Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A young adult defendant was charged with vandalism and vehicle theft in Santa Clara County. After the prosecution indicated the defendant met initial eligibility requirements for a young adult deferred entry of judgment program under Penal Code section 1000.7, the trial court referred the defendant to the county probation department for further assessment. The probation department determined the defendant was unsuitable for the program because he resided in Alameda County, which did not operate a corresponding program, and concluded that he could not benefit from Santa Clara County’s services due to his residency.The Superior Court of Santa Clara County accepted the probation department’s determination and continued the criminal cases, effectively denying deferred entry of judgment. The defense argued that section 1000.7 did not prohibit out-of-county residents from participating, that the trial court should have authority to make the final eligibility determination, and that if the statute granted exclusive authority to probation, it would violate the constitutional separation of powers. The trial court found the statute unambiguously vested eligibility determinations with the probation department.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or alternative relief. The court held that section 1000.7 gives the probation department—not the trial court—the authority to decide whether a defendant meets the statutory criteria for participation in the deferred entry of judgment program. The court also held that assigning this responsibility to the probation department does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. Finally, the court determined that the probation department did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant entry into the program based on his out-of-county residence. The petition was denied. View "Armstrong v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

A criminal complaint was filed against an individual in July 2024, alleging multiple counts of lewd acts, forcible lewd acts, and continuous sexual abuse of four minors, all of whom are his grandchildren. The prosecution also alleged a multiple victim enhancement. At an initial arraignment, the magistrate court set bail and imposed protective orders. Later, the prosecution moved to have the defendant held without bail, citing the danger he posed to the community. At a Humphrey hearing, the prosecution presented testimony and evidence suggesting repeated sexual abuse over many years, including admissions by the defendant. The magistrate court found this evidence reliable and determined that nonfinancial conditions of release would not protect the public or victims, ordering the defendant held without bail.The defendant challenged the no-bail order in the Superior Court of Fresno County through a petition for writ of habeas corpus. He argued the magistrate court abused its discretion, particularly in considering the prosecution’s request for remand without bail absent a change in circumstances, and asserted there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of substantial likelihood of great bodily harm. The superior court issued an order to show cause on these specific issues but ultimately denied the petition after considering the parties’ responses.Upon further review, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, was directed by the California Supreme Court to address whether Penal Code section 292 constitutes an impermissible legislative extension of the constitutional terms “acts of violence” and “great bodily harm,” and whether, absent section 292, clear and convincing evidence supported denial of bail. The appellate court held that section 292 is a valid legislative implementation, not an invalid extension, of the bail exception in article I, section 12 of the California Constitution. The court further found that substantial evidence supported the finding that the defendant’s release would pose a substantial likelihood of great bodily harm, and denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus. View "In re Bergstrom" on Justia Law

A man on probation was investigated for allegedly diverting customer payments from his employer to himself. Law enforcement learned that, as a condition of his probation, he had agreed to allow searches of his person, residence, and electronic devices, but his probation terms specifically excluded “financial accounts or transactions” from warrantless searches. During the investigation, officers arrested him, seized his phone, and searched several banking applications, including Apple Pay. Information from Apple Pay revealed the existence of certain bank accounts, which led officers to obtain a warrant to search those accounts and gather further evidence.In the Superior Court of Orange County, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the bank accounts and to quash the warrant, arguing that the Apple Pay search exceeded the scope of his probation terms and that the subsequent warrant was based on unlawfully obtained information. The prosecution argued the motion was more properly a motion to traverse the warrant, contending that Apple Pay was not a “financial account” and that the warrant was supported by probable cause. The trial court denied the suppression and quash motions.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that the defendant’s motion should be treated as a motion to traverse the warrant, as the warrant affidavit omitted material information about the probation search limitations. The court found that Apple Pay is a “financial account” under the plain meaning of the probation terms. Because the information about the bank accounts was obtained through an unlawful search of a financial account, it was improperly included in the warrant application. The appellate court ordered the trial court to vacate its earlier order and grant the motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the bank accounts. View "Meiner v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A noncitizen defendant was charged in 2015 with serious felonies, including assault with intent to commit rape, following a single incident. He faced nearly certain deportation if convicted, as his charges qualified as “aggravated felonies” under federal immigration law. Initially represented by a public defender, the defendant later retained new counsel and proceeded to trial, ultimately being convicted on all counts in 2017. During plea negotiations, the prosecution required any deal to include prison time, sex offender registration, and a “strike,” but no immigration-safe plea was pursued. Notably, after the defendant changed attorneys, a federal appellate decision altered the immigration consequences for certain California offenses, making immigration-neutral pleas possible.After completing his sentence, the defendant filed a motion under California Penal Code section 1473.7 to vacate his conviction, arguing that he did not meaningfully understand the dire immigration consequences of conviction and would have sought an immigration-safe plea had he been properly advised. The Superior Court of Riverside County denied the motion, finding the defendant was ineligible for relief because his conviction was final before the current statutory amendment applied, and concluding he would not have accepted a plea in any event.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reversed. The appellate court held that Penal Code section 1473.7 relief is available for final convictions, including those after trial, and found that the defendant did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences. The court further held there was a reasonable probability he would have pursued an immigration-safe plea, and that such a plea would likely have been accepted by the prosecution and trial court. The appellate court remanded with instructions to grant the motion and vacate the conviction. View "P. v. Avena" on Justia Law

A man suffering from diagnosed schizoaffective disorder was involved in a series of violent encounters with law enforcement officers after he believed, due to his delusions, that he was being pursued by the CIA. The incident began at a gas station where he brandished a firearm at a woman he thought was an agent. He later fired gunshots and fled, leading officers on a high-speed chase during which he shot at officers and other vehicles, eventually wounding a pursuing officer in a physical confrontation. Evidence showed he possessed firearms, body armor, and hallucinogenic mushrooms, although toxicology results for drug use were inconclusive. The defendant testified that he acted out of fear for his life, believing officers were working with the CIA to kill him.The Superior Court of Tulare County presided over the trial. The defendant requested that the jury be instructed on imperfect self-defense, arguing he honestly, though unreasonably, believed he needed to defend himself. The trial court denied this request, relying on People v. Elmore, which held that imperfect self-defense is not available where the belief is purely delusional and lacks an “objective correlate” in reality. The court found that the defendant’s belief was entirely delusional, with no objective facts supporting a need for self-defense, as the officers had not threatened or harmed him prior to his attack.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that imperfect self-defense does not apply when a defendant’s belief in the need for self-defense is wholly delusional and unsupported by any objective facts. The court concluded that the mere presence and lawful actions of peace officers do not constitute an objective correlate sufficient to warrant an imperfect self-defense instruction. The judgment was affirmed. View "P. v. Chang" on Justia Law

A man lived with his girlfriend for several years, and her brother moved in with them from Mexico. After neighbors heard alarming noises from their apartment, family members, prompted by disturbing messages from the man, entered the residence and found the bodies of both the girlfriend and her brother, who had died from numerous stab wounds. The apartment was extremely cold due to a newly purchased air conditioning unit placed to slow decomposition. The man was later found in Mexico and extradited to Los Angeles.At trial in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the prosecution charged the man with two counts of murder. The defense sought to introduce a handwritten note found at the crime scene, in which the man claimed he killed the victims in a rage after discovering them having sex. The trial court excluded the note during the prosecution’s case under Evidence Code section 352, reasoning its probative value was outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice and that it could not be properly tested without the man’s testimony. As a result, the man testified in order to introduce the note, and was subsequently convicted by a jury of first degree murder for his girlfriend and second degree murder for her brother.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court erred in excluding the note during the prosecution’s case, as its probative value concerning provocation and the defendant’s state of mind was not substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice, and a limiting instruction could have adequately addressed concerns. The Court of Appeal found the error prejudicial, as it forced the man to testify and likely affected the verdicts. The court reversed the convictions and directed the trial court to vacate them and set the matter for a new trial. View "People v. Tzul" on Justia Law

Late at night, police officers responded to a 911 call reporting a man with a gun in an area known for gang activity. The caller provided a description and stated that the man put a gun in a white Kia parked nearby. An officer recognized someone matching the description—later identified as Perez—who entered a nearby apartment. Officers, without a warrant or exigent circumstances, approached the residence, saw Perez inside through the screen door, and ordered him to come out at gunpoint. Perez initially did not comply but eventually exited and was detained outside. A witness identified Perez as the suspect, and a subsequent search of the Kia and Perez’s person uncovered a firearm, drugs, and related evidence.Perez moved to suppress the evidence in the Superior Court of Orange County, arguing that his seizure inside the apartment violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked probable cause and a warrant. The prosecution argued that the initial detention was justified by reasonable suspicion and that no warrant was necessary since officers did not physically enter the residence. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the detention was proper, and Perez ultimately pleaded guilty and was sentenced.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that Perez was seized while still inside the residence and that, under the Fourth Amendment, such a seizure requires both probable cause and a warrant or exigent circumstances. The court rejected the prosecution’s arguments that the officers’ conduct was permissible as a mere detention or as a warrantless arrest effected from outside the home. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to allow Perez to withdraw his plea and to grant suppression of the evidence and identification derived from the unlawful seizure. View "People v. Perez" on Justia Law

The defendant was involved in an incident in August 2022 in which, while intoxicated, he assaulted a woman with whom he had a long-term relationship, causing physical injuries that required medical attention. When deputies attempted to arrest him, he resisted and injured two officers. He was subsequently charged with several offenses, including resisting an executive officer and inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant, and admitted to aggravating factors based on his prior convictions. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he was sentenced to county jail on the misdemeanor count and received a four-year suspended prison sentence with four years of probation on the felony count, along with presentence custody credits.After being arrested for a new offense and failing to comply with the conditions of his release, his probation was revoked by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Judge Emily Cole), and the previously suspended four-year prison sentence was imposed. The court recalculated his presentence custody credits, but an error was made in the calculation. While his appeal was pending, appellate counsel notified the trial court (Supervising Judge Michelle deCasas) of the miscalculation, requesting correction. The trial court acknowledged the mistake but concluded it lacked jurisdiction to correct it after the notice of appeal had been filed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that Penal Code section 1237.1 expressly confers jurisdiction on the trial court to correct errors in presentence custody credit calculations even after a notice of appeal is filed, provided the defendant requests the correction. The court found that the miscalculation was conceded by both parties and modified the judgment to award the correct amount of 400 days of presentence custody credit. The judgment was otherwise affirmed as modified. View "People v. Taft" on Justia Law

The case involves a traffic stop in Milpitas, California, where a police officer observed a driver, Eric Jaime Perez, commit a municipal code violation. Upon stopping Perez, the officer discovered that Perez had been driving with a suspended license since 1993. Perez’s vehicle was legally parked and not posing any hazard or obstruction. The officer decided to impound the minivan pursuant to his usual practice for drivers with suspended licenses, conducted an inventory search, and discovered drugs and cash. Evidence from the vehicle search led to a warrant and subsequent search of a hotel room connected to Perez, where more contraband was found.A magistrate in the Santa Clara County Superior Court denied Perez’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding the impound and inventory search justified under the Vehicle Code. The trial court later denied Perez’s renewed suppression motion, and Perez entered no contest pleas to weapon and drug charges in exchange for probation. After sentencing, Perez appealed, challenging the denial of his suppression motion and contending that the impound and search did not serve a legitimate community caretaking function as required by the Fourth Amendment.The California Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate District reviewed the case and held that statutory authority under the Vehicle Code alone does not establish the constitutional reasonableness of an impound. The court found that the prosecution failed to show any facts specific to Perez’s vehicle that justified impoundment as a community caretaking function. The impoundment was based solely on a desire to prevent further unlicensed driving, which is insufficient under the Fourth Amendment. The court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, directing the trial court to permit Perez to withdraw his pleas and to grant his suppression motion if he does so. View "People v. Perez" on Justia Law

The case concerns a probationer who was suspected of stealing from an auto business by having customers pay him directly instead of the business. Law enforcement, during their investigation, learned the individual was on probation with terms allowing searches of his person, residence, and electronic devices, but explicitly excluding “medical/legal information, financial accounts or transactions, or any data created before the acceptance of this probation grant.” After arresting him, officers searched his cell phone and accessed his Apple Pay account, finding two linked debit cards (Chase and Credit One). This discovery led them to seek and obtain a warrant to search those bank accounts, but the application for the warrant omitted the limitation in the probation terms excluding “financial accounts.”Following these events, the Superior Court of Orange County denied a motion to suppress evidence obtained from the bank accounts and to quash the warrant. The superior court concluded that the search of the Apple Pay account was permitted under the probation search terms, and did not address whether the motion should be considered a motion to traverse the warrant.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three reviewed the matter. The appellate court held that the motion should be treated as a motion to traverse the search warrant, because the claim was that the warrant application omitted material information regarding the probation search limitation. The court found that an Apple Pay account qualifies as a “financial account” within the ordinary meaning of the probation terms, and thus was excluded from warrantless probation searches. The court concluded that the officer’s omission in the warrant application was, at minimum, reckless, and that the omission was material to the finding of probable cause. Accordingly, the appellate court directed the superior court to vacate its previous order and grant the motion to suppress the evidence obtained from Chase and Credit One. View "Meiner v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law