Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Thyrone Stewart was a veteran, honorably discharged from the Army in 1976. He was diagnosed with schizophrenia, which was determined to be related to his military service. In 1986 and again in 1992, he was convicted of first degree burglary. In 2001, after being convicted on two counts of spousal battery (among other things), he was sentenced, as a third-striker, to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison. In 2018, the California Legislature amended section 1170.91 so as to allow a convicted veteran who suffers from a specified disorder as a result of his or her military service to petition for resentencing, so that that disorder may be considered as a mitigating factor when imposing a determinate term. Petitioner sought resentencing under section 1170.91. The trial court denied the petition because petitioner had been sentenced to indeterminate terms. Petitioner contended this was error because, if resentenced, there was a possibility that he could be sentenced to determinate terms. Specifically, he argued he could bring a motion under California v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal.4th 497 (1996) to strike one or more of his strike priors. The Court of Appeal considered whether Stewart would be entitled to be sentenced to determinate terms under Proposition 36, but concluded neither possibility was open to him. The trial court therefore did not err by denying the petition. View "California v. Stewart" on Justia Law

A juvenile wardship petition (Welfare and Institutions Code section 602(a)) alleged that Matthew had committed assault with a deadly weapon and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury; that Matthew had personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim and had caused the victim to suffer great bodily injury resulting in paralysis and had personally used a deadly weapon, a knife. The juvenile court found true all of the allegations except for the paralysis enhancement; dismissed count two and the accompanying enhancement, at the request of the prosecutor; declared Matthew a ward of the court; and placed Matthew on probation with conditions.The court of appeal reversed, finding that Matthew’s pre-arrest statements to police were made during a custodial interrogation without the required Miranda warnings and that the admission of those statements was prejudicial. While Matthew was told at the start of the interrogation that he was not under arrest, and the police officers who were present did not handcuff him or unholster their weapons, the interview was initiated by police, who had just heard from another that Matthew had stabbed the victim. The entire interrogation was an attempt to get Matthew to admit that he stabbed the victim and to provide additional incriminating information. View "In re Matthew W." on Justia Law

Defendants Luis Dominguez and Abraham Torres shot and killed Angel Sanabria and wounded Joseph Luna. They missed two others (Juan Coronado and Alberto Nava), who were in or near the same small enclosed area. All four victims were members or associates of the Eastside San Diego gang. Defendants were charged with the first degree murder of Sanabria and the premeditated attempted murder of Luna, Coronado, and Nava. Defendants were not gang members, but were admittedly part of a neighborhood “tagging crew” that had conflicts with the Eastside gang. Defendants admitted they were the shooters; the issue was their state of mind. Each testified he fired in a panic and fear when, while about eight feet away from them, Sanabria asked them where they were from, “This is Eastside,” and lunged at them while reaching for an apparent weapon in his waistband. The court instructed the jury on both self-defense and voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense. But it refused Defendants’ request to instruct on voluntary manslaughter based on heat-of-passion, determining there was insufficient evidence of the requisite provocation. Along with making true findings on certain gun enhancements, the jury convicted Defendants of second degree murder as to Sanabria and attempted murder as to Luna and Coronado. It found allegations that the attempted murders were premeditated to be "not true." It also acquitted Defendants of: (1) first degree murder as to Sanabria; and (2) both attempted murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter as to Nava. The court sentenced Dominguez to a prison term of 16 years, plus 65 years to life and Torres to 17 years, plus 65 years to life. On appeal, Defendants contended the trial court erroneously refused their request to instruct on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion. Additionally, they claimed that in light of California v. Canizales, 7 Cal.5th 591 (2019) (which was decided after trial), the court gave an erroneous “kill zone” instruction on the element of intent to kill for attempted murder. They further claimed the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions on that theory. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erroneously refused to instruct on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion. On the attempted murder convictions, the Attorney General conceded that “the trial court’s kill zone instruction was prejudicially erroneous” under Canizales. Judgments were reversed and the cases remanded for a new trial on the reversed convictions. View "California v. Dominguez" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the summary denial of his petition to vacate his 2000 murder conviction and for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. The parties agree that the superior court's denial of the petition was in error. At issue is whether a jury's not true finding on a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation constitutes "a prior finding by a . . . jury that the petitioner did not act with reckless indifference to human life or was not a major participant in the [underlying] felony," thus triggering the superior court's duty to vacate the murder conviction and resentence the petitioner under section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(2)?The Court of Appeal held that the jury's unanimous rejection of the special-circumstance allegation establishes the petitioner's entitlement to relief under section 1170.95 as a matter of law. In this case, appellant stated a prima facie case for relief under section 1170.95, and the superior court's summary denial of the petition based on its own findings of fact violated the statutory procedures mandated under section subdivisions 1170.95(c) and (d). The court explained that the superior court is required to vacate the murder conviction and resentence appellant based on the jury's unanimous finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the special-circumstance allegation was not true. Therefore, the court reversed the order denying the petition and remanded to the superior court with directions to grant the petition, vacate appellant's murder conviction, and resentence him on the remaining counts. View "People v. Clayton" on Justia Law

After defendant was convicted of identity theft charges, the trial court awarded restitution for 19 hours of lost time to the victim, who owned 30 percent of a company called Electrical Advantage Engineering, and for the company. In this case, the victim spent 12 hours on the phone dealing with issues related to the case involving his credit and his business phone number. The victim also used one sick day. The trial court granted a 12-hour restitution award to the company and a seven-hour award to the victim.The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding restitution to the victim and the company where the victim's testimony was prima facie evidence of loss to him and his company. Furthermore, defendant failed to disprove these losses or to provide a viable alternative theory of valuation. The court also concluded that the $420 restitution order to the victim was proper where the victim lost seven working hours correcting the harm defendant directly caused. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering $2,340 restitution to the company where the company was a direct victim of defendant's actions. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by calculating loss to the company notwithstanding the victim's efforts to make up lost work hours for the company. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment with instructions to amend the minute order to reflect the correct amount of restitution. View "People v. Grandpierre" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop, Sanchez was driving a pickup truck with methamphetamine in its cab; in its open bed, police found a loaded rifle inside a bag that was partially covered by a board. Sanchez was charged with possession of a short-barreled rifle or shotgun (Pen. Code 33210); possession of a controlled substance while armed with a loaded firearm (Health & Safety 11370(a)); and carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle (Pen. Code 25850(a)). "Armed with” means “having available for immediate offensive or defensive use.” An officer testified that, at five foot nine inches tall he could easily reach into the bed and grab the bag while standing next to the truck. He estimated that Sanchez was about five feet and six or seven inches tall. Alhough the gun was rusted, a criminalist determined it was operational. A jury found Sanchez not guilty on count 1, but guilty on counts 2 and 3.The court of appeal reversed. Based on plain meaning, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the firearm was available for immediate use because Sanchez could not have used it without exiting the truck, retrieving the bag from under the board in the truck bed, and taking the gun out of the bag. View "People v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

Gonsalves was found in possession of a knife, credit cards in the names of Anna and Tracy, three cell phones, and a hotel key card, which contained credit card information for Carl.. The cell phones contained personal identifying information for numerous people who did not know Gonsalves or give him permission to use their information; they had been used to access websites where personal identifying information could be illegally purchased and contained metadata indicating they belonged to Gonsalves. A jury found Gonsalves guilty of misdemeanor grand theft (Penal Code 484e(d)) and felony fraudulent possession of personal information (section 530.5(c)(3)).The court denied Gonsalves’s request to reduce the felony conviction to a misdemeanor, noting his criminal history, and sentenced Gonsalves to three years of felony probation, ordering Gonsalves not to “associate with[] any person known to [him] to have a criminal record.” The court of appeal remanded for resentencing. The challenged probation condition was constitutionally flawed; the term “criminal record” is impermissibly vague because it has no settled meaning and may include a record of an arrest resulting in no charge or conviction. The condition is not carefully tailored to the government’s interests in rehabilitating Gonsalves and protecting the public. Gonsalves’s probation term must be reduced in accordance with Assembly Bill 1950 (2020). View "People v. Gonsalves" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jose Medina was placed in custody in November 2016 on charges of second degree robbery and misdemeanor sexual battery. In June 2017, the respondent court found that Medina was mentally incompetent to stand trial and had a developmental disability under Penal Code section 1370.1. Since the time Medina was adjudicated to be mentally incompetent, he has received neither treatment nor a trial. The regional center and the California Department of Developmental Services (DDS), which have the responsibility for providing services for people with developmental disabilities, disagreed with the court’s adjudication and concluded that Medina did not have a developmental disability. Although the incompetency order was legal and binding on the regional center and the DDS, they declined to offer Medina services or recommend placement. At issue was that the version of Penal Code 1369 and 1370.1 in effect in 2017 did not require the regional center’s determination that a defendant have a developmental disability. In 2017, a trial court’s findings of mental incompetence and developmental disability were sufficient, without concurrence by the regional center, to cause the suspension of criminal proceedings. In July 2020, the respondent court attempted to end the standoff by vacating the 2017 order adjudicating Medina to be incompetent. The court ordered new examinations and another competency hearing to be held. Medina challenged the respondent court’s actions by this petition for writ of mandate/prohibition. The Court of Appeal granted the petition in part and ordered the issuance of a writ directing the respondent court to vacate its order, reinstate the orders adjudicating Medina to be incompetent to stand trial and to have a developmental disability, and determine whether the maximum period of confinement has elapsed. View "Medina v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

After defendant successfully petitioned the trial court under Penal Code section 1170.95 to vacate his second degree murder conviction, his conviction was redesignated as the uncharged target offense, battery, in accordance with section 1170.95, subdivision (e).The Court of Appeal concluded that when a defendant is resentenced under a legislative enactment, such as section 1170.95, that gives inmates serving otherwise final sentences the opportunity to petition to take advantage of ameliorative changes to the law governing their convictions, there is no ex post facto violation if the court resentences the defendant under the then existing law so long as that law does not prescribe a penalty that is greater than the penalty that was prescribed for the criminal act at the time it was committed. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a three year sentence. In this case, the trial court acknowledged that if the fight had not been for the benefit of a gang, the appropriate sentence would be a misdemeanor. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the high term of three years was appropriate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "People v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

Defendant Gabriel Presley challenged his commitment pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), arguing his commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP) was erroneous because expert testimony at trial was based on case-specific inadmissible hearsay, in violation of California v. Sanchez, 63 Cal.4th 665 (2016). The trial court heard from four experts, all substantially agreeing defendant had a diagnosed mental disorder. The trial court observed that, though it was “required to consider the opinions of experts,” “as the trier of fact, [it] [didn’t] have to . . . agree with them.” The Court found the conclusion of one of the experts "to be a bit of an outlier," compelling the court to conclude ". . . that not only does [defendant] have a diagnosed mental disorder, . . . he is a danger to the health and safety of others, because I find that it is likely that he will engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior.” The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion, as nothing in the record "dispels the presumption the trial court ignored material it knew was inadmissible under Sanchez." View "California v. Presley" on Justia Law