Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the petitioner, Cedrick Conway, is awaiting trial on a petition to commit him as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). In preparation for the trial, he requested a court order directing a Department of State Hospitals (DSH) evaluator to update a previous evaluation of Conway which was done several years earlier and concluded that he did not meet the criteria for commitment as an SVP. The trial court denied the request, believing that the pertinent statute only allows the prosecution (the party seeking commitment) to request an updated evaluation—not the defense. Conway challenged this ruling, leading to the present case.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Five concluded that the trial court had misunderstood the statute. While the SVPA does allow the prosecution to request an updated evaluation from DSH, the court found nothing in the statute that would prohibit the defense from obtaining an updated evaluation if authorized by a court order. The court therefore held that the trial court erred in denying Conway’s request for an updated evaluation based on a mistaken understanding of the statute.The court also rejected the defense’s claim that the prosecution was not entitled to oppose the defense motion for an updated evaluation. The court determined that the trial court has discretion to decide whether to entertain opposition from the prosecution. The court therefore issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to reconsider Conway’s request for an updated evaluation, taking into account the court's discretion to authorize such an evaluation for the defense. View "Conway v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Buckner was convicted of arson of an inhabited structure and sentenced to three years in prison. He argued that: there is no substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that the house was inhabited because the evidence did not show that he intended to continue living in the house after the fire; the court erred by admitting statements he made during a police interview that he argues were taken in violation of his Miranda rights; and the trial court improperly ordered him to pay restitution to his insurance company and the fire department.The court of appeal affirmed in part. The law does not require the prosecution to prove that Buckner intended to continue living in the house after the fire; since Buckner was living in the house at the time of the fire, substantial evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that the house was inhabited. Buckner’s statements to the police were properly admitted at trial because, under the totality of the circumstances, the interview during which he made them was not custodial. The restitution order must be reversed because the insurance company and the fire department are not victims of Buckner’s crime for purposes of restitution under Penal Code section 1202.4. View "People v. Buckner" on Justia Law

Phillips. arrested for DUI, was taken to a lab facility. Ramos, a phlebotomist, took a needle from a sealed package supplied by the County Forensic Lab, cleaned Phillips’ arm, and drew two vials of blood. The county lab measured Phillips’ BAC at 0.110 percent, +/- 0.004 percent. The lab report certifies the "sample appears to be compliant with Title 17” of the California Code of Regulations. At a hearing, Phillips attempted to rebut the presumption, Evidence Code section 664, that the blood was properly collected. Phillips called one witness, Ribeiro, the president of Bay Area Phlebotomy and Laboratory Services, who testified that Ramos was a CPT, not a "qualified person" (licensed physician, RN, LVN, licensed clinical laboratory scientist, licensed clinical laboratory bioanalyst, certified paramedic, or licensed physician assistant). Phillips also established that a licensed physician had not approved the policies and procedures that Ramos followed; a qualified person had not verified Ramos’ competency to draw blood for alcohol testing before she was first allowed to do so without direct supervision; a qualified person had not reviewed Ramos’ work at least once a month; and no qualified individual was accessible for consultation within 30 minutes.The hearing officer rejected Phillips’ arguments and ordered the suspension of Phillips’ driving privilege. The court of appeal affirmed. While Phillips rebutted the presumption that the blood test was properly performed, the evidence established the reliability of the manner of collection of Phillips’ blood. View "Phillips v. Gordon" on Justia Law

Wiley was charged with kidnapping and making a criminal threat. Wiley pled guilty to the criminal threat charge. The court imposed the upper term (three years) but suspended the execution of the sentence and placed Wiley on probation with a condition that Wiley obey all laws. Wiley was subsequently charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of a billy club, and possession of a stun gun by a felon. The information alleged Wiley had sustained a prior serious felony conviction, a strike, his criminal threat conviction. Wiley pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. The court dismissed the other counts and the prior conviction allegation and found that Wiley had violated his probation in the criminal threat case.The court imposed a three-year upper term for the criminal threat conviction and a consecutive eight months (one-third the midterm) for the firearm possession conviction. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court erred under federal and state law by selecting the upper term, relying in part on aggravating factors—the increasing seriousness of Wiley’s convictions and his poor performance on probation—that were not admitted by Wiley or found true by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The facts were proved by a certified record of Wiley’s convictions, and fall within the prior conviction exception to the heightened proof requirements. View "People v. Wiley" on Justia Law

Appellant Robert Velasco, who was serving a sentence for attempted home invasion robbery, assault with a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a felon, was identified as eligible for resentencing pursuant to California Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess., codified at Penal Code section 1172.75). At a September 2022 resentencing hearing, Velasco’s attorney made an oral motion to strike Velasco’s one year prison prior enhancement, which had been imposed pursuant to section 667.5(b) and did not involve a sexually violent offense. Velasco was not present at the hearing and, although the minute order reflected his presence was waived, the record did not contain a written waiver. The trial court granted the request, struck the enhancement, and resentenced Velasco to a total term of 26 years and four months. Neither counsel nor the court addressed whether other new sentencing laws might impact Velasco’s sentence or whether postconviction factors should influence the new sentence. Velasco argued on appeal the trial court abused its discretion by not conducting a full resentencing hearing as was required by section 1172.75. He further contended the trial court violated his federal and state constitutional rights by holding a resentencing hearing in his absence without a valid waiver. The State argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct this resentencing hearing at all because Velasco’s case was already on appeal before the Court of Appeal in case No. D080603. However, should the appeals court determine that the trial court had jurisdiction, the State conceded remand was warranted because Velasco did not waive his presence at the resentencing hearing. The Court concluded the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence Velasco pursuant to section 1172.75 but reversed and remanded for a new hearing on the grounds that Velasco was not present at the sentencing hearing and did not validly waive his presence. View "California v. Velasco" on Justia Law

The trial court appointed the same attorney (counsel) to represent defendant Mark Foley and Raymond Gladden, who had been a codefendant in the underlying criminal trial, at a consolidated evidentiary hearing after both had filed separate petitions for resentencing. Both men were not the actual killer, but both had been convicted of murder on a felony-murder theory. At the hearing, to save the murder convictions, the prosecution was required to prove that defendant’s and Gladden’s individual participation in the underlying felony of kidnapping made them major participants in the kidnapping and that they acted with reckless indifference to human life. The prosecution argued those elements were satisfied for defendant and Gladden. Counsel then argued factors she considered favorable to defendant and also argued factors favorable to Gladden. But the same factors did not favor both, and counsel stated Gladden “certainly [had] the stronger petition.” The court granted Gladden’s petition only. The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of defendant’s petition because the court violated defendant’s constitutional right to conflict-free representation. The case was remanded for a new evidentiary hearing. View "California v. Foley" on Justia Law

After being released from prison, Evers lived in the forest in Mendocino County and obtained food, alcohol, firearms, and other items from occupied and unoccupied residences. Officers, responding to a report that Evers had broken into a residence, chased him. Evers shot toward an officer and escaped. Apprehended, he pleaded guilty to assault on a peace officer with a firearm and agreed to a sentence of 25 years to life in prison. The court ordered Evers to pay direct restitution of $1,450 and $839.99 to two victims, with 10 percent annual interest, and a 15 percent administrative fee plus a $10,000 restitution fine. The court ordered but suspended a $10,000 parole restitution fine. The court stated that Evers would be able to earn wages while incarcerated, so inability to pay was not a reason not to impose or to reduce the restitution fine, The court declined to use a statutory formula to reduce the restitution fine.The court of appeal modified the judgment. The 15 percent administrative fee was invalid; the statute under which it was imposed was repealed before Evers's sentencing. The court otherwise affirmed. Evers forfeited his argument that the restitution fines were unconstitutional under cases requiring sentencing courts to take into account a defendant’s ability to pay. He did not properly raise his constitutional challenge to the fines by submitting two informal post-judgment motions to the trial court under Penal Code 1237.2. View "People v. Evers" on Justia Law

The trial court here dismissed a violent felony charge filed against defendant-respondent Brian Turner for the third time, finding that the two prior dismissals did not result from any excusable neglect. The Riverside County District Attorney appealed. If a charge for a violent felony has been dismissed twice, Penal Code section 1387.1 authorized prosecutors to refile the charge for a third time so long as one of the dismissals was “due solely to excusable neglect . . . on the part of the court, prosecution, law enforcement agency, or witnesses,” and the prosecution did not act in bad faith. Because the first dismissal was due to the trial court’s excusable neglect, the Court of Appeal reversed. View "California v. Turner" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted following a jury trial in 2004 of first-degree murder and robbery arising from a shooting death and attempted murder and a second count of robbery based on two separate incidents on June 30, 2022. In January 2020, the superior court granted Defendant’s petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6 expressly finding Defendant had been a major participant in the robbery but not the actual shooter and impliedly finding he did not act with reckless indifference to human life during the robbery. The court vacated the murder conviction, resentenced Defendant on the remaining three convictions and ordered him released from custody based on time served. Defendant petitioned pursuant to section 851.8 for a finding of actual innocence, arguing as evidence of his innocence that the victim’s companion, the only eyewitness to the robbery-murder, had not identified Defendant as a participant in the crime and that the prosecutor had withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83. The superior court denied the petition. On appeal, Defendant argued the order vacating his murder conviction under section 1172.6 necessarily entitled him to a finding of factual innocence.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that Defendant’s successful section 1172.6 petition did not entitle him to a finding of factual innocence. The court explained that an order granting Defendant’s petition for resentencing does not mean, without more, Defendant is factually innocent of the crime of murder. The court noted that the record must exonerate, not merely raise a substantial question as to guilt. View "P. v. Hollie" on Justia Law

James Koenig petitioned the California Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Court of Appeal. Koenig contended the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) and the Board of Parole Hearings erred in denying his request for nonviolent offender early parole consideration under Proposition 57, The Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016. Koenig was sentenced in July 2013 to an aggregate term of 42 years eight months in prison: (1) a 12-year principal term on one count of sale by a false statement consisting of five years plus a three-year enhancement for multiple fraudulent felonies and a four-year enhancement for taking property in excess of $3.2 million; (2) 28 one-year consecutive subordinate terms on 28 counts of sale by a false statement; and (3) 2 one-year and four-month consecutive subordinate terms for two counts of first degree burglary. The court imposed and stayed under Penal Code section 654 sentences for one count of fraudulent use of a scheme, one count of conspiracy, and two counts of sale by false statement. Koenig contended was eligible for early parole consideration because he served the full term of his primary offense—as defined by Proposition 57—and also “the violent offense portion of his total sentence.” The Court of Appeal concluded Koenig was not being unconstitutionally excluded from early parole consideration because he was convicted of and sentenced for violent felony offenses, and he was serving a term for these violent felonies throughout his aggregate term. "The fact he has completed the full term for his primary, nonviolent offense within the meaning of Proposition 57 is insufficient to render him eligible for early parole consideration." His petition for habeas relief was denied. View "In re Koenig" on Justia Law