Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

California has two statutory mechanisms for detaining, evaluating, and treating persons who have been declared incompetent to stand trial for a felony that entailed a threat of bodily harm, and who continue to pose a danger to others. When the reason is a "developmental disability," the applicable mechanism is civil commitment under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500; when the reason is a "mental disease, defect, or disorder," the applicable mechanism is a so-called Murphy conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act) (section 5000 et seq.), section 5008, subdivision (h)(1)(B). Under section 6500, the one-year recommitment period ends on the anniversary of the date of the recommitment order; for a Murphy conservatorship, the one-year period ends on the anniversary of the date of the initial commitment order. Because, as is common, recommitment orders under section 6500 are not fully litigated (and hence not issued) until after the anniversary of the date of the initial commitment order, the end dates for section 6500 recommitments typically get pushed out further and further with each recommitment.The Court of Appeal held that this "creep" of the end date under section 6500 does not violate equal protection in regard to Murphy conservatorships. The court explained that individuals civilly committed under section 6500 and Murphy conservatorships are not similarly situated for purposes of fixing the end date for a recommitment. Even assuming that persons civilly committed under section 6500 and in a Murphy conservatorship are similarly situated for purposes of the timetable for terminating a one-year period for a recommitment, the court concluded that there is a sufficient justification for that differential treatment that withstands rational basis scrutiny. Accordingly, the court affirmed the end date for the section 6500 recommitment in this case. View "People v. Nolasco" on Justia Law

Before defendant was charged with ordering the kidnapping, rape, and killing of a 13-year-old girl, defendant made inconsistent statements to law enforcement—at first denying he ever saw the victim, but later admitting that he saw her just before she went missing and in the company of the gang members who kidnapped, raped, and killed her. Defendant made these statements pursuant to a proffer agreement with prosecutors, wherein they agreed not to use "any statements made" during the proffer session in any future case-in-chief as long as defendant was "completely truthful and candid" during the proffer session.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal held that the prosecutorial agency that seeks to use these internally inconsistent (and hence untruthful) statements is not required to first demonstrate that it has standing to enforce the proffer agreement. The court explained that standing is necessary when a party seeks affirmative relief from a contract, but here it is defendant—not the prosecutors—who is seeking specific performance of the proffer agreement's promise of inadmissibility, and hence defendant who must establish that he met the agreement's condition precedent of truthfulness. The court noted that this holding differs in some respects from prior cases that have seemingly treated a defendant's untruthfulness as a breach of contract to be established by prosecutors. In this case, the court agreed with the trial court that defendant's statements were properly admitted because he failed to establish the truthfulness of his proffered statements. View "People v. Palacios" on Justia Law

When part of a criminal sentence is ordered stricken by an appellate court, the trial court on remand "has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the sentence" when resentencing. The Court of Appeal held that a trial court conducting such a resentencing is required to exercise that jurisdiction in order to correct a different part of the sentence that has become incorrect by the time of resentencing. In this case, the trial court conducted a resentencing to correct one sentencing enhancement while letting stand another enhancement that had become incorrect. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for plenary resentencing. View "People v. Walker" on Justia Law

Defendant Johnny Lapenias committed multiple sex offenses against his stepdaughter. However, the stepdaughter did not disclose Lapenias’ sexual abuse to the police until years later, when she was 14 years old. At a jury trial, the trial court admitted expert testimony regarding Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS), a theory that identified typical behaviors of sexually abused children, including delayed disclosures. During the CSAAS expert’s testimony, a juror asked: “Is it common for children to make up a story that abuse occurred, when, in fact it did not?” Over Lapenias’ objection, the CSAAS expert testified: “No, that’s rare.” The jury later found Lapenias guilty of the charged sex offenses and the trial court imposed a life sentence. On appeal, Lapenias challenged the admission of the CSAAS evidence, the related jury instruction, the CSAAS expert’s testimony, and statutory fines and fees. The Court of Appeal found the trial court erred by allowing the CSAAS expert to testify that it is “rare” for children to make up stories about sexual abuse, but the Court did not find the error to be prejudicial. Finding no other errors, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "California v. Lapenias" on Justia Law

A mother of four young children was found guilty by jury of first degree murder and assault on a child resulting in death, after she killed her youngest child and only daughter. There was no dispute defendant Ka Yang, while alone with her baby Mirabelle, placed the baby in a microwave oven and turned it on. These actions killed the baby. Defendant told her family and first responders that she did not know how the baby was injured, but she consistently spoke of having suffered a seizure, and guessed that the baby had been injured when dropped on a nearby heater while defendant was incapacitated. Defendant's defense at trial, supported in part by expert testimony, was that she killed her daughter while unconscious due to an epileptic seizure. The prosecution countered defendant’s claim of unconsciousness with expert testimony of its own (and medical records), after an inadvertent disclosure by the trial court allowed the prosecutor to discern these records’ contents midtrial and secure their admission on that basis. Although defendant had not been diagnosed with any postpartum mental disorder, and Mirabelle’s pediatrician testified defendant had screened negative for any such disorder, the prosecution relied on this evidence to theorize that defendant was motivated to kill her daughter by hallucinations related to undiagnosed postpartum psychosis. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony regarding postpartum mental disorders without sufficient factual basis and by subsequently admitting into evidence defendant’s psychological records not directly related to any mental condition she had put at issue. The Court could not conclude these errors were harmless when considered together, thus it reversed the judgment in its entirety. View "California v. Yang" on Justia Law

Defendants Vasquez and Carrillo's trial was trifurcated into three proceedings: in the first proceeding, a jury convicted defendants of first degree murder, and found the personal firearm use enhancement to be true as to both defendants; in the second proceeding, the jury found true the gang enhancement and the discharge of a firearm by a principal causing death enhancement as to both defendants; and in the third proceeding, the trial court found true the prior prison term allegations against Vasquez.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded that the prosecution was not required to show connection between the gang subsets. In this case, there is no violation of the sameness requirement because there was substantial evidence that the gang whose members Carrillo acted in association with, the gang whose members committed the predicate offenses, and the gang whose primary activities were established by expert testimony is one and the same: the broader Sureño gang. The court accepted the Attorney General's concession that Vasquez is entitled to relief under Senate Bill No. 136. Accordingly, the court modified the judgment as to Vasquez and affirmed. The court affirmed the judgment as to Carrillo. View "People v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

In November 2013, the victim went to a parking lot to purchase cocaine from another individual. Hoang pulled out a gun and fatally shot the victim. The prosecution’s theory was that Hoang intended to rob the victim and shot him when he resisted. Hoang was charged with murder and second-degree robbery. As to each count, it was also alleged that Hoang personally discharged a firearm, causing the victim’s death (Penal Code 12022.53(d)). A jury convicted Hoang of second-degree murder, found true the firearm enhancement allegation, but could not reach a verdict on the robbery count. The court sentenced Hoang to 15 years to life for the murder and 25 years to life for the 12022.53(d) enhancement.While Hoang’s appeal was pending, section 12022.53(h) was amended to state: “The court may, in the interests of justice pursuant to Section 1385 and at the time of sentencing, strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise required to be imposed by this section.” On remand, the trial court declined to exercise its discretion to strike the firearm enhancement and declined to consider “the possibility of giving a ten- or a 20-year enhancement.” The court of appeal affirmed. Section 12022.53(h) authorizes a court to exercise discretion to strike or dismiss a firearm enhancement only; it does not authorize a court, in the furtherance of justice, to impose a lesser firearm enhancement that was neither alleged nor found to be true. View "People v. Hoang" on Justia Law

Doane lost control of his truck and collided head-on with a vehicle driven by Jouaux, killing him. Doane fled on foot and was not apprehended until the following day. At trial, the key disputed issue was whether Doane acted with gross negligence; he conceded he acted with ordinary negligence and was thus liable for the lesser included misdemeanor offense of vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence. A jury convicted him of vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence, with an enhancement for fleeing the scene, and a separate count of leaving the scene of an accident. He was sentenced to 11 years in prison.The court of appeal affirmed the conviction for leaving the scene. Sufficient evidence supported the conviction of gross vehicular manslaughter and a jury instruction on unconsciousness was unwarranted. However, the prosecutor misstated the law involving circumstantial evidence in closing arguments and the trial court incorrectly answered a jury question about the use of post-crash conduct to find gross negligence; those two errors were collectively prejudicial to warrant reversal of the gross vehicular manslaughter conviction. The prosecution may retry Doane for that offense, otherwise, the judgment will be modified to the lesser included offense of misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter, to which the enhancement for fleeing the scene does not apply. View "People v. Doane" on Justia Law

Sergio Rojas Arias appealed the summary denial of his petition to vacate his first degree murder conviction under Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court found Arias was not entitled to relief, as a matter of law, because the jury that found him guilty of murder returned a true finding on a robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation associated with the conviction. Because Arias was not the actual killer, the special-circumstance finding meant the jury necessarily found Arias aided and abetted in the commission of the murder with an intent to kill, or aided and abetted in the commission of the robbery while acting as a major participant and with reckless indifference to human life. The California Courts of Appeal were divided on the question of whether a jury’s true finding on a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation categorically precludes resentencing under section 1170.95 where, as here, the true finding was made prior to California v. Banks, 61 Cal.4th 788 (2015) and California v. Clark, 63 Cal.4th 522 (2016). The Court here found persuasive the logic of those courts that determined a pre- Banks and Clark felony-murder special-circumstance finding did not necessarily preclude resentencing under section 1170.95. Thus, the Court concluded the trial court erred in denying Arias’s petition based solely on the existence of the true robbery-murder special-circumstance finding. "Further, given the limited record of conviction before us, we are unable to conclude the special- circumstance finding satisfied the standards set forth in Banks and Clark." The trial court was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings on whether Arias made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief. View "California v. Arias" on Justia Law

Petitioner Pedro Rodriguez was serving a determinate term of 14 years eight months in prison. This term was the result of two separate proceedings in the trial court, both of which ended with jury trials and judgments of conviction. Following the second proceeding, the trial court announced a single, aggregate term of imprisonment for all of Rodriguez’s felony convictions from both proceedings. In the first proceeding, the trial court imposed a one-year prior prison term enhancement under former Penal Code section 667.5(b). This one-year term was included in the aggregate term of imprisonment imposed following the second proceeding. While Rodriguez’s appeal of the second proceeding was pending, section 667.5 was amended to limit the prior prison term enhancement to sexually violent offenses. Rodriguez contended the amendment applied retroactively to him under In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (1965) because his aggregate sentence was not yet final when the amendment became effective. The Attorney General contended that the judgment in the first proceeding, where the enhancement was imposed, was final before the amendment became effective, and its finality was not affected by its inclusion in the aggregate term of imprisonment announced by the court following the second proceeding. The Court of Appeal concluded that, under Estrada, the amendment to section 667.5 did not apply retroactively to eliminate the prior prison term enhancement imposed on Rodriguez in the first proceeding. Rodriguez's petition for habeas relief was thus denied. View "In re Rodriguez" on Justia Law