Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was convicted of eight sex crimes involving three juvenile girls, including his stepdaughter and two other children in the household. The most serious incident occurred in December 2016, when a six-year-old girl suffered a severe vaginal injury while in the defendant’s care, leading to hospitalization and subsequent disclosure of sexual abuse. Over the following years, two other girls reported that the defendant had also sexually abused them on multiple occasions, with one describing repeated acts of molestation occurring regularly over a period of time.The Sonoma County Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, including multiple counts of sexual intercourse or lewd acts with a child under 14, and found true several sentencing enhancements. The defendant appealed, challenging two of the convictions related to one victim. He argued that the prosecution relied on the same testimony to support both charged and uncharged offenses, and that the jury instruction regarding uncharged sex offenses (CALCRIM No. 1191A) improperly lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof and confused the jury. He also raised an alternative claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the instruction.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that, although the same testimony was used to support both charged and uncharged offenses and the instructions could have been clearer, any potential instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found that the jury was properly instructed that each charged offense had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the evidence supporting the convictions was substantial. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "People v. Dejesus-Galindo" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant charged with second degree robbery after an incident in which the victim was attacked by multiple individuals, including the defendant, who was identified as the Hispanic female participant. The victim suffered significant injuries, including lacerations and a puncture wound, and reported that the defendant made threatening statements during the robbery. The defendant, who had a history of mental health and substance abuse issues, was unhoused at the time and later sought pretrial mental health diversion under California Penal Code section 1001.36, submitting evidence of her diagnoses and willingness to participate in treatment.The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied the defendant’s motion for mental health diversion on three grounds: it found the prosecution had rebutted the presumption that her mental health disorders were a significant factor in the offense; it determined she posed an unreasonable risk to public safety if treated in the community; and it exercised its residual discretion to deny diversion based on the nature of the offense and the victim’s injuries. The defendant then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, seeking to overturn the denial.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for mental health diversion. The appellate court found there was no substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings that the prosecution had rebutted the statutory presumption regarding the significance of the defendant’s mental disorder or that she posed an unreasonable risk of committing a super-strike offense if treated in the community. The appellate court also concluded that the trial court’s exercise of residual discretion was inconsistent with the purposes of the mental health diversion statute. The court issued a peremptory writ directing the trial court to vacate its denial and grant the application for mental health diversion. View "Gomez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Christopher Skaggs was released on parole in 2019 after serving a prison sentence for felony violations of the Vehicle Code. In December 2020, the Mendocino County District Attorney filed a petition to revoke his parole, alleging new criminal conduct, and also filed a related criminal complaint. Skaggs failed to appear for hearings, resulting in bench warrants. He was later arrested in Lake County on these warrants and new charges, convicted, and sentenced to additional prison time. While incarcerated, Skaggs repeatedly requested to resolve the Mendocino County parole revocation and criminal matters. The criminal complaint was dismissed under Penal Code section 1381, but the court declined to dismiss the parole revocation petition, finding section 1381 inapplicable.Skaggs subsequently filed a nonstatutory motion to dismiss the parole revocation petition on constitutional due process grounds, arguing that delays prejudiced him by preventing concurrent sentencing and prolonging his custody. The Mendocino County Superior Court construed his motion as a Penal Code section 1385 motion and denied it, reasoning that section 1385 does not apply to parole revocation proceedings. The court then held a contested revocation hearing, found Skaggs violated parole, sentenced him to 90 days in jail, and ordered his parole terminated upon release. Skaggs appealed the denial of his motion and the parole revocation.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, determined that Skaggs’s appeal was moot because his parole had already been terminated and no effective relief could be granted. However, the court exercised its discretion to address the trial court’s error, holding that the trial court improperly construed Skaggs’s constitutional due process motion as a section 1385 motion and incorrectly concluded it lacked authority to consider the motion. The appellate court clarified that trial courts have jurisdiction to entertain nonstatutory motions to dismiss parole revocation petitions on constitutional due process grounds. The appeal was dismissed as moot. View "People v. Skaggs" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was accused of multiple sexual offenses involving two individuals: his sister-in-law, Nathaly, and a family friend, Evelin. The prosecution charged him with several counts related to alleged assaults on Nathaly when she was a minor, and one count of misdemeanor sexual battery involving Evelin. The jury convicted the defendant only on the misdemeanor count involving Evelin, finding that he groped her after a party. The jury could not reach a verdict on the counts involving Nathaly, leading the trial court to declare a mistrial on those charges, which the prosecution chose not to retry.Following the conviction, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County sentenced the defendant to 364 days in county jail for the misdemeanor sexual battery, ordered him to register as a sex offender, and issued a protective order under Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), restraining him from contacting Nathaly. The defendant appealed, arguing that the protective order for Nathaly was unauthorized because she was not a victim of the crime for which he was convicted, and that his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum for the offense.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that, under the current version of Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), a postconviction protective order may only be issued to protect a victim of the specific crime for which the defendant was convicted. Because Nathaly was not a victim of the misdemeanor sexual battery, the trial court lacked authority to issue a protective order for her. The court also found the 364-day sentence unauthorized, as the statutory maximum for the offense is six months. The conviction was affirmed, but the judgment was reversed with directions to vacate the protective order and resentence the defendant to six months. View "People v. Pena" on Justia Law

The defendant, a military veteran, was convicted in 2017 of multiple firearm-related offenses, including possession of assault weapons and ammunition as a felon, as well as possessing a forged driver’s license. The convictions stemmed from his involvement in acquiring and storing firearms and ammunition, despite being prohibited from doing so due to his criminal record. The defendant’s background included significant childhood trauma, military service, and subsequent mental health and substance abuse issues, which were not considered at his original sentencing. While incarcerated, he received mental health treatment and engaged in rehabilitation efforts.After his conviction and sentencing to 20 years in prison, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.91, which allows veterans to seek reduced sentences if their mental health conditions related to military service were not considered at sentencing. The Superior Court of Orange County found the defendant eligible for relief, acknowledging a connection between his mental health disorders and military service. However, the court denied resentencing, reasoning that there was no evidence linking his mental health issues to the commission of his offenses and refusing to consider his rehabilitative conduct in prison.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on an irrelevant factor—requiring a nexus between the defendant’s mental health condition and his offenses—and by failing to consider relevant factors, such as the defendant’s rehabilitation while incarcerated and changes in the law favoring mitigation. The appellate court reversed the order denying resentencing and remanded the matter for a new resentencing hearing under section 1170.91, subdivision (b). View "People v. Hayde" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was charged with assault with a deadly weapon after an altercation with a neighbor in April 2020. The defendant, who had a prior falling out with the victim, was accused of attacking the victim with a skateboard following a brief verbal exchange. In September 2023, the defendant sought pretrial mental health diversion, submitting a recent diagnosis from a qualified mental health professional indicating he suffered from major depressive disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder.The Superior Court of Riverside County denied the defendant’s motion for mental health diversion. The court acknowledged the recent diagnosis but concluded that because the diagnosis was made three years after the offense, it did not demonstrate that the mental disorder played a significant role in the commission of the crime. The court did not find clear and convincing evidence that the mental disorder was a contributing factor, and the defendant subsequently pleaded guilty. After his plea, the defendant renewed his motion for diversion and sought to withdraw his plea, but both motions were denied.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that under the amended Penal Code section 1001.36, a qualifying mental health diagnosis made within five years of the diversion request creates a presumption that the disorder contributed to the charged offense. The trial court erred by imposing a stricter timing requirement and by failing to recognize the statutory presumption. Because the prosecution did not present clear and convincing evidence to rebut this presumption, the appellate court conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the case for the trial court to determine the defendant’s suitability for diversion, rather than eligibility. If found suitable, diversion may be granted; otherwise, the conviction will be reinstated. View "P. v. Harlow" on Justia Law

The case concerns an incident in which the defendant, while on probation, delivered an unexpected punch to a friend, causing the victim to fall and sustain a fatal brain injury. The two had been drinking with others, and after a separate altercation, the victim attempted to calm the defendant. As the victim backed away, the defendant struck him, resulting in the victim’s head hitting the street. The defendant fled the scene. The victim died from catastrophic brain swelling due to the impact.A jury in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County convicted the defendant of voluntary manslaughter based on conscious disregard for human life. The defendant admitted to a prior serious felony and a prior strike under California’s “Three Strikes” law. The trial court denied a motion to dismiss the strike and imposed a 27-year sentence, consisting of the upper term for manslaughter, doubled for the strike, plus an enhancement for the prior serious felony. The defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the prosecutor misstated the law regarding the required risk of death for voluntary manslaughter and that the jury instructions were inadequate. The California Court of Appeal initially affirmed the judgment.The California Supreme Court granted review and remanded the case to the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, instructing reconsideration in light of recent Supreme Court decisions. On reconsideration, the Court of Appeal held that the “high degree of probability of death” standard articulated in People v. Reyes applies only to implied malice murder, not to voluntary manslaughter based on conscious disregard for life. The court found no error in the prosecutor’s statements or the jury instructions. However, the court determined that resentencing was required due to statutory changes and recent Supreme Court guidance on sentencing procedures. The sentence was reversed and remanded for full resentencing; the judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "P. v. Fleming" on Justia Law

An 18-year-old defendant assisted his employer, a drug dealer, in abducting a drug addict at gunpoint. The victim, who had previously sold drugs for the dealer under threat, was lured to a parking lot, forcibly taken to the dealer’s home, and subjected to prolonged violence and threats in an attempt to extort $100,000. The victim was beaten, tied up, threatened with death, forced to ingest or absorb drugs, and ultimately locked in a closet with the door screwed shut. After approximately 28 hours, a SWAT team rescued the victim. The defendant was present throughout the ordeal, actively participated in the violence, and threatened the victim and his family.A jury in the Superior Court of Orange County convicted the defendant of aggravated kidnapping with bodily harm and a firearm enhancement. The court imposed a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) plus a 10-year firearm enhancement, and also imposed a $300 parole revocation fine. The defendant appealed, arguing that the LWOP sentence was unconstitutional as applied to 18-year-olds under both the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the California Constitution, and that the parole revocation fine was improper because he was ineligible for parole.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that binding precedent from the United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court does not extend the constitutional protections against LWOP sentences for juveniles to offenders who were 18 at the time of the crime. The court also found that the sentence was not grossly disproportionate under the California Constitution, given the defendant’s conduct and criminal history. However, the court agreed that the parole revocation fine was improper and ordered it stricken. The judgment was affirmed as modified. View "P. v. Christensen" on Justia Law

In 2024, Carlos Huerta filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the superior court, seeking relief under the Racial Justice Act (RJA). The superior court denied the petition without appointing counsel, concluding that Huerta had failed to establish a prima facie claim for relief. Huerta then filed a petition in the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, alleging racial discrimination in his charges and sentence, supported by statistical data.Previously, in 2010, Huerta was convicted of three counts of premeditated attempted murder and other felonies, with gang enhancements, and sentenced to 53 years to life plus 14 years. In 2022, he was resentenced to a determinate term of 26 years following changes in the law concerning attempted murder, retaining multiple gang enhancements. The RJA was not addressed during the resentencing.The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause (OSC) in October 2024, appointing counsel for Huerta and directing the parties to address the legal showing required for the appointment of counsel in an RJA petition. The respondent initially argued that a prima facie showing was necessary for counsel appointment but later conceded that the McIntosh decision correctly interpreted section 1473, subdivision (e), which requires the appointment of counsel if the petition alleges facts that would establish an RJA violation.The Court of Appeal held that the superior court misapplied the statutory sequence by requiring a prima facie showing before assessing the lower pleading threshold for appointing counsel. However, the Court of Appeal concluded that Huerta's petition was facially defective as it failed to allege facts showing a qualifying offense under the RJA. The petition relied solely on gang enhancements, which do not fall within the scope of the relevant statutory provisions. Consequently, the Court of Appeal denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus. View "In re Huerta" on Justia Law

Defendant Sergio Munguia Torres was found guilty of first-degree murder in the killing of his wife, Sonia Suarez. The evidence showed that Torres waited in his vehicle until Suarez drove by, followed her, ran her off the road, and shot her when she tried to drive off. He then fled the scene. The jury also found true the allegation that Torres personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death. Torres was sentenced to 25 years to life for murder, plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement, totaling 50 years to life.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County reviewed the case. The prosecution filed a sentencing brief requesting the court to deny probation and not dismiss the firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 1385. Torres did not file a sentencing brief. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court acknowledged its discretion to strike the enhancement but noted the victim's vulnerability and the planning involved in the crime. The court concluded it would not dismiss the firearm enhancement and imposed the maximum sentence.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. Torres contended that the trial court erred in failing to strike the firearm enhancement under section 1385 based on the mitigating circumstance that the enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. The appellate court disagreed, interpreting the statute to mean that the enhancement itself must result in a sentence exceeding 20 years. Since Torres's sentence already exceeded 20 years without the enhancement, the court found that section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) did not apply. The judgment was affirmed. View "P. v. Torres" on Justia Law