Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Omar Kasrawi was apprehended in an affluent neighborhood in possession of property he had stolen from some nearby cars. Although the officer who stopped and ultimately arrested him acted on no more than a hunch after watching Kasrawi innocuously cross the street to his legally parked car, the officer learned that Kasrawi had an outstanding arrest warrant. California Supreme Court precedent compelled the Court of Appeal to conclude that despite the Fourth Amendment violation, the evidence did not need to be suppressed: “This case falls into a narrow exception to the exclusionary rule that applies where a law enforcement officer discovers the defendant’s outstanding warrant after an illegal stop but before a search yields evidence of a crime. Under these limited circumstances, discovery of the warrant can attenuate the taint of the original detention.” On those grounds, the Court affirmed the denial of Kasrawi’s suppression motion. View "California v. Kasrawi" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of petitions for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole for murder with the special circumstance that petitioner was engaged in the commission and attempted commission of a robbery at the time the murder was committed. The trial court summarily denied the petitions on the ground that petitioner was a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life, a disqualifying factor pursuant to section 1170.95, subdivision (a)(3).The court concluded that any error in failing to appoint counsel or afford petitioner the other procedures outlined in section 1170.95, subdivision (c) was harmless, because the record establishes petitioner is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. The court explained that the principles for determining whether defendant was a major contributor who acted with reckless indifference to human life existed when petitioner was convicted and, absent a determination on direct appeal or in habeas that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding, there is no basis to conclude petitioner's jury applied different standards. View "People v. Simmons" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandate and a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging statewide delays in the transfer of incompetent to stand trial (IST) defendants from county jails to DSH and DDS to begin substantive services. The trial court granted the petition in part, first finding that defendants systematically violate the due process rights of IST defendants in California who are committed to DSH pursuant to Penal Code section 1370 or to DDS pursuant to section 1370.1, subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i). The trial court found that due process requires defendants to commence substantive services for these IST defendants within 28 days of the date on which the order transferring responsibility for those defendants to DSH or DDS is served. The trial court denied the petition as to certain IST defendants charged with felony sex offenses who are committed to DDS pursuant to section 1370.1, subdivision (a)(1)(B)(ii) and (iii).The Court of Appeal concluded that defendants have systematically violated the due process rights of all IST defendants in California by failing to commence substantive services designed to return those defendants to competency within 28 days of service of the transfer of responsibility document, which is the date of service of the commitment packet for all defendants committed to DSH and the date of service of the order of commitment for all defendants committed to DDS. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment as to the issues raised in defendants' appeal, but reversed as to the issue raised in plaintiffs' cross-appeal. The court remanded to the trial court with directions to modify its order granting in part plaintiffs' petition for writ of mandate to reflect a uniform transfer of responsibility date for all IST defendants committed to DDS. View "Stiavetti v. Clendenin" on Justia Law

Appellant Mark Sorden appealed his conviction for contempt of court for violating a Criminal Protective Order— Domestic Violence (CPO) issued in a prior action. The Court of Appeal determined Appellant did not meet his burden of establishing reversible error, finding: (1) Appellant could not collaterally attack the CPO in this action; (2) the trial court properly instructed the jury as to the meaning of “disturbing the peace” for purposes of the contempt conviction; (3) the trial court did not deny Appellant due process of law when it allowed the jury to consider evidence of cellphone tracking that was not presented at the preliminary hearing; (4) the trial court properly instructed the jury as to the meaning of “act of violence” for purposes of the conduct enhancement; (5) the trial court was not required to give a unanimity instruction for the conduct enhancement; and (6) without individual instances of trial court error, there could be no prejudice from “cumulative error.” The Court further concluded that, as Appellant and the Attorney General agreed, because Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2019, ch. 590, sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2020) applied retroactively, the two one-year sentence enhancements based on prior prison terms should be stricken from the judgment. Accordingly, the Court modified the judgment to strike the two one-year sentence enhancements and otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Sorden" on Justia Law

The court of appeal affirmed Lopez's convictions for murder and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. The trial court abused its discretion in concealing the prospective jurors' names from the attorneys but the error was harmless. It is a generally accepted practice for courts to refer to jurors by their badge numbers during voir dire to protect their privacy. Courts must be careful to make clear to jurors there is a reason for the procedure other than possible safety concerns relating to the defendant. The trial court erred in advising prospective jurors that the court was referring to them by numbers in part for security reasons; jurors could speculate that Lopez posed a security risk. The court withheld from the attorneys the jurors’ names out of concern that attorneys (or members of the public or press) would obtain additional information about the jurors online or contact the jurors. Absent a compelling case-specific need to conceal the names from the attorneys, that was an abuse of discretion. The court upheld the denial of the motion to exclude Lopez’s admission, in a jail call with his sister, that he had killed someone. View "People v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Roberts beat his girlfriend with a belt, was apprehended several weeks later, and gave a false name. The District Attorney was unable to locate the complaining witness before trial; the court denied a motion to exclude statements she made on the day of the event. A potential juror’s sister was a paralegal in the public defender’s office. Defense counsel knew her. The prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to that juror, the only African American potential juror. Defendant unsuccessfully objected on the ground that the peremptory challenge was racially motivated. There was testimony about a previous domestic violence incident. Convicted of inflicting corporal injury on an intimate partner and giving a false name to a police officer, Roberts was acquitted of assault likely to cause great bodily injury. The judge applied an enhancement for committing the crimes while released on bail. Roberts was granted probation, with a condition that he serve one year in county jail.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that a missing portion of the reporter’s transcript prevented a meaningful review of Roberts's claim that the prosecutor exercised a race-based peremptory challenge; concerning the alleged admission of hearsay and a response Roberts gave to an officer’s question while in custody; concerning alleged misconduct by the prosecutor in closing argument; and concerning the imposition of fines and fees without a hearing to determine his ability to pay. View "People v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Eloy Gonzalez appealed a trial court’s postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. Gonzalez claimed the court improperly determined he was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. “Southside” gang members Gonzalez, Matthew Robert Miller, and Eduardo Vargas engaged in a series of armed robberies, one of which ended with Vargas shooting a robbery victim, Jesse Muro. Vargas was tried separately, convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to death. The Attorney General (AG) conceded section 1170.95 was constitutional but contended the court’s denial was nevertheless proper. The AG argued a person convicted of murder with a robbery-murder special circumstance before the Supreme Court’s decisions in California v. Banks, 61 Cal.4th 788 (2015), and California v. Clark, 63 Cal.4th 522 (2016), was barred from pursuing resentencing under section 1170.95 without first having obtained a writ of habeas corpus to set aside the special circumstance for insufficient evidence. To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed: because the record of conviction did not establish Gonzalez’s ineligibility for resentencing as a matter of law, the postjudgment order denying the petition for resentencing was reversed and the matter remanded with directions to issue an order to show cause (OSC) and to proceed in accordance with section 1170.95 (d). View "California v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed defendant's second degree robbery conviction, concluding that the prosecutor misstated the law; the victim repeatedly denied being actually afraid; the jury instruction, CALCRIM No. 1600, does not speak to this issue; and the trial court rejected defendant's entreaty to give a supplemental instruction in favor of letting the jury "sort that out." Because there was substantial evidence to sustain a finding of guilt, the court remanded for further proceedings. In this case, there was substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the assistant manager was actually afraid of defendant at the time he allowed defendant to leave the store with Walgreens's merchandise. View "People v. Collins" on Justia Law

Richardson pleaded no contest to human trafficking of a minor for a sex act (Pen. Code 236.1(c)(1)); seven remaining felony charges were dismissed. The victim was 26 years old and claimed that she unwillingly participated in sex work for Richardson to support her addiction and because he blackmailed her. Richardson was 29 years old and had no prior convictions. The district attorney told the court that the plea had been offered “in order to reduce the count from [the] eight-year minimum triad.” The trial court denied Richardson's request for probation and imposed a five-year state prison term allowed under the plea agreement.The court of appeal vacated, stating that while it did not wish to stifle or discourage creative dispositions in the trial courts, the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it approved the plea bargain. The law requires that any negotiated plea must have a factual basis. Richardson’s negotiated plea “was no more valid than a no-contest plea to murder where the victim is still alive.” The defendant’s failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause did not preclude the review of the plea agreement. View "People v. Richardson" on Justia Law

In August 2018, Surety posted a $100,000 bond for Lee's release from the San Mateo Jail. On September 13, Lee failed to appear at a scheduled preliminary hearing. The court issued a bench warrant and ordered the bail forfeited. On September 21, the clerk of the court mailed a “Notice of Order Forfeiting Bail” to Surety. On March 25, 2019, Surety moved to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bail. Supporting exhibits indicated that Lee was in custody in Alameda County on federal charges and that the San Mateo County District Attorney’s Office had been notified of that detention. Surety argued that the court was required to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bail under Penal Code 1305(c)(3) because Lee had been surrendered by the bail agent to local law enforcement agencies; if the district attorney were to choose not to extradite, exoneration of bail was required under section 1305(f); and if the district attorney were to place a hold on Lee, the court should exonerate bail under section 1305(i) and (c)(3). As alternative relief, Surety requested tolling urging that Lee was disabled from appearing in court. The District Attorney elected to extradite Lee.The trial court denied Surety’s motions. The court of appeal ordered the trial court to exonerate the bond, noting that it failed to timely enter summary judgment and now lacks jurisdiction to enforce the forfeiture. View "People v. Bankers Insurance Co." on Justia Law