Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Moore was convicted of murder (Penal Code 187) and robbery (section 211); a jury found true the special circumstance that the murder was committed during a robbery (190.2(a)(17)). Moore sought habeas relief, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for the robbery-murder special-circumstance finding.The California Supreme Court ordered the court of appeal to consider “whether [Moore’s] youth at the time of the offense should be one of the factors considered under” precedent in which the California Supreme Court examined the felony-murder special circumstance, Penal Code 190.2(d). Under that provision, a person who is guilty of murder but is not the “actual killer” and who aids or abets the commission of certain felonies that result in death may be sentenced to death or life without the possibility of parole if that person is a “major participant” and acts with “reckless indifference to human life.”On remand, the court of appeal vacated the conviction. A defendant’s youth at the time of the offense should be a factor in determining whether that defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life under section 190.2(d). Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that Moore was only 16 at the time of his offenses, the court found insufficient evidence to establish that Moore acted with the requisite reckless indifference to human life. View "In re Moore" on Justia Law

In 2005, Rodriguez pleaded no contest to the charge of possession for sale of methamphetamine. She was placed on probation. She brought her Penal Code 1473.7 motion soon after she was detained by federal authorities, facing deportation. She submitted declarations of her own and from the law office that represented her, stating that her conviction was legally invalid because a prejudicial error damaged her ability to meaningfully understand the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of her no contest plea. She stated that she had come to the U.S. when she was an infant and that her family, including her two young children, her parents, and her five sisters, all live in the U.S. The trial court rejected her motion, noting that she appeared to be on probation in another case and that she failed to show there was a reasonable probability that she would not have entered her plea if she had been fully informed of its adverse immigration consequences.The court of appeal reversed the denial of Rodriguez’s motion. Rodriguez's probation status in a separate case did not bar her motion. She showed it was reasonably probable that she would not have entered her plea if she had known its adverse immigration consequences. View "People v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Medrano and Vargas purchased a semi-automatic rifle. Medrano “scored” the bullets to make them "more explosive.” Vargas, Throop, and Scholle discussed committing a drive-by shooting. Vargas drove them to Ventura County. Throop held the rifle, sitting in the back seat next to Medrano, and fired multiple shots at people attending a baptism party. As Vargas drove away, Scholle shouted the names of rival gangs. Two men attending the party died of gunshot wounds. Two others were shot but survived.In 1991 Medrano was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder with a multiple death special circumstances finding, two counts of attempted first-degree murder, and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. He was sentenced to prison for 50 years to life. In 2019, Medrano filed a Penal Code section 1170.95 petition seeking resentencing, arguing that he was convicted of first-degree murder pursuant to the felony murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine and could not now be convicted of 1st or 2nd-degree murder because of Senate Bill 1437's changes to Penal Code sections 188 and 189, effective in 2019. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of his petition. Section 1170.95 relief is unavailable to a petitioner concurrently convicted of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder where both convictions involve the same victim; conviction of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder shows, as a matter of law, that the “target offense” is murder, not some lesser offense. View "People v. Medrano" on Justia Law

In 2018, the California Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), which amended the mens rea requirements for the crime of murder and restricted the circumstances under which a person can be liable for murder under the felony-murder rule. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether Senate Bill No. 1437 eradicated the narrowing function traditionally performed by the felony-murder special circumstance statute, Penal Code section 190.2. The trial court found it did, thus rendering the felony-murder special circumstance statute inoperable in practice. Based on this finding, the court found Senate Bill No. 1437 unconstitutionally amended a voter-approved initiative pertaining to special circumstances. After this ruling, the court struck a petition filed by defendant Virgil Wilkins to have his first degree murder conviction vacated under section 1170.95 (the resentencing provision of Senate Bill No. 1437). The Court of Appeal concluded Senate Bill No. 1437 neither repealed the felony-murder special circumstance statute in practice nor amended any voter-approved initiative. Given this conclusion, the Court reversed the trial court order striking the defendant’s resentencing petition and remanded the matter for further proceedings pursuant to section 1170.95 (c). View "California v. Wilkins" on Justia Law

Thirteen-year-old Jessica F.-H. was brutally murdered in a Sacramento County park. Her murder went unsolved until defendant Ryan Roberts' DNA was linked to her belt buckle and cigarette butts found at the scene. Defendant’s DNA had been collected after an unrelated felony arrest more than a year after Jessica’s murder. Although that arrest was supported by probable cause, he was not formally charged in that matter. Based primarily on the DNA evidence, a jury found defendant guilty of murder in the first degree. The jury also found true an enhancement allegation that defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a knife. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 26 years to life. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether using a DNA sample taken from a defendant who was validly arrested for a felony on probable cause but never formally charged, violated the defendant’s federal or state constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure or his state constitutional right to privacy. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court concluded defendant’s federal right protecting him against unreasonable search and seizure was not violated. Further, the Court held defendant’s state constitutional rights were not violated, but even if they were, the Truth-in-Evidence provision of Proposition 8 prohibited suppression of the DNA evidence in a criminal trial. In addition to defendant’s search and seizure and privacy claims concerning the DNA evidence, defendant also asserted: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred in restricting the scope of his gang expert’s testimony; (2 the trial court prejudicially erred in precluding the defense from presenting certain demonstrative evidence; (3 the trial court denied defendant due process by refusing to give his proposed pinpoint jury instruction on third party culpability; (4) the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors warrants reversal; (5) the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial premised on newly discovered evidence; and (6) the trial court erred in concluding a juror did not commit prejudicial misconduct related to statements made on Twitter during the trial. As to the last claim, defendant requested that the Court perform an independent in camera review of the juror’s Twitter account records. After review, the Court found no reversible error and affirmed judgment. View "California v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Ahmed Mumin was convicted by jury of first degree murder, burglary, and robbery. The jury also convicted Mumin on two counts of premeditated attempted murder of a peace officer, two counts of assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm, two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and one count each of possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of ammunition by a prohibited person. The jury found true various firearm enhancements. The trial court sentenced Mumin to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, plus an additional consecutive indeterminate term of 55 years to life imprisonment and a consecutive determinate term of 41 years four months. Mumin appealed, contending: (1) the evidence did not support a jury instruction on the kill zone theory of attempted murder liability; (2) the trial court committed prejudicial misconduct by questioning Mumin’s counsel about her closing argument in the presence of the jury; and (3) his convictions for assault with a semiautomatic firearm should be vacated because they were lesser included offenses of assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm. The Attorney General conceded the two assault convictions should have been vacated or reversed, and the Court of Appeal accepted this concession. The Court held Mumin’s two remaining contentions were without merit. Therefore, judgment was modified to vacate the two assault convictions (and the stayed sentences thereon) and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "California v. Mumin" on Justia Law

In 1998, Tan was convicted of first-degree murder (Penal Code 187) and robbery. With firearm, prior strike, and serious felony enhancements, the court sentenced him to an aggregate indeterminate term of 56 years to life for count 1 and stayed count 2. In 2019, Senate Bill 1437 changed the law governing accomplice liability for felony murder and murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine; Penal Code section 1170.95 allows defendants who could not be convicted of murder under the amended law to petition to vacate their murder convictions and be resentenced on any remaining counts. A person who is resentenced shall be given credit for time served.A court granted Tan's section 1170.95 petition, holding that no reasonable jury could convict Tan of murder under current law, vacating Tan’s murder conviction and imposing an aggregate determinate term of 16 years for the robbery conviction, doubled for the prior strike, plus one year for the firearm enhancement and five years for the serious-felony prior, then ordered him released on time served. The court placed Tan on parole supervision for three years. The court of appeal modified his parole sentence. Section 3000.01, which was enacted before he was resentenced, limits Tan’s parole term to two years. View "People v. Tan" on Justia Law

Czirban was charged with regulatory crimes following a fatal 2016 accident involving his bulldozer, which had been assisting the California Department of Forestry and Fire (Cal Fire) at a wildfire in Monterey County. Czirban was convicted of procuring or offering a false or forged instrument, tax evasion, failure to collect, account for, or pay taxes, and misdemeanor failure to secure payment of workers’ compensation insurance. The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Czirban on felony probation for three years with conditions, including the payment of a $10,000 fine under Labor Code section 3700.5.The court of appeal rejected Czirban’s arguments that his convictions for tax evasion, failure to pay taxes, and failure to secure payment of workers’ compensation insurance must be reversed because he did not have an employment relationship with his bulldozer drivers, an element of those offenses. The court remanded in part. Assembly Bill 1950 (2019-2020) subsequently limited the term of probation to two years. The trial court failed to understand that it had discretion whether to impose the $10,000 fine. View "People v. Czirban" on Justia Law

In 2017, after being charged with willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (Pen. Code 187(a)), McClure pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter (192(a)) and 11 other crimes. The superior court imposed an agreed-upon determinate sentence of 25 years. In 2020, McClure sought resentencing under section 1170.95, (Senate Bill 1437), which “amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine . . . to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant of the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” Section 1170.95 allows individuals “convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory” to petition the sentencing court to vacate the “murder conviction” and be resentenced on remaining counts.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the petition. McClure failed to state a prima facie case for relief because she was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, not murder. Section 1170.95 does not apply to individuals who pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter in lieu of going to trial on a murder charge under a felony murder or a natural and probable consequences theory. The court also rejected constitutional equal protection, substantive due process, and cruel and/or unusual punishment claims. View "People v. McClure" on Justia Law

Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.7 to vacate a 2000 conviction entered after he pled guilty to felony theft.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal addressed the meaning of the timeliness provisions set forth in subdivision (b) of section 1473.7, which is a pure question of law and not dependent upon the facts of this case. The court explained that subdivision (b) contains a general rule requiring the court to deem the motion timely in certain circumstances and a discretionary exception that permits the court to deem the motion untimely if the moving party did not act with reasonable diligence in bringing the motion after specific triggering events. Therefore, the absence of reasonable diligence does not automatically result in the motion being deemed untimely. The court held that a superior court has the discretionary authority, after considering the totality of the circumstances, to deem a motion timely even if the moving party did not act with reasonable diligence. The court reversed the order denying the section 1473.7 motion. View "People v. Perez" on Justia Law