Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Harris is charged with a violent rape that occurred in 1989. DNA from the crime scene and a vaginal swab matched Harris’s. A “pretrial services court report” indicated that Harris appeared to be an appropriate candidate for release on his own recognizance with enhanced monitoring. Harris asked for release on his own recognizance with nonfinancial conditions, e.g., a no-contact order, limitation of his use of dating websites, and GPS tracking. Harris argued that he is indigent, there is no indication he is a flight or safety risk, the alleged crimes occurred 32 years ago, he has not tried to contact the victim, he had a limited criminal history in the interim years, and he had community ties. The prosecution offered testimony by the victim that she feared for her safety, the doctor who treated the victim, and several women who reported that Harris liked to tie women up during sex and enact rape fantasies.Ultimately, the trial court denied Harris bail. finding that the charged felony offenses involved acts of violence on another person and that there is clear and convincing evidence of a substantial likelihood that Harris’s release would result in great bodily harm to others. The court of appeal remanded. The court erred in failing to set out reasons on the record why less restrictive alternatives to detention could not reasonably protect the public or victim safety. View "In re Harris" on Justia Law

In 2013, Price was convicted of first-degree murder with a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation that the murder was committed while Price was participating in a robbery and either was the killer, aided and abetted the murder with the intent to kill, or acted with reckless indifference to human life and was a major participant in the robbery. California Supreme Court decisions in 2015-2016 clarified the meaning of “major participant” and “reckless indifference to human life.” The court of appeal affirmed Price's conviction, holding the jury’s special circumstance finding was supported by substantial evidence that Price was the actual killer and that she intended for Merrill to be killed.In 2018, Senate Bill 1437 amended the statutory definition of murder in Penal Code 188, 189 to eliminate murder liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and to limit felony-murder liability to cases in which the felony-murder special circumstance was proven. The legislation provided a retroactive resentencing remedy (section 1170.95) for individuals who were convicted of murder before the amendment and could not be convicted under the amended law.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of Price’s section 1170.95 petition. Substantial evidence supports each of the three alternatives presented to the jury, including whether Price acted as a “major participant” in the robbery acting with “reckless indifference” to human life. View "People v. Price" on Justia Law

The district attorney charged Appellant Joseph Codinha with four offenses which occurred on two different dates. The counts alleged, respectively: (1) felony indecent exposure; (2) misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia used for narcotics; (3) felony possession of a controlled substance, i.e., methamphetamine; and (4) misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia used for narcotics. In addition, the amended information alleged: a prison prior for violating Penal Code section 667.5(b); five probation denial priors; the commission of one count while out on bail; and the requirement for registration as a sex offender. Appellant raised a number of issues as a result of rulings in four separate proceedings in the trial court: (1) the denial of Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea; (2) the denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence of drugs and drug paraphernalia; (3) the determination, based on Appellant’s Pitchess motion that the San Diego Police Department had no records responsive to Appellant’s discovery request; and (4) the sentence, which included a stay of a one-year enhancement on one of the counts. The Court of Appeal determined the trial court erred in staying Appellant's section 667.5(b) one-year enhancement: due to a change in the law after Appellant’s guilty plea and before Appellant’s sentencing, at the time of sentencing Appellant was no longer subject to the one-year sentence enhancement based on a prior prison term. Accordingly, the Court struck the enhancement and affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "California v. Codinha" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed a postjudgment order denying defendant's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 as to his conviction of first degree murder under a theory of felony murder based on his participation in an attempted carjacking. The court agreed with defendant that substantial evidence does not support the trial court's conclusion that he was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.In this case, defendant did not provide the murder weapon, instruct his confederate to shoot, or know of his confederate's propensity toward violence, and the shooting occurred quickly without defendant having a meaningful opportunity to intervene. Although defendant was aware his confederate had a gun and intended to use it in the carjacking, as a 15-year-old he may well have lacked the experience and maturity to appreciate the risk that the attempted carjacking would escalate into a shooting and death, and he was more susceptible to pressure from his fellow gang members to participate in the carjacking. The court also agreed with defendant that Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391 apply to defendant's resentencing under section 1170.95 and directed the trial court to transfer the matter to the juvenile court. View "People v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted murder in violation of Penal Code sections 664 and 187, subdivision (a), and one count of mayhem in violation of section 203. In 2021, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95, which the trial court denied. While defendant's appeal was pending, the Governor signed into law Senate Bill No. 775.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of his petition for resentencing. The court opted to apply the revised provisions set forth in SB 775 to defendant's case, concluding that the trial court's denial of defendant's petition based on its own determination that he was a major participant who acted with reckless disregard for human life was improper at the prima facie stage of his resentencing petition. Accordingly, the court remanded with directions to the trial court to permit the parties to brief whether defendant has established a prima facie basis for resentencing relief and, if so, to hold further proceedings consistent with section 1170.95, subdivision (c), after January 1, 2022, the effective date of SB 775. View "People v. Montes" on Justia Law

Appellant Javier Murillo was convicted by jury of forcibly resisting an executive officer in the performance of his duties, as well as delaying a peace officer in the performance of his duties and possessing drug paraphernalia. After he served his prison sentence, Murillo moved to vacate his resisting conviction based on newly discovered evidence, pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.6. Based on its own assessment of the underlying facts of the case and the credibility of the prosecution’s key witness, the trial court summarily denied appellant’s motion for failure to establish a prima facie case for relief. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that such factfinding at the initial stage of the motion process was improper. Therefore, the trial court’s denial order was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Murillo" on Justia Law

Williams, convicted of murder in 1995 and sentenced to 30 years to life in prison, was released on lifetime parole in 2018. In 2019, he was charged with two misdemeanors. The district attorney filed a petition to revoke his parole. After a contested hearing, the trial court rejected a petty-theft allegation but found that Williams had possessed drug paraphernalia and remanded him to prison, the required sanction whenever a court finds that a lifetime parolee has violated parole, (Pen. Code 3000.08(h).The court of appeal agreed that the appeal was moot because Williams had been paroled again but found the issue to be of continuing public interest and likely to recur yet evade appellate review. The trial court erred by refusing to refer the matter to the parole agency for a written report before ruling on the petition, section 1203.2(b)(1) There is no implied exception to this requirement when such a petition is filed against a lifetime parolee such as Williams because the report is not pointless even though a court has no discretion to impose intermediate sanctions. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the summary denial of a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. Defendant was convicted in 2016 of first degree murder, kidnapping to commit another crime, and robbery. The jury found true the special circumstance allegation that the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery.The court concluded that, because the jury found the robbery-murder special circumstance true, defendant is ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 as a matter of law. The court explained that the superior court erred in failing to appoint counsel, but the error was harmless in light of the jury's true finding on the robbery-murder special circumstance allegation. Furthermore, defendant is not entitled to relief under section 1170.95 based on the natural and probable consequences instructions given in connection with the uncharged conspiracy to commit robbery. View "People v. Farfan" on Justia Law

PVE’s owner, Morales is a licensed civil engineer, with an engineering seal which he uses to stamp building plans and other documents requiring an engineer’s services. In December 2007, Morales found a folder on Gutierrez’s desk containing invoices for Gutierrez’s own company, with structural calculations and drawings displaying Morales’s seal and signature. Gutierrez stated he was working alone; Morales believed him. Gutierrez was terminated from PVE in 2008.In 2014, Morales audited Rodriguez’s computer and discovered engineering documents for non-PVE projects with Morales’s seal and signature. Rodriguez, an engineering draftsman, admitted he worked on non-PVE projects using PVE’s logo and Morales’s seal and signature. Rodriguez was terminated. Morales notified the police. In February 2018, Gutierrez and Rodrigues were charged. The information alleged all of the charged criminal conduct occurred in 2009-2014 and was not discovered until March 2014.Rodriguez was convicted of 238 counts of forgery and identity theft, eight counts of grand theft, and six misdemeanor counts of petty theft. Gutierrez was convicted of 193 counts of forgery and identity theft, six counts of grand theft, and six misdemeanor counts of petty theft. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the charges were time-barred based on a four-year limitations period. The trial court did not err striking Morales’s testimony regarding what comprises a document and allowing convictions based on each page of a plan set. Defendants were properly convicted of both forgery and identity theft based on the same document. View "People v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Fisher was stopped for reckless driving and officers found, in his car's trunk, three pipe bombs that could cause serious injury to anyone holding them when lit. Fisher was released on bail. The friend who facilitated his release found chemicals in Fisher's garage and called the police, who found chemical powders and an AR-15 rifle, with no serial number, capable of accepting a magazine. Fisher was convicted of five destructive device felonies. Three offenses were subject to sentences served in county jail (Penal Code section 1170(h)) but Fisher was also convicted of two felony counts of simple possession of a destructive device, a “wobbler” offense that is not county jail eligible under section 1170(h). The court ordered that Fisher’s entire sentence be served in state prison.Fisher argued the disparate punishment of offenders convicted of the simple possession crime violates constitutional equal protection principles by treating similarly situated classes of offenders differently with no rational basis for the disparate treatment. The court of appeal found that persons charged with the various destructive device offenses are similarly situated and that there is no realistically conceivable legislative purpose to require a state prison sentence for those convicted of possession while affording the benefits of county jail incarceration for the 1170(h)-eligible offenses. The court concluded that the proper remedy is to reform section 18710 by making its violation punishable under section 1170(h). View "People v. Fisher" on Justia Law