Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal vacated the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to strike the one-year prior prison term enhancement from his state prison sentence. Defendant contends the court should have granted his motion because Senate Bill No. 136 applies retroactively to cases, like his, that are not yet final.The court concluded that a judgment imposing but suspending execution of a sentence is not final for purposes of S.B. 136 retroactivity where, as here, a defendant "may still timely obtain direct review of [the] order revoking probation and causing the state prison sentence to take effect." The court remanded with directions to strike the enhancement from defendant's sentence. View "People v. Ruggerio" on Justia Law

Defendants and Glass attempted to rob L.V. and Poblete, while they were waiting to purchase marijuana. During that robbery, Poblete was shot and killed. Defendants were charged with murder and attempted second-degree robbery. The information alleged felony-murder special circumstance allegations and personal gun use allegations. During their trial, Senate Bill 1437, amended Penal Code section 189(e)(3) to provide that a defendant who was not the actual killer and did not have an intent to kill is not liable for felony murder unless he “was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.” The defendants were recharged with murder, removing all reference to the attempted robbery. The court granted the defendants a mistrial.Glass took a plea deal and testified at a second trial that he and the defendants had guns. A jury convicted defendants of felony murder. The court sentenced them to 25 years to life. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the evidence was insufficient to establish the defendants acted with the “reckless indifference to human life” required for felony murder and that the trial court erred by failing to instruct on robbery as a lesser included offense to felony murder. View "People v. Bradley" on Justia Law

A superior court judge summarily denied petitioner Nancy Michelle Mendoza's petition for writ of habeas corpus, wherein she claimed she received ineffective assistance of counsel at her sentencing hearing. The California Supreme Court later issued an order to show cause (OSC) returnable to the superior court on the same claim. The case was then assigned to the same judge who had previously denied Mendoza’s petition. More than 40 days later, Mendoza filed a peremptory challenge to the judge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. A different judge denied the challenge as untimely. Mendoza sought a writ of mandate from the Court of Appeal to direct the superior court to vacate its order denying her peremptory challenge, and to disqualify the original judge. The Court found her petition presented an issue of first impression as to whether her peremptory challenge was subject to section 170.6(a)(2)’s 60-day deadline following a “reversal on appeal” and assignment to the original judge for “a new trial” (in which case Mendoza’s challenge was timely); or section 170.6(a)(2)’s 10-day deadline for criminal cases assigned to a judge for all purposes (in which case Mendoza’s challenge was untimely). The Court determined the 60-day deadline did not apply. The Court found the proceedings on Mendoza's petition would not constitute a new trial; thus the 10-day all purpose assignment deadline applied. Applying this deadline, the superior court properly denied Mendoza’s challenge as untimely. View "Mendoza v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In prior proceedings, defendant Phong Thanh Huynh's conviction on murder and firearms charges was reversed. Defendant was retried on the same charges in 2019. The jury found him guilty of the same charges, and he was sentenced to a term of 25-years-to life in prison for the murder, and a consecutive term of 25-years-to-life for the enhancement of discharging a firearm. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court erroneously admitted evidence that he was a member and the leader of, or had authority in, a gang called Thien Dang. He claimed the gang evidence was not relevant because Thien Dang was not a criminal street gang. Further, he contended there was no evidence that criminal activity was a primary activity of Thien Dang or any member of Thien Dang had ever committed any crime; and that Thien Dang was merely a group of Vietnamese men who gathered to drink, eat, and socialize. Defendant’s principal position was that identifying Thien Dang as a street gang was highly inflammatory and the error was compounded by a hypothetical question posed to the State's gang expert. To this latter point, the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant. Judgment was reversed: "On remand, instead of an 'all' (i.e., the instant case) or 'nothing' (i.e., Huynh I) approach to the admission of such evidence, the trial court as the gatekeeper of the evidence may appropriately limit the admission of gang evidence as relevant to the issues raised by the parties and in accordance with the dictates of this decision." View "California v. Huynh" on Justia Law

Defendant Yamin Amahli Bongani El was convicted by jury of misdemeanor driving on a suspended license. On appeal, he argued the trial court: (1) failed to exercise its discretion in sentencing him to the maximum term in jail, as it believed such a term was mandatory when he declined probation; and (2) failed to articulate the fines and fees imposed. The State conceded these points. The Court thus vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. Defendant's convictions were affirmed. View "California v. El" on Justia Law

San Francisco police arrested Corona after he entered a freestanding garage located on the same property as a house. The garage contained two vehicles, laundry machines, and other personal property belonging to the residents. Corona was charged with first-degree burglary, which applies to the burglary of “an inhabited dwelling house,” Pen. Code 460(a). Corona argued that the first-degree burglary charge was improper because the detached garage is not part of the house. Corona also made a motion under section 17(b), requesting a reduction of the lesser-included offense of second-degree burglary to a misdemeanor. The superior court indicated that, if it were to set aside the first-degree burglary charge, it would also set aside the lesser-included second-degree burglary charge because “the case law is pretty clear it is a substantial right” to obtain a section 17(b) ruling before the information is filed, but denied Corona’s motion to set aside the first-degree burglary charge and did not rule on section 17(b).The court of appeal issued a peremptory writ of prohibition restraining the superior court from taking any action on the charge of first-degree burglary except dismissal. Corona’s position is consistent with the text and history of the statutes, decades of case law, and the legislature’s acquiescence in longstanding precedent. View "Corona v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2017, Israel Ontiveros was convicted of multiple felonies and sentenced to state prison in two criminal cases. In the first case, a jury convicted Ontiveros on two counts of assault with a deadly weapon with gang enhancements. Ontiveros admitted suffering a prior serious felony conviction, a “strike” prior, and a prison prior. The trial court sentenced Ontiveros to an effective prison term of 19 years 8 months. In the second case, Ontiveros pleaded guilty to one count of robbery, and again he admitted a prior serious felony conviction. The court sentenced Ontiveros to a term of seven years in prison, to run consecutively with Ontiveros’s sentence in the first case. Two years later, Ontiveros requested early parole consideration under Proposition 57, the California Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) denied his request. The trial court likewise denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court reasoned that, because one of Ontiveros’s convictions was for a violent felony (robbery), he was ineligible for early parole consideration under Proposition 57. Ontiveros petitioned the Court of Appeal for habeas relief, relying primarily on In re Mohammad, 42 Cal.App.5th 719 (2019). In response, the Attorney General argued that Mohammad’s interpretation of Proposition 57 was inconsistent with the intent of the voters and lead to an absurd result. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Attorney General: "A policy that rewards inmates for additional convictions is plainly unreasonable. Under established principles of statutory construction, we are not bound to follow the literal interpretation of the text if it would lead to such an absurd and unreasonable result that could not have been intended. We therefore conclude Ontiveros is not entitled to early parole consideration under Proposition 57 and deny his petition." View "In re Ontiveros" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Coleman appealed from the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.91. That section allowed a current or former servicemember who might be suffering from sexual trauma or substance abuse (among other conditions) as a result of his or her military service to obtain a new sentencing hearing. Defendant contended he pleaded and proved a qualifying condition, and that the trial court erred by ruling otherwise. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed the trial court. View "California v. Coleman" on Justia Law

In 2013, a jury found defendant-respondent James Ambrosia Williams guilty of child abuse and that he had personally inflicted great bodily injury on the child, who was under the age of five. The trial court found defendant had a prior strike conviction, a prior serious felony conviction, and two prior prison terms. It imposed an aggregate term of 22 years in state prison, including a five-year enhancement for the prior serious felony conviction. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal, and judgment was affirmed. At the time defendant was sentenced, Penal Code section 1385 generally authorized judges and magistrates to order an action dismissed in the interests of justice on their own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney but specifically barred them from striking any prior serious felony conviction in connection with imposition of a five- year enhancement. Four years after defendant was sentenced, Senate Bill No. 1393 (Reg. Sess. 2017-2018) amended the statute to delete the prohibition. In an unreported minute order dated September 30, 2019, and without the parties present, the sentencing judge recalled defendant’s sentence and struck the five-year punishment for the section 667 serious felony enhancement. The rest of defendant’s sentence remained unchanged. The State appealed. The Court of Appeal vacated the sentence: the trial court set forth the authority it relied upon for its decision but did not articulate a factual basis for exercising its discretion to strike the punishment for the prior serious felony enhancement. The matter was remanded for the sentencing court to articulate its basis for exercising discretion to strike the punishment. View "California v. Williams" on Justia Law

In October 2020, the superior court conducted a contested hearing and issued orders granting relief to defendant-respondent, Travis Burhop, on Burhop’s petition to vacate his 2015 second degree murder conviction and to be resentenced pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. On October 2, 2020, the petition was the subject of a pending appeal with the Court of Appeal in California v. Travis Burhop (Aug. 28, 2020, E073709 [nonpub. opn.]) (Burhop II). In August 2020, the Court of Appeal court issued its opinion in Burhop II and remanded the matter to the superior court for further proceedings on Burhop’s petition. But the remittitur in Burhop II was not issued until October 30, 2020. Thus, in this appeal, the State claimed that the October 2, 2020 orders adjudicating Burhop’s section 1170.95 petition were null and void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, given that the petition was the subject of the pending appeal in Burhop II and the remittitur in Burhop II had not yet issued. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed the October 2 orders and again remanded the matter for further proceedings on the petition. View "California v. Burhop" on Justia Law