Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

During a traffic stop for speeding and driving without a front license plate, the officer recognized the smell of marijuana in the car and saw marijuana particles. During a search, the officer found about $47,000, determined that the driver (Bush) did not have a valid license, and called for a drug-sniffing dog, which alerted to the money. Other officers arrived and verified the strong smell of marijuana. Bush had no verifiable explanation of the source of the money. Bush was convict of driving with a suspended license and of receiving and acquiring proceeds knowing them to be derived from a controlled substance offense with the intent to conceal those proceeds and avoid a transaction reporting requirement. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel; that there was insufficient evidence he intended to conceal the nature or source of the money; that he could not be convicted for receiving or acquiring proceeds from sales that he allegedly conducted himself; and that the jury should have been instructed on the elements of the underlying controlled substance offense. View "People v. Bush" on Justia Law

The District Attorney of El Dorado County convened a criminal grand jury and issued subpoenas to witnesses in connection with a peace officer's 2015 fatal shooting of a suspect, deliberately waiting until 2016 in order to challenge the Legislature's amendment of Penal Code section 917. On the motions of the real parties in interest South Lake Tahoe Police Officers' Association, the superior court issued orders quashing the District Attorney's subpoenas and dismissing the criminal grand jury. The District Attorney thereafter filed this petition in the name of the People seeking a writ of mandate directing the superior court to overturn its orders. The Court of Appeal granted leave to a number of amici to file arguments in support of the petition. After review of this matter, the Court concluded the legislative object could not be accomplished in this manner: "it intrudes on the constitutional grant of authority to the criminal grand jury to issue an indictment after inquiry, which taken to its logical conclusion would allow the Legislature by statute to abrogate indictments entirely for all classes of offenses. The Legislature instead must seek a constitutional amendment to accomplish the same end as section 917, or otherwise act to amend grand jury procedures in lethal force cases to achieve its objective of greater 'transparency' and accountability." View "California ex rel. v. Superior Court (South Lake Tahoe etc.)" on Justia Law

In 2009, petitioner Anthony Cook, Jr. was convicted for two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder, for which he received a sentence of 125 years to life. Petitioner was 17 years old at the time of the crimes, and through petition for habeas relief, contended his sentence was unconstitutional under "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)). In "In re Cook (Apr. 6, 2016, G050907) (nonpub. opn.), the Court of Appeal denied Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus, concluding that based on "Montgomery v. Louisiana," (136 S.Ct. 718 (2016)), "Miller" applied retroactively to cases on collateral review but that recently enacted Penal Code sections 3051 and 4801 had the effect of curing the unconstitutional sentence imposed on Petitioner. In July 2016, the California Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for review of the Court of Appeals' opinion and transferred the matter with directions to vacate the decision and consider, in light of "California v. Franklin," (63 Cal.4th 261 (2016), "whether petitioner is entitled to make a record before the superior court of 'mitigating evidence tied to his youth.'" The Court of Appeals granted the petition insofar as the relief sought in the prayer of Petitioner's supplemental opening brief sought a hearing to allow Petitioner to make a record of mitigating evidence tied to his youth at the time of the offense. The matter was remanded with directions to the trial court to grant Petitioner a hearing at which he can make a record of such mitigating evidence. In doing so, the Court held that the relief afforded by "Franklin" was available by both direct review and petition for writ of habeas corpus. View "In re Cook" on Justia Law

Oswaldo Gonzalez appealed a postjudgment order granting a petition under Penal Code sections 1203.2 (b), and 3455(a), to revoke his postrelease community supervision (PRCS). The trial court found that Gonzalez, who was homeless, violated the terms and conditions of PRCS by failing to report his change of residence after he was released from a facility in which he had been held. The court ordered Gonzalez to serve 180 days in jail, with credit for time served, and reinstated PRCS. After review of this matter, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred by finding Gonzalez violated the condition of PRCS that he report a change of residence. "The lack of a definition of residence is a glaring omission in the PRCS Act that leaves open issues about the reporting obligations of those persons subject to PRCS who, like Gonzalez, are homeless. The Sex Offender Registration Act, in contrast, not only defines 'residence' but defines 'transient' and sets forth a means by which transients can comply with registration requirements. We respectfully urge the Legislature to amend the PRCS Act to define 'residence' and to address the issue of the obligations of homeless persons subject to PRCS to report residence and changes in residence." View "California v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Epperson and two codefendants armed themselves with guns and forcibly entered the Eustice home, where they threatened, robbed and attempted to rob Eustice and her guests. Police arrived while the robbery was ongoing because a guest called 911 on his cell phone. Epperson was convicted of two counts of first-degree robbery (Penal Code 211, 212.5(a)); four counts of attempted first-degree robbery (sections 211, 212.5(a), 664); and one count each of first-degree burglary (section 459), false imprisonment by violence (section 236), assault with a firearm (section 245(a)(2), and criminal threats (section 422), with enhancement allegations for personal use of a firearm (sections 12022.5(a), 12022.53(b)). The jury also found that Epperson acted in concert within the meaning of section 213(a)(1)(A). He was sentenced to prison for an aggregate term of 40 years, four months. The court of appeal modified the sentence for the firearm enhancement, but otherwise affirmed, rejecting an argument that section 213(a)(1)(A), which establishes an increased sentencing range for first-degree robbery committed inside an inhabited dwelling by a defendant voluntarily acting in concert with other persons applies only to completed robberies and that the trial court failed to adequately instruct the jury on the elements of that allegation in connection with the attempted robbery counts. View "People v. Epperson" on Justia Law

Starski identified himself as a lawyer in a demand letter to a business, claiming that his “client” (Cornett, his mother’s husband) had been injured at the business. The manager was suspicious and contacted authorities, who subsequently staged a pretext call during which Starski identified himself as an attorney. Cornett subsequently stated that he had not been injured at the business, but changed his story again for trial. A search of Starski’s computer uncovered documents revealing that he had been involved in several similar schemes, representing himself as an attorney. He is not a licensed attorney, but described himself as a “freelance paralegal.” After his trial on felony charges of attempted grand theft and conspiracy and a misdemeanor charge of unlawful practice of law (Business and Professions Code section 6126), the judge instructed the jury that section 6126 requires more than simply holding oneself out as an attorney, that “practicing law” entails use of that purported status. Starski and Cornett were convicted. Each was given to probation. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments of insufficient evidence; that the instructions on section 6126 were “overbroad” because they allowed conviction for what a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision made protected free speech; and that the judge erred by refusing to give Starski’s special instruction on a “claim-of-right” defense to the charges of attempting and conspiring to commit grand theft. View "People v. Starski" on Justia Law

William Cady drove his vehicle at an excessive and unsafe speed while intoxicated, resulting in an accident that killed three of his passengers and injured two others. A jury found Cady guilty of: three counts of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (with the further finding that he personally inflicted great bodily injury); one count of driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent or more causing injury; and one count of driving under the combined influence of alcohol and a drug causing injury. The trial court sentenced Cady to 18 years in prison. Cady raised two contentions on appeal: (1) that the crime of driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury was a lesser included offense of the crime of driving under the combined influence of alcohol and a drug causing injury, so that he should not have been convicted; and (2) for the charge of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, the trial court prejudicially erred in not sua sponte giving the jury the option of convicting him of the lesser included offense of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated for those counts. The Court of Appeal concluded that the conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury was not a lesser included offense of the driving under the combined influence of alcohol and a drug causing injury (for which Cady was convicted in a separate count). The Court also conclude that there was no merit to Cady's contention that the trial court erred by failing to instruct on vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated as a lesser included offense of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Cady's convictions. View "California v. Cady" on Justia Law

Codefendants Elissa Arambula, Jose Luis Munguia and Anesia Lucia Ribeiro were convicted of first degree burglary and other charges. The court found Arambula’s and Munguia’s first degree burglary convictions are supported by substantial evidence; the occupied burglary enhancement applies if there is a person other than an accomplice present at any time prior to the perpetrator’s final departure from the residence; no prejudice resulted from the admission of Munguia’s prior burglary conviction; and no instructional error was committed. View "People v. Munguia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Tony San Nicolas appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of mandate challenging his placement in the California Department of Justice's sex offender tracking program. He contended the court erroneously determined his Washington state conviction for communicating with a minor for immoral purposes qualified under the “least adjudicated elements” test as a registrable offense in California. The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the judgment. View "San Nicolas v. Harris" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking and kidnapping to commit robbery, committed when he was 16 years old. He was sentenced to seven years to life in prison in 1999. In 2014 and 2016 the Board of Parole Hearings denied him parole. He sought habeas relief, arguing the Board’s decisions, based on his purported lack of insight into his criminal conduct and his prison disciplinary history, was arbitrary, in violation of due process, and unsupported by evidence of his current dangerousness. He also argued the Board’s failure to set a base term and an adjusted base term for him in accordance with a 2013 stipulated order constituted a denial of his rights to due process and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The court of appeal granted relief and remanded. The evidence relied on by the Board at both hearings was not rationally indicative of current dangerousness, so its decisions violate due process. The court noted that the Board recently set a base term and adjusted base term, rendering that claim moot. View "In re Perez" on Justia Law