Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Guice was convicted, in three separate cases. of transportation of a controlled substance, two counts of possession of cocaine base for sale, evading an officer, robbery, possession of a controlled substance for sale, and bringing a controlled substance into jail. The allegation that Guice had a prior strike conviction was found true, as were various sentence enhancement allegations. In 2019, Guice sought habeas corpus relief, contending that he is eligible for parole consideration under Proposition 57 because his primary offense of transportation of a controlled substance is nonviolent.The court of appeal denied relief. Regulations adopted by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, excluding mixed-offense inmates who are currently serving a term for a violent felony offense from nonviolent parole consideration, are “a reasonable interpretation” of section 32(a), added to the California Constitution by Proposition 57. Guice has completed serving the full term for his primary, nonviolent offense and is currently serving a term for a violent felony offense. Although section 32 clearly mandates nonviolent parole consideration for individuals convicted solely of nonviolent offenses, the fact that the provision does not define the phrase, “convicted of a nonviolent felony offense,” renders it “reasonably susceptible of more than one meaning” when applied to mixed-offense. View "In re Guice" on Justia Law

In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that, under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, Assembly Bill No. 1950 applies retroactively to cases not yet final on review. However, the court rejected defendant's interpretation of Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (m)(1), and concluded that his convictions for violating Vehicle Code section 23153 preclude him from relief under subdivision (a) of section 1203.1.The court explained that defendant was convicted of violating section 23153, subdivisions (a) and (b), and for those offenses, section 23600, subdivision (b)(1), provides for a specific probation length. Therefore, the court concluded that the exclusion under section 1203.1, subdivision (m)(1), applies in this case and defendant is ineligible to have his probation term reduced under subdivision (a) of section 1203.1. View "People v. Schultz" on Justia Law

In 1983, Marsha Carter was found dead, in the trunk of her car, from multiple sharp-force injuries. The case went inactive. In 2008, investigators processed evidence, using procedures unavailable in 1983. The DNA analysis of blood found in Carter’s home pointed to Smothers, who was dating Carter in 1983. Scrapings beneath Carter’s fingernails yielded DNA, which was entered into the FBI’s CODIS database of DNA profiles, and matched to Sennett, who had no known connection to California, Carter, or Smothers. In 2016, Smothers was charged with Carter’s murder.Defense counsel never introduced evidence that the DNA evidence was matched to Sennett, although the court had given the green light to do so. The defense presented no witnesses. Smothers did not testify. Smothers's conviction was most consistent with the theory that Smothers conspired with a third party to kill Carter.The court of appeal reversed. Smothers’s attorney was ineffective for not presenting the available Sennett evidence, including his identity, to the jury. The prosecution’s key witness testified that Smothers tried to get him and/or other local friends to help him kill Carter. To convict Smothers of the uncharged conspiracy to commit murder, the prosecution had to prove that Smothers had the specific intent to enter into an agreement with someone to kill Carter. There was no evidence that Smothers entered into an agreement with Sennett. The jury likely concluded that Smothers finally located some local acquaintance to kill Carter; it is unclear whether this jury would have reached the same conclusion if they had been told Sennett’s identity and heard there was no known connection between him and Smothers. View "People v. Smothers" on Justia Law

In 2009, Wilson was convicted of two counts of lewd and lascivious acts with a child under age 14 using force or violence and one count of sexual battery. After serving a state prison term, Wilson was released to parole in 2018. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) determined that Wilson was a “high risk” sex offender and imposed a residency restriction as a condition of his parole: “You shall not reside within one-half mile of any public or private school (kindergarten and grades 1 through 12, inclusive) pursuant to [s]ection 3003(g).” In 2019, Wilson, under Penal Code section 1203.2(b)(1)), asked the trial court to modify the conditions of his parole to exclude that restriction, arguing he was homeless because he was unable to reside in any home available to him. CDCR opposed the motion, arguing the court was not authorized to modify Wilson’s parole conditions under section 1203.2(b)(1) absent a pending parole violation.The court of appeal reversed the trial court’s modification. Courts have only limited jurisdiction over parolees, restricted to alleged parole violations and revocation hearings. The court noted a violating parolee can receive a favorable modification under section 1203.2(b)(1) while a non-violating parolee cannot, and urged the Legislature to grant courts the authority to modify parole conditions outside of an alleged violation or revocation proceeding. View "People v. Wilson" on Justia Law

In 2003, Pineda lured Ramirez into an alley and beat Ramirez with a baseball bat. According to Rosales, Pineda and Rosales left the scene but returned. Pineda got into Ramirez’s truck. Rosales, in a Mazda, claims he accidentally hit Ramirez and dragged him before driving away. Pineda drove away in Ramirez’s truck. After a chase, officers stopped Pineda, covered in blood. Pineda stated, “He (Rosales) didn’t have anything to do with this” Ramirez’s blood was found on the undercarriage and interior of the Mazda. Ramirez died from his wounds; his baseball bat injuries were not lethal or potentially lethal.Pineda and Rosales were convicted of first-degree murder, second-degree robbery, and carjacking, with a felony-murder special circumstance. In 2019, Pineda sought section 1170.95 relief, alleging, that Pineda was convicted pursuant to the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine and that Pineda could not now be so convicted because of changes to Penal Code sections 188 and 189 The court concluded that the felony-murder special circumstance finding precluded Pineda from making a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief.The court of appeal reversed, noting the issue is pending before the California Supreme Court: Pineda is entitled to a judicial determination of whether his conduct is proscribed by the special circumstances statute, considering the level of personal culpability described by recent precedent, before his section 1170.95 petition may be summarily denied. View "People v. Pineda" on Justia Law

Defendant Jesus Rodriguez and his codefendant Ralph Gamboa went on a two-day crime spree in Stockton, California: they robbed and attempted to rob numerous victims, and when met with resistance or perceived noncompliance, they resorted to violence. In separate incidents on the same day, defendant shot Victor D.R. in the head but he survived. Gamboa later shot and killed Luis Z.. And defendant later shot and killed Javier R. A jury found defendant guilty of all 19 counts charged and found true 11 firearm enhancements and two robbery-murder special-circumstances allegations. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 178 years eight months to life plus two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, defendant raised five issues. Reviewing each, the Court of Appeal modified the judgment to: (1) stay execution of the sentence imposed on count 8, mayhem, pursuant to Penal Code section 654; and (2) impose the $1,000 collection fee pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4 (l). As so modified, the Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Defendant v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon (Count 1), possession of ammunition by a felon (Count 2), being under the influence of a controlled substance (Count 3), and possession of drug paraphernalia (Count 4).The Court of Appeal found no error with respect to either the Pitchess proceedings or the trial court's determination that there is no discoverable information in one of the officer's personnel file. In this case, the trial court followed the proper procedure and created an adequate record of the relevant in camera hearing. Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining there is no information subject to disclosure. However, the court concluded that defendant is entitled to relief from the narcotics offender registration requirement and the prior prison term enhancement under Assembly Bill No. 1261 and Senate Bill No. 136. In light of the court's recent decision in People v. Montes (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1107, the court concluded that defendant is entitled to a remand so he may raise the issue of his ability to pay the fines, fees and assessments. The court otherwise affirmed. View "People v. Pinedo" on Justia Law

Mount was convicted in 1998 of felony possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code 11377(a)) after entering a plea and after also admitting to having served two prior prison terms (667.5(b)). The judgment was affirmed. Fourteen years later, in 2012, Mount died. Eight years later, a Napa County public defender filed an application in the trial court seeking to have Mount’s felony conviction designated a misdemeanor under section 1170.18(f). The court dismissed the application after a contested hearing, stating no argument had been presented that there was any substantial right at issue “that would have any effect to the living or dead.” The court of appeal dismissed an appeal. There is no relief that can be granted to Mount; an application under section 1170.18(f) on behalf of a deceased defendant is moot where, as here, there is no showing that granting the petition would provide any effective relief. View "People v. Mount" on Justia Law

Defendant Sigifredo Zendejas Lopez (Lopez) brought a motion pursuant to California Penal Code section 1018 to vacate his 2019 guilty plea on three felony counts, one of which would have lead to almost certain deportation under federal law. Lopez, who was a lawful permanent resident of the United States at the time of his conviction, argued his retained trial counsel failed to provide accurate and affirmative advice about the immigration consequences of the proposed plea. Lopez’s trial counsel testified at the hearing on the motion that he was not aware of the specific immigration consequences of the individual charges Lopez was facing. Therefore, he could not have provided accurate and affirmative advice as to the consequences of a guilty plea to any particular count. Moreover, trial counsel testified that he tried to negotiate a plea bargain to one misdemeanor count, which was rejected by the prosecution. Had he known the immigration consequences of the specific felony counts, there was some possibility that he could have negotiated an immigration-neutral plea offer the prosecution was more likely to accept. But as he admitted, he did not know those consequences. The Court of Appeal determined Lopez was prejudiced by this course of events. He submitted evidence that he would have taken his chances at trial if he had known and fully understood the immigration consequences of the plea agreement trial counsel negotiated. Because Lopez was not accurately and affirmatively advised, and because there was not an effort to negotiate an acceptable plea bargain with the relevant immigration consequences in mind, the Court reversed the trial court’s order denying the motion to withdraw Lopez’s guilty plea in the interests of justice. View "California v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Potter sexually abused his daughter when she was five years old. He admitted the abuse during an interrogation at the police station. Convicted of one count of oral copulation with a child 10 years of age or younger, defendant was sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in state prison. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) his confession should have been excluded because it was unlawfully obtained during custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings; (2) defendant’s trial counsel provided constitutionally deficient assistance by failing to object to the daughter's testimony on competency grounds; (3) the trial court prejudicially abused its discretion and violated defendant’s federal constitutional rights by allowing the prosecution to amend the information during trial; and (4) the trial court’s determination that defendant possessed the ability to pay a $5,000 restitution fine, as well as court security and court operations assessments of $30 and $40, respectively, was not supported by substantial evidence and violates his federal constitutional rights. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Potter" on Justia Law