Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Samuel Scott Copeland was convicted by a jury of attempting to prevent or dissuade a witness from giving testimony, in violation of Penal Code section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2). The conviction was based on allegations that Copeland withheld rent to pressure his friend and landlord, Madelyn Wagner, from testifying in a civil dispute involving their mutual friend, Trina West. The trial court sentenced Copeland to two years of formal probation and imposed but stayed a sentence of 365 days in custody, pending successful completion of probation.The Superior Court of San Diego County declined to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor. Copeland appealed, arguing that substantial evidence did not support the finding that Wagner was a “witness” within the meaning of section 136, subdivision (2) at the time of the alleged intimidation, that the jury instruction improperly expanded the definition of “witness,” and that the prosecution violated his First Amendment right to free speech.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the term “witness” as defined in section 136, subdivision (2) does not include potential future witnesses to a civil dispute. Therefore, there was not substantial evidence that Wagner was a “witness” as used in the statute of conviction. Additionally, the court found that the model instruction given to the jury misstated the law in a prejudicial manner by improperly expanding the definition of “witness” to include potential future witnesses.As a result, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, holding that the conviction was not supported by substantial evidence and that the jury instruction contained a prejudicial misstatement of the law. View "P. v. Copeland" on Justia Law

In 2014, Donald Hill, Jr. handed a gun to Timothy Mitchell, who, along with Danny Jeffreys, opened fire on a group of men, resulting in the death of Tereaun Berry and the injury of his brother Trent. Hill was convicted in 2015 of first-degree murder and attempted murder. On appeal in 2018, his murder conviction was reversed due to a trial court error, but his attempted murder conviction was affirmed. In 2019, Hill entered a plea agreement, pleading no contest to attempted premeditated murder of Tereaun Berry, and the original murder count was dismissed.Hill petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 in 2022. The district attorney conceded a prima facie case for relief, but the trial court ultimately denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing. Hill argued that the trial court erred by relying on principles of implied malice and that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that Hill was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 because he was not convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The jury instructions and verdicts established that Hill was convicted of attempted murder as a direct aider and abettor, a theory still valid under current law. The court also found that Hill's no contest plea to attempted premeditated murder indicated express malice, making him ineligible for relief. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of Hill's petition for resentencing. View "People v. Hill" on Justia Law

Elijah Jackson, a Black man, was charged with carrying a loaded firearm after police found a handgun during a search of the car he was driving. Jackson filed a motion under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020, arguing that the police stopped and searched his car due to racial bias. The superior court denied his motion, stating that Jackson failed to establish a prima facie violation under the Racial Justice Act.The superior court found that the police officers were conducting a saturation patrol in a high-crime area and stopped Jackson for having illegally tinted windows. The officers observed Jackson and his brother, who were wearing clothing associated with gang members, and conducted a traffic stop. During the stop, the officers found a baseball bat in the car and, after a search, discovered an unregistered loaded firearm. Jackson argued that the stop and search were racially motivated, supported by statistical evidence showing racial disparities in traffic stops and searches by the San Diego Police Department (SDPD).The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that Jackson had produced facts that, if true, established a substantial likelihood of a violation of the Racial Justice Act. The court noted the statistical evidence showing racial disparities in SDPD's traffic stops and searches, as well as Jackson's and his brother's repeated stops for the same tinted windows without receiving citations. The court also considered the officers' focus on Jackson's and his brother's appearance and the neighborhood they were in, which suggested implicit bias.The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate directing the superior court to grant an evidentiary hearing to consider Jackson's motion under the Racial Justice Act. The court emphasized the importance of addressing implicit bias in the criminal justice system and ensuring that race does not play a role in seeking or obtaining convictions. View "Jackson v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2018, Charles David Wilson was charged with 14 felony counts. In 2022, he pled no contest to one count of kidnapping, admitted to using a firearm, and acknowledged an aggravating factor. In exchange, the prosecution dismissed the remaining charges and enhancements. Wilson received a 12-year prison sentence, consisting of an eight-year term for kidnapping and a four-year term for the firearm enhancement.Wilson later petitioned the trial court for resentencing under former section 1172.1, citing a new directive from the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office aimed at reducing reliance on enhancements and allegations. The directive suggested that prosecutors should generally not file or require defendants to plead to sentence enhancements and allowed for probation as the presumptive offer for certain felonies. However, the trial court determined it lacked jurisdiction to entertain Wilson’s petition because it had not recalled the sentence within 120 days of the original commitment, and Wilson did not have standing to file such a motion himself.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the directive from the district attorney’s office did not constitute a prosecutorial stipulation or recommendation for resentencing under section 1172.1. The court emphasized that internal directives do not create enforceable duties for prosecutors to recommend resentencing. Consequently, Wilson’s petition was deemed a defendant-initiated request for the court to exercise its own-motion jurisdiction, which the court lacked. The appeal was dismissed due to the lack of jurisdiction to consider Wilson’s petition or any other arguments. View "People v. Wilson" on Justia Law

David Paul Planchard was convicted by a jury of stalking Debra Doe and violating a protective order. Planchard and Doe had a relationship from 1997 to 2000 and had a son together in 2006. Despite a restraining order issued in 2020, Planchard continued to harass Doe through public Facebook posts from 2016 to 2023. These posts included threats, derogatory comments, and references to Doe's past trauma. Planchard also showed up at Doe's house in May 2023, violating the protective order.The Superior Court of Sacramento County found Planchard guilty of stalking and violating a protective order. The jury determined that Planchard's actions, including his Facebook posts and visit to Doe's house, constituted a credible threat and harassment. The court sentenced him to five years for stalking and a stayed term of six months for violating the protective order.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. Planchard argued that his Facebook posts did not constitute direct contact and thus could not be considered harassment under the stalking statute. The court disagreed, citing precedent that indirect threats and harassment through third parties or public posts can still meet the statutory requirements for stalking. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, noting that the posts were intended to harass and threaten Doe, and it was reasonably foreseeable that she would see them.The court also addressed Planchard's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding no merit in his arguments. The court concluded that the Facebook posts were relevant and admissible, and that any failure to object by his counsel did not constitute ineffective assistance. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "P. v. Planchard" on Justia Law

In March 2016, Paul Palalaua Tuilaepa filed his third petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, claiming his 1987 death sentence violated Atkins v. Virginia because he was intellectually disabled. He provided declarations from experts diagnosing him with an intellectual disability and another declaration recanting flawed testimony from his original trial. In November 2016, California voters enacted Proposition 66, which aimed to expedite death penalty appeals and postconviction proceedings. The trial court concluded Tuilaepa’s petition was procedurally barred under section 1509 and did not state a prima facie case for relief based on intellectual disability.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Tuilaepa’s habeas petition in December 2020, ruling it was procedurally barred due to substantial delay and did not state a prima facie case for relief. The court found the expert declarations insufficient and inconsistent with other evidence in the record. Tuilaepa appealed, and the California Court of Appeal granted a certificate of appealability on whether the superior court erred in dismissing the petition as successive and without issuing an order to show cause.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and concluded that section 1509, subdivision (d), applied retroactively to Tuilaepa’s petition. The court found that Tuilaepa’s petition was not procedurally barred because he established a prima facie case for relief based on intellectual disability. The court reversed the superior court’s order and remanded the case with directions to issue an order to show cause on Tuilaepa’s Atkins claim. View "In re Tuilaepa" on Justia Law

Jorge Sarmiento-Zuniga was found guilty by a jury of oral copulation of a person he knew or should have known was intoxicated. In March 2023, the San Francisco Superior Court sentenced him to the middle term of six years in prison for this count. The court reviewed various documents, including the probation officer’s report and the victim’s impact statement, before announcing a tentative sentence. The court cited Sarmiento’s prior convictions and the victim’s repeated refusals captured on video as reasons for the middle term sentence. Despite the defense’s argument for a lesser sentence based on time already served, the court finalized the middle term sentence.The San Francisco Superior Court’s decision was appealed by Sarmiento, who argued that the court erred in considering his prior convictions without certified records and that the lower term should have been imposed due to the victim’s voluntary intoxication. The People contended that the appeal was forfeited because Sarmiento did not object to the sentence during the trial. They also argued that certified records were unnecessary for the middle term sentence and that none of the statutory circumstances mandating the lower term applied.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that Sarmiento forfeited his appeal by not objecting to the sentence in the trial court. However, the court exercised its discretion to review the merits and affirmed the sentence. The court found that Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) does not impose additional evidentiary requirements for a middle term sentence and that the trial court properly stated its reasons for the sentence on the record. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Sarmiento-Zuniga" on Justia Law

In September 2022, Antoine Leon Richardson had an altercation with Mckyla Middleton at a liquor store in Lancaster, California. Richardson accused Middleton of cutting him off, threatened her, and flashed a gun at her from a satchel. In November 2022, police searched Richardson’s home and found ammunition but no firearms. Richardson admitted to brandishing the gun during the altercation and owning the ammunition.The Los Angeles County Superior Court charged Richardson with being a felon in possession of a firearm, being a felon in possession of ammunition, and misdemeanor exhibiting a concealable firearm in public. The jury found Richardson guilty on all counts and confirmed his prior felony convictions. The court sentenced him to three years and eight months in prison for the firearm and ammunition charges, with a concurrent 364-day term for the misdemeanor.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Richardson argued that his convictions for firearm and ammunition possession violated the Second Amendment, citing New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen. The court disagreed, stating that the Second Amendment protects law-abiding citizens, not felons. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Richardson had separate objectives for possessing and exhibiting the firearm, thus allowing multiple sentences under Penal Code section 654.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment, upholding Richardson’s convictions and sentences. View "People v. Richardson" on Justia Law

In 1985, Terry D. Bemore was arrested and later convicted for the murder of a liquor store clerk. He was sentenced to death in 1989. Bemore's trial counsel was found to have provided ineffective assistance, and evidence of racial bias by his lead counsel was presented. In 2015, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Bemore's death sentence, and he was resentenced to life without parole in 2016. In 2020, the California Legislature enacted the Racial Justice Act (RJA), allowing defendants to challenge convictions based on racial discrimination. Bemore sought to use this new law to challenge his conviction.The trial court appointed the San Diego Office of the Primary Public Defender to represent Bemore in his RJA claim, despite his request to have his previous habeas counsel, Sayasane and Cotterill, appointed. Bemore filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the trial court should have appointed his preferred counsel due to their extensive prior representation and familiarity with his case.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 987.2 of the Penal Code governs the selection and assignment of counsel in noncapital postconviction habeas proceedings, including those under the RJA. The court found that the trial court erred in placing the burden on Bemore to demonstrate the Public Defender's unavailability and in failing to recognize the good cause shown for appointing Sayasane and Cotterill. Additionally, the court determined that the Public Defender had created a conflict of interest by opposing Bemore's petition, thus disqualifying itself from representing him.The Court of Appeal granted Bemore's petition, vacated the trial court's order appointing the Public Defender, and directed the trial court to appoint one or both of Bemore's requested attorneys. View "Bemore v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Michael Lovelace was charged with multiple felonies, including rape and aggravated kidnapping, along with special sentencing enhancements and aggravating factors under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(c). Lovelace challenged the constitutionality of the rule 4.421(c) residual clause, which allows for consideration of any other factors that reasonably relate to the defendant or the circumstances under which the crime was committed. He argued that this clause violated the separation of powers and due process principles.The trial court denied Lovelace's motion to set aside the information, leading him to seek interlocutory review by petition for a writ of prohibition. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, issued an order to show cause and held oral arguments. Following the Supreme Court's decision in People v. Lynch, which provided guidance on the interpretation and application of Senate Bill 567 amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), the court took supplemental briefing.The Court of Appeal granted writ relief, holding that the rule 4.421(c) residual clause is unconstitutionally vague and exceeds the Judicial Council’s delegated authority to adopt rules promoting uniformity in sentencing. The court found that the clause grants prosecutors and juries open-ended power to define sentencing criteria on an ad hoc basis, violating the separation of powers clause of the California Constitution. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order denying Lovelace's section 995 motion and to enter a new order sustaining the motion to the extent it seeks to invalidate the residual clause. The court prohibited the trial court from allowing a jury to consider any findings based on the rule 4.421(c) residual clause. View "Lovelace v. Superior Court" on Justia Law