Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

K.D. called 911; she wanted Ana out of her apartment. K.D. then texted a friend that Ana “raped me last night while I was knocked out.” Ana was interrogated after waiving his Miranda rights. In a recorded interview, he told the detectives that he and K.D. had a sexual relationship and that she had told him she no longer wanted to have a sexual relationship; that K.D., seemingly drunk, had texted him about coming to the apartment; that, at the apartment, after K.D.’s friends left he had sex with her while she was sleeping. K.D. underwent a sexual assault response team examination by a sexual assault forensic nurse, who testified that K.D. had multiple abrasions and lacerations to her external and internal vaginal areas. DNA samples were taken from genital swabs; a criminalist testified that the DNA samples matched K.D. and Ana.The court of appeal affirmed his convictions for rape of an intoxicated person and rape of an unconscious person, rejecting arguments the interrogating officers violated Ana’s Miranda rights, the trial court made improper comments when questioning an expert witness, counsel provided ineffective assistance by not objecting to a nurse’s qualifications as an expert, the jury instructions did not correctly define consent, and that the court erred in resolving a jury deadlock. The court stayed the punishment for rape of an unconscious person under Penal Code section 654. View "People v. Ana" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's conviction for second degree murder and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, concluding that a warrantless blood draw did not violate defendant's Fourth Amendment rights under the exigent circumstances exception. The court explained that circumstances are exigent when blood alcohol evidence is dissipating, as it always is, and a pressing health, safety, or law enforcement need takes priority over a warrant application. In this case, defendant created the exigency by injuring himself badly, he was unconscious and had to be helicoptered to surgery, and caring for defendant's medical need left no time for a breath test. The court directed the trial court to stay the sentence for count 2 pursuant to Penal Code section 654 and to forward a corrected copy of the abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. View "People v. Nault" on Justia Law

Lange drove past California Highway Patrol Officer Weikert, who noticed Lange was blaring music and honking unnecessarily. Weikert followed Lange, activating his overhead lights to signal that Lange should pull over. Seconds later, Lange arrived at the driveway of his home and drove into his attached garage. Weikert followed Lange into the garage and began questioning him. Lange appeared intoxicated. Weikert conducted field sobriety tests, which Lange failed. Lange’s blood-alcohol content was over three times the legal limit. Lange, charged with DUI and operating a vehicle’s sound system at excessive levels, unsuccessfully moved to suppress all evidence collected after Weikert entered Lange’s garage.In 2019, the court of appeal affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, reasoning that an officer’s hot pursuit into the house to prevent the suspect from frustrating the arrest is always permissible under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the “flight of a suspected misdemeanant does not always justify a warrantless entry into a home”; an “officer must consider all the circumstances in a pursuit case to determine whether there is a law enforcement emergency,” and vacated for reconsideration.The court of appeal again affirmed the denial of the motion. Weikert followed binding state appellate law when he entered the garage in pursuit of Lange. The exclusionary rule does not require exclusion of the evidence seized in Lange’s home, even though under the Supreme Court’s new pronouncement. View "People v. Lange" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of the tragic rape and murder of Rachel Russell, perpetrated by her grandson, Sidney DeAvila. DeAvila suffered from severe mental illness, and at the time of the murder he was on parole. Russell’s son, plaintiff Steven Russell, brought an action against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department), alleging the Department’s parole agents had a special relationship with Russell, and they failed to warn her of DeAvila’s dangerous propensities. A jury agreed, and ultimately awarded plaintiff $4.5 million in noneconomic damages, which the trial court reduced to $2.7 million. The Department appealed, arguing it had no duty to warn Russell of DeAvila’s dangerous propensities and, even if it did have a duty to warn, it was immune from that liability. Plaintiff claimed on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in reducing the judgment and imposing sanctions against trial counsel. The Court of Appeal was "compelled to agree" with the Department, that because the facts presented were not sufficient to establish that there was a special relationship between the agents and Russell, no duty to warn arose. Accordingly, judgment was reversed. View "Russell v. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

Petitioner Derrick Blakes sought review of the denial of his motion to suppress the fruits of a search of his car following a traffic stop. He claimed the trial court erred in finding the warrantless search supported by probable cause and was a valid impound search. The Court of Appeal found the facts adduced by the officers before the warrantless entry of the car were: illegally tinted windows, defendant taking one-tenth of a mile to pull over and stop, the smell of marijuana emanating from the car, his having a suspended license, and his having a prior arrest for felon in possession of a firearm. The Court concluded these facts did not provide probable cause that contraband or evidence of illegal activity was in the car. The Court determined the evidence showed the impound decision was based on an investigative pretext rather than serving a community caretaking function. The Court thus granted petitioner's request for mandamus relief, and remanded this case to the trial court with directions to grant the suppression motion. View "Blakes v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate directing the appellate division of the Los Angeles County Superior Court to set aside its opinion reversing the trial court's dismissal of her criminal case under Penal Code section 1385, and instead to affirm the dismissal.The Court of Appeal held that the local ordinances that petitioner was charged with violating, Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) sections 104.15(a)1, 104.15(b)4, and 12.21A.1.(a), are not preempted by state law. The court also held that the appellate division did not err in concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the charges primarily based on petitioner's lack of knowledge or intent, because the ordinances impose strict liability and do not require proof of knowledge or intent. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Wheeler v. Appellate Division of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law

A police officer spotted defendant Enrique Jimenez and his two teenaged sons by some trash cans in a field. They jumped into an SUV and drove away. The officer, believing they had committed illegal dumping, tried to pull them over. Instead, defendant dropped off his sons near his house, then led the police in a pursuit. When the police took a closer look at the trash cans, they found that one contained a dead body. Defendant confessed that he had intentionally stabbed the victim to death. Defendant was convicted by jury of first degree murder with an enhancement for personal use of a deadly weapon; recklessly evading an officer; and two counts of aggravated assault on a peace officer. He was sentenced to a total of 29 years to life, plus fines, fees, and ancillary orders. On appeal, defendant contended, among other things, that his confession was involuntary because the police induced it by threatening to charge his sons with the murder. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal agreed: the interrogating officer told defendant that he knew defendant’s sons were innocent of murder, but he intended to charge them anyway — unless defendant confessed. "We cannot say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that if defendant’s confession had been excluded, he would still have been convicted of first degree murder. Indeed, it is reasonably probable that the jury would have found him guilty of a lesser offense, such as second degree murder or involuntary manslaughter, or acquitted him on this count." The judgment was reversed solely with respect to the conviction on count 1 (murder) and with respect to the sentence; in all other respects, it was affirmed. On remand, if the State did not bring defendant to a new trial on count 1 in a timely manner, then the Court's remittitur would be deemed to modify the verdict by striking the conviction on count 1 and the trial court would have to promptly resentence defendant. View "California v. Jimenez" on Justia Law

Defendant Allen Benzler was sentenced in 2014 for offenses he committed when he was 18 years old. He appealed the summary denial of his motion for a "Franklin" hearing under California Penal Code section 1203.01, contending he satisfied the eligibility criteria for such a hearing laid out in In re Cook, 7 Cal.5th 439 (2019), and did not previously have an opportunity to present evidence related to his status as a juvenile offender. To this, the Court of Appeal concurred, reversed the trial court’s order, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "California v. Benzler" on Justia Law

Defendants Jamie Ramirez and Albert Villa participated in a beating of another inmate while in custody at Southwest Detention Center. A jury convicted them of one count of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury. The jury also found true the allegation that defendants committed the assault “for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with” a criminal street gang for purposes of the STEP Act gang enhancement. On appeal, defendants argued the record contained insufficient evidence to support their gang enhancements. During trial, the prosecution presented evidence that defendants and the inmate who orchestrated the assault each belonged to different Riverside County gangs before they were incarcerated but that they committed the assault for the benefit of the prison gang “La Eme” (also known as the Mexican Mafia). Despite this theory, the prosecution proved that the three Riverside County gangs satisfied the STEP Act’s definition of a “criminal street gang,” but didn’t present such proof for La Eme, the gang the assault was related to. Because the record contained no nexus between the assault and a proven gang, Court of Appeal concluded the enhancements could not stand. It therefore vacated that aspect of the jury’s verdict but otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

In 2003, Strother was convicted of second-degree burglary and theft of access card information. Under the Three Strikes law, he was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison. In 2013, Strother filed a petition to recall his entire sentence pursuant to Proposition 36 (Penal Code 1170.126); in 2014 he sought recall of his sentence for theft of access card information pursuant to Proposition 47 (section 1170.18).The trial court found him eligible for relief under both propositions but, after a hearing, found that Strother posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety and was not suitable for resentencing. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court abused its discretion in finding he posed an unreasonable risk of committing a “super strike” by failing to consider that his two prior convictions involving violence and firearm use occurred almost 30 years ago with no evidence he was the shooter; failed to consider his prison fighting in 2016-2019 was the result of his 2016 gang renunciation; and erroneously found that his conflict resolution and anger management programming and parole plans were inadequate. The court noted that Strother’s juvenile record began in 1979, when he was 14 years old, with a sustained petition for robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, a knife. View "People v. Strother" on Justia Law