Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of drugs and bribing an executive officer. During the arrest, the officer observed signs of intoxication and conducted field sobriety tests, which the defendant failed. A preliminary alcohol screening test showed no alcohol, leading the officer to suspect drug use. The defendant admitted to using cannabis and Alprazolam. At the police station, the defendant initially agreed to a blood test but later refused without a warrant. The officer obtained a warrant, and the blood test confirmed the presence of drugs. The defendant was charged and convicted of DUI and bribery.The Superior Court of California, County of Marin, handled the initial trial. The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 2130, allowing them to infer consciousness of guilt from the defendant's refusal to submit to a blood test. The defendant was found guilty on both counts and sentenced to three years of probation and 180 days in jail. The defendant appealed, arguing that the jury instruction was improper because he had a constitutional right to refuse the blood test without a warrant.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the instruction was proper, stating that while the Fourth Amendment prohibits criminal penalties for refusing a blood test without a warrant, it does not prohibit all consequences. The court emphasized that implied consent laws can impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences for refusal. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, concluding that the instruction did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. View "People v. Bolourchi" on Justia Law

In 2008, the defendant was convicted by a jury of multiple counts of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle at another person. He was acquitted of murder and the jury deadlocked on two attempted murder charges, which were not retried. The jury found true the allegations that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death during the commission of one count, and that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The defendant was sentenced to a combination of determinate and indeterminate terms.The defendant filed a petition for resentencing in August 2022 under section 1172.6, asserting he could not be convicted of murder or attempted murder due to changes in the law. The trial court denied the petition in April 2023, concluding he had not been convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter. The defendant filed another identical petition in July 2023, which was also denied on the same grounds.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The defendant did not challenge the denial of his petition for failing to establish a prima facie case for relief. Instead, he argued for the first time that his original sentence was unauthorized because the court imposed a full-term consecutive sentence rather than one-third of the middle term for the subordinate term, in violation of section 1170.1. The Court of Appeal concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider the unauthorized sentence claim in this appeal, as it was unrelated to the denial of the section 1172.6 petition. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed in its entirety. View "P. v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Adrian Pina was charged with the murder of his brother, Samuel, and the attempted murder of another man. Pina's defense counsel issued subpoenas to Snap, Inc. and Meta Platforms, Inc. to obtain Samuel's social media posts and communications from the two years prior to his death, believing they might show Samuel's violent character. Snap refused to provide the information, and Meta ignored the subpoena. The trial court ordered both companies to comply, prompting them to file motions to quash, citing the Stored Communications Act (SCA). The trial court denied the motions, leading Snap and Meta to petition the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District.The trial court found that Pina had shown good cause for the subpoenas, based on evidence from Samuel's phone and testimony from Samuel's girlfriend. The court determined that the requested material was not available from other sources and that Pina had a plausible justification for seeking it. The court also noted that the material should be produced to the court for in-camera review to determine its relevance to Pina's defense.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and agreed with the trial court's good cause finding. The court concluded that the business models of Snap and Meta, which involve accessing and using their users' data for business purposes, exclude them from the SCA's limitations on disclosure. The court held that the SCA does not apply to the material sought by Pina because Snap and Meta are not acting solely as providers of electronic communication or remote computing services under the SCA. The court directed the trial court to issue a modified order requiring Snap and Meta to produce the requested material for in-camera review to determine its relevance to Pina's defense. The petitions for writ relief were denied in part and granted in part. View "Snap, Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Aquiles Jimenez appealed the denial of his second petition for resentencing under California Penal Code section 1172.6. Jimenez had previously pled guilty to aiding and abetting second-degree murder and was sentenced to 15 years to life. His first petition for resentencing was denied after an evidentiary hearing where the trial court found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a direct aider and abettor with implied malice. This decision was affirmed on appeal based on the sufficiency of the evidence.In his second petition, Jimenez argued that changes in the law, specifically Senate Bill No. 775 and the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Reyes, made the doctrines of collateral estoppel and law of the case inapplicable. He also cited People v. Pittman, which changed how courts should consider an offender’s youth when determining implied malice. The trial court denied the second petition at the prima facie stage, stating there was no legal basis to revisit its prior ruling.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court concluded that significant changes in the law regarding the culpability of young adult offenders necessitated a new evidentiary hearing. The court noted that recent case law and legislative changes require consideration of a defendant's youth and brain development when determining malice. The court found that the trial court's failure to consider Jimenez's youth was not harmless and that the doctrines of collateral estoppel and law of the case did not bar his second petition.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for a new evidentiary hearing consistent with current law, allowing the trial court to consider Jimenez's youth and brain development in determining whether he acted with malice. View "P. v. Jimenez" on Justia Law

In 2011, Raymond Edward Hernandez was charged with corporal injury to a significant other, with enhancements for great bodily injury (GBI) and three prior prison terms. He entered a plea agreement in 2013, resulting in a 21-year sentence, which included enhancements for the GBI and prior prison terms. In 2017, his sentence was reduced to 19 years after two prison priors were reclassified as misdemeanors. In 2022, the trial court further reduced his sentence to 18 years by striking the remaining prison prior under Penal Code section 1172.75. Later, the court struck the GBI enhancement, reducing his sentence to 13 years.The Superior Court of Riverside County initially accepted the plea agreement and imposed the stipulated sentence. In 2017, the court resentenced Hernandez under section 1170.18, removing two prison priors and reducing his sentence to 19 years. In 2022, the court recalled and resentenced Hernandez under section 1172.75, striking the remaining prison prior and setting a hearing for a motion to dismiss his prior strike. In 2023, the court struck the GBI enhancement, further reducing his sentence to 13 years.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1172.75 required a full resentencing, even in plea bargain cases, and allowed the trial court to strike the GBI enhancement. The court concluded that the People could not withdraw from the plea agreement due to the sentence reduction. The appellate court affirmed the postjudgment order and directed the trial court to correct clerical errors in the amended abstract of judgment, including the resentencing hearing date, the status of the GBI enhancement, and updated custody credits. View "P. v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

In 2022, the defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus requesting the trial court to dismiss his firearm enhancements, arguing that his convictions were not final when a new law granting courts discretion to dismiss such enhancements took effect on January 1, 2018. The trial court found a prima facie case for the firearm enhancements, held a hearing, and dismissed them. The defendant then argued that the court should revisit his entire sentence and vacate his underlying convictions based on new laws that took effect after his convictions became final.The Los Angeles County Superior Court initially sentenced the defendant to 75 years to life plus 37 years and 8 months for first-degree murder and two counts of robbery, with various enhancements. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions and sentence in 2017, and the California Supreme Court denied review, making the convictions final in early 2018. In 2022, the defendant filed a habeas petition to dismiss the firearm enhancements, which the trial court granted, reducing his sentence by 38 years and 4 months. However, the court declined to revisit other aspects of his sentence, including gang enhancements and prior serious felony convictions.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that habeas review is issue-specific and that the trial court was not obligated to revisit the entire sentence merely because it granted review on the firearm enhancements. The court emphasized that habeas corpus allows for issue-specific relief and that a rule requiring full resentencing whenever any part of a sentence is revisited would be inconsistent with legislative intent and could discourage courts from granting partial relief. The court affirmed the trial court's order. View "P. v. Esquivias" on Justia Law

Marcelo Caparrotta was convicted of elder abuse likely to produce great bodily harm or death and making a criminal threat. The incident involved Caparrotta assaulting his elderly father, who has arthritis and walks with a cane, by punching him in the head and ribs, causing significant bleeding and injuries. Caparrotta also left a threatening voicemail for his brother, indicating he would harm his father again.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County found Caparrotta guilty on both counts. The court also found that Caparrotta had a prior strike and identified several aggravating factors, including the crime's violence and the victim's vulnerability. The court sentenced Caparrotta to six years in prison, comprising a three-year middle term for elder abuse, doubled due to the prior strike, and a concurrent 365-day sentence for the criminal threat.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. Caparrotta raised several issues on appeal, including the trial court's handling of peremptory challenges during jury selection, the sufficiency of evidence for the elder abuse conviction, the jury instruction on "great bodily harm," the imposition of a middle term sentence without considering a presumptive lower term, and the imposition of fines and fees without considering his ability to pay.The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment. It found no error in the trial court's handling of peremptory challenges, concluding that the trial court correctly applied the statutory framework. The court also determined that substantial evidence supported the elder abuse conviction, given the circumstances and the victim's vulnerability. The jury instruction on "great bodily harm" was deemed appropriate, and the trial court was found to have properly considered the aggravating and mitigating factors in sentencing. Finally, the appellate court held that Caparrotta forfeited his challenge to the fines and fees by not raising the issue at sentencing and found no ineffective assistance of counsel. View "P. v. Caparrotta" on Justia Law

Lynette Mendoza was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent or more, and a traffic infraction. She withdrew her general time waiver and requested a speedy trial, which was initially set for March 9, 2023. However, the trial was repeatedly continued due to the COVID-19 pandemic, with the last continuance pushing the trial date to March 15, 2024. Mendoza objected to these delays and filed a motion to dismiss based on a violation of her statutory right to a speedy trial.The San Francisco City & County Superior Court denied Mendoza's motion to dismiss, citing ongoing effects of the COVID-19 pandemic as good cause for the delay. The court relied on judicial notice of various public health orders and past findings related to the pandemic. The appellate division of the superior court summarily denied Mendoza's writ petition, suggesting that the Court of Appeal might expand upon the precedent set in Hernandez-Valenzuela v. Superior Court.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the prosecution had not met its burden to demonstrate good cause for the delay. The court noted that the superior court improperly relied on judicial notice to establish disputed facts and that the prosecution conceded there was no good cause for the delay. The Court of Appeal held that the superior court abused its discretion in denying Mendoza's motion to dismiss and directed the superior court to grant the motion. The appellate court emphasized that judicial notice cannot be used to prove disputed facts and that the prosecution's failure to present evidence of good cause necessitated dismissal of the charges. View "Mendoza v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Jose Oliveras, serving a life sentence without parole, was found with over 600 pornographic images on a tablet assigned to him. The images were stored on a removable SIM card. Oliveras was charged with possession of contraband under California Code of Regulations (CCR), title 15, section 3006(c). He pled guilty to the administrative violation and received counseling without reprimand. However, at a subsequent classification review, his computer clearance was rescinded due to the violation, which was interpreted as computer fraud or abuse under CCR sections 3040(h) and 3041.3(j).Oliveras filed a grievance with the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), arguing that his violation did not constitute computer fraud or abuse. The CDCR denied his grievance and subsequent appeal. He then petitioned the superior court, which upheld the decision, stating it was supported by "some evidence." Oliveras filed a habeas corpus petition with the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District. While the petition was pending, his computer clearance was reauthorized at an annual review.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and determined that the issue was not moot despite the reauthorization of Oliveras's computer clearance. The court found that the classification of his violation as computer fraud or abuse could still affect future decisions. The court held that Oliveras's conduct did not constitute computer fraud or abuse under Penal Code section 502, as there was no evidence he used the tablet's functions to obtain or distribute the images, nor did his actions align with the legislative intent behind section 502. The court reversed the October 2022 revocation of Oliveras's computer clearance and ordered the removal of any reference to this revocation from his file. View "In re Oliveras" on Justia Law

In 2015, J.M., then 17, broke into a 72-year-old woman's home, assaulted her with intent to commit rape, and stole $900. The People filed charges directly in adult criminal court under former section 707. A jury found J.M. guilty of assault with intent to commit rape during a burglary, attempted rape, and first-degree robbery, with an elder abuse enhancement. He was sentenced to 14 years to life.J.M. appealed, arguing that Proposition 57, which eliminated direct charging of juveniles in adult court, should apply retroactively. The California Supreme Court in People v. Superior Court (Lara) agreed, holding that Proposition 57 applies retroactively to nonfinal cases. The Court of Appeal conditionally reversed J.M.'s judgment and remanded for a juvenile transfer hearing. The juvenile court, after a hearing, transferred J.M. to adult court, reinstating his sentence. J.M.'s appeal of this order was dismissed, but he later successfully petitioned for habeas corpus, leading to the reentry of the transfer order and this appeal.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that recent amendments to section 707, which raised the prosecution's burden of proof and required specific findings regarding a minor's amenability to rehabilitation, apply retroactively to J.M.'s case. The court conditionally reversed the transfer order and remanded for a new transfer/amenability hearing under the amended law. If the juvenile court again transfers J.M. to adult court, the criminal court must conduct a new sentencing hearing considering recent ameliorative changes in sentencing laws. View "In re J.M." on Justia Law