Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2000, Tommie Lawson Lynex, an African American man, was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and received a firearm enhancement under California Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d), resulting in a sentence of 50 years to life. Twenty years later, California enacted the Racial Justice Act, allowing prisoners to seek habeas relief if their conviction or sentence was influenced by race, ethnicity, or national origin. Lynex filed a habeas petition under this Act, including statistical evidence showing racial disparities in the prosecution of murder charges with firearm enhancements in Los Angeles County.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially denied Lynex’s habeas petition and his request for appointment of counsel, finding the petition procedurally barred as successive and concluding that Lynex had not made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief under the Racial Justice Act. The court also determined that Lynex did not sufficiently allege facts indicating racial animus or bias in the police investigation or prosecution.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard by requiring a prima facie showing for appointment of counsel. Under the Racial Justice Act and section 1473, subdivision (e), a petitioner need only plead a plausible allegation of a violation to obtain counsel. The appellate court also found that the trial court erred by not recognizing its discretion to permit amendment of the petition and by improperly invoking procedural bars at the initial stage. The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its denial and conduct further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re Lynex" on Justia Law

The case concerns a criminal defendant who, while living with his parents and sister, became involved in a heated conflict with his sister. During the altercation, he threatened her and, at one point, pointed a gun and later a taser at her, ultimately leading her to leave the house. The defendant was charged by the Riverside County District Attorney with multiple offenses, including assault with a semiautomatic firearm, making criminal threats, assault with a deadly weapon, and misdemeanor battery. The defendant filed a motion for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, supported by diagnoses from mental health professionals indicating longstanding mental disorders that contributed to his conduct.Prior to trial, the Superior Court of Riverside County held a hearing on the motion. The court found a connection between the defendant’s mental health diagnoses and his conduct but concluded that his actions were primarily motivated by his sister’s threats to out him to their parents, rather than by his mental disorder alone. The court denied the diversion motion, reasoning that the defendant did not fall within the “spirit” of the diversion statute because he had been compliant with mental health treatment at the time of the incident and had no prior criminal history.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case after the defendant petitioned for a writ of mandate. The appellate court held that the trial court abused its residual discretion by denying the motion on improper grounds, misapplying the legal standard for diversion. The appellate court directed the trial court to vacate its order and conduct a new hearing consistent with the correct legal standards, emphasizing that eligibility for diversion does not require a mental disorder to be the sole motivating factor in the offense. The petition was granted and remanded for further proceedings. View "Flareau v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The defendant is incarcerated for murder and has been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. She has spent most of her sentence in an inpatient psychiatric treatment program and has been largely unresponsive to medications administered under an involuntary medication order. After other treatments failed, the acting warden petitioned for authorization to administer electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), as her condition persisted and she lacked the capacity to provide informed consent. Both parties stipulated to her incapacity to consent to ECT, and she conceded on appeal that ECT is medically necessary.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County held an evidentiary hearing and granted the warden’s petition, authorizing ECT for six months, the maximum period allowed by statute. On appeal, the defendant did not challenge the medical necessity of ECT but argued that the statutory requirement for “no less onerous alternatives” to ECT should include procedural alternatives, specifically the possibility of obtaining informed consent from a surrogate decisionmaker under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5326.7.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. It held that the “no less onerous alternatives” language in Penal Code section 2679 refers to medical alternatives to ECT, not alternative procedural methods such as surrogate consent. The court found that the statutory scheme intentionally excludes ECT from expedited surrogate decision-making provisions, requiring judicial authorization instead. The court rejected the argument that the warden must seek surrogate consent before judicial authorization and affirmed the trial court’s order authorizing ECT. View "P. v. T.B." on Justia Law

In December 2023, a man was arrested after setting a fire in a rural area near the Ortega Mountains in Riverside County, California. Witnesses saw him near the scene, and firefighters and investigators concluded the fire was intentionally and maliciously set. At the time, there was a prolonged state of emergency in California, initially declared in 2015 due to widespread tree mortality from bark beetle infestations, which increased wildfire risks in certain regions.A jury in the Superior Court of Riverside County convicted the defendant of felony arson of forest land and found true a sentencing enhancement for committing arson “during and within an area” proclaimed by the Governor to be in a state of emergency. The court imposed a lengthy prison sentence, including additional time for prior convictions and the state of emergency enhancement.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The appellate court found that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to decide the legal scope of the Governor’s state of emergency proclamation. The appellate court conducted an independent legal review and determined that the 2015 proclamation did not declare a statewide emergency but limited the emergency to specific high-risk zones to be identified by state agencies. The prosecution failed to provide evidence that the fire occurred within such a designated area, making the evidence insufficient to support the enhancement.The appellate court reversed the true finding on the state of emergency enhancement, ordered a full resentencing, and affirmed the underlying arson conviction. The court also directed that, upon the defendant’s request, the trial court hold a hearing on his ability to pay fines and costs, consistent with the standards set in People v. Kopp. View "People v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who pleaded no contest in 2009 to second degree murder, shooting at an occupied vehicle, and participating in a criminal street gang, following an amended indictment stemming from a 2006 shooting. The plea was supported by a stipulation that police reports and grand jury testimony provided a factual basis for the charges. The defendant was sentenced to a total of 25 years to life. After a direct appeal resulted in a minor modification to presentence custody credits, the conviction stood.Years later, the defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The Kern County Superior Court initially denied the petition at the prima facie stage, but the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Upon remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing. The People introduced, and the court admitted, transcripts from the grand jury proceedings, police reports, witness statements, and related law enforcement documents, over the defendant’s objections. The trial court denied the resentencing petition, finding the defendant was a major participant in the murder who acted with reckless indifference to human life, relying on the challenged evidence.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, found that the trial court erred in admitting the grand jury transcript and police reports at the evidentiary hearing, as these did not fall within the exceptions for admissible evidence under section 1172.6(d)(3). The appellate court held that neither the stipulation to the factual basis for the plea nor any other exception permitted their admission. The court vacated the denial of the resentencing petition and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing, explicitly directing that only admissible evidence consistent with section 1172.6 may be considered. The holding does not bar the prosecution from presenting admissible evidence on remand. View "P. v. Dixon" on Justia Law

After an undercover police operation responding to an online advertisement for fentanyl, law enforcement negotiated a drug purchase with the defendant using text messages and a Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) phone number. The defendant was identified and apprehended with nearly 1,000 fentanyl pills in his possession, and his cell phone was linked to the communications coordinating the sale. At the time, the defendant was already on probation for a similar drug offense. He ultimately entered a plea of no contest to felony possession of fentanyl for sale, admitting to an enhancement for a large quantity of contraband.The Alameda County Superior Court, following the plea agreement, placed the defendant on two years of formal probation with electronic monitoring. Over defense objection, the court imposed a “five-way” search condition, allowing warrantless searches of his person, property, vehicle, residence, and all electronic devices under his control, including the obligation to provide passwords. The search clause was justified by the court based on the defendant’s use of electronic devices to facilitate drug sales and obscure his identity. The defendant timely appealed, arguing that the electronics search condition was unconstitutionally overbroad and unreasonable.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the probation condition’s constitutionality and reasonableness de novo. The court found the electronics search clause was neither overbroad nor unreasonable, given the direct involvement of electronic devices in the offense and the defendant’s criminal history. The court also rejected proposals from both the Attorney General and the defense to modify or narrow the condition, concluding that the clause was sufficiently tailored to the facts of the case and necessary for rehabilitation and public safety. The judgment was affirmed, and the search condition was upheld without modification. View "P. v. Flores" on Justia Law

In 2000, a 16-year-old girl and her boyfriend developed a fascination with murder, exchanging letters expressing admiration for notorious killers and a desire to commit murder themselves. In the early morning hours of July 21, 2000, she let her boyfriend into her family’s home, and waited in the bathroom while he fatally stabbed her uncle, three cousins, and seriously wounded her aunt. Her fingerprints were found on weapons and duct tape at the scene. During the investigation, she admitted to planning a staged robbery to bring her family together, but maintained she did not intend for anyone to be killed.A jury in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County convicted her of four counts of first degree murder under both direct aiding and abetting and felony murder theories. She was sentenced to four consecutive terms of 25 years to life. On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal reversed her attempted murder conviction and special circumstance findings but affirmed her murder convictions. Subsequent appeals and resentencing focused on mitigating factors such as her age and psychological condition, but her convictions and sentences were largely upheld.In 2020, she petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which allows certain defendants convicted under the felony murder rule or natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek resentencing. After an evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court found her ineligible for resentencing, concluding that she was a direct aider and abettor with intent to kill, and a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed, holding that resentencing relief is not available to a direct aider and abettor who acts with intent to kill, and found no error or ineffective assistance regarding the consideration of her youth. View "P. v. Diaz" on Justia Law

A murder occurred in 2014 when the victim, Justin Triplett, was shot multiple times at his apartment. Jason Johnomar Zapata became a suspect after evidence connected him to the murder weapon and ammunition. Nearly a year later, while in custody on unrelated charges, Zapata was subjected to what is known as a Perkins operation: he was placed in a holding cell with two undercover agents posing as inmates. During the operation, a law enforcement officer conducted a fake lineup and falsely told Zapata that a witness had identified him as the killer. When asked if he wanted to discuss the murder, Zapata invoked his right to counsel. Nevertheless, the deputy returned Zapata to the cell, announced to the undercover agents that Zapata would be charged with murder, and the agents subsequently questioned Zapata, eliciting an incriminating confession.At trial in the Superior Court of Riverside County, Zapata moved to suppress his statements, arguing that his Miranda rights were violated because he had invoked his right to counsel before the confession and had not waived it. The trial court denied the motion, admitted the confession into evidence, and Zapata was convicted by a jury of second degree murder. The jury did not reach a verdict on the personal firearm enhancement, but Zapata later admitted a lesser firearm use enhancement.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that when a suspect invokes the right to counsel and a known law enforcement officer actively “stimulates” a Perkins operation in a manner that amounts to custodial interrogation, any resulting incriminating statements are inadmissible under Miranda and Edwards. The court found the admission of Zapata's statements prejudicial and reversed the judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "P. v. Zapata" on Justia Law

The case concerns a criminal defendant charged with kidnapping his fiancée, L.S., for ransom or extortion. At the time of the alleged offense, L.S. was under a temporary conservatorship due to a probate court’s finding that she was “gravely disabled” as defined by the Lanterman–Petris–Short Act (LPS Act), and the San Bernardino County Public Guardian was appointed as her conservator. After the defendant subpoenaed L.S. to testify in his defense at the preliminary hearing, the Public Guardian moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that L.S. was incompetent to testify by virtue of the probate court’s grave disability finding.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted the motion to quash, ruling that the finding of grave disability was tantamount to a finding of incompetence to testify under Evidence Code section 701, and that the issue did not need to be relitigated. The defendant then petitioned for a writ of mandate, challenging the trial court’s legal conclusion.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that a finding of grave disability under the LPS Act does not by itself establish incompetence to testify under Evidence Code section 701. The standards for grave disability and testimonial competence are distinct, and incompetence to testify may not be presumed from a grave disability finding or an involuntary medication order. The appellate court directed the superior court to vacate its order granting the motion to quash, to enter a new order denying the motion, and to determine L.S.’s competence to testify under the correct legal standard. The previously ordered stay was vacated upon issuance of the remittitur. View "Esparza v. Super Ct." on Justia Law

A jury found the defendant guilty of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle, conspiracy to commit vehicle theft, and receiving stolen property after he was observed towing a motorhome from an unoccupied property using makeshift equipment taken from the premises. He did not have permission to move either the motorhome or the equipment. The charges included allegations of prior convictions relating to vehicle theft and strike priors. The defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the priors and stipulated to one prior strike in exchange for dismissal of the other two.The Superior Court of San Diego County sentenced the defendant to six years on count one (three years, doubled for the strike), four years on count two (stayed under Penal Code section 654), and one year on count four (to run concurrently). The defendant appealed, alleging a violation of the Racial Justice Act (RJA) due to the use of a dog analogy during voir dire and closing arguments, and asserting several sentencing errors, including the procedure for priors and the application of sentences.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, held that the defendant forfeited the RJA claim by failing to object at trial and that, even if considered on the merits, the dog analogy did not constitute racially discriminatory language under section 745. The court also found sentencing errors: there were no findings on the prior convictions supporting the enhanced sentence under Penal Code section 666.5, and the defendant did not personally admit the strike prior. The court remanded the matter for resentencing to include a court trial on the qualifying prior conviction and confirmation of the strike admission, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "P. v. Gomez" on Justia Law