Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Contreras was charged with rape and forcible oral copulation but was convicted only of misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code 242) as a lesser included offense of the rape charge. The trial court placed him on probation and exercised its discretion to require him to register as a sex offender, finding the battery was committed for the purpose of sexual gratification.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to state sufficient reasons for requiring him to register as a sex offender under section 290.006 and in ordering registration because there was “no evidence” he was likely to re-offend and erred in relying on the results of his pre-sentencing sex offender risk assessment in ordering registration. The defense had a meaningful opportunity to object at the sentencing hearing that the trial court did not adequately state reasons for requiring registration under section 290.006; by not doing so, the defense forfeited the argument. There was evidence Contreras was likely to re-offend. He scored a “4” on the STATIC-99R, which placed him in the “above average risk” category for reoffending. View "People v. Contreras" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Tyrus Jenkins was convicted by jury of first-degree burglary of a residence with a person present, second degree burglary of a car, attempted unlawful taking of the car, and misdemeanor possession of burglary tools. The court sentenced him to a total of 13 years. Jenkins appealed, contending his conviction for attempted unlawful taking of a vehicle should have been reversed because the court permitted, over his objection, a police detective to testify to the car’s estimated value obtained from the Kelley Blue Book’s Web site. Jenkins claimed this was hearsay evidence that should have been excluded, and absent this testimony, there was no evidence establishing the car was worth more than $950, an element of the felony offense. Jenkins also contended his conviction for vehicular burglary also had to be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to prove the car was locked at the time of his entry. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court properly admitted the Blue Book evidence under Evidence Code section 1340, the published compilation exception to the hearsay rule. And the Court found substantial circumstantial evidence established the car was locked. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

In 2001, Sands was 24 years old when he committed special circumstance murder (Penal Code 187, 190.2(a)(10)) and was sentenced to a prison term of life without the possibility of parole. The trial court denied his motion, seeking to develop a record of mitigating circumstances for an eventual youth offender parole hearing under “Franklin.”The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting his Equal Protection argument. The statute provides an opportunity for release (via youth offender parole hearings) to most persons convicted of crimes committed before the age of 26 in their 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration, depending on the sentence imposed for their “[c]ontrolling offense,” sections 3051(a)(2)(B), (b)(1)-(4). The statute excludes offenders who were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for crimes they committed at age 18-25. The Legislature had a rational basis to distinguish between offenders with the same sentence (life without parole) based on their age. For juvenile offenders, such a sentence may violate the Eighth Amendment but the same sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment when imposed on an adult, even an adult under the age of 26. The Legislature could rationally decide to remedy unconstitutional sentences but go no further. View "People v. Sands" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Flores was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter, among other crimes, after the jury initially declared it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. Defendant moved for a new trial based on evidence the jury considered defendant’s sentence in determining the verdict. The jurors’ declarations in support of the new trial motion showed the jury was at an impasse between second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter and shortly after discussing the possibility defendant would “walk” if it were to hang, the jury found defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court denied defendant’s new trial motion, finding inadmissible any evidence of the jury’s deliberations regarding punishment and that discussing punishment during deliberations was not misconduct. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding: (1) the trial court erred in finding inadmissible the entire contents of the jurors’ declarations submitted in support of the new trial motion; (2) consideration of the admissible portions of the jurors’ declarations establish misconduct occurred, raising a rebuttable presumption of prejudice; and (3) the State failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice. View "California v. Flores" on Justia Law

In 2003, defendant-appellant Louis Montes was convicted of, among other things, the special circumstance murder of April Peake (the victim) which he committed when he was 17 years old. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). After the United States Supreme Court ruled in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012), the California Supreme Court decided that juveniles sentenced to LWOP were entitled to a hearing in order to have an opportunity to present information as to juvenile characteristics and circumstances at the time the offense was committed. Defendant petitioned to recall his sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170(d)(2). The superior court granted the petition, recalled defendant’s sentence, and resentenced him to LWOP. In this appeal, defendant contended the superior court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard during resentencing. He further contended the court should have sua sponte transferred this matter to the juvenile court for a transfer/fitness hearing pursuant to Proposition 57 (as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016)). The Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s first contention but found merit in the second: in supplemental briefing, the parties agreed, and the Court concurred, the minute order of the resentencing hearing had to be corrected, and a new abstract of judgment should issue. Accordingly, the Court conditionally reversed defendant’s sentence and remanded for defendant to receive a transfer/fitness hearing in the juvenile court. View "California v. Montes" on Justia Law

Frias pleaded no contest to stealing a 2001 Chevrolet Tahoe, with 200,000 miles on it and no dents, scratches, or damage before the theft. After the theft, there was damage to the bumper, side, grille, and other parts of the car. A shop estimated repair at $8,385.04. Frias opposed this estimate and proposed $7,025.21, which was a later estimate from the same shop but without using original GM parts. The court of appeal affirmed an order of restitution for $8,385.04 Restitution should be based on the amount of loss the victim claims and should “fully reimburse” the victim for every economic loss the defendant’s criminal conduct caused (Pen. Code 1202.4(f)). The trial court had the discretion to determine the owner was entitled to original manufacturer parts rather than aftermarket parts. It was Frias’s burden to show otherwise. Frias’s counsel suggested there might be zero quality difference between original and aftermarket parts, but the court was free to reject this claim, which no evidence supported. View "People v. Frias" on Justia Law

Following a preliminary hearing, petitioner Dr. Sanjoy Banerjee was charged in an information with two counts of presenting a false or fraudulent health care claim to an insurer (a form of insurance fraud, counts 1-2), and three counts of perjury (counts 3-5). The superior court denied Banerjee’s motion to dismiss the information as unsupported by reasonable or probable cause. Banerjee petitioned for a writ of prohibition to direct the superior court to vacate its order denying his Penal Code section 995 motion and to issue an order setting aside the information. The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause and an order staying further proceedings on the information, pending the Court's resolution of the merits of Banerjee’s petition. The State filed a return, and Banerjee filed a traverse. The State argued the evidence supported a strong suspicion that Banerjee committed two counts of insurance fraud and three counts of perjury, based on his violations of Labor Code section 139.3(a) between 2014 and 2016. During that period, Banerjee billed a workers’ compensation insurer for services he rendered to patients through his professional corporation and through two other legal entities he owned and controlled. The insurance fraud charges are based on Banerjee’s 2014-2016 billings to the insurer through the two other entities. The perjury charges were based on three instances in which Banerjee signed doctor’s reports, certifying under penalty of perjury that he had not violated “section 139.3.” Banerjee argued: (1) the evidence showed he did not violate the statute's referral prohibition; (2) even if he did not comply with section 139.3(e), the “physician’s office” exception to the referral prohibition applied to all of his referrals to his two other legal entities; and (3) the patient disclosure requirement of section 139.3(e), the referral prohibition of section 139.3(a), and the physician’s office exception to the referral prohibition were unconstitutionally vague. The Court of Appeal concluded: (1) Banerjee did not violate section 139.3(a) by referring his patients to his two other legal entities; and (2) the evidence supported a strong suspicion that Banerjee specifically intended to present false and fraudulent claims for health care benefits, in violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(6), by billing the workers’ compensation insurer substantially higher amounts through his two other legal entities than he previously and customarily billed the insurer for the same services he formerly rendered through his professional corporation and his former group practice. Thus, the Court granted the writ as to the perjury charges but denied it as to the insurance fraud charges. View "Banerjee v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the superior court's judgment against Bad Boys Bail Bonds in the amount of $6,118.78, plus administrative costs and interest. The amount represented the costs of extraditing the criminal defendant for whom the North River parties had posted a bail bond, with the Company as the surety and Bad Boys Bail Bonds as the Company's bail agent. The court concluded that the judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction because the bond had already been exonerated by operation of law when the defendant appeared in court and the superior court had no power to impose liability on Bad Boys Bail Bonds arising from the Company's undertaking set forth in the bond. Furthermore, the issue of naming Bad Boys Bail Bonds in entering summary judgment is moot. View "People v. The North River Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In 1997, with the help of an interpreter, defendant Estaban Bravo pleaded guilty to, and was convicted on, a plea bargain agreement of: a felony violation of domestic violence (count 1); and felony violation of child cruelty (count 2). The trial court sentenced defendant to two years’ incarceration, suspended, and placed him on formal probation for 36 months on terms and conditions including 25 days’ custody, for which he was granted time served. In 2018, defendant moved to vacate the judgment pursuant to Penal Code sections 1016.5 and 1473.7. In 2019, the trial court denied the motion. In late 2020, following defendant’s appeal of the trial court’s decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed. In March 2021, the California Supreme Court granted review, and in May issued California v. Vivar, 11 Cal.5th 510 (2021), disapproving of the appellate court’s opinion in Bravo. The Supreme Court transferred the appeal in Bravo back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate the decision and reconsider the matter in light of Vivar. Defendant stated that the immediate advantage of his plea was that he would be released from custody that same day so that he could return to his construction job without being fired and could therefore support his spouse and their child. Defendant stated he was informed by counsel and the prosecution that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) would conduct a sweep of the county jail where he was being held by the next morning; being released that afternoon allowed him to avoid the ICE sweep and likely deportation as a result of that encounter. Before the Court of Appeal, defendant contended that at the time he executed the plea agreement, he was unaware of future immigration consequences of his plea, and had he known, he would not have executed the agreement. After reconsideration, the Court of Appeal found that notwithstanding its sufficiency to meet the statutory language of section 1016.5, the advisement on defendant’s 1997 plea agreement was inadequate to advise him of the mandatory immigration consequences of his plea. "In such cases, '[d]efendants must be advised that they will be deported, excluded, and denied naturalization as a mandatory consequence of the conviction." However, "a defendant's self-serving statement - after trial, conviction and sentence... must be corroborated independently by objective evidence." Here, notably, defendant offered no statement or declaration by his trial counsel or any other contemporaneous evidence other than the statements in his declaration to support that claim. Accordingly, there was no supportable reason for defendant to believe the court would accept an immigration-neutral alternative charge. The Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's section 1473.7 application; judgment was therefore affirmed. View "California v. Bravo" on Justia Law

An employee of a tire store was closing the store when defendant Jered Pillsbury entered wearing a hooded sweatshirt with the hood pulled over his head and his face covered either with a shirt or a mask. Defendant approached the employee and started grabbing cash out of the cash drawer. The employee noticed that defendant had a handgun that he believed to be a Glock nine-millimeter. The employee recognized defendant’s distinct voice and his eyes and eyebrows; defendant had been a former employee and had worked with the employee at the tire shop for approximately three years. Defendant was ultimately charged with second-degree robbery and a firearm enhancement. In a separate case, defendant was charged with two counts of second degree commercial burglary of a veterinary hospital. In each instance, defendant entered by breaking a window and stole property and cash, totaling approximately $8,000. Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, defendant entered a plea of no contest to robbery, and admitted that, in the course of the robbery, he personally used a firearm. He also pleaded no contest to commercial burglary, and the remaining count was dismissed. Consistent with the negotiated agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 13 years. This case presented issues relating to the 2018 amendments to California Penal Code section 1170(d) and the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) program related to those amendments. The Court of Appeal concluded that, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of CDCR (the Secretary), trial courts have the authority to recall and resentence defendants based on post-judgment changes in the law giving courts discretion to strike or dismiss enhancements, even when the judgment in the case is long since final and even when the original sentence was the product of a plea agreement. The Court also conclude that, while trial courts have the authority to summarily decline to recall and resentence, defendants have due process rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the court rules, and a statement of the court’s reasons for the declination. However, in cases such as this one where the prosecution had not weighed in prior to the trial court’s summary declination, defendants do not have a constitutional right to counsel. View "California v. Pillsbury" on Justia Law