Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Amit Bharth was convicted by jury on two counts of forcible rape, assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, and false imprisonment. The jury also found true the allegation that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury. Defendant was sentenced to 23 years, 8 months in prison. The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial, which was based on his contention that the court permitted testimony by the victim that violated his confrontation clause rights. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's convictions. View "California v. Bharth" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal concluded that Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (h) does not violate equal protection, and the exclusion of offenders sentenced under the Three Strikes law from youth offender parole consideration is rationally related to a legitimate penal interest. The court also concluded that it lacks jurisdiction to rule on appellant's clam that the imposition of the five-year enhancement under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a) resulted in an unauthorized sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the postjudgment order. View "People v. Moore" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Barefield appealed his convictions of corporal injury, assault with a deadly weapon, and false imprisonment, arising from his attack against a former girlfriend. He claimed the trial court erred by: (1) admitting evidence in violation of the marital testimony privilege; (2) admitting propensity evidence; (3) admitting fresh complaint evidence; (4) not staying his sentence on the false imprisonment count; and (5) using the firearm possession to impose the upper-term sentence on the assault count and a firearm enhancement. Although the trial court admitted evidence in violation of the marital privilege, the Court of Appeal found the error was harmless. Finding no other reversible error, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Barefield" on Justia Law

Defendant Kejhonne Henderson shot and killed J.P. at a house party in the North Highlands neighborhood of Sacramento. Upset that music of a local rapper disparaging his neighborhood’s gang was being played, defendant exchanged heated words with the party’s host. When J.P. intervened, he and defendant agreed to step outside. On their way to the door, defendant pulled a handgun out of his waistband and when they got outside, shot J.P. multiple times in the head and chest. A.J., one of the party goers, tackled defendant and knocked the gun out of his hand. Defendant regained possession and shot A.J. multiple times before fleeing. J.P. died before emergency services arrived at the scene, but A.J. survived. A jury found defendant guilty of one count of second degree murder and one count of attempted murder, and found true enhancement allegations that defendant personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death as to each count. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve an aggregate determinate term of seven years plus an aggregate indeterminate prison term of 65 years to life. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded a trial court could not excuse for cause African-American prospective jurors solely because of their belief that the criminal justice system treats African-Americans unfairly, but rejected defendant’s assertion that the two African-American prospective jurors here were excused for that reason. "They were excused because the trial court concluded that, based on the voir dire evidence, they could not be impartial because of their bias and sympathy for defendant." On this record, the Court did not find the trial court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion; nor was defendant’s constitutional right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community violated. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court erred in excusing a seated juror, because the record did not demonstrate the juror could not perform his duties. However, applying the harmless error standard in Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818 (1956), the Court concluded the error was harmless. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected defendant’s other claims of error, and affirmed his convictions and sentence. View "California v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Alicia Haro was convicted by jury of multiple drug related offenses after she crossed into the United States from Mexico on three occasions while transporting large amounts of methamphetamine hidden in her vehicle. She was sentenced to 21 years in prison. On appeal, Haro argued the trial court erred: (1) in allowing a drug trafficking expert to testify that he did not believe that a drug organization would entrust large quantities of valuable drugs to an individual who had no knowledge of what they were transporting; (2) when it declined to disclose private juror information after defense counsel asserted that an alternate juror approached her following the reading of the verdict and told her that some of the jurors had discussed the case before deliberations began; and (3) when it aggregated two 10-kilogram enhancements that had been pled and proven with respect to separate charged counts of conspiracy and instead imposed the sentence for a single 20-kilogram weight enhancement, given that the court dismissed one of the conspiracy counts after the jury determined that the two charged conspiracies were in fact part of a single conspiracy. Finally, Haro contended the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that she was ineligible for a split sentence because of her immigration status. The Court of Appeal concluded Haro’s first two contentions were without merit. However, the Court agreed with Haro that the trial court erred in imposing a 20-kilogram weight enhancement under Health and Safety Code section 11370.4 (a)(4), because the accusatory pleading failed to provide Haro with notice that she could be subject to such an enhancement with respect to any charged count. The Court ruled this enhancement had to be stricken, the sentence vacated, and the matter remanded for resentencing. Given the Court's vacatur of Haro’s sentence and limited remand for resentencing, the Court did not consider Haro’s final argument. View "California v. Haro" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants for wrongful arrest after plaintiffs were arrested for public intoxication under Carson Municipal Code section 4201. Plaintiffs spent a night and the better part of the next day in jail, but they were never charged.Because Penal Code section 647, subdivision (f) has preempted section 4201, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that a violation of the Carson ordinance, if proved, would establish reasonable cause to arrest. The court also concluded that the erroneous instruction was prejudicial where the instruction and special verdict form afforded no other basis to find the deputy had reasonable cause to arrest plaintiffs without a warrant. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment rendered on the jury's special verdict findings and remanded for further proceedings. View "Carcamo v. L.A. County Sheriff's Dept." on Justia Law

Two years after she pled guilty to felony animal cruelty Danae Rodriguez requested pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. The trial court denied her request as untimely because it was not presented until after her conviction by guilty plea. Section 1001.36(c), defined pretrial diversion as postponement of prosecution “at any point in the judicial process . . . until adjudication” and the trial court interpreted the term “adjudication” to mean an adjudication of guilt, whether by jury conviction or a plea of guilty. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court’s interpretation and affirmed its judgment. View "California v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

California Highway Patrol Officers Herve and Bethay passed a pickup truck and saw the driver, Grabham, looking down at his cellphone. They noticed Grabhams’s vehicle registration had expired. Although Herve had not noticed any signs of impaired driving, he initiated a traffic stop, approached the truck, and saw a 12-pack of beer on the seat. Herve smelled alcohol coming from the truck and noticed Grabham’s eyes were red and watery; he also slurred his speech and struggled to follow directions. Grabham’s performance in several field sobriety tests indicated he was under the influence of alcohol. Herve arrested him and administered a breath test. The first test reported a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.12, and the second test reported a BAC of 0.11.A jury found Grabham guilty of driving under the influence (DUI) of an alcoholic beverage (Vehicle Code, 23152(a)) and driving with a 0.08 BAC (section 23152(b)). The court found enhancement allegations under section 23550.5 to be true and sentenced Grabham to three years in state prison but suspended execution of the sentence. Grabham was placed on three years of probation on the condition that he participate in a residential treatment program. The court of appeal affirmed. Section 23152(a) and (b) are separate offenses and a defendant may properly be convicted of both. View "People v. Grabham" on Justia Law

In 2008, Murray was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a first-degree special circumstance murder he committed when he was 22 years old. His conviction was affirmed In 2010, In 2020, Murray sought a Franklin hearing, contending he was eligible for a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051.3 The trial court denied his motion because under the terms of section 3051(h), “people sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for crimes committed when they were at least 18 years of age but no more than ‘25 years of age or younger are not eligible for youth offender parole hearings.” The court of appeal affirmed.The court of appeal then rejected Murray’s argument that section 3051 violates his constitutional right to equal protection by affording juvenile LWOP offenders a youth offender parole hearing but denying such a hearing to youthful LWOP offenders. There is a rational basis for distinguishing between juvenile and youthful LWOP offenders in this context. View "In re Murray" on Justia Law

Saxton pled no contest to driving under the influence (Veh. Code 23152(f)), a misdemeanor, and willfully evading a police officer (Veh. Code 2800.2(a)), a felony. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and ordered her to serve three years of formal probation. It specified that any probation violation that occurs during those three years can carry felony punishment consequences. Saxton argued A.B. 1950 limits the felony consequences of any probation violation to the first two years of her probationary term.The court of appeal affirmed, modifying the probation order. A defendant who is convicted of both a misdemeanor exempt from A.B. 1950’s probation term limits and a nonexempt felony can be ordered to serve a term of formal probation equal to the length of time specified by the exempt misdemeanor. But consistent with A.B. 1950’s purpose, a probation violation can carry felony punishment consequences only during the first two years of the probationary term. Any violation that occurs after that two-year period can have only misdemeanor punishment consequences. View "People v. Saxton" on Justia Law