Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Joseph Jackson sought a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051 as a result of his conviction in 1998 that included two counts of first-degree murder with multiple special circumstances, which counts resulted in a sentence of two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Defendant was 19 years old when he committed the homicides. In his October 2019 motion, defendant argued section 3051 violated his equal protection rights because he allegedly “is entitled to the same protections as any other person who violated the law at the same age whether it was murder without special circumstances, robbery, kidnapping or any other crime.” The trial court in November 2019 denied the motion, finding that defendant was statutorily ineligible for relief and that there was a rational basis for carving out from section 3051 offenders such as defendant who were convicted of first-degree special circumstance murder and sentenced to LWOP. On appeal, defendant reiterated his trial court argument that section 3051’s exclusion of persons over 18 years of age with LWOP sentences from its parole hearing provisions violated the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. Upon de novo review, the Court of Appeal concluded the carve out to section 3051 for offenders such as defendant serving a LWOP sentence for special circumstance murder was not an equal protection violation. View "California v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Hardy was convicted of five criminal counts for firing a semi-automatic pistol in the direction of an occupied vehicle while standing in an Oakland street. An Oakland undercover officer observed Hardy firing a handgun which was corroborated by a liquor store’s surveillance video and other evidence. Most of Hardy’s 236-month prison sentence was based on his conviction for assault with a semi-automatic firearm, count 5. The only unambiguous evidence that the firearm was semi-automatic was an audio recording that had been sent to the Oakland Police Department by a third-party service, “Shotspotter.”The court of appeal reversed as to count 5. The trial court erred in admitting the Shotspotter evidence without first conducting an evidentiary hearing to assess its scientific reliability pursuant to the Kelly/Frye precedent and the error was prejudicial. The court may reinstate that conviction after conducting a Kelly/Frye hearing if it concludes the Shotspotter evidence was admissible. The court rejected as “harmless” any errors committed when the preliminary hearing magistrate barred defense counsel’s cross-examination of the undercover officer about the officer’s location while he observed Hardy fire the weapon after the officer claimed an official privilege to withhold the information and in the court’s response to a jury question during deliberations. View "People v. Hardy" on Justia Law

In this case, two gang members were walking together in their gang’s territory where they both lived. Police detained the pair and arrested defendant after retrieving a knife from his pants pocket. A gang expert later opined (given these facts) defendant carried the knife for the benefit of, in association with, and with the intent to promote his gang. A jury found defendant guilty of carrying the concealed knife and found true a two-year gang enhancement. The Court of Appeal concluded there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find the gang enhancement true beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court thus reversed defendant’s gang enhancement and remanded the matter so the trial court could conduct a new sentencing hearing. View "California v. Soriano" on Justia Law

J.J. was alleged to have committed forcible lewd conduct with a minor. The juvenile court declared him incompetent to stand trial, suspended the delinquency proceedings, and ordered remediation services in juvenile hall. After 12 months, the court found that J.J. still had not attained competency. Although the maximum period for remediation under Welfare and Institutions Code section 709 is 12 months, the court ordered his continued confinement pending finalization of an exit order and post-release services to assist his reentry into the community. Section 709(h)(5)(C) allows confinement of certain juveniles for up to 18 months if “necessary and in the best interests of the minor and the public’s safety.”The court of appeal held that the juvenile court lacked authority to order J.J.'s continued confinement beyond the remediation period for a purpose other than restoration to competency, which would potentially violate his due process rights. Once the court determined that J.J. had not attained competency at the end of the statutory remediation period, no further confinement could be ordered given the record in J.J.’s case. The purpose of section 709 is to protect a minor from juvenile proceedings during incompetency and to provide remediation services with the goal of restoring the minor to competence. Section 709(h)(5) does not permit the involuntary confinement of a minor beyond the statutory remediation period for the purpose of arranging postrelease services that are not designed to restore competency. View "J.J. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendant Malcolm Brewer and codefendants Glen Conway and Shane Williams participated in a string of armed robberies and attempted robberies, mostly of gas stations and convenience stores, in November and December 2017. In many of the robberies and attempted robberies, defendant personally used a firearm by displaying it to or pointing it at the victims. Defendant and his codefendants were charged in a 20-count amended information with numerous counts of robbery and attempted robbery with firearm enhancement allegations as well as one count of felon in possession of a firearm. Williams entered into a plea agreement. Defendant and Conway proceeded to trial together before separate juries. Defendant’s jury found him guilty of 11 counts of second degree robbery, two counts of attempted second degree robbery, and one count of felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court sentenced defendant, who had a strike prior, to an aggregate determinate term of 63 years. On appeal, defendant characterized his sentence as the functional equivalent of a life sentence without parole imposed on a developmentally disabled person, and contended it was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of federal and California Constitutions. The Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s contention that such a sentence categorically violated those constitutional provisions in the same way as imposition of the death penalty as to developmentally disabled adults and imposition of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) as to juvenile defendants. Accordingly, his convictions and sentence were affirmed. View "California v. Brewer" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order denying American Surety's motion to vacate the judgment forfeiting bail. American Surety contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to continue the proceedings without forfeiting bail when the defendant failed to appear in court without presenting a sufficient excuse for his absence.The court concluded that a court may continue criminal proceedings without forfeiting bail if the court has reason to believe that a sufficient excuse may exist for the failure to appear. In this case, counsel represented that the defendant had been on a 5150 hold in Ventura County, counsel of record had been attempting to contact him, counsel of record could not appear in court on that day because of a road closure due to inclement weather, and the defendant had appeared at prior court appearances. Therefore, the court concluded that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it continued the bond for one week at counsel's request. View "People v. American Surety Co." on Justia Law

After a jury convicted defendant of attempted premeditated murder and assault on a peace officer, assault with a firearm, and two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon, the trial court sentenced him to a determinate term of 18 years, followed by a consecutive term of 55 years to life.In the published portion of the opinion, the court concluded that the trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant's immigration status and deportation history on the limited issue of motive. The court concluded that there was no reversible error in defendant's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Casillas" on Justia Law

A surety appeals from an order denying its motion to set aside summary judgment, discharge the forfeiture, and exonerate bail, and contends that the setting of the amount of bail was unconstitutional and the forfeiture of the full amount of bail was unconstitutional.The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment, concluding that the statutory scheme under which the amount of the criminal defendant's bail was set and subsequently forfeited is not unconstitutional on its face. The court also concluded that the statutory scheme, as applied to the circumstances of this case, did not unconstitutionally impose an excessive fine or otherwise violate the constitutional rights of the criminal defendant or the surety. As a separate and independent ground for its decision, the court assumed a constitutional violation occurred and addressed the consequences of the assumed violation. The court joined other appellate courts and concluded that a violation of the criminal defendant's constitutional rights does not free the surety from its obligations under the bail bond. View "People v. Accredited Surety & Casualty Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Metaxas was the president and CEO of Gateway Bank in 2008, during the financial crisis. Federal regulators categorized Gateway as a “troubled institution.” Gateway tried to raise capital and deal with its troubled assets. Certain transactions resulted in a lengthy investigation. The U.S. Attorney became involved. Metaxas was indicted. In 2015, she pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud. Gateway sued Metaxas based on two transactions involving Ideal Mortgage: a March 2009 $3.65 million working capital loan and a November 2009 $757,000 wire transfer. A court-appointed referee awarded Gateway $250,000 in tort-of-another damages arising from “the fallout” from the first transaction, and $132,000 in damages for the second.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the first transaction resulted in “substantial benefit” to Gateway and that Metaxas had no alternative but to approve the wire transfer. Gateway did not ask for any purported “benefit.” The evidence showed that the Board would not have approved either the toxic asset sale or the working capital loan if Metaxas had disclosed the true facts. Metaxas damaged Gateway’s reputation. Metaxas knew that the government was trying to shut Ideal down but approved the wire transfer on the last business day before Ideal was shut down, by expressly, angrily, overruling the CFO. View "Gateway Bank, F.S.B. v. Metaxas" on Justia Law

Clotfelter was convicted of multiple counts of child molestation in the 1980s. After he served his 10-year state prison sentence and was released from prison, he was found to be a sexually violent predator (SVP). While Clotfelter was held in a state hospital as an SVP, he volunteered to be surgically castrated, which took place in 2001. In 2007, Clotfelter was unconditionally released, subject to lifetime SVP registration. During a routine sex offender compliance check and search of Clotfelter’s residence in 2016, an officer found evidence that he had formed relationships with three minor boys and their families. A jury convicted Clotfelter of two counts of annoying or molesting a child (Steven) under the age of 18, two counts of contacting or communicating with a 14 or 15-year-old child (B.H.) with the intent to commit a sexual offense, and two counts of contacting or communicating with a child under the age of 14 (E.H.) with the intent to commit a sexual offense.The court of appeal reversed. With respect to Steven, the evidence was insufficient to establish that Clotfelter’s conduct—including emails and gifts—was objectively irritating or disturbing under the statute. Defense counsel prejudicially erred; it is reasonably probable that the outcome would have been different had counsel objected to expert testimony that Clotfelter had the requisite mental states to commit the charged crimes and concerning child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome, and to testimony about his prior sexual offenses. View "People v. Clotfelter" on Justia Law