Defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree commercial burglary; count 2 was dismissed. She was placed on three years' probation. In 2015, defendant unsuccessfully sought to have her conviction reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47. The court of appeal affirmed. The second-degree commercial burglary conviction did not fall within the new shoplifting misdemeanor offense in Proposition 47 (Penal Code 459.5), which defines “shoplifting” as “entering a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny while that establishment is open during regular business hours, where the value of the property that is taken or intended to be taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950). Any other entry into a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny is burglary.” The court noted that defendant intended to pay for the prescriptions; her "intent" was to commit the crime of filling a forged prescription. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law