Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant, who had previously been convicted of first degree burglary and attempted first degree burglary, was found by a jury to have committed these offenses while a person was present. In a separate proceeding, the trial court determined that he had three prior felony convictions qualifying under California’s Three Strikes law, three prior serious felony convictions, and a prior prison term enhancement. He was initially sentenced to 66 years to life, which was later reduced to 41 years to life. Following referral from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the defendant sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, requesting the trial court exercise its discretion to dismiss certain prior convictions and enhancements based on changes to Penal Code section 1385 and arguments under People v. Superior Court (Romero).The Superior Court of Los Angeles County held a hearing at which the defendant requested dismissal of two prior strike convictions and one five-year prior serious felony enhancement, citing age and conduct in prison. The People opposed, arguing the Three Strikes sentence was appropriate. The trial court dismissed the one-year prior prison term enhancement and struck the three five-year prior serious felony conviction enhancements but declined to dismiss any prior strike convictions under the Three Strikes law. The defendant was resentenced to 25 years to life.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed whether the amended section 1385, subdivision (c), applied to the Three Strikes law and whether the rule of lenity could extend its application. The court held that section 1385, subdivision (c), as amended by Senate Bill No. 81, does not apply to the Three Strikes law, since the law constitutes an alternative sentencing scheme, not an enhancement. The court also found no statutory ambiguity warranting application of the rule of lenity. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "P. v. Grandberry" on Justia Law

The case centers on Taiwan Orran Reed, who was convicted by a jury in August 2020 of multiple offenses, including pimping, pandering, human trafficking, and rape involving two victims. The jury also found special circumstances under California’s one strike law, resulting in Reed’s sentence of 21 years four months in prison, plus 30 years to life. Reed, who is African American, later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Riverside County Superior Court, seeking relief under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020. He alleged that racially discriminatory language—specifically being referred to as a “gorilla pimp”—was used by the prosecutor and expert law enforcement witnesses during his trial.After Reed’s retained counsel withdrew due to personal reasons and lack of payment, the superior court appointed the Riverside County Public Defender to represent Reed at an evidentiary hearing on his habeas petition. The Public Defender objected to the appointment, arguing that under Government Code section 27706, subdivision (g), his office has discretionary authority to decline representation in postconviction habeas matters, unlike mandatory representation required in trial proceedings under subdivision (a). The trial court disagreed and compelled the Public Defender to accept the appointment, finding that the Public Defender had not demonstrated unavailability.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, granted the Public Defender’s petition for writ of mandate. The appellate court held that section 27706(g) governs public defenders’ representation of habeas petitioners, granting them discretion to decline such appointments without a showing of unavailability. The trial court’s order compelling the Public Defender to represent Reed was vacated, and the superior court was directed to appoint alternate counsel for Reed’s habeas petition. View "Harmon v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

The defendant was arrested on October 2, 2021, for misdemeanor driving under the influence and was released after signing a citation promising to appear in court on December 14, 2021. The Riverside County District Attorney filed a misdemeanor complaint on November 17, 2021. The defendant failed to appear on the scheduled date, resulting in a bench warrant for her arrest. After a subsequent stop and another citation, she failed to appear again, leading to another bench warrant. In March 2024, the defendant voluntarily contacted the court, had her matters calendared, and pled not guilty. She later filed a motion to dismiss, arguing her Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated due to delays.The Riverside County Superior Court denied the motion, finding the defendant’s own failures to appear contributed to the delay. The defendant then sought review by petitioning the Appellate Division of the Riverside County Superior Court. The Appellate Division, in a divided opinion, held that the prosecution’s failure to file a formal complaint within 25 days as required by Penal Code section 853.6 deprived the trial court of personal jurisdiction and automatically relieved the defendant of any obligation to appear. Based on this, it ordered the trial court to vacate its order and reconsider the motion to dismiss.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision. It held the lower court had abused its discretion by misinterpreting Penal Code section 853.6. The Court of Appeal clarified that the failure to file charges within 25 days did not relieve a defendant of the obligation to appear or deprive the court of personal jurisdiction. The appellate court issued a writ directing the Appellate Division to vacate its opinion and reconsider the defendant’s writ petition consistent with this interpretation. View "People v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

In this case, Raul Rodriguez was charged in 1994 with several crimes, including the murder of Jose Alvaro Salavia. During the preliminary hearing, three police officers testified, primarily relaying hearsay statements from Rodriguez’s mother and uncle, indicating Rodriguez admitted to the shooting. No other evidence implicated Rodriguez, and the defense presented none. The court found probable cause, and Rodriguez subsequently pleaded guilty to second degree murder. The plea hearing did not include admissions to specific facts or a stipulation to the preliminary hearing transcript; the court found a factual basis based on counsel’s stipulation.Years later, in 2022, Rodriguez petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that recent changes to California homicide law made him ineligible for a murder conviction under the prior theory. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County appointed counsel, ordered briefing, and reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript, which contained the police officers’ hearsay testimony. The People argued Rodriguez was the sole perpetrator, making him ineligible for relief. Rodriguez did not provide specific factual allegations in response and submitted on the papers. The court denied the petition, finding Rodriguez had not established a prima facie case for resentencing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the order. It held that, at the prima facie stage of a section 1172.6 resentencing petition, courts may rely on hearsay statements admitted at the preliminary hearing, even if they would be inadmissible at a later evidentiary hearing, because the transcript serves to frame the issues rather than resolve factual disputes. The court affirmed the denial of Rodriguez’s petition but remanded the case to allow him thirty days to file an amended petition with nonconclusory factual allegations. View "People v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

John Ross Craig, along with two accomplices, entered a clothing store in 2012 and robbed employees at gunpoint, ordering them to lie on the floor and taking their wallets and phones. After being surrounded by police, the group negotiated for two hours before surrendering. Craig was charged with multiple counts, including kidnapping to commit robbery and second degree robbery, with firearm and gang enhancements, as well as allegations of prior serious felony convictions. In 2015, he pleaded no contest to two counts of second degree robbery, admitted to the firearm enhancement and prior felony allegations, and was sentenced to 23 years in prison.In 2024, Craig petitioned the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to recall and resentence him under Penal Code section 1172.1, citing several legislative changes giving courts discretion to strike certain enhancements and asking for consideration of his post-conviction rehabilitation, youth at the time of the offense, and parole plans. The prosecution opposed, highlighting Craig’s prison rule violations. The superior court denied the petition, reasoning that Craig should be held to the plea agreement he entered and expressing skepticism about his rehabilitation and employment plans.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed whether the superior court’s order denying Craig’s petition was appealable and whether the court erred in its decision. The appellate court held that the denial affected Craig’s substantial rights and was therefore appealable. Importantly, it found the superior court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard—relying on Craig’s plea agreement rather than the statutory criteria for resentencing under section 1172.1. The appellate court reversed the denial and directed the superior court to conduct a new resentencing hearing in accordance with the proper legal standard. View "People v. Craig" on Justia Law

Daquon Ray Washington was charged in 2019 with first degree burglary with a person present and grand theft of an automobile. The information alleged prior convictions and jail terms for burglary and receiving stolen property, making him subject to sentence enhancements under several provisions of the Penal Code, including two one-year enhancements under then-section 667.5(b). Washington pleaded no contest and admitted the prior convictions. He was sentenced to eight years in state prison, with the section 667.5(b) enhancements imposed but stayed.Following legislative amendments, Penal Code section 1172.75 (formerly section 1171.1) retroactively invalidated most enhancements imposed under section 667.5(b), except for those involving sexually violent offenses. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified Washington as serving a sentence including an invalid enhancement. In April 2024, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied resentencing, concluding that Washington was ineligible because the enhancements were stayed at sentencing. While Washington’s appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court in People v. Rhodius clarified that section 1172.75 applies to invalid enhancements regardless of whether they were stayed or executed, mandating resentencing if such enhancements were imposed.While Washington’s appeal was pending, he was released on parole. The People argued in the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, that release on parole terminated eligibility for resentencing under section 1172.75. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, holding that eligibility for resentencing does not require the defendant to remain incarcerated until the resentencing takes place. Once identified by CDCR as eligible, subsequent release on parole does not preclude relief; resentencing can afford practical benefits, such as shortening the parole term. The appellate court reversed the superior court’s denial of resentencing and remanded for further proceedings consistent with section 1172.75. View "People v. Washington" on Justia Law

The defendant was held alone in a cell at the Tuolumne County jail when a deputy observed him striking the cell window with a broom handle, causing it to crack extensively and necessitate replacement. Evidence at trial established that the actual cost of the window was $245.47, with an additional $161.97 for installation, totaling $407.44 in damages. The prosecution charged the defendant with felony vandalism for damages over $400 and with damaging jail property. The jury found the defendant guilty on both counts and determined the damage exceeded $400.After the trial in the Superior Court of Tuolumne County, the defendant was sentenced to six years on the felony vandalism conviction, with a concurrent six-month sentence on the jail property charge that was stayed. The court ordered victim restitution in the amount of $1,980.83, based on a probation report estimate rather than the trial evidence. The prosecutor noted errors in the probation report regarding the amount and classification of damages for the jail property charge, leading to its amendment to reflect a misdemeanor. The defendant appealed, arguing the felony conviction and restitution order were unsupported by substantial evidence, and, in supplemental briefing, that a more specific statute governed his conduct.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It found substantial evidence supported the damages calculation for felony vandalism but held that prosecution under the general vandalism statute was precluded by the existence of a more specific statute addressing destruction of jail property. Accordingly, the court reversed the felony vandalism conviction and the restitution order, remanding the matter for resentencing under the specific statute and a new restitution hearing. The holding clarified that when a specific statute covers the conduct, prosecution under a general statute is barred, and restitution must reflect actual loss proven at trial. View "People v. Jimenez" on Justia Law

Enrique Aguilar was involved in a shootout with San Diego Police Department officers after leading one officer on a foot chase during which he brandished a gun. Although Aguilar was wounded, none of the officers were hit, and a bullet fired from Aguilar’s direction struck a nearby store door. Aguilar was charged with multiple offenses, including attempted voluntary manslaughter, assaulting peace officers with a semiautomatic firearm, shooting at an occupied building, possessing methamphetamine while armed, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. At trial in September 2023, a jury convicted him of all charges and the court sentenced him to a lengthy prison term.During jury selection in the Superior Court of San Diego County, the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to strike a Latina juror (Juror 1), claiming she struggled to understand the concept of intent, as revealed by her responses to a hypothetical question. Aguilar objected, arguing that the prosecutor was improperly excluding Hispanic and Latina jurors. The trial court accepted the prosecutor’s explanation, found Juror 1’s answers equivocal and overruled Aguilar’s objection, determining that ethnicity was not a factor in the challenge.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the denial of Aguilar’s objection de novo, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7. The appellate court found no substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that Juror 1 was confused about intent; her answers were clear and consistent. The court held that “juror confusion” is a presumptively invalid reason for a peremptory challenge under section 231.7, and that the prosecution failed to rebut this presumption. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. View "P. v. Aguilar" on Justia Law

The petitioner was charged in three separate criminal cases for drug-related offenses in Solano County. Two of these cases involved charges under Health and Safety Code section 11395, which was newly established by Proposition 36 and criminalizes possession of a hard drug with two prior drug-related convictions. The third case concerned possession for sale of a controlled substance. The petitioner sought pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36 for all pending charges, arguing that he had a qualifying mental health diagnosis and was a suitable candidate for diversion, while also requesting treatment under section 11395.The Solano County Superior Court ruled that the petitioner was ineligible for pretrial mental health diversion for the section 11395 charges, interpreting the statute as precluding diversion due to its “notwithstanding any other law” language. The court granted pretrial mental health diversion for the possession for sale charge but denied it for the section 11395 charges, reasoning that the treatment-mandated felony provisions of section 11395 superseded the diversion option. After denial of a motion for reconsideration, the petitioner sought relief via a writ of mandate.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the statutory interplay between section 11395 and Penal Code section 1001.36 de novo. The court held that section 11395 does not expressly or impliedly preclude trial courts from granting pretrial mental health diversion to defendants charged under section 11395. It found that both statutes can coexist, as section 11395 provides a postconviction treatment path and does not bar the pretrial diversion process. Accordingly, the appellate court directed the superior court to vacate its denial and to reconsider the petitioner’s requests for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. View "Reed v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

After serving nearly 19 years in prison for a series of robberies, the defendant was released on parole. Within eight months, at age 57, he committed 10 new robberies, each involving the use of a pellet gun to threaten employees and take cash. He did not physically harm anyone during these offenses. The jury convicted him of 13 counts of second-degree robbery, finding he had used a deadly and dangerous weapon, and the trial court determined he had three prior serious felony convictions. The defendant was sentenced under California’s Three Strikes law to a total of 369 years to life.Following a change in sentencing law that gave trial judges discretion to strike five-year prior conviction enhancements, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation recommended resentencing. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County recalled the defendant’s sentence, struck the prior conviction and weapon enhancements, and resentenced him to 225 years to life. The defendant appealed, arguing that the resentencing was not a “meaningful modification” as suggested by the uncodified statement of intent from the 2023 bill amending Penal Code section 1172.1, and that his postconviction rehabilitation and low risk of reoffending were not properly considered. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and challenged the trial court’s calculation of postsentence conduct credits.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, held that the uncodified statement of legislative intent does not create a mandate for resentencing to advance release or parole dates. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to leave the Three Strikes sentence intact, given the defendant’s extensive recidivism. The ineffective assistance claims lacked merit, as the arguments were unsupported. However, the appellate court modified the judgment to remove postsentence conduct credits, which should be calculated by the Department of Corrections. The judgment was affirmed as modified, and a separate appeal from the trial court’s decision not to act on the defendant’s motion to vacate the new sentence was dismissed as non-appealable. View "People v. Brammer" on Justia Law