Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Before committing a minor to the California Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ), the state’s most restrictive placement for its most severe juvenile offenders, the law required the juvenile court to find both that the placement would probably benefit the minor, and that less restrictive options would be either ineffective or inappropriate. In this case, we address an issue anticipated, but not decided, in In re Carlos J., 22 Cal.App.5th 1 (2018), namely, what constitutes substantial evidence to support a DJJ commitment when the minor has submitted reliable evidence that such a placement would undermine the minor’s specific rehabilitative needs, and where the minor’s own history does not demonstrate that less restrictive options would not work? The Court of Appeal concluded the State had to provide some contrary evidence that would enable the juvenile court to make a comparative analysis of the placement options before it concludes the minor will probably benefit from DJJ, and that less restrictive options would be ineffective or inappropriate. Here, expert testimony indicated that placing this minor in DJJ would be counterproductive because it would likely assure his entrenchment in gang culture and, due to the ready availability of drugs in DJJ facilities, undermine efforts to treat and improve a significant substance abuse disorder that led to a single episode of violent criminal behavior over the course of a few hours. Beyond identifying that substance abuse treatment was available at DJJ, the State introduced no responsive evidence. So, as in Carlos J., the Court reversed and remanded in an opinion that focused "not on the substantive correctness of the juvenile court’s conclusion, but on the procedural requirement that there be evidence in the record to support whatever conclusion the court reaches." On remand, given intervening changes to the juvenile court law, the trial court had to first make a threshold finding as to whether juvenile justice realignment now precluded commitment to DJJ. View "In re Miguel C." on Justia Law

In 2018, defendant Ashneel Mani broke into the house where his mother and his brother lived. Defendant’s brother opened his bedroom door and saw defendant running up the stairs holding a kitchen knife. Scared, defendant’s brother went back into his room and locked the door, and defendant’s mother called 911. At the time, defendant’s brother had a restraining order in place against defendant. A jury found defendant guilty of first degree residential burglary and willfully disobeying a court order. The jury found true the allegation that a person, other than an accomplice, was present during the burglary. At a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found defendant had a previous strike conviction. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 13 years. On appeal, defendant claimed: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of prior acts of domestic violence under Evidence Code sections 1109 and 352, including prior acts of domestic violence to prove propensity to commit residential burglary grounded on a theory of intent to steal; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting prior acts evidence under Evidence Code sections 1101(b), and 352; (3) the trial court committed instructional error in instructing the jury with a modified version of the Evidence Code section 1109 instruction, CALCRIM No. 852A, because burglary based on an intent to steal theory was not a crime involving domestic violence; and (4) he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of these errors. The Court of Appeal discovered a sentencing error as to the application of Penal Code section 654: because the trial court failed to impose a term of imprisonment and then suspend execution of that sentence on count two, the case was remanded for resentencing with directions that the trial court to do so. Judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Mani" on Justia Law

After Morales distanced himself from a gang, gang members assaulted him and stabbed him twice. Morales testified against a gang member and was placed in a witness protection program. Morales carried knives for self-defense. Outside a bus station, McMillian asked Morales for a cigarette. As he was turning away, Morales felt McMillian’s fingers pull on his backpack. According to Morales, McMillian was trying to take his cell phone and wallet. Ultimately, Morales drove his knife five and a half inches into McMillian’s torso. A video shows that McMillian’s arms were at his sides. Morales admitted that McMillian never drew a weapon and did not verbally threaten him. McMillian walked to a nearby building, dripping blood, and asked the clerk to call 911. He had Morales’ backpack. McMillian died from his injuries. Police detained Morales at the bus station. The autopsy showed that McMillian’s blood tested positive for cocaine, methadone, and a very low level of marijuana. Morales tested positive for methamphetamine and an antidepressant drug but not amphetamines. A psychologist testified that Morales had significant PTSD.After a second trial, Morales was convicted for second-degree murder and was sentenced to 16 years to life in prison. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court erred by improperly instructing the jury on self-defense and imperfect self-defense and denying an instruction on voluntary intoxication. View "People v. Morales" on Justia Law

Police found Sumagang asleep in a car in a remote rural area. Sangco’s deceased body was lying on top of him. The police took Sumagang into custody and a detective subsequently interviewed him in two stages—first without warning him under Miranda, and then again after warning him. In both parts of the interview, he admitted choking Sangco until she stopped breathing or moving. He claimed she had asked him to kill her, and he said he had intended to kill himself as well. Sangco, who was 20 years old, suffered from depression and had previously expressed suicidal thoughts. Toxicology tests showed she had a “potentially toxic” level of drugs in her body at the time of death. The prosecution charged Sumagang with willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (Pen. Code 187(a)). Convicted, he was sentenced to 25 years to life.The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erred by denying Sumagang’s motion to exclude the confession under Missouri v. Seibert and Sumagang was prejudiced by the admission of the confession at trial. The court concluded the detective deliberately undermined Miranda by employing the two-step interrogation tactic. There was no practical justification for treating the second stage of interrogation as distinct from the first, unearned, and inadmissible segment. View "People v. Sumagang" on Justia Law

Myles, living in White’s home reported White, missing. Weeks later police executed a search warrant and found White’s body entombed beneath a basement workbench. An autopsy indicated blunt trauma to his head. Myles had used White’s identification to open credit accounts and made purchases of $13,000. Myles, who told inconsistent stories, was charged with murder, alleging that she personally inflicted great bodily injury, identity theft, forgery, and making false financial statements. Myles pled no contest to second-degree murder in exchange for dismissal of the other charges and the great bodily injury allegation. Myles was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison in 2006.In 2019, Myles sought resentencing under Penal Code 1170.95. The court considered Myles’s statements from a parole risk assessment and parole suitability hearing, in which she admitted killing White by hitting him with a metal bottle, entombed him, and lied to his family. Myles unsuccessfully argued that evidence was subject to use immunity, and even if it were admissible, it would be admissible only for impeachment. The court denied the petition, stating, “it does not appear that this is a felony murder case, nor is it a case where the prosecution allegation is that [defendant] was an aider and abettor and that it was a natural and probable consequences theory of aiding and abetting … no one else was involved.“ The court of appeal affirmed, upholding the admission of the parole hearing evidence. View "People v. Myles" on Justia Law

Appellant Thandiew Wilson was convicted by a jury in July 2002 of, among other things, murder with the special circumstance findings that it was committed during the commission or attempted commission of a robbery and a burglary. By finding the special circumstance allegations true, the jury necessarily found that Wilson either participated in the crimes with an intent to kill or was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Wilson was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, plus 25 years to life for a gun enhancement. The Court of Appeal affirmed that judgment on appeal. Wilson appealed the summary denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to California Penal Code section 1170.95 (Petition). The trial court denied the Petition in light of the jury’s special circumstance findings, which it deemed a categorical bar to resentencing relief. Recently, however, another panel of the Court of Appeal held that a felony murder special circumstance finding did not bar resentencing relief under section 1170.95 as a matter of law, having been persuaded by the reasoning of those Courts of Appeal that considered the issue after California v. Gomez, 52 Cal.App.5th 1 (2020). The Court’s review of that case law and the meaning of the terms “major participant” and “reckless indifference to human life” also persuaded the Court that special circumstance findings could not be a categorical bar to resentencing relief. Therefore, the Court reversed the order summarily denying the Petition, and remanded the case to the trial court for a determination on whether Wilson made a prima facile showing of entitlement to relief under section 1170.95. View "California v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Prison inmate Alex Marti petitioned for habeas relief from the warden of Mule Creek State Prison’s decision adjudicating him guilty of a prison disciplinary violation for possession of excess property on May 5, 2019. This was adjudged to be an administrative violation rather than a serious rules violation. Among other claims, petitioner claimed his rights under prison regulations were violated because the officer who adjudicated the violation had prior knowledge and involvement in a related matter that was considered as evidence at petitioner’s disciplinary hearing. The Warden argued this case was moot because petitioner suffered the punitive consequences of the decision, and any future impact on him was speculative. The Court of Appeal concluded the matter was not moot as this court could afford petitioner meaningful relief. If the Court did not intervene, the violation would remain in petitioner’s file and could be considered by prison officials in making decisions relating to petitioner. The Court further found petitioner’s argument was well taken that the hearing officer should have been recused from acting in that capacity. Petitioner was entitled to have the officer’s disciplinary finding vacated. View "In re Marti" on Justia Law

Dawson, the City Manager of Del Rey Oaks, purchased the Portola lot, “the last vacant lot” in the City. It had a water meter but no water credits and could not be built upon without water credits. The prior owner had never been able to obtain water rights or water credits. The City lacked any water credits and had no surplus water. In 2015, the City leased the Rosita property, part of Work Memorial Park, to Mori for a garden center. Dawson contracted on behalf of the City for a new well on the Rosita property and arranged for the water credit from the Rosita property to be transferred to Dawson’s Portola lot. Dawson never reported his ownership of the Portola lot on his Form 700 disclosure.Dawson was convicted of a felony count of violating Government Code section 10901 (conflict of interest as to a contract entered into in his official capacity) and a misdemeanor count of violating section 91000 (failing to report an interest in real property under the Political Reform Act). The court granted him probation. The court of appeal affirmed. The prosecution was not required to prove the inapplicability of an exception to section 1090 “for remote or minimal interests” because it was an affirmative defense; Dawson bore the burden of raising a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Dawson" on Justia Law

Defendant Gregory Lee Wise texted and called a woman, R.F., hundreds of times for three years after they had gone on two dates despite her continued demands for him to stop. During this period, defendant stored hundreds of pictures of R.F. on his computer taken from the internet and used in a sexual manner. Defendant was arrested after a light rail rider called 911 reporting defendant had a gun in his pocket on the train. Officers found on defendant a map to R.F.’s house and a document titled “Plan Trackering [sic]” that discussed placing a tracking device on a vehicle. Defendant also had a document with R.F.’s license plate number and a description of her vehicle. Police officers later searched defendant’s home and electronic storage devices. R.F.’s name appeared over 2,000 times in one device, along with hundreds of photos of her and other women. Officers also found in defendant’s home several weapons and containers of ammunition. Police later determined defendant had on three separate occasions stolen some of the ammunition found at his house from two sporting goods stores. Defendant was charged with and convicted of stalking, unlawfully manufacturing an assault weapon, nine counts of possession of an assault weapon, felony commercial burglary, felony grand theft of property, and petty theft. On appeal, defendant challenged the admission of certain photographs, and that the trial court improperly failed to provide a lesser included offense jury instruction for the unlawfully manufacturing an assault weapon charge. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's convictions. View "California v. Wise" on Justia Law

On February 22, a criminal complaint was filed against the defendant for unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. On February 26, the defendant was in custody and present in court for a pretrial hearing. The court continued the matter to March 20. The Surety posted a bond of $25,000 for the defendant’s release from custody. At the March 20 pretrial hearing, the defendant was not present. The court told defense counsel “I’ll give you a week to bring him back in. … Bench warrant of 35,000 held … it’s not likely to waste your family and friends money and then FTA on a 10851.” On March 28, the defendant again failed to appear. The court ordered bail forfeited. A notice of forfeiture was mailed to the parties on March 29.On October 2, the Surety moved to vacate, forfeit, and exonerate bail or to extend time, arguing that the court lost jurisdiction over the bond because it failed to declare a forfeiture (Penal Code 13051) when the defendant did not appear on March 20. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the motion. The trial court had a rational basis for believing there may have been an excuse for the defendant’s failure to appear sufficient to warrant continuing the case without declaring a forfeiture and retained jurisdiction to later declare the bail forfeited. View "People v. Bankers Insurance Co." on Justia Law