Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Armani Miller appealed the trial court's denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. In August 2020, Miller pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter with a firearm use enhancement and was sentenced to 16 years in state prison. In May 2023, he filed a petition for resentencing, arguing that he could not be convicted of murder based on changes to the felony-murder rule effective January 1, 2019, and subsequent cases recognizing youth as a factor in determining reckless indifference to human life.The Alameda County Superior Court denied Miller's petition, finding he failed to make a prima facie case for relief. The court reasoned that Miller's plea and conviction occurred after the felony-murder rule was amended, and he could not show he could not be convicted of murder due to changes effective January 1, 2019.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that Miller could not establish a prima facie case for relief because the amended information against him was filed after the felony-murder rule was amended by Senate Bill 1437. Therefore, the prosecution was precluded from proceeding under the old, invalid theory of felony murder. The court concluded that Miller was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(1), as the charging document did not allow the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder that imputed malice based solely on his participation in the crime. The order denying Miller's petition for resentencing was affirmed. View "People v. Miller" on Justia Law

The People initiated a criminal prosecution against Diana Maria Teran, alleging she misused information obtained during her employment with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) while working for the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office. Teran was charged with violations of Penal Code section 502, subdivision (c)(2), which criminalizes unauthorized access and use of data from a computer system. The charges were based on Teran’s alleged use of data related to disciplinary proceedings of sheriff’s deputies, which she accessed during her tenure at LASD and later shared with a colleague at the District Attorney’s Office.The Los Angeles County Superior Court held Teran to answer on six counts after a preliminary hearing, finding sufficient evidence that she accessed the deputies' personnel records through LASD’s Performance Recording and Monitoring System (PRMS) and used this data without permission. The court rejected Teran’s argument that she was exempt from prosecution under the statute for acting within the scope of lawful employment and denied her motion to dismiss the charges under section 995. Teran then filed a petition for writ of prohibition.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and granted Teran’s petition. The court held that section 502(c)(2) does not apply to the use of purely public court records, even if those records were accessed from a computer system without permission. The court emphasized that the legislative intent behind the statute was to prevent hacking and tampering with computer systems, not to criminalize the sharing of public information. Consequently, the court ordered the dismissal of the charges against Teran and unsealed certain exhibits related to the case. View "Teran v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

In 1999, a jury convicted Patrick Allen Trent of first-degree murder and street terrorism but found not true the enhancements that he had personally used a knife and that the murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life plus eight months. This court affirmed the judgment in 2001. Trent’s first-degree murder conviction was later reduced to second-degree murder, reducing his aggregate term to 15 years to life plus eight months. In July 2020, Trent filed a petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95, which the trial court granted in February 2022. The trial court redesignated the murder conviction as assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury with a great bodily injury enhancement and resentenced Trent to six years eight months.The trial court denied Trent’s request to vacate the gang conviction, finding that section 1172.6 concerned the murder conviction. Trent timely appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to retroactively apply Assembly Bill No. 333 to his gang conviction and in imposing a great bodily injury enhancement to the redesignated offense. The People opposed Trent’s arguments but agreed that the abstract of judgment required correction to reflect that Trent’s convictions were by jury, not by plea.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, agreed with Trent that he was entitled to the retroactive application of Assembly Bill No. 333, requiring the reversal of his section 186.22 conviction and remand for further proceedings. The court also vacated Trent’s great bodily injury enhancement, finding that the trial court erred in imposing an uncharged enhancement. The court directed the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting these changes and that Trent’s convictions were by jury. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "P. v. Trent" on Justia Law

James Dixon was convicted in 2008 of first-degree murder and two counts of rape. The jury found true special-circumstance allegations that the murder was committed during a robbery and kidnapping, and Dixon was sentenced to death. Additionally, the court imposed and stayed execution of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life for the rape convictions, a one-year firearm enhancement, and four one-year prior prison term enhancements under Penal Code section 667.5, former subdivision (b).The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation informed the Superior Court of Los Angeles County in 2023 that Dixon was eligible for recall and resentencing under section 1172.75. The superior court, without holding a hearing, permanently stayed execution of the prior prison term enhancements but ruled Dixon was not eligible for resentencing because the trial court had stayed execution of his enhancements. Dixon appealed, arguing he was entitled to a full resentencing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the superior court had jurisdiction to resentence Dixon on the noncapital portions of his sentence, despite his pending automatic appeal in the Supreme Court. The court held that section 1172.75 applies to all enhancements imposed under section 667.5, former subdivision (b), whether executed or stayed. Therefore, the superior court should have stricken the prior prison term enhancements and conducted a resentencing hearing on the non-death portions of Dixon’s sentence.The Court of Appeal reversed the superior court's order and directed it to vacate its previous order, strike Dixon’s prior prison term enhancements, and resentence him on the rape convictions and the firearm enhancement in accordance with section 1172.75. The superior court was also instructed to prepare a new abstract of judgment and send it to the Department. View "P. v. Dixon" on Justia Law

In 1985, the petitioner was sentenced by the Los Angeles County Superior Court (LASC) to 15 years to life plus seven years for murder. While serving this sentence, he was found with methamphetamine in 1997 and subsequently sentenced by the Kern County Superior Court (KSC) in 1998 to an additional eight years, to be served consecutively. In July 2024, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) notified both courts that the petitioner qualified for compassionate release under Penal Code section 1172.2. The KSC denied the petition, while the LASC granted it and ordered the CDCR to release the petitioner. However, the CDCR refused to release him, citing the unserved eight-year sentence from the KSC.The petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court, which ordered the CDCR to show cause why the writ should not be granted, questioning the compatibility of sections 1172.2 and 1170.1(c). The case was transferred to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The appellate court reviewed the case and concluded that section 1172.2, which mandates a single court to resolve compassionate release petitions, is reconcilable with section 1170.1(c), which governs consecutive sentences for in-prison offenses.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, held that section 1172.2 requires a single court to handle compassionate release petitions and that the KSC, as the last court to impose a sentence, was the appropriate court to rule on the petition. The court found that the statutes were not irreconcilable and denied the petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus. The order to show cause was discharged, and the petitioner’s request for release was denied. View "In re Brissette" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of continuous sexual abuse of a child and sentenced to 12 years in prison. The trial court also ordered the defendant to undergo an HIV test and to stay away from his ex-wife and three of his children. The defendant appealed, arguing that the court erred by allowing speculative testimony, ordering the HIV test, and issuing a no-contact order with his ex-wife and two of his children.The Tuolumne County Superior Court initially charged the defendant with one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child and three counts of lewd conduct against a child. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts but hung on the substantial sexual conduct enhancements. The prosecution did not retry the enhancements. The trial court reversed the convictions on the lewd conduct counts and sentenced the defendant to 12 years for the continuous sexual abuse count. The court also ordered the defendant to undergo HIV testing and issued a protective order against his ex-wife and two of his children.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the defendant’s conviction but found that the trial court erred in ordering the HIV test and including the defendant’s ex-wife and two of his children in the protective order. The appellate court vacated the HIV test order and the protective order as it pertained to the ex-wife and two children. The court directed the trial court to amend the protective order to reflect that it was issued under the correct statutory basis and that only the victim, T.W., was to be protected. The case was remanded to the Tuolumne County Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion. View "P. v. Walts" on Justia Law

In 2007, Angel Eduardo Ramos was involved in a gang-related shooting where he was identified as the shooter. Ramos pleaded guilty to attempted murder and related crimes, receiving a 19-year prison sentence. In 2022, Ramos filed a petition under Penal Code section 1172.6 to vacate his attempted murder conviction. During the evidentiary hearing, the trial court admitted transcripts from the trial of Ramos's codefendant, Cordero, who was convicted of aiding and abetting the attempted murder. The court found Ramos to be the actual shooter and denied his petition.The Orange County Superior Court initially handled Ramos's case, where he pleaded guilty and was sentenced. Ramos later filed his petition for vacatur and resentencing under section 1172.6, which led to an evidentiary hearing. The trial court admitted the transcripts from Cordero’s trial over Ramos’s objection and denied the petition based on the evidence presented.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that under section 1172.6 (d)(3), evidence from "any prior hearing or trial" is admissible if it is admissible under current law. The court found that the trial court did not err in admitting the transcripts from Cordero’s trial, as the statute allows for such evidence to be considered. The court emphasized that section 1172.6 aims to ensure that a petitioner’s punishment is commensurate with their actions, and the evidence showed that Ramos was the actual shooter. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order denying Ramos’s petition for vacatur and resentencing. View "P. v. Ramos" on Justia Law

In 1993, a man was convicted by a jury of multiple crimes, including torture, mayhem, corporal injury to a child, and child abuse, after he bound his then-girlfriend’s five-year-old daughter with tape and forced her into scalding water, causing severe burns and permanent injuries. The child, R.P., suffered extensive medical trauma, permanent disfigurement, and lifelong disabilities. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a restitution fine but did not order direct victim restitution. Decades later, after the defendant was granted parole, the prosecution sought restitution for R.P. and her parents to cover medical expenses and lost wages.The Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County held a restitution hearing in 2023, where R.P. and her parents testified about the economic impact of the injuries. The court found their testimony credible and awarded restitution for medical expenses and both past and future lost wages. The defendant objected, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to impose restitution so long after sentencing, that the delay violated his constitutional rights, and that the discount rate used to calculate present value of future wages was unsupported. He did not challenge the amounts claimed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court held that there is no time limit restricting a court’s authority to order victim restitution in a criminal case, even decades after sentencing, when the original sentence omitted such an order. The court also found no violation of constitutional rights due to the delay, noting the defendant forfeited some arguments by not raising them earlier, and upheld the trial court’s use of the discount rate. The restitution order was affirmed. View "P. v. Sinay" on Justia Law

American Surety Company posted a $100,000 bail bond for Marlon Anibal Valle-Mejia. Valle-Mejia failed to appear at a court hearing on July 19, 2022, despite knowing the date. His attorney did not provide a reason for his absence. The court continued the case to August 8 without forfeiting the bail bond. Valle-Mejia again failed to appear on August 8, and the court continued the case to August 29, ordering him to appear personally. When Valle-Mejia did not appear on August 29, the court forfeited the bail bond and issued a bench warrant.American Surety Company filed motions in the criminal court to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bail, arguing that the court lost jurisdiction by not forfeiting the bail after the initial failure to appear. The criminal court denied both motions, and American did not appeal these decisions. Subsequently, a summary judgment against the bond was entered in a civil case, and American filed a motion to set aside the summary judgment, which was denied by the civil court based on issue preclusion.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court was required to forfeit the bail when Valle-Mejia first failed to appear without sufficient excuse on July 19, 2022. By not doing so, the court lost jurisdiction to forfeit the bail later. Consequently, the subsequent forfeiture and summary judgment were void. The appellate court determined that issue preclusion did not apply because the initial forfeiture was beyond the court's fundamental jurisdiction. The judgment was reversed, and American Surety Company was entitled to recover its costs on appeal. View "P. v. American Surety Co." on Justia Law

In 1991, an individual was convicted of the rape and murder of a woman in San Diego County. The crime involved the perpetrator bludgeoning the victim with a metal steering wheel lock, restraining and sexually assaulting her for several hours, and ultimately suffocating her before burying her body in the desert. The perpetrator confessed to the crimes and entered a plea agreement, resulting in a sentence of six years for rape and 25 years to life for first-degree premeditated murder. Over the years, state forensic psychologists consistently diagnosed the individual with sexual sadism disorder and a personality disorder with narcissistic features.After serving decades in prison, the Board of Parole Hearings found the individual suitable for parole in 2019 and again in 2022. On both occasions, the Governor of California exercised his authority to independently review and reverse the Board’s decision, citing concerns about the individual’s insight into the crimes and risk to public safety. The San Diego County Superior Court denied the individual’s petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the Governor’s 2022 reversal.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the habeas petition. Applying the highly deferential “some evidence” standard, the court examined whether there was a rational nexus between the evidence and the Governor’s determination of current dangerousness. The court found substantial evidence supporting the Governor’s conclusion that the individual lacked sufficient insight into the connection between his sexual disorder and violent conduct, continued to minimize his culpability, and demonstrated lapses in judgment and self-control in recent prison incidents. The court held that these factors, combined with the aggravated nature of the original crimes, provided a sufficient basis for the Governor’s decision. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "In re Rogowski" on Justia Law