Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

During an altercation outside a bar after last call, defendant-appellant Charles Waxlax stabbed Erik Kimbler in the back with a military-grade knife. Kimbler suffered serious injuries but survived. At trial, the jury rejected Waxlax’s claim of self-defense and convicted him of the four crimes the prosecution had charged him with: attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon, assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, and attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime. Defendant was sentenced 11 years in prison, consisting of nine years for the attempted murder conviction and two years for the dissuading conviction. The judge imposed, but stayed under Penal Code section 654, three-year sentences on the two assault convictions. On appeal, Defendant argued the omission of three self-defense related jury instructions required reversal of his murder and assault convictions: (1) an instruction on the doctrine of transferred self-defense; (2) CALCRIM No. 3470, which defined self-defense for all nonhomicide offenses, and (3) a pinpoint instruction that his specific fear of imminent danger arose from his belief he was being robbed. Defendant also argued his dual assault convictions at the very least violated Penal Code section 954 because force-likely assault and assault with a deadly weapon were different statements of the same offense and his charges were based on the same conduct - his single act of stabbing Kimbler. The Court of Appeal found Defendant's claims of instructional error meritless, but agreed his dual assault convictions violated section 954. The Court therefore vacated the force-likely assault conviction in count 2 and struck the fees associated with that count. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Waxlax" on Justia Law

In 2014, Silva and codefendants were convicted of two counts of first-degree murder arising out of a home invasion robbery. Silva, who was involved in transporting stolen items after the robbery was underway, was sentenced to 50 years to life in prison. In 2019, Silva obtained resentencing as a non-killer under Penal Code 1170.95; his murder convictions were vacated and he was resentenced to a term of 16 years based on two in-concert home-invasion robberies plus six home-invasion robberies or attempted robberies based on the number of robbery victims alleged in the original information. He was never tried or convicted of any of those robberies, nor did the jury make findings against him as to any of them.The court of appeal reversed in part, stroking one of the robberies. The resentencing judge had the discretion to redesignate more offenses than one in lieu of each of Silva’s murder convictions, to more closely approximate the gravity of his conduct. There is no constitutional bar to the redesignation of additional counts, if the petitioner receives notice, an opportunity to be heard and the prosecution bears its burden of proving guilt on the redesignated counts; on the record, that standard was met. The court otherwise rejected Silva’s claims of constitutional error and concluded that remand was unnecessary. View "People v. Silva" on Justia Law

Washington was convicted of five sexually violent offenses that occurred in 1984. Before Washington’s 2014 release, the state sought to commit Washington as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act, The trial court declared Washington to be an SVP and committed him to the California Department of State Hospitals for an indeterminate term.The court of appeal remanded, first rejecting Washington’s argument that the trial court violated the Act by failing to advise him of his right to a jury trial and to obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right. The Act provides that trial will be “before the court without a jury” if the defendant or attorney “does not demand a jury trial.” The statute does not provide for advisement of the alleged SVP’s right to a jury trial. Washington also argued that failure to obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial violated his right to due process, and the Act’s failure to provide protections for his jury trial right, unlike statutes governing other types of civil commitments, violated his equal protection rights. The court questioned whether the dangerousness of SVP’s is a constitutionally valid justification for differential treatment with respect to procedural protections of their jury trial right but remanded for evaluation of that challenge. View "People v. Washington" on Justia Law

Since he was 19 years old, defendant John Vasquez had been continuously been on probation, parole, or incarcerated. At age 26, Vasquez pleaded guilty to two armed robberies and went to prison for 13 years. At age 42, while still on parole, Vasquez committed two recent armed robberies. In the last robbery, Vasquez hit a gas station attendant in the face with his handgun, causing fractures to the victim’s right orbital area. Vasquez also shot the victim in the leg. The prosecution charged Vasquez with attempted murder, two armed robberies, related crimes, and sentencing enhancements. The prosecution calculated Vasquez’s potential exposure at 90 years to life. However, the trial court struck one of Vasquez’s two prior strike convictions and imposed a 28-year determinate prison term after Vazquez pleaded to the sheet. The prosecution objected and appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded that given Vasquez’s background, character, and prospects, he fell squarely within the letter and the spirit of the “Three Strikes” law, and there were no extraordinary circumstances that justified a departure from that law. Therefore, the Court found the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing one of Vasquez’s strike priors. View "California v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

Cervantes was charged in connection with separate shooting incidents, several months apart. In both incidents, his motive appeared to be the victims’ alleged romantic pursuit of a woman Cervantes had dated. He was convicted of assault with a semi-automatic firearm, possession of a firearm by a felon, and assault with a firearm, along with true findings on special enhancements for the personal use of a firearm and personal infliction of great bodily injury. He was acquitted on willful, deliberate, premeditated attempted murder and assault with a stun gun or taser and admitted his strike prior. The court imposed a sentence of 352 months, including 10 years for the gun enhancement. The court of appeal rejected claims of juror misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel but remanded a claim under SB 620, noting “the trial court may strike the firearm enhancements or strike only the punishment for the enhancements.”The court of appeal affirmed the denial of Cervantes’s motion to strike the firearms enhancement. The trial court was not required to exercise its full sentencing discretion. The case was not remanded to recall and resentence as under section 1170.126(b), nor because the court committed legal error in sentencing. The matter was remanded to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike the firearm enhancements under Penal Code 12022.5(c).” View "People v. Cervantes" on Justia Law

Rodney Lewis appealed after a jury convicted him of rape by intoxication and kidnapping to commit rape. Lewis argued the trial court erred in instructing the jury on kidnapping to commit rape and insufficient evidence supported his convictions. After careful consideration, the Court of Appeal agreed there was prejudicial instructional error and reversed his kidnapping to commit rape conviction. Because there was insufficient evidence to support that conviction, Lewis could not be retried. His insufficiency of the evidence claim as to his rape by intoxication conviction was meritless. In all other respects, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In 1991, petitioner Nokkuwa Ervin and other perpetrators committed an armed robbery of a store. During the robbery, one of the perpetrators shot and killed an innocent victim. A jury found Ervin guilty of burglary, robbery, and murder. The jury found true two sentencing allegations that Ervin personally used a firearm as to the burglary and the robbery counts. The jury found not true a sentencing allegation that Ervin personally used a firearm as to the murder count. The jury also found true two felony-murder special-circumstance allegations. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. In 2019, the California Legislature limited the scope of the felony-murder rule: if a victim is killed during a designated felony, a defendant cannot be found guilty of murder unless he was: (1) the actual killer; (2) aided and abetted the actual killer with the intent to kill; or (3) was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. Ervin petitioned for resentencing, arguing he could no longer be convicted of murder. The trial court initially found Ervin established a prima facie basis for relief, issued an order to show cause (OSC), and set an evidentiary hearing. But the court later revoked the OSC and summarily denied the petition. The court ruled the felony-murder special-circumstance findings precluded Ervin from obtaining relief under Penal Code section 1170.95 as a matter of law. The trial court’s ruling was made prior to the California Supreme Court’s ruling in California v. Lewis, 11 Cal.5th 952 (2021), which clarified the guidelines for section 1170.95 petitions. In its de novo review, the Court of Appeal found Ervin’s section 1170.95 petition reliably met the “very low” prima facie threshold for relief. Thus, the Court reversed the trial court’s summary denial of Ervin’s section 1170.95 petition. On remand, the Court ordered the trial court to issue an OSC and to conduct an evidentiary hearing. View "California v. Ervin" on Justia Law

Antioch police officers, responding to a call about a prowler, tried to stop a Pontiac sedan that the caller had identified. Officers in different vehicles pursued the Pontiac. At one point, an officer started to exit his vehicle with his firearm drawn. The Pontiac accelerated toward the officers, striking the driver’s door on the first vehicle so that it slammed on the officer’s ankle. The Pontiac hit the bumper on the second vehicle, causing no noticeable damage. The Pontiac sideswiped and scratched the third vehicle. After an extended chase with pursuit by a helicopter, officers apprehended the occupants of the Pontiac, including the driver (the minor).The court sustained a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code 602(a) for evasion of a peace officer while driving in willful disregard of others, deadly weapon assault on a peace officer, and force-likely assault. The court of appeal reversed in part. The punishment on the reckless evasion of police count must be stayed because it is based on the same indivisible course of conduct with the same intent and objective as the assault counts. The juvenile court must designate counts 1 and 3 as felonies or misdemeanors. The court rejected an argument that the finding on force-likely assault must be vacated because it is a lesser included offense of deadly weapon assault on a peace officer and is based on the same conduct. View "In re L.J." on Justia Law

While serving as an inmate at West Valley Detention Center, defendant Chelsea Giddens threw a milk carton filled with urine at a deputy, hitting her in the face. The incident was recorded by one of the jail’s security cameras. Based on the video, the prosecution charged Giddens with one count of “gassing” a peace officer, an aggravated form of battery that occurs when an inmate intentionally causes “any mixture containing human excrement or other bodily fluids” to make contact with the officer’s “skin or membranes.” At trial, the prosecution played the security footage for the jury, and the deputy testified she was certain the “salty, warm” liquid that splashed into her eyes and mouth was urine. Giddens testified in her own defense and denied throwing anything at the deputy, but her attorney presented a different theory during closing statements, arguing the prosecution had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the liquid was urine as it was just as likely Giddens had made a concoction of warm water and rotting food from her cell. The jury found Giddens guilty as charged. On appeal, she argued: (1) the jail violated Penal Code section 243.9’s mandatory duty to collect a sample of the suspected gassing substance and test it to determine whether it in fact contained a bodily fluid; (2) the failure to test the contents of the liquid also violated her due process rights to the disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence; and (3) the trial judge erroneously denied her motion to dismiss the gassing charge for insufficient evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed Giddens' conviction. View "California v. Giddens" on Justia Law

Jesus Valderas, facing several felony charges, did not appear at a status conference/trial call on October 20, 2020. It was the second consecutive court appearance that Valderas missed. The trial court issued a bench warrant for Valderas but ordered the warrant to be held until December 8, 2020, the date on which the court had set a readiness conference. The court sent notice to Valderas by mail to his last known address. When Valderas did not appear at the December 8 hearing, the court lifted its hold on the bench warrant. Valderas sought a writ of mandamus to recall the December 8 bench warrant., arguing there was no evidence before the court, at the time it lifted its hold on the bench warrant, that Valderas had actual notice that he was required to appear. Put differently, Valderas argues that a court may only issue a bench warrant if it can show that the subject defendant had actual notice of the hearing date he or she missed. The wrinkle here was that the COVID-19 pandemic caused the San Diego Superior Court to close for all criminal proceedings and continue all hearing and trial dates, thus requiring new dates be set for Valderas’s upcoming hearings and trial. Valderas did not dispute that the notices were mailed. His counsel represented to the court that Valderas was “couch surfing” with no set living address and infrequent access to a cell phone. Based on these representations, Valderas insisted there was no evidence that he had actual notice of the hearings, and, without actual notice, the court could not issue a bench warrant. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument: "Here, we believe the burden appropriately falls on Valderas. ... Even if Valderas were changing residences or having difficulty obtaining the use of a cell phone, it is not too burdensome to require him to check in with the court or his attorney in the eight months that followed the continuation of his trial date. He did not do so. ... We decline to require a court in this situation to track down Valderas’s actual whereabouts, provide him with notice of a hearing, and, only then, if he does not appear, issue a bench warrant. ... "The court correctly exercised its discretion in issuing the bench warrant for Valderas. View "Valderas v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law