Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2001, Phuoc Thien Luu, then 17, participated in an attempted home invasion robbery with three others. One accomplice shot the homeowner, who survived. Luu and another accomplice, Dung Van Nguyen, were charged with attempted murder and related crimes. Nguyen was found guilty of attempted murder and sentenced to 102 years to life plus 10 years. Luu was found not guilty of attempted murder but guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter and related crimes, receiving a sentence of 25 years to life plus 1.5 years.In 2022, both Luu and Nguyen filed petitions under Penal Code section 1172.6 for resentencing. The People conceded Nguyen was entitled to relief, and he was released. However, they argued Luu was ineligible because attempted manslaughter is not mentioned in section 1172.6. The trial court initially issued an order to show cause but later ruled Luu was statutorily ineligible for relief.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that excluding Luu from relief under section 1172.6, despite his conviction under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, led to an unjust and absurd result. The court held that a petitioner is eligible for relief under section 1172.6 if they were charged with attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted manslaughter. The court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case, directing the trial court to reissue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing. If the People cannot prove Luu's guilt under current laws, the court must resentence him with credit for time served. View "People v. Luu" on Justia Law

In 2006, a jury convicted the defendant of robbery and assault with a firearm, with enhancements for personal firearm use and prior convictions. The trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life for the robbery, 10 years for the firearm enhancement, and five years for a prior serious felony conviction, staying the sentence for the assault conviction. In 2024, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under the amended Penal Code section 1172.1, which the trial court dismissed, stating that the defendant was not entitled to file such a petition and that no authorized agency had recommended recall and resentencing.The defendant appealed the trial court's dismissal of his petition. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed whether the trial court's order was appealable. The court noted that under section 1237, subdivision (b), a criminal defendant can appeal any postjudgment order affecting their substantial rights. However, the court found that the trial court's order did not affect the defendant's substantial rights because the trial court had no statutory obligation to act on the defendant's request for recall and resentencing.The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's order dismissing the defendant's request for relief under section 1172.1 was not appealable. The court reasoned that since the trial court was not required to respond to the defendant's request, the order did not affect the defendant's substantial rights. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "P. v. Roy" on Justia Law

Anthony Frank Romane, Jr. was arrested for driving under the influence after being found unconscious in his car. He exhibited signs of intoxication and failed field sobriety tests. At the police station, he refused to submit to a chemical test after being read the Chemical Test Admonition. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) initiated proceedings to suspend his license for one year due to his refusal to submit to testing. Romane requested an Administrative Per Se (APS) hearing to challenge the suspension.The APS hearing was conducted by a single hearing officer, Trena Leota, who introduced three documents into evidence: the arresting officer’s sworn DS 367 form, the unsworn arrest report, and Romane’s driving record. Romane’s counsel objected, arguing that the hearing officer was acting as an advocate, violating due process as explained in California DUI Lawyers Association v. Department of Motor Vehicles. The hearing officer overruled the objections and admitted the documents. Romane’s bodyworn camera footage was also admitted into evidence. The hearing officer ultimately sustained the suspension of Romane’s license.Romane filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of San Diego County, arguing that his due process rights were violated because the hearing officer acted as both advocate and adjudicator. The superior court agreed and ordered the DMV to set aside the suspension unless a new hearing was conducted with separate individuals acting as advocate and adjudicator.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case and reversed the superior court’s decision. The appellate court held that the hearing officer did not act as an advocate but merely collected and developed evidence, which is constitutionally permissible. The case was remanded to the superior court to consider Romane’s contention that the evidence did not support the hearing officer’s findings. View "Romane v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

Calvin Glass, Jr. pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter of Jordan Luis with the personal use of a firearm and the attempted murder of Julius L. He was sentenced to 21 years in state prison. Glass later filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6, which was denied by the trial court for failure to state a prima facie case for relief. Glass argued on appeal that his guilty plea could not rule out imputed malice and that the trial court improperly considered matters outside the record of conviction.The Superior Court of San Diego County initially found Glass's petition facially valid, appointed him counsel, and set a hearing. The People argued that Glass was ineligible for relief because his record of conviction showed he was the actual killer and direct perpetrator of the attempted murder. The trial court ruled that Glass was ineligible for resentencing based on his sworn statements in the plea form and at the plea hearing, which indicated he was the killer. The court also referenced a prior opinion affirming Glass's judgment to corroborate its decision.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court agreed with the People that Glass's record of conviction indicated he was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. However, following the precedent set by People v. Patton, the court decided to remand the matter to the superior court. Glass was granted 30 days to supplement his petition with additional facts to support his claim. The order denying his resentencing petition was otherwise conditionally affirmed. View "People v. Glass" on Justia Law

In June 2021, the defendant, K.D., stole a car with a one-year-old child inside. She was arrested shortly after and found with the stolen items. K.D. admitted to taking the car and knowing the child was inside. She was charged with kidnapping, child abduction, and vehicle theft. K.D.'s defense counsel raised doubts about her competency, leading to evaluations that diagnosed her with a moderate intellectual disability. She was found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to the Porterville Developmental Center for treatment. After being declared competent in August 2022, K.D. requested developmental disability diversion.The Mendocino County Superior Court initially denied K.D.'s request for diversion, citing her lack of ties to the community, her criminal history, and concerns about her ability to comply with diversion requirements. The court also noted that K.D. had never received services from the regional center and had a history of probation violations. Despite acknowledging her developmental disability, the court concluded that her disability was not related to the charged offense and that she would not benefit from diversion.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court had abused its discretion by not properly considering the relationship between K.D.'s developmental disability and the charged offense. The appellate court noted that the trial court failed to ensure that the regional center provided a proper report and diversion plan tailored to K.D.'s needs. The appellate court conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new diversion eligibility hearing, instructing the trial court to comply with statutory requirements and consider whether K.D. would benefit from diversion. If K.D. satisfactorily completes diversion, the charges should be dismissed; otherwise, her conviction should be reinstated. View "People v. K.D." on Justia Law

Arthur Lee Henderson appealed the judgment entered after the Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6) concerning his attempted murder conviction. The court resentenced him on his remaining convictions for murder (with a felony-murder special-circumstance finding) and attempted robbery, imposing a life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) sentence. Henderson argued that the application of section 1385.1, which restricted the court's discretion to strike the felony-murder special circumstance, violated the ex post facto clauses of the California and United States Constitutions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially sentenced Henderson in 1988 to LWOP for first-degree murder, plus additional terms for attempted murder and attempted robbery. Henderson's petition for resentencing was partially granted, leading to the dismissal of his attempted murder conviction. However, the court maintained the LWOP sentence for the murder conviction, citing section 1385.1, which prohibits striking special circumstances in first-degree murder cases.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that the application of section 1385.1 at Henderson's 2023 resentencing did not violate ex post facto principles. The court reasoned that the resentencing under section 1172.6 was an act of legislative lenity, not a new criminal prosecution, and Henderson's new sentence was no more severe than the punishment prescribed at the time of his crimes. The court also found that the law of the case doctrine barred reconsideration of Henderson's petition for resentencing as to his murder conviction, as the Supreme Court's decision in People v. Curiel did not constitute a significant change in the law regarding direct aider and abettor liability.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, directing the Superior Court to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment accurately. View "People v. Henderson" on Justia Law

In 1991, Maurice Jackson was convicted of the first-degree murders of Johnny Castaneda, Timothy Treas, and Claudia Blackmon, along with multiple other charges including kidnapping, robbery, and burglary. The jury found true the special circumstance allegations for the murders of Castaneda and Treas but not for Blackmon. Jackson was sentenced to life without parole.The Contra Costa County Superior Court denied Jackson's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which allows for resentencing if a defendant could not be convicted of murder under current law. The court denied the petition at the prima facie stage for the murders of Castaneda and Treas, relying on the jury's special circumstance findings. For Blackmon's murder, the court issued an order to show cause but denied the petition without a hearing, finding Jackson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the trial record.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in denying the petition at the prima facie stage for the Castaneda and Treas murders, as the jury's special circumstance findings did not necessarily establish all elements required under current law. The appellate court also found that the trial court's failure to hold a hearing for the Blackmon murder was prejudicial error, as Jackson was entitled to be present and potentially testify.The appellate court reversed the trial court's rulings and remanded the case for further proceedings. The trial court must hold a hearing for the Blackmon murder and issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing for the Castaneda and Treas murders, applying the correct legal standards under current law. View "P. v. Jackson" on Justia Law

In 1997, Kenneth Griggs was convicted by a jury of forcible rape, forcible penetration with a foreign object, and false imprisonment. He admitted to having three prior convictions that were both strikes and serious felonies. The court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 35 years to life, including a determinate term of 10 years for two of the priors.The Sacramento County Superior Court, on its own motion, recalled Griggs' sentence under section 1172.1, which had been amended by Assembly Bill No. 600 to allow courts to resentence defendants if applicable sentencing laws change. The presiding judge noted that courts now have discretion to strike five-year priors, which was not the case when Griggs was originally sentenced. The matter was assigned for a resentencing hearing, and the District Attorney appealed the recall order.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the recall order was not appealable under section 1238, subdivision (a)(5), because it did not affect the substantial rights of the People at this stage. The court noted that the recall order merely permitted a resentencing hearing and did not determine whether Griggs' sentence would change. The court dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that the prosecution's right to appeal in a criminal case is strictly limited by statute and that the recall order did not yet impact the enforcement of the judgment or the prosecution's substantial rights. View "P. v. Griggs" on Justia Law

L.H. pled no contest to first-degree murder and was committed to a secure youth treatment facility by the juvenile court. The court set his maximum term of confinement to 25 years to life or until he turns 25, whichever comes first, and applied 734 days of precommitment credits to this term. L.H. appealed, arguing that the court incorrectly applied Welfare and Institutions Code section 875 in setting his maximum term of confinement beyond his 25th birthday and erred in applying his precommitment credits against a theoretical maximum term of 25 years. He also claimed that equal protection principles require his precommitment credits to be applied against a term that does not exceed his 25th birthday.The juvenile court adjudged L.H. a ward of the court and committed him to Briones Youth Academy, Secure Pathway. The court determined that L.H.'s remaining custody time was 22 years and 361 days after applying the precommitment credits.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the juvenile court correctly applied section 875 in setting the maximum term of confinement. The court interpreted section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(A) as providing a separate cap on the length of a ward’s physical confinement, independent of the maximum term of confinement set by the juvenile court. The court also held that the juvenile court did not err in applying L.H.'s precommitment credits against the maximum term of confinement of 25 years, as required by section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C). The court found no equal protection violation, as the application of precommitment credits was consistent with the statutory requirements.The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s disposition order. View "In re L.H." on Justia Law

Ramiro Munoz, a member of a criminal street gang, was convicted in 2008 of first-degree murder and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle, with firearm and gang allegations found true. Munoz, who was 15 years old at the time of the crime, was sentenced to 50 years to life in prison. In 2023, Munoz filed a petition for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), arguing that his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole, making him eligible for relief under the statute.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Munoz's petition, stating that he would be eligible for parole under section 3051 in 2029, when he would be 39 years old. Munoz appealed the decision, and the case was reviewed by the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven.The Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court's decision, holding that Munoz's sentence of 50 years to life is not the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole. The court concluded that section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), applies only to juvenile offenders explicitly sentenced to life without the possibility of parole and does not extend to those with lengthy sentences that may be considered de facto life without parole. The court also noted that Munoz would have a realistic opportunity to obtain release from prison during his expected lifetime, distinguishing his case from others with significantly longer sentences. View "People v. Munoz" on Justia Law