Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against City Bail Bonds for restitution under California's unfair competition law (UCL) based on defendants' unlawful solicitation of bail. The trial court ruled in plaintiff's favor and awarded $38,666 in restitution. Defendants appealed and argued that the trial court erred in finding defendants unlawfully solicited bail from plaintiff in violation of California Code of Regulations, title 10, section 2079.The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the trial court correctly interpreted California Code of Regulations, title 10, section 2079 to prohibit defendants' solicitation of plaintiff to post another individual's bail. The court explained that the regulations are intended to protect recent arrestees against harassment, intimidation, overreaching, annoyance or invasions of privacy by bail agents clamoring for their business. In this case, defendants' conduct runs afoul of both the language of the regulations and their purpose where their high powered tactics eventually overcame plaintiff's will. The court also concluded that the trial court did not err in holding defendants liable for restitution under the UCL where substantial evidence supported the finding that defendants' violation of section 2079 resulted in plaintiff paying defendants for the individual's bail. View "Ngu v. City Bail Bonds" on Justia Law

In 2007, Davenport pled no contest to second-degree murder with a personal use of a firearm enhancement. He acknowledged: I am satisfied that I know the evidence that could be used against me in trial, as well as any possible defense ... I agree that a jury or judge who heard the evidence against me could find me guilty of the charges to which I am pleading guilty/no contest. In 2018, Senate Bill 1437 amended Penal Code section 189 to limit liability for murder under a felony-murder or natural and probable consequences theory to a person who is the actual killer, has the intent to kill and aids or abets the actual killer, or is a major participant in the underlying felony and acts with reckless indifference to human life.In 2019, Davenport filed a petition for resentencing, alleging he was tried under an information that allowed the prosecution to proceed on a felony-murder theory or under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, that he pled no contest to second-degree murder because he believed he could have been convicted of first-degree murder under either doctrine, and that he could not now be convicted of first or second-degree murder. The court summarily denied the petition, citing Davenport’s admission to the firearm enhancement and the preliminary hearing transcript: Davenport approached a car in which his former girlfriend was sitting with her new boyfriend, and killed the victim by shooting him at close range. The court of appeal reversed and remanded. By relying on facts stated in the transcript without any stipulation that the facts supplied a basis for his plea, the trial court erroneously concluded he failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief. View "People v. Davenport" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason Schuller shot his long-time friend, W.T., nine times in the head and set the body on fire. Defendant testified, claiming self-defense, but his trial testimony about what happened leading up to and during the shooting suggested he was delusional and hallucinating. Following a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, a jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder in the guilt phase. He was ultimately found legally sane and sentenced to an aggregate term of 50 years to life. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense. He contended substantial evidence demonstrated he had an actual, albeit unreasonable, belief in the need for self- defense that was not entirely delusional. The Court of Appeal agreed, but find the error harmless. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Schuller" on Justia Law

In 2020, a juvenile wardship petition was filed charging D.C. with committing a murder in 2016, when he was 16 years old. The probation officer’s report reviewed the statutory factors relevant to a transfer out of juvenile court and recommended transfer, finding D.C. exhibited criminal sophistication, that D.C. was 20 years old and it was difficult to predict how he may mature in the next five years, that D.C.’s delinquent history included a 2014 wardship referral for battery involving a physical fight at school. D.C. also had “a pattern of delinquency” at school, D.C. admitted to abusing alcohol, marijuana, and Xanax, and that the circumstances and gravity of the alleged offenses were serious compared to other homicides.The juvenile court granted a motion to transfer him from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction (Welf. & Inst. Code 707(a)(1)). The court of appeal denied a petition challenging the transfer. The juvenile court did not err in considering D.C.’s 2017 burglary or the behavior documented in his school records. The finding that he was not likely to be rehabilitated before the expiration of juvenile court jurisdiction is supported by substantial evidence. The court also rejected challenges to expert testimony and evidentiary rulings. View "D.C. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendant Donte Revels appealed his convictions for child abuse resulting in death, and child abuse. He contended the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial after a testifying expert doctor rendered assistance to an unconscious juror. The Court of Appeal concluded there was no abuse of discretion, but found an error in the minute order and abstract of judgment that required correction. The Court ordered the error corrected and affirm the judgment. View "California v. Revels" on Justia Law

At 2:15 a.m. on June 3, 2020, Deputy Zeas and his partner drove their patrol car into a parking lot and stopped five-six feet from where Cuadra was standing. Because of Black Lives Matter protests, there was a curfew in effect. Zeas asked Cuadra if he was aware of the curfew. Cuadra said no. Zeas did not cite Cuadra for a curfew violation; the curfew did not apply to persons on private property. Zeas then asked Cuadra if he was on parole or probation. Cuadra said he was on probation. Zeas then decided to detain Cuadra, who raised his hands and started to step backward away from the patrol car, while asking why the officers were “attempting to detain” him when he had done nothing wrong. After Cuardra raised his hands in response to Zeas, Zeas saw a "pretty big" “bulge” in Cuadra’s front pants pocket, consistent with the shape of a firearm. Cuadra “spontaneously” stated he had a gun. Zeas performed a patdown search and recovered a loaded revolver from his front pants pocket.The court of appeal reversed the denial of Cuadra’s motion to suppress. The firearm evidence was the fruit of the unlawful detention. The observation of the gun occurred when Cuadra submitted to a show of authority and his detention was not founded on reasonable suspicion, consent, or probable cause to arrest. View "People v. Cuadra" on Justia Law

James babysat D., six months old. When D. returned from James’ home, his parents noticed swelling on the side of D.’s head. X-rays showed he had three skull fractures and a possible rib fracture. D. had surgery to place an extraventricular drain to decrease pressure in his head. Fairfield detectives questioned James for about two and a half hours, but the detectives took long breaks. Initially, James maintained that D. had fallen from a pillow on the floor and that she did not think he had been hurt. Eventually, James admitted she tossed D. onto the couch and saw him bounce off and hit his head on the brick fireplace. James was convicted of felony child abuse or endangering the health of a child. James had a prior conviction for felony child abuse. She was sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment.The court of appeal ordered a limited remand to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion on James’ “Romero” motion to strike her prior conviction at sentencing. The court rejected James’ arguments that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move to exclude her statements to detectives; the trial court erred in refusing to allow defense counsel to ask hypothetical questions of the defense expert witness on police interrogation techniques and erred in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that it could consider the reliability of her admission; and erred with respect to a pre-trial “Pitchess” motion seeking information from the detectives' personnel files. View "People v. James" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate to vacate an order denying mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36 in his two pending criminal cases. Principally at issue is whether a defendant suffering from an excluded mental health disorder under section 1001.36(b)(1)(A) is statutorily ineligible for mental health diversion based on a different, qualifying mental disorder.The Court of Appeal concluded that section 1001.36(b)(1)(A) does not wholly preclude from diversion defendants who suffer from both excluded and included mental health disorders; section 1001.36(b)(1)(A) requires only that a defendant suffers from one qualified mental health disorder. In this case, the trial court's denial of diversion was incorrect under the court's interpretation of the section 1001.36(b)(1)(A). Accordingly, the court vacated the trial court's order and remanded for a new eligibility hearing on petitioner's request for diversion under section 1001.36. View "Negron v. Superior Court of Kern County" on Justia Law

Defendant Ryan Shropshire was convicted of of manufacturing concentrated cannabis. Defendant Bryan Roberts was convicted on multiple counts, including two counts of receiving stolen property, unlawful possession of methamphetamine, unlawful possession of ammunition, two counts of receiving a stolen motor vehicle, possession of a deadly weapon, and three counts of possession of a firearm by a felon. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal agreed with Shropshire that he was entitled to additional custody credits: Shropshire was serving a two-year sentence in a separate case from Placer County while he awaited trial in this case, and the sentence in the Placer County case was reduced to a misdemeanor before Shropshire was sentenced here. Because he had accrued more custody credits than was necessary to serve the sentence in the Placer County case, defendant was entitled to apply those excess credits to his sentence to the cannabis conviction. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected Roberts’ and Shropshire’s challenges to a search warrant authorizing a search for stolen property. Further, the Court disagreed with Roberts’ remaining contentions except that one of his convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm should have been stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654, and rejected Shropshire’s remaining claims except that a one-year prior prison term enhancement imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5(b) should have been stricken. Accordingly, the Court modified the judgments as to both defendants and affirmed the judgments as modified. View "California v. Shropshire" on Justia Law

In 2002, a jury convicted Sherwood Jenkins of the second degree murder and kidnapping of Phillip Reeves. In 2019, Jenkins filed a petition to vacate his murder conviction under Penal Code section 1170.95, and the trial court denied the petition without issuing an order to show cause. Jenkins argued the court erred because it engaged in improper factfinding at the prima facie review stage, and the record of conviction did not refute the allegations of his petition. The State conceded the court erred by failing to issue an order to show cause, and to this, the Court of Appeal agreed. Accordingly, the Court reversed the order denying the petition, and the trial court was directed to issue an order to show cause under section 1170.95(c). View "California v. Jenkins" on Justia Law