Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Based on his active role in a 2010 shootout between rival gangs, Mancilla was convicted of first-degree murder and four counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. In 2016, the court of appeal rejected an argument that instructions on provocative act murder permitted the jury to convict Mancilla of first-degree murder based on a finding that a codefendant had acted with premeditation in committing attempted murder or without any finding on premeditation at all and rejected Mancilla’s argument he was prejudiced by the failure to instruct the jury he could not be convicted of first-degree murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.In 2020, the superior court denied Mancilla’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.951 without first appointing counsel or inviting briefing, finding, based on the court’s recollection of the trial, as refreshed by reviewing Mancilla’s brief in his direct appeal, that Mancilla had been prosecuted and found guilty under the theory of provocative act murder, not under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The court of appeal affirmed. The record of conviction establishes Mancilla is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law, so any errors committed by the superior court were harmless. Mancilla failed to make a prima facie showing of his entitlement to relief. View "People v. Mancilla" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Gregory Wilson guilty of second degree murder. He was sentenced to 17 years to life. On appeal he contended the trial court erred in failing to: (1) instruct the jury sua sponte on defenses arising from the use of deadly force to protect against common law felonies; (2) instruct sua sponte on the Home Protection Bill of Rights presumption; and (3) provide the jury with verdict forms for voluntary manslaughter. He also contended: (4) the errors cumulatively required reversal; (5) his prior prison term enhancement should have been struck in light of Senate Bill No. 136; and (6) the imposition of certain fines and fees were unlawful in light of California v. Dueñas, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (2019). The Court of Appeal concurred defendant was entitled to the ameliorative benefit of Senate Bill 136 and struck the one-year prior prison term; the Court affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Karen Sims, a former attorney with long standing history of mental illness, was convicted of murdering her husband Henry Sims in 2006 and was sentenced to prison for a term of 50 years to life. After her conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in 2008, she petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to the California Supreme Court in 2011, on the ground her conviction was invalid because she was incompetent to stand trial. An order to show cause (OSC) was issued by the Supreme Court, returnable to the Riverside County Superior Court, but was denied. In 2016, petitioner again sought habeas relief, petitioning the Supreme Court, but with additional information about her postconviction mental health problems as they related to timeliness. The California Supreme Court again issued an OSC, this time returnable to the Court of Appeal. The appellate granted the petition and remanded the matter again to the superior court for an evidentiary hearing, where it specified that counsel should present the testimony of Michael DeFrank, as well as any expert witnesses or mental health professionals who were aware of defendant’s mental health condition during the period between August and December 2006, or such other evidence as may constitute substantial evidence of defendant’s incompetence to stand trial. On remand, the court heard the testimony of petitioner’s trial counsel, which it found lacking in credibility, and that of petitioner, and denied the petition once again. This petition followed. The State argued that the court properly found the testimony of petitioner’s trial counsel lacked credibility and argued the Court of Appeal's previous remand order did not require the superior court to readdress petitioner’s claim that she was incompetent to stand trial. The Court of Appeal granted the petition and reversed the judgment of conviction. Defendant could be retried on the charges for which she was convicted if she was competent to stand trial. View "In re Sims" on Justia Law

Defendant Nathan Henderson pleaded no contest to possession of a nunchaku, and admitted a prior prison term. In August 2018, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of four years, consisting of: three years for the nunchaku possession plus a consecutive year for the prior prison term enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5 (b). The trial court suspended execution of the final 1,096 days of the sentence and ordered them to be served as a period of mandatory supervision with various terms and conditions. Defendant subsequently admitted violating his mandatory supervision on four occasions. In May 2020, the trial court terminated defendant’s mandatory supervision, reaffirmed his sentence, but declined to strike the prior prison term enhancement pursuant to Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 136), effective January 1, 2020, concluding that defendant’s sentence had become a final judgment 60 days after his sentence was pronounced on August 8, 2018, and thus defendant was not entitled to retroactive relief. On appeal, Defendant contended the trial court erred in declining to strike the prior prison term enhancement. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal agreed. However, in light of the California Supreme Court’s decision in California v. Stamps, 9 Cal.5th 685 (2020), the Court asked for supplemental briefing on whether striking the prior prison term enhancement while maintaining the remainder of the plea agreement would deprive the State of the benefit of their bargain, such that the State should be afforded an opportunity to withdraw from the plea agreement. Defendant argued the Court could strike the enhancement and keep the plea deal intact, whereas the State argued the Court had to must remand to permit it to withdraw from the plea agreement. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court concluded Stamps was not on point because in this case the parties entered into an open plea agreement rather than agreeing to a stipulated sentence. The Court thus modified the judgment to strike defendant’s prior prison term enhancement and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "California v. Henderson" on Justia Law

When he was 17 years old, M.W. assaulted his girlfriend. After a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition was filed, seeking to have him declared a ward of the juvenile court, M.W. admitted to willful infliction of corporal injury. The juvenile court adjudged M.W. a ward of the court and ordered him to reside in his mother’s home under the probation department’s supervision and to complete a 52-week “Batterer’s Intervention Program” because M.W. had a “pattern of engaging in violent behavior, as well as inappropriateness with females.”M.W. requested that the court order the probation department to pay for the program. M.W. had already enrolled in the program at a cost of $153 per month, approximately $1,800 for the 52-week program. The court denied M.W.’s request. The court of appeal reversed. Under the Welfare and Institutions Code, neither M/W/ nor his mother is liable for the costs of his treatment program. A court may not impose liability on a minor’s parents unless authorized by statute; a minor may be liable for costs only in very limited instances. The People cite no authority to support an order imposing the costs of the Batterer’s Intervention Program on M.W. or his family. View "In re M.W." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal denied a petition for writ of habeas corpus to petitioner who was convicted of murdering her three young children by setting a house fire that killed them. Petitioner argues that the current scientific understanding of burn patterns and how fire behaves under certain conditions fatally undermines expert testimony offered by the prosecution at trial regarding the cause and origin of the fire at petitioner's home, as well as the fire scene investigation on which the experts based those opinions.The court concluded that petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to relief under Penal Code section 1473, subdivision (b). Although petitioner has identified real advances in fire investigation science, the court explained that section 1473, subdivisions (b) and (e)(1) condition the availability of habeas relief on the effect such advancements likely would have had on the particular expert testimony at issue in the particular proceedings at issue. In this case, given the extent to which the same criticisms of the prosecution's expert testimony were litigated at the original trial, the continuing expert debate on these topics reflected at the evidentiary hearing, the lack of any authority rejecting some aspect of the original investigation as improper or incorrect by current standards, and the other evidence of guilt offered against petitioner at trial, petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to relief.The court also concluded, for largely the same reasons, that petitioner failed to establish that the state of fire investigation science at the time of trial rendered her trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process. The court stated that, although additional scientific support for the defense's expert testimony at trial would have been helpful to the defense in rebutting the prosecution expert's opinions, the absence of such additional support did not necessarily prevent a fair trial. View "In re Parks" on Justia Law

A juvenile wardship petition charged Noah with several crimes, such as motor vehicle burglaries and vandalism; he entered a plea admitting one felony motor vehicle burglary count. While Noah’s wardship was ongoing, a supplemental juvenile wardship petition alleged Noah, then 14 years old, committed attempted robbery and caused or permitted an elder or dependent adult to suffer. A video showed Jacqueline, the 88-year-old victim, leaving a restaurant. As she opens the car door, a young man runs up. Her husband, Philippe, got into the driver’s seat. When Jacqueline steps aside to let the young man pass, he grabs her purse and starts to run, dragging Jacqueline behind the car, where she falls, slams into the ground, and rolls, still holding the purse. A police officer took fingerprints from where the young man touched the car; they matched Noah’s. Jacqueline was still on the ground when the officer arrived; she was confused and bleeding.The juvenile court sustained the allegations and found the attempted robbery adjudication qualified as an offense under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) and committed Noah to a ranch facility for 12 months with a 180 day “aftercare period.” The court of appeal affirmed. Noah’s adjudication for attempted robbery is an offense described in Penal Code section 1203.09 and falls within Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b). Substantial evidence showed Noah’s intent to rob Jacqueline and that he inflicted great bodily injury. View "In re Noah S." on Justia Law

Morales fired six shots toward a parked car, resulting in the death of his pregnant acquaintance who stood near the car. The jury convicted Morales of two counts of first-degree murder, one count of attempted murder, one count of shooting at an occupied vehicle, and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, finding true four firearm use enhancements under Penal Code 12022.53(d) and a multiple murder special circumstance allegation (section 190.2(a)(3)).The court of appeal affirmed, modifying the sentence. The court rejected Morales’s arguments that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in closing argument and that counsel was ineffective for failing to object; that there was insufficient evidence to support a kill zone jury instruction; and with respect to the firearm use enhancement on count 1, that Morales was deprived of due process by the court’s failure to instruct that the requisite great bodily injury or death under section 12022.53(d) must be to a person other than an accomplice. The judgment was modified by striking the sentences of 25 years to life on counts 1 and 2, and the term of life without the possibility of parole imposed for the multiple-murder special circumstance finding. The superior court is to impose a term of life without the possibility of parole on counts 1 and 2. For count 1, the jury’s true finding under section 12022.53(d) was reversed; the 25-years-to-life enhancement imposed upon that finding was vacated. View "People v. Morales" on Justia Law

San Mateo County Deputy Tapia was dispatched to a Millbrae apartment about 2:00 a.m. on September 21, 2020, based on a 911 call. Tapia learned that Ayala had accused his stepfather, Abner, of molesting Ayala’s daughter and had made threats. After arresting Ayala for criminal threats and reading him his Miranda rights Tapia interviewed Ayala, who acknowledged having said “some violent shit.” Tapia believed that Ayala may have been under the influence of drugs.A magistrate held Ayala to answer to count 1 (Abner) but not to count 2 (Ayala’s mother, Clarisa), finding a “failure of proof of a threat that would result in death and great bodily injury to Clarisa.” The charge nonetheless included two counts, with two prior strike convictions and two prior felony convictions. Ayala moved to dismiss count 2 on the ground that Clarisa was not threatened within the meaning of Penal Code 422 because the alleged threat was to kill or inflict physical harm on Abner. The trial court denied Ayala’s motion. Following a remand, the court of appeal denied Ayala’s petition for peremptory writ of prohibition. Section 422 is focused on mental distress and does not require a threat of violence against the victim. View "Ayala v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Clark, a felon with multiple priors, was approached by a police officer and fled the scene, disposed of a loaded handgun by throwing it over a fence, and then resisted arrest, ultimately injuring the officer. Clark pleaded no contest possession of a firearm by a felon and to threatening a police officer; the prosecutor dismissed the additional counts. The San Mateo County Superior Court imposed a 42-month prison sentence, suspended execution of the sentence, and placed Clark on probation for five years, with standard conditions of one year in county jail, modifiable to residential treatment. Clark left residential treatment without permission. The court found that Clark violated the terms of his probation and ordered the original prison sentence into execution and orally pronounced that “[a] $300 probation revocation fine is imposed and all outstanding fines and fees.” In the abstract of judgment, the court listed: $300 fine, $300 suspended parole revocation fine, $300 probation revocation fine, $40 court operations assessment, and $30 conviction assessment. … Total Fine/Fees $570."While his appeal was pending, Assembly Bill 1869 repealed the statute authorizing the probation supervision fee, Penal Code 1203.1b. The court of appeal held that Assembly Bill 1869 applies, so the $100 fee must be stricken; the $470 “Criminal Violation Distribution” fine did not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment. The court vacated the sentencing order, subject to reinstatement on remand with an amended abstract of judgment View "People v. Clark" on Justia Law