Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, All of Us or None–Riverside Chapter (All of Us or None), Jane Roe, and Phyllis McNeal, filed an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants, Superior Court of California, County of Riverside (Riverside Superior Court), and its Executive Officer and Clerk, W. Samuel Hamrick, Jr. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants improperly maintained the Riverside Superior Court’s records in criminal cases in various ways. Plaintiffs alleged that these practices invaded their right to privacy as embodied in the California Constitution (fifth cause of action). Plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to declaratory relief (sixth cause of action) and writ of mandate (seventh cause of action) to remedy these violations. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s demurrer and summary judgment rulings. The Court of Appeal agreed with Plaintiffs the trial court erred in its ruling on the first, third, and fifth causes of action; as a result, the trial court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs’ remedial causes of action for declaratory relief (sixth cause of action) and injunctive relief (seventh cause of action) were also reversed. The matter was thus remanded for further proceedings. View "All of Us or None etc. v. Hamrick" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for mental health diversion. Defendant was charged with multiple counts of burglary, robbery, and related offenses arising from several incidents. After he was denied mental health diversion, he pleaded no contest to some of the counts and the remaining counts were dismissed.The court concluded that defendant forfeited his challenge to the trial court's reliance on reports prepared in relation to his insanity plea by failing to object. The court nevertheless exercised its discretion to reach the issue on the merits and concluded that the trial court was permitted to consider the challenged reports, and that the reports support the trial court's finding that defendant was ineligible for mental health diversion because his schizoaffective disorder was not a significant factor in his criminal behavior. Therefore, because this finding independently supports the trial court's denial of defendant's motion, the court concluded that defendant was not prejudiced by any error in determining whether he presented a risk of danger to public safety. View "People v. Oneal" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his second petition for recall of sentence pursuant to the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 under Penal Code, section 1170.126. Defendant contends that his rehabilitative progress in prison constitutes good cause to permit the untimely and successive petition.The Court of Appeal concluded that it need not resolve whether the Three Strikes Reform Act permits an inmate to file successive recall petitions because, even assuming it does, an inmate's rehabilitative progress does not constitute good cause to excuse an untimely filing. The court explained that the language and structure of the statute do not permit a showing that rehabilitative progress constitutes good cause to permit an otherwise untimely successive petition, and the history of the law confirms the voters did not intend to permit such filing. Therefore, the court concluded that the trial court properly denied the petition and the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Valencia" on Justia Law

After hearing a dispatch broadcast about a possible drunk driver, Napa Officer Cadena arrived at a location where that vehicle had been observed parked, engine running, with the driver (Escareno) apparently asleep. Escareno appeared intoxicated. There was an empty can of beer in plain view. Escareno performed poorly on field sobriety tests. Subsequent testing found a blood alcohol level of .208.Escareno entered a plea of no contest to felony DUI after two prior felony convictions for the same, felony driving with .08 percent or higher blood alcohol after two prior felony convictions for the same, misdemeanor unlawful operation of a vehicle not equipped with a functioning ignition interlock device, misdemeanor driving when privilege suspended for DUI, with priors, misdemeanor driving while license suspended or revoked, with priors, misdemeanor driving without a valid license, and possession of an open alcoholic beverage while driving, an infraction.The court imposed the three-year aggravated term on felony count 1 and the same on felony count 2, stayed. The court rejected a defense argument that because Escarena was sentenced to prison, the misdemeanor and infraction counts had to be dismissed under section 41500: “A person shall not be subject to prosecution for a nonfelony offense arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle” that is pending against him at the time of his commitment” to custody and imposed a county jail sentence, stayed.The court of appeal affirmed. Applying section 41500 to a defendant being prosecuted in a single action for felony and nonfelony offenses arising out of a single incident would offer a windfall to a defendant who committed multiple offenses. View "People v. Escareno" on Justia Law

In separate criminal cases, a trial court found 37 defendants incompetent to stand trial (IST) and ordered the State Department of State Hospitals (Department) to admit them within 60 days of the receipt of an informational packet. The Department failed to timely admit 31 of the 37 defendants. These defendants separately sought sanctions against the Department pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5, claiming violation of the court’s order. The trial court found the Department in violation of the order, and imposed monetary sanctions. The Department appealed, contending the trial court was not authorized to impose sanctions against it under section 177.5. Additionally, it claimed good cause or substantial justification for violating the order even assuming the court could impose sanctions under section 177.5. After review, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the Department’s arguments and affirmed. View "California v. Aguirre" on Justia Law

In 1988, Watson was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. In 2019, Watson moved to vacate his murder conviction and obtain resentencing under section 1170.95, effective in 2019 and intended to limit the application of the felony-murder rule and murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The statute provides that where murder was charged generically and the underlying felony was not charged, the court redesignates the vacated murder conviction as the “underlying felony for resentencing purposes.” A person who is resentenced under this section "shall be given credit for time served. The judge may order the petitioner to be subject to parole supervision for up to three years following the completion of the sentence.”The trial court vacated Watson’s murder conviction, redesignated that conviction as two offenses: first-degree burglary and first-degree robbery, and sentenced Watson on the burglary conviction to six years in prison. It imposed but stayed the execution of a sentence on the robbery conviction. The court placed Watson on parole supervision and ordered that he pay a $1,800 restitution fine and a matching parole revocation restitution fine.The court of appeal affirmed in part. The trial court properly redesignated the murder conviction as both burglary and robbery. The court remanded for determination the duration of Watson’s parole period, modification of the judgment to show the restitution fine is satisfied, and striking the parole revocation fine. View "People v. Watson" on Justia Law

Prior to entering into the plea, the trial court denied defendant Jemondre Moore’s motion to suppress evidence found during a search of defendant’s backpack, which he left on the front passenger’s side floorboard of a friend’s Jeep. The backpack was searched during a search of the Jeep pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The trial court concluded this exception authorized the search because the officer who conducted the search had probable cause to believe the Jeep contained an unlawful amount of marijuana. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant entered a plea of no contest to one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and admitted he was previously convicted of a strike offense within the meaning of the three strikes law, and served a prior prison term. The remaining count, charging defendant with possession of marijuana for sale, and additional enhancement allegations were dismissed. Defendant was sentenced to serve five years in state prison. The Court of Appeal concluded the search was reasonable under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, and affirmed judgment on that basis. View "California v. Moore" on Justia Law

In July 2019, Houle pleaded no contest to unlawfully carrying a concealed dirk or dagger and admitted prior strike and prior prison term allegations. Houle received a stipulated six-year prison term for the dagger case, the reduction of a felony to a misdemeanor charge for intimidation of a witness in another case, and the dismissal of a third case involving an unspecified charge(s). The court imposed a four-year term for unlawfully carrying a concealed dirk or dagger and two one-year enhancements required for the prior prison terms.Effective January 1, 2020, Penal Code 667.5(b) was amended to eliminate the enhancement for prior prison terms except those based on sexually violent offenses. The prosecution agreed the amendment applies to Houle but argued the proper remedy is to strike the enhancements and remand to the trial court to exercise its discretion “to achieve a new sentence as near as possible to the six-year stipulated term.”The court of appeal held that remand is appropriate for the trial court to strike the section 667.5(b) enhancements and that the amendment rendered the parties’ plea bargain unenforceable. On remand, the trial court must restore the parties to the status quo ante. The parties may enter into a new plea agreement; if they do, the trial court may not impose a longer sentence than Houle’s original six-year term. View "People v. Houle" on Justia Law

Financial Casualty executed Geronimomendez's bail bond, promising to guarantee his appearance in court or pay $60,000. After Geronimomendez failed to appear, the court ordered the bond forfeited and signed and entered summary judgment against Financial Casualty on the bond. Financial Casualty argued that the judgment was void because the court failed to inquire into Geronimomendez’s ability to pay bail, as required by “Humphrey” (2018). Financial Casualty did not argue that the court failed to “enter” summary judgment as required by Penal Code section 1306, or that the bond should not be enforced under principles of unconscionability. The court denied the motion. The court of appeal affirmed. As reflected on the file-stamped order granting summary judgment, the trial timely entered judgment on the bond. Any failure by the trial court to consider Geronimomendez’s ability to pay bail, even if erroneous, did not void the bond or judgment entered thereon. The unconscionability claim was forfeited by Financial Casualty’s failure to raise it below and is meritless because it is directed at a judicial order rather than a contract. View "People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffrey Lord, Sr. was convicted by jury of making criminal threats and obstructing an executive officer by threat or violence. The trial court placed him on probation for five years. He appealed, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for making criminal threats because the threat did not cause the victim sustained fear. He further sought to have his case remanded for resentencing in light of the new two-year limit on terms of probation for certain felonies. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed Lord’s conviction but reversed and remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Lord" on Justia Law