Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Mariano Albert Valdez was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a murder he committed at age 17. In 2018, Valdez petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d)(1), which allows juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP to seek resentencing after 15 years of incarceration. The trial court granted the petition and resentenced Valdez to 50 years to life.In 2024, Valdez petitioned for resentencing again, arguing that his 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP, citing People v. Heard, which held that denying resentencing relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP violates equal protection. The trial court construed Valdez's filing as a petition under section 1170(d)(10), which allows for resentencing after 20 years of imprisonment if the defendant was resentenced to LWOP or its functional equivalent. The trial court granted the petition, reasoning that Valdez's 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP and that excluding him from resentencing relief would violate equal protection.The People petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to deny Valdez's resentencing relief. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, granted the petition. The court clarified that the reasoning in Heard does not apply to section 1170(d)(10) if the defendant was eligible for youth offender parole under the sentence imposed at resentencing under section 1170(d)(1). Valdez was eligible for youth offender parole under his 50-year-to-life sentence, making it not the functional equivalent of LWOP. Therefore, Valdez was not entitled to relief under section 1170(d)(10). The court directed the trial court to vacate its order granting resentencing relief and to deny Valdez's petition for resentencing. View "People v. Superior Court (Valdez)" on Justia Law

In 1997, Robert Wayne Cunningham was convicted by a jury of provocative act murder and other offenses following a 1995 shootout with police. Cunningham and his accomplice, Daniel Soly, were under police surveillance for a series of armed robberies. After robbing a liquor store, they were blocked by police, leading Cunningham to shoot at the officers. The police returned fire, killing Soly and wounding Cunningham and at least one officer.Cunningham was convicted of special-circumstance murder, attempted murder of peace officers, robbery, commercial burglary, and conspiracy to commit robbery, with a personal firearm use enhancement. He was sentenced to life without parole plus additional consecutive sentences. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. In 2021, Cunningham petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which the trial court denied at the prima facie stage, concluding he was ineligible for relief as a matter of law.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reconsidered the case following the Supreme Court's directive in light of People v. Antonelli. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of Cunningham's petition, holding that the jury instructions and the first-degree murder verdict established that Cunningham acted with personal malice. This finding rendered him ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6, as the provocative act doctrine required proof of malice, which was not imputed solely based on his participation in the crime. The court concluded that Cunningham's conviction was based on his own actions and malice, not on a theory of imputed malice. View "People v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

In January 2015, Juan Carlos Benitez-Torres, a lawful permanent resident, was stopped by police while driving a car with tinted windows. The car, not registered to him, was searched, and methamphetamine was found in hidden compartments. Benitez was charged with narcotics offenses. His family hired attorney Kenneth Reed for $15,000, but Reed appeared only four times and did not file a motion to suppress the evidence. In August 2015, Reed advised Benitez to accept a three-year plea deal without adequately explaining the immigration consequences. Benitez pleaded guilty and was deported after his release.Benitez filed a motion under Penal Code section 1473.7 in January 2023 to vacate his guilty plea, arguing he did not understand the immigration consequences and was prejudiced by this lack of understanding. The Superior Court of Orange County denied the motion, finding insufficient evidence that Benitez did not understand the consequences of his plea.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that Reed did not provide adequate advice regarding the immigration consequences of the plea, as required by Padilla v. Kentucky. The court determined that Benitez did not meaningfully understand the mandatory deportation consequences of his plea and that there was a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea had he understood these consequences. The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case with directions to allow Benitez to withdraw his 2015 guilty pleas. View "People v. Benitez-Torres" on Justia Law

In 2014, Michael Andrew Cota was charged with four counts of sexual abuse, including committing a lewd act upon a child under 14. The complaint also included allegations of a prior strike conviction, a prior serious felony conviction, a prior prison term for a violent felony, and three prior prison terms under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). In 2015, Cota entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to the lewd act charge and admitting the prior convictions and prison terms. In return, other charges were dismissed, and he was sentenced to 24 years in prison, with the punishment for two of the prison priors being struck.The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified Cota as eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75, which invalidates certain prison priors. However, the trial court denied resentencing in August 2022, reasoning that Cota was not eligible because the punishment for the prison priors was struck. Cota appealed this decision, arguing that the trial court erred in its interpretation of section 1172.75.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence Cota despite CDCR's delayed notification. The court determined that CDCR's notification obligation is directory, not mandatory or jurisdictional. The court also held that section 1172.75 requires resentencing even if the punishment for prison priors was struck, following the precedent set by People v. Espino. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for a full resentencing consistent with section 1172.75 and current law. View "People v. Cota" on Justia Law

Kristopher Birtcher, experiencing a mental health crisis, was reported to law enforcement by a Hobby Lobby manager. Birtcher, unarmed and not threatening anyone, was detained by sheriff’s deputies. During the detention, Birtcher attempted to flee but was subdued by multiple deputies who restrained him in a prone position, applying bodyweight pressure to his back. Despite Birtcher’s pleas that he could not breathe, the deputies maintained the restraint, and Birtcher eventually stopped moving and died from asphyxiation and sudden cardiac arrest.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding no triable issues of material fact regarding the excessive force claim. The court concluded that the deputies’ actions were in accordance with their training and that Birtcher’s restraint was proper. The court also ruled that plaintiff failed to establish a legal basis for the negligent training claim against Sheriff William D. Gore.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that there were indeed triable issues of material fact regarding the excessive force used by the deputies. The appellate court found that the evidence, including expert testimony, suggested that the deputies’ use of bodyweight pressure on Birtcher while he was restrained in a prone position could be considered excessive force. The court also held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the negligent training claim against Sheriff Gore, as there was a statutory basis for the claim and evidence suggesting his involvement in the training policies.The appellate court reversed the judgment in favor of all defendants and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "A.B. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 25 years to life. During pretrial proceedings, his defense counsel raised doubts about his competency to stand trial, leading the trial court to suspend criminal proceedings and appoint a psychologist for evaluation. The psychologist observed the defendant's extremely low intelligence, confusion during police interviews and the competency evaluation, and scores below the cutoff on a test designed to assess incompetence due to intellectual disability. Despite these observations, the psychologist concluded that the defendant was competent to stand trial. The trial court found the defendant competent based on the psychologist's report, and criminal proceedings resumed.The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court mishandled the procedures for determining his competency. He contended that there was sufficient evidence of intellectual disability to trigger the trial court's duty to appoint the director of the regional center for the developmentally disabled, or the director’s designee, to examine him. The appellate court agreed, concluding that the trial court was presented with evidence raising sufficient doubt that the defendant was intellectually disabled and was thus obligated to appoint the regional center director or their designee for evaluation. The court's failure to do so was deemed prejudicial error.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred by not appointing the regional center director or their designee to evaluate the defendant for developmental disability. The appellate court found that the psychologist's report, which indicated the defendant's extremely low IQ and confusion, raised sufficient doubt about his intellectual disability. The court concluded that the trial court's failure to appoint the regional center director deprived the defendant of a fair competency trial. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for a new trial. View "People v. Lara" on Justia Law

Perrie Thompson was sentenced to 50 years to life for a homicide he committed at age 17. Fifteen years later, he petitioned for relief under Penal Code section 1170(d), which allows juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole to seek resentencing. Thompson argued that his sentence was effectively life without parole and cited cases like People v. Contreras and People v. Heard to support his claim. He presented evidence of his rehabilitation efforts while incarcerated. The trial court denied his petition, stating that his sentence was not equivalent to life without parole since he would be eligible for parole within his life expectancy.Thompson appealed the decision. The Attorney General initially opposed the appeal but later conceded that a 50-years-to-life sentence is functionally equivalent to life without parole and that denying relief to such offenders violates equal protection. However, the court independently reviewed the merits of Thompson's arguments.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court's order. The court held that Thompson's 50-years-to-life sentence is not the functional equivalent of life without parole for equal protection purposes. The court reasoned that the legislative intent behind section 1170(d) was to address the most severe punishments, specifically life without parole, and that the Legislature could rationally distinguish between life without parole and lengthy term-of-years sentences. The court concluded that Thompson failed to demonstrate that the exclusion of his sentence from section 1170(d) relief was irrational or unconstitutional. View "People v. Thompson" on Justia Law

In 2000, Johnny Lawrence Brinson was convicted of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, with firearm use and discharge, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to 39 years to life in prison. In 2024, Brinson filed multiple requests for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.1, citing amendments to the Penal Code and Assembly Bill No. 600. The trial court declined to take any action on these requests.Previously, the trial court had affirmed Brinson's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. In 2024, Brinson filed his first request for recall and resentencing, which the court denied. He subsequently filed two more requests, both of which the court also declined to act upon, issuing orders stating no action would be taken pursuant to section 1172.1, subdivision (c). Brinson appealed the court's decision not to act on his requests.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court's decision not to take action on Brinson's request for recall and resentencing is not an appealable order. The court emphasized that under section 1172.1, subdivision (c), a defendant is not entitled to file a petition for resentencing, and the court is not required to respond to such a request. The appellate court agreed with existing case law that a trial court's decision not to act on a defendant-initiated request for recall and resentencing does not affect the defendant's substantial rights. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "People v. Brinson" on Justia Law

David Valle, an inmate at the California Men’s Colony, was found in possession of a 14-inch by 1-inch sharpened plastic fragment, metal fragments from a shower valve cover, and a folded metal sheet during a cell search. The plastic fragment was described as a weapon resembling a spear or knife. Valle admitted to having the items but claimed he could not remember why.Valle was convicted by a jury of possessing a sharp instrument in prison under Penal Code section 4502. The trial court sentenced him as a third-strike offender to 25 years to life in prison. Valle appealed, arguing that section 4502 is unconstitutionally vague because it does not define "sharp instrument."The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed Valle's constitutional challenge de novo and rejected it. The court held that section 4502 is not unconstitutionally vague, either facially or as applied to Valle. The court reasoned that the statute's purpose is to protect inmates and prison officials from assaults by armed prisoners and that it provides a clear standard of conduct. The court cited previous California decisions that consistently upheld the statute's constitutionality.The court concluded that a 14-inch by 1-inch sharpened piece of hard, non-flexible plastic is a sharp instrument prohibited by section 4502. Valle's possession of such items, concealed in his cell, demonstrated his understanding that they were prohibited. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Valle" on Justia Law

Kevin Gray, a sexually violent predator (SVP), was found suitable for conditional release. The State Department of State Hospitals identified a proposed placement for Gray, but the Stanislaus County District Attorney opposed it due to its proximity to a home where a child engaged in a public charter school’s independent study program. The court ruled that the home constituted a “school” under section 6608.5, subdivision (f), making the location ineligible for Gray’s placement.The trial court initially determined Gray was suitable for conditional release and ordered a housing search. After an extensive search, a proposed site was identified. The People opposed the site, arguing it was too close to a home-based school. The court agreed, ruling the home was a “school” under the statute, and barred the placement.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that a home where a child engages in a public school independent study program does not constitute a “school” under section 6608.5, subdivision (f). The court distinguished this case from People v. Superior Court (Cheek), which involved a private home school. The court noted that independent study is a program, not a type of school, and the legislative intent behind the placement restriction was to protect children in traditional school settings. The court declined to consider alternative arguments regarding the proximity of children fitting Gray’s victim profile, as these were not addressed by the trial court.The court granted the petition for writ of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its order barring Gray’s placement at the proposed site. View "Gray v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law