Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Under Proposition 47, Kevin Mallard sought and received a reclassification of his felony conviction of possession of concentrated cannabis. He sought immediate release from county jail on the grounds he was being incarcerated illegally. To this end, he argued that this reclassification prohibited the application of section 2933.1, which imposed a 15 percent conduct credit limitation on his sentence. He also contended that the application of section 2933.1 to his sentence violated federal and state equal protection clauses. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Mallard's arguments lacked merit: when a consecutive felony term is subject to a 15 percent conduct credit limitation under section 2933.1, that felony term being resentenced to a misdemeanor term under Proposition 47 does not change the credit limitation imposed by section 2933.1. Accordingly, the Court denied the requested relief. View "In re Mallard" on Justia Law

In a felony complaint, the prosecution charged Blake Hudson with three counts of willfully failing to timely file tax returns for three consecutive years with the intent to evade paying a tax. A magistrate presided over a preliminary hearing in which an Franchise Tax Board (FTB) agent testified as the prosecution’s sole witness. The agent testified that generally a person must file tax returns by either April 15, or October 15, for the prior taxable year. Generally, a crime occurs when a person commits a wrongful act with the requisite criminal intent. In California, it is a crime when a person willfully fails to timely file a state tax return with the intent to evade paying the taxes that are owed. Hudson had filed returns in other years and the FTB had repeatedly notified Hudson of his duty to file his tax returns. As a result, the magistrate bound Hudson over for trial; and the superior denied his motion to set aside the information. Hudson argues that there was insufficient evidence to show his intent to evade paying taxes. Hudson argued that in order to prove his intent, the prosecution needed to show an additional affirmative act of fraud. The Court of Appeal found that Hudson’s argument was based on a United States Supreme Court opinion interpreting a federal tax law. But unlike the California state statute, the federal tax law at issue did not explicitly make the failure to timely file a tax return a criminal act. "That distinction is ultimately fatal to Hudson’s claim." The Court concluded there was a rational basis for the magistrate to assume that Hudson harbored the requisite intent to evade paying his taxes when he failed to timely file his tax returns. View "Hudson v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

San Diego police officers Carlos Robles and Kyle Williams initiated contact with plaintiff Kenneth Simmons for being in a city park after it closed and for riding a bicycle in the dark without a headlight. Simmons fled. The officers pursued, detained, and searched him, finding a plastic baggie containing rock cocaine. Simmons was charged with possessing a controlled substance, using a weapon in a fight, and resisting an officer. A jury was unable to reach a verdict on the drug possession count and acquitted him on the others. Simmons then brought a civil action against the City of San Diego and the officers (collectively, defendants) asserting (among others) claims under the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act and under the Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1974. Simmons, an African-American, alleged the officers violated these statutes by using excessive force during his arrest, pulling his underwear into a "wedgie" while searching him, and conducting a nonconsensual physical body cavity search of his rectum. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the Bane Act and Ralph Act claims. The trial court granted the motion. Simmons filed a petition for writ of mandate, which defendants opposed. Finding that Simmons met his burden of demonstrating a triable issue with respect to his Bane Act claim, the Court of Appeals vacated summary judgment on that issue. The Court found the trial court properly granted summary judgment with respect to the Ralph Act claim. View "Simmons v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant Derrick Sledge appealed an order denying his petition for resentencing under one of the statutes that was enacted in 2014 as part of the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47). The trial court found defendant’s record contained a 1980 felony forcible rape juvenile adjudication and ruled it was a disqualifying prior conviction under section 1170.18(i). After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded: (1) substantial evidence supports the court’s historical factual finding that defendant suffered the felony forcible rape juvenile adjudication; (2) some felony juvenile adjudications are disqualifying “prior convictions” for purposes of section 1170.18(i); and (3) defendant’s felony forcible rape juvenile adjudication is a disqualifying prior conviction under section 1170.18(i). Accordingly, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Sledge" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to 50 years to life in prison after he was convicted of first degree murder of his wife. The court concluded that defendant forfeited any claim of prosecutorial misconduct by failing to object; misstatement of the law regarding the jury’s consideration of evidence of voluntary intoxication was harmless; and any misstatement of law regarding heat of passion does not warrant reversal. The court also concluded that even assuming the trial court’s classification of voluntary manslaughter as a general intent crime was misleading, the characterization was irrelevant to the issues of whether he acted willfully, deliberately and with premeditation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Forrest" on Justia Law

In 2009, petitioner Sandra Hudson, acting as secretary of the board of directors for the Palo Verde Healthcare District (PVHD), voted to approve two contracts between PVHD and Hussain Sahlolbei, M.D. One pertained to “Surgical Services Directorship with Dr. Sahlolbei,” and the other was called the “Surgery On-Call Agreement with Dr. Salolbei.” At the time of petitioner’s vote on the contracts, Dr. Sahlolbei was renting a residence that was owned at least in part by petitioner’s husband. Petitioner received Dr. Sahlolbei’s rent checks at times, and that at least some of those checks were deposited into an account petitioner and her husband shared. In 2008, petitioner disclosed the rented property on her “Form 700” and explained that it was her husband’s separate property. However, her Form 700 filings in 2009 through 2013 failed to disclose any interest in the property. In 2014, real party in interest, the State, filed a complaint charging petitioner with a single count of violating of Government Code section 1090. Petitioner was arraigned on the single-count complaint. A grand jury later returned an indictment against petitioner. The indictment contained the original count for violation of Government Code section 1090 and added a second count under the same statute. Petitioner moved to set aside the indictment, arguing then as on appeal here, that she was not “financially interested in” PVHD?s contracts with Dr. Sahlolbei, invoked the Williamson rule, and attacked the timeliness of all but the two Penal Code section 115 counts. The trial court dismissed one of the Penal Code section 115 counts (count three) as time-barred, it otherwise denied petitioner’s motion under Penal Code section 995. The trial court agreed with petitioner that the tolling allegations in the complaint and the indictment were deficient but allowed the State leave to amend so they could add more detail to their tolling allegations. The Court of Appeal reviewed the petition, determined it may have merit, stayed the action in the trial court, and requested an informal response. Having considered the informal response and a reply, the Court determined that petitioner may have established a right to relief and set an order to show cause on two of the three issues petitioner raised. The Court subsequently reviewed the return and traverse and concluded the petition succeeds as to issues concerning the rule set forth in “Williamson,” (43 Cal.2d 651 (1954), but it failed with respect to petitioner’s complaints about the State’s allegations regarding tolling of the statute of limitations. The Court therefore granted relief only in part. View "Hudson v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In lieu of adjudging minor J.G. a ward of the court based on his commission of trespass and felony vandalism, the juvenile court granted minor deferred entry of judgment and placed him on probation with terms and conditions including payment of restitution to the victim. Because minor eventually satisfied the terms and conditions of his probation with the exception of ordered restitution, the juvenile court terminated probation, dismissed the wardship petition and converted the restitution order to a civil judgment. Minor appealed that order, arguing: (1) the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to review the juvenile court’s order because the order was a judgment within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 800(a); (2) a juvenile court can only convert a restitution order to a civil judgment if it has adjudged a minor a ward of the court; and (3) the juvenile court misapplied the law in assessing minor’s ability to pay restitution. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded: (1) the challenged order was a judgment within the meaning of section 800(a) because the juvenile court rendered a final determination of the rights of the parties in the wardship proceeding; and (2) even if a juvenile court has not adjudged a minor a ward of the court, it can convert an unfulfilled restitution order to a civil judgment when it terminates a minor’s deferred entry of judgment probation and dismisses the wardship petition. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, the Court concluded: (3) minor has not established a misapplication of the law. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the juvenile court. View "In re J.G." on Justia Law

Defendant Andrew Garcia was sentenced to 35 years to life after a jury convicted him as an adult of attempted murder and other charges for robbing and shooting a woman in the face when he was 15 years old. In this appeal, defendant argued, the State conceded, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that a three-year enhancement for great bodily harm under Penal Code section 12022.7 was unauthorized and should have been stayed. This reduced defendant’s sentence to 32 years to life. Defendant also contended his overall sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment because the sentencing court did not comply with the requirements in “Miller v. Alabama,” (132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)) and “California v. Caballero,” (55 Cal.4th 262 (2012)) that it consider his youth and consequent reduced culpability and impose a sentence reflecting these considerations. While the Court of Appeal recognized that considerations of defendant’s youth did not, and by statute could not, play a major part in determining his sentence, the sentence passed constitutional muster because he “shall be eligible for release on parole by the board during his or her 25th year of incarceration at a youth offender parole hearing” pursuant to section 3051. Therefore, the Court affirmed, with directions that the trial court determine whether defendant was afforded an adequate opportunity to make a record that complies with the requirements set forth in “California v. Franklin,” (63 Cal.4th 261 (2016)). View "California v. Garcia" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of Victor Garrett and Erion Varnado’s participation in armed robberies and an attempted armed robbery in November 2008. Both Garrett and Varnado were 17 years old when the offenses were committed, but were tried as adults. A jury convicted Garrett of six counts of second degree robbery, two counts of kidnapping for robbery, one count of attempted robbery, and one count of assault with a firearm. For each of the offenses, the jury found true the allegation Garrett personally used a firearm, and as to the assault with a firearm, that Garrett personally discharged a firearm. Garrett was sentenced to serve a total of 74 years and 4 months to life in prison. Varnado was also convicted by a jury of two counts of second degree robbery, one count of attempted robbery, and one count of assault with a firearm. The jury also found true the allegation Varnado personally used a firearm during the assault and attempted robbery. However, the jury found Varnado not guilty of four counts of robbery. The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to: the two counts of kidnapping to commit robbery, whether Varnado personally used a firearm during the second degree robberies, or he discharged a firearm during the attempted robbery. The trial court declared a mistrial as to the counts and enhancements for which the jury could not reach a verdict. On retrial, Varnado was convicted of the remaining two counts of second degree robbery, and the jury found true the allegation he used a firearm during these robberies. The second jury was not asked to decide whether Varnado discharged a firearm during the attempted robbery. Varnado was sentenced to serve a total of 31 years to life in prison. Both appealed. The Court of Appeal found no reversible error and affirmed each defendant's convictions and sentence. View "California v. Garrett" on Justia Law

In early 2016, petitioner (the State) initiated a prosecution against real party in interest, a minor who was detained at juvenile hall, by directly filing a criminal complaint against him in adult court. Preliminary hearings occurred on May 26, 2016, and on June 10, 2016, and the State filed an information charging real party in interest with felony violations. On November 8, 2016, the voters passed Proposition 57. As relevant here, Proposition 57 eliminated the State's ability to directly file charges against a juvenile offender in adult court and instead authorized the State to file “a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction.” On November 16, 2016, real party in interest filed a motion requesting “a fitness hearing in juvenile court pursuant to recently enacted legislation via Proposition 57.” After considering written opposition from the State, who argued Proposition 57 could not be applied to real party in interest’s case retroactively, the trial court granted the motion on November 29, 2016. The State then appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded lacked merit. "Our order requesting an informal response notified real party in interest that a peremptory writ might issue unless it showed good cause to the contrary. All parties received 'due notice,' and 'it appears that the petition and opposing papers on file adequately address the issues raised by the petition, that no factual dispute exists, and that the additional briefing that would follow issuance of an alternative writ is unnecessary to disposition of the petition.'" In reliance on these rules, and because the Court agreed that the issue posed by the petition was an important one warranting speedy resolution, the Court of Appeal resolved the petition by way of a formal written opinion denying relief. View "California v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law