Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In a companion case, where an employee claimed she was forced to sign an arbitration agreement after litigation had commenced and without the benefit of her counsel, the Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause why relief should not have been granted. Although this case generally did not present the same factual scenario, the Court issued an order to show cause following motions to compel arbitration because this case was ordered related to the other and involves the same defendants. Here, the trial court granted the motions for eight employees, each of whom signed one of two versions of arbitration agreements. Because the first version did not clearly and unmistakably delegate questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator, the Court granted the writ petition as to the employees who signed that version. As to two of these employees, the trial court had to decide whether this first version was unconscionable, guided by the Court's analysis in this opinion. As to the other two employees who signed this version, the Court of Appeal found that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable for the separate reason of fraud in the execution. Furthermore, the Court found that fraud in the execution voided the agreement for two of the employees who signed the other, second version of the arbitration agreement. The petition was denied as to the remaining two employees who signed the second version. View "Najarro v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In the mid-2000s, Carlos Argenis Figueroa Alatorre was working as a car salesperson when he lost his job. Although he knew his brother-in-law, Luis, was involved in something unsavory, Alatorre began working for him, acting as a lookout and a driver for about two months before the United States Department of Justice closed in on Luis’s drug importation ring, arresting Alatorre along with several others at a border patrol checkpoint. In the wake of the arrest, Alatorre was forthcoming about his involvement. He had already been in jail for a year and a half, awaiting his trial, when he was offered a plea deal that would allow him to be released from custody with credit for time served. So in 2008, at the age of 24, he pleaded guilty to his first and only criminal charge: conspiracy to possess cocaine for sale. Alatorre did not know this conviction would render him immediately deportable. He had come to the United States from Mexico when he was just four years old, and lived here as a permanent resident. In 2011, three years after his plea, he attempted to become a naturalized citizen, which had the unintended consequence of alerting immigration authorities to his criminal conviction. Within a few months, he was deported to Mexico. Alatorre lived in Mexicali after that, taking any available work he could find. Although his children, who are both U.S. citizens, were usually able visit him on the weekends, he was separated from his wife and children, parents, four siblings, and dozens of nieces, nephews, and cousins—all of whom lived in the U.S. In early 2020, Alatorre moved to vacate his conviction, only to have the trial court deny it as untimely based on a finding that he did not exercise “reasonable diligence” to become aware of the existence of the statutory remedy after the law became effective. The question posed by this case was how a petitioner’s “reasonable diligence” should be evaluated when the ripening of an unexpected immigration consequence predates the creation of an avenue of relief. After considering the text, history, and purpose of Penal Code section 1473.7, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s ruling, finding that it applied an incorrect legal standard when it assumed Alatorre was obligated to learn about section 1473.7 starting in January 2017, when the section became effective. As to the merits of his request, the Court found he established prejudicial error within the meaning of section 1473.7, and remanded to the trial court with instructions to issue an order granting the motion. View "California v. Alatorre" on Justia Law

M.S. and J.G. argued during a high school class. J.G. hit M.S. with a small book. J.G. was suspended for two days. About a month later, J.G. accused M.S. of taking her backpack. M.S. pulled a rectangular device with protruding antennas out of her bag, turned it on, and said “[t]ry that again, I’m going to tase you.” A spark erupted from the device. J.G. thought the device was a taser and retreated. The principal learned of the incident.The school resource officer, Reed, took custody of the device, identifying it as an “over-the-counter” stun gun. He did not know the weapon’s voltage and testified that the “capability” of a stun gun depended on its voltage. He initially opined that M.S.’s stun gun probably could not immobilize a person but later noted that it could immobilize a person of smaller stature, and, depending on their size, age, and medical condition, could “in some cases even cause death.” The juvenile court found that M.S. brought a stun gun into school, sustained the Penal Code 626.10(a) allegation, reduced the offense to a misdemeanor, adjudicated M.S. a ward of the court, and placed her in her mother’s custody with probation conditions. The court of appeal reversed. There was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the weapon was capable of temporarily immobilizing a person and, therefore, that it qualified as a stun gun under sections 626.10(a) and 244.5(a). View "In re M.S." on Justia Law

In 2013, Crane was studying in a GED class at the High Desert State Prison. Inmate Dolihite approached Crane from behind and stabbed him in the neck with a pencil. Crane was taken to the prison’s emergency clinic. Crane alleges that after he was released from administrative segregation, he was assaulted by other prisoners and prison guards. He sued the correctional officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Crane contends the assaults were retaliation against him for previously suing the warden and two captains for denying outdoor exercise and staging assaults on inmates.Crane, self-represented, sued Dolihite. The suit was dismissed for failure to serve the summons and complaint within the time prescribed by Code Civ. Proc., 583.210(a). Dolihite had been transferred to Salinas Valley State Prison; for a time, Crane was unable to identify his location. The superior court advised Crane to use the sheriff’s office to effect service but the Monterey County Sheriff’s Office refused to serve the summons and complaint. The litigation coordinator at Salinas Valley refused to accept service on behalf of Dolihite.The court of appeal reversed the dismissal. The litigation coordinator’s refusal contradicts Penal Code 4013(a) and Code of Civil Procedure 416.90, which have been interpreted as authorizing state prison litigation coordinators to accept service on behalf of inmates. Crane’s statutory right to initiate and prosecute a civil action was infringed. View "Crane v. Dolihite" on Justia Law

Greeley was convicted of first-degree burglary (Pen. Code 460(a)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence, placed Greeley on probation for three years, and imposed various fines and fees, and restitution. The court of appeal reversed. The court first rejected arguments that instances of prosecutorial misconduct, individually and collectively, warrant reversal; the trial court prejudicially erred by giving CALCRIM No. 315 [Eyewitness Identification]; these errors cumulatively violated Greeley’s due process rights; and the imposition of court assessments and a restitution fine without an ability-to-pay hearing violated her constitutional rights. The court agreed that the three-year term of probation is now unauthorized and the court should strike the criminal justice administration fee and the probation supervision fee. The court remanded with instructions that the term of probation should be reduced to two years and that the unpaid portions of the criminal justice administration and probation supervision fees should be stricken. View "People v. Greeley" on Justia Law

In 2016, Rodriguez was charged in two criminal cases. In 2018, the court found Rodriguez not competent and signed an order committing Rodriguez. The order stated the “maximum term is 3 years minus 0 days actual credit” Later, the court found Rodriguez’s competency restored and reinstated the criminal proceedings. Rodriguez was present in court and waived time for trial. Almost four months later, the court again declared a doubt about Rodriguez’s competency and suspended the proceedings. The court later found Rodriguez not competent and ordered that Rodriguez be committed for placement in a locked psychiatric facility.Rodriguez claimed that, although certification of his mental competency had been filed, he had reached the two-year maximum period for an incompetency commitment under Penal Code 1370(c)(1) before a judicial hearing on the certification had been held, so that the trial court lacked authority to hold such a hearing. The court of appeal concluded that Rodriguez’s maximum commitment period has not yet run. View "Rodriguez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 1990, defendant-appellant Marty Dominguez was convicted by jury of second degree murder, and an allegation was found true he was armed with a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. Dominguez was sentenced to prison for 21 years to life. He appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed in an unpublished opinion. In January 2019, Dominguez filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, which permitted a defendant convicted of murder under a felony-murder theory or the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition for the conviction to be vacated and resentenced. The superior court found that Dominguez did not make a prima facie showing that he was entitled to relief and denied the petition. Dominguez appealed, contending the court erred in determining his petition did not establish a prima facie case for relief. The Court of Appeal concluded the superior court properly considered the record of conviction to determine as a matter of law that Dominguez was ineligible for relief under section 1170.95. View "California v. Dominguez" on Justia Law

In 2018, defendant pleaded guilty to carjacking as a second strike, and admitted he sustained a prior serious felony conviction. In 2020, the secretary of the CDCR sent a letter to the trial court invoking the sentence recall provision of Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). The trial court recalled defendant's sentence and held a resentencing hearing under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), declining to strike defendant's enhancement.The Court of Appeal agreed with People v. Pillsbury (Sept. 30, 2021, C089002) ___ Cal.App.5th ___, where the Third Appellate District recently held that, "upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the CDCR . . . , trial courts have the authority to recall and resentence defendants based on post-judgment changes in the law giving courts discretion to strike or dismiss enhancements, even when the judgment in the case is long since final and even when the original sentence was the product of a plea agreement." The court also concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to strike defendant's prior serious felony enhancement. Accordingly, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for a new section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) resentencing hearing. View "People v. Cepeda" on Justia Law

During the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial, a jury found Linde Smith guilty of second-degree murder, and found true a deadly weapon enhancement allegation. Smith’s mother, Anne Smith (Anne), was the victim. During the sanity phase of the trial, the jury found that Smith was legally sane at the time she committed the offense. The trial court sentenced Smith to a term of 16 years to life in prison, consisting of a 15 years to life term for the murder and a one-year consecutive term for the deadly weapon enhancement. On appeal, with respect to the guilt phase, Smith claimed the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence pertaining to the severity of her depression at the time of the incident giving rise to the charged offense. In addition, Smith contended the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on involuntary manslaughter as an uncharged lesser included offense to murder. With respect to the sanity phase, Smith claimed the trial court violated her constitutional right to due process under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) and its progeny by admitting evidence that she claims amounted to a comment on her exercise of her right to remain silent pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). She also contended the trial court erred in refusing to preclude an expert retained by the prosecution from testifying due to the State’s alleged failure to timely provide the defense with the expert’s report and related data. Finally, Smith argued cumulative error required reversal of the sanity verdict. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter because there was no substantial evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court did not commit Doyle error. The Court rejected the remainder of Smith’s claims in unpublished portions of its opinion. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant Tevita Kaihea was convicted by jury of first degree murder and other offenses involving a crime spree preceding the murder. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregated prison term of 111 years and court months to life. On appeal defendant challenged: (1) the admission of certain gang evidence as cumulative and highly prejudicial; (2) the court’s failure to instruct the jury on the defense of mistake of fact and transferred intent; and (3) the court’s instruction that the jury could consider gang evidence in deciding whether defendant acted in self-defense and heat of passion. Defendant contended those errors were cumulatively prejudicial. He also (4) challenged the imposition of a gang enhancement sentence to his murder conviction; (5) contended the trial court improperly calculated custody credits; and (6) contended the court improperly deducted actual days served credit for his jail behavior. Both defendant and the State separately noted (7) the trial court erroneously awarded conduct credit. In the published portion of its opinion,the Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s third contention and concluded the standard instruction, CALCRIM No. 1403, was legally correct as it related to the use of gang evidence for the purpose of deciding whether a defendant actually believed in the need to defend himself or acted in the heat of passion. Furthermore, the Court concluded defendant failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel grounded on the failure to request the modification because the failure did not prejudice defendant. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court conclude d that some of defendant’s other contentions had merit. The Court struck the 10-year gang enhancement, directed the trial court to award an additional 213 days of credit, and struck the award of conduct credits. The Court also directed the trial court to correct several errors in the abstract of judgment. In all other respects, judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Kaihea" on Justia Law