Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Roderick Barnes III was convicted by a jury of three counts of attempted murder, three counts of attempted robbery, and three counts of assault with a firearm. The jury also found that Barnes personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and that he participated in a criminal street gang, committing the crimes for the benefit of the gang. Barnes was sentenced to 70 years to life in prison.Barnes appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge against a Black prospective juror, failing to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 332, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the gang participation conviction and enhancements. The People conceded the latter two points but argued that the gang-related offenses could be retried.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in overruling Barnes’s objection to the peremptory challenge. The court determined that the prosecutor’s reasons for striking the juror were not valid and that the trial court improperly considered reasons not stated by the prosecutor. The court also found that substantial evidence did not support the gang participation conviction and enhancements, as the prosecution failed to provide a sufficient foundation for the expert’s opinion that the murder of P.M. commonly benefited the gang.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in its entirety and remanded the case for a new trial on counts 1 through 9. The court held that the prosecution could not retry Barnes for the gang participation offense or the gang enhancements due to insufficient evidence. View "People v. Barnes" on Justia Law

In 2008, Charome Davis was charged with the murder of Rudy Henderson, Jr. and possession of a firearm by a felon. Davis pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and admitted to using a firearm in the commission of the offense, resulting in a 21-year prison sentence. In April 2022, Davis filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that recent changes to the murder statutes meant he could not be convicted of murder.The Alameda County Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing where the prosecution presented evidence, including a police interview with a witness, R.L., and the preliminary hearing transcript. R.L. had initially told police that Davis was involved in the shooting and described the events leading up to Henderson's death. However, at the preliminary hearing, R.L. was uncooperative and claimed not to remember the events or her previous statements.The trial court found R.L.'s initial police interview more credible than her preliminary hearing testimony. Based on R.L.'s detailed account and other circumstantial evidence, the court concluded that Davis was the actual killer and had acted with reckless indifference to human life. The court denied Davis's petition for resentencing, finding sufficient evidence to support the original conviction.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that Davis was the actual killer, based on R.L.'s statements and the circumstantial evidence presented. Consequently, the denial of Davis's petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 was upheld. View "People v. Davis" on Justia Law

The case involves the appellant, who was convicted by a jury of three counts of forcible rape and three counts of incest against his biological daughter, who was 16 and 17 years old at the time. The appellant argued that the incest charges should be reversed because the prosecution did not present genetic testing evidence or evidence that he was married to and cohabiting with the victim’s mother when the victim was conceived. He contended that such evidence was necessary to establish he was the victim’s biological father, making both the jury instructions and the evidence insufficient.The Superior Court of Riverside County reviewed the case, where the jury convicted the appellant of all counts and found true all the allegations against him. The court sentenced the appellant to a term of life without the possibility of parole for one count of rape, along with additional consecutive and concurrent sentences for the other counts, resulting in a total aggregate sentence of 22 years and 8 months followed by life without the possibility of parole.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court rejected the appellant’s arguments, stating that genetic testing or evidence of marriage and cohabitation is not necessary to establish biological parenthood. The court found that other evidence, such as testimony from the victim and the appellant’s parents, was sufficient to establish the appellant as the biological father. The court also concluded that there was ample evidence to support the jury’s finding of forcible rape, including the victim’s lack of consent and the appellant’s use of force and duress. The court affirmed the judgment, including the appellant’s sentence, finding it was not cruel and unusual punishment. View "People v. Torres" on Justia Law

The case involves Stephen James Lattin, who was convicted of assault with a firearm and other related charges. Lattin contended that a gun must be loaded to commit assault with a firearm unless used as a club or bludgeon. He requested a jury instruction to this effect, which the trial court declined. Lattin also argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for assault with a firearm.In the lower court, Lattin was initially convicted of four counts of assault with a firearm and other charges. However, the appellate court reversed these convictions due to a failure to instruct on self-defense. On remand, the prosecution refiled the assault charges, and a second jury convicted Lattin of one count of assault with a firearm and three counts of simple assault. The trial court sentenced him to nine years and four months in prison, including the upper term for the assault with a firearm conviction.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that there is no brightline rule in California requiring a gun to be loaded to commit assault with a firearm. The court concluded that if ammunition is readily available, it is a question for the jury whether the defendant has the means to load the gun and shoot immediately. The court also found that the trial court erred in imposing the upper term sentence based on aggravating factors that were not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by section 1170(b). The appellate court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "P. v. Lattin" on Justia Law

Richard Manuel Nava, while serving a life sentence, stabbed another inmate with a sharpened piece of metal. He was convicted of several crimes, including under Penal Code sections 4500 and 4501. Section 4500 criminalizes assaults by life prisoners with malice aforethought using force likely to produce great bodily injury or a deadly weapon. Section 4501 similarly criminalizes assaults by prisoners with a deadly weapon, except as provided in Section 4500. Nava appealed his conviction under section 4501, arguing it does not apply to life prisoners.The Superior Court of Sacramento County found Nava guilty on all counts, including violations of sections 4500 and 4501 for the same conduct. The court sentenced him to 27 years to life for the section 4500 violation and 25 years to life for possessing a weapon in a penal institution, to be served concurrently. The sentence for the section 4501 violation was imposed but stayed. Nava filed a timely appeal.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that a person convicted under section 4500 cannot also be convicted under section 4501 for the same conduct due to the clause “[e]xcept as provided in Section 4500” in section 4501. This clause indicates that section 4501 does not apply when section 4500 governs the conduct. Consequently, the court reversed Nava’s conviction under section 4501, directing the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting this modification and to forward it to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "P. v. Nava" on Justia Law

Tam Steven Nguyen committed various crimes at the age of 22 and was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term with the possibility of parole. He is eligible for a parole hearing under Penal Code section 3046, which sets a minimum eligible parole date (MEPD). Additionally, because he was under 26 years old when he committed his crimes, he is entitled to a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051, which sets a youth parole eligible date (YPED). Nguyen can earn various credits to advance his MEPD, but only educational merit credit can advance his YPED.Nguyen petitioned the trial court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he should be able to use additional credits to advance his YPED. The trial court denied his petition. Nguyen then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, which summarily denied the petition. The California Supreme Court granted review, ordered the Court of Appeal to vacate its order, and issue an order to show cause.The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and found that youth and nonyouth offenders are not similarly situated for the purposes of the regulations governing parole eligibility dates. Youth offenders have two parole eligibility dates (MEPD and YPED), while nonyouth offenders have only one (MEPD). The court held that the difference in how credits are applied to MEPD and YPED does not violate equal protection because the groups are not similarly situated, and there is a rational basis for the distinction. The court concluded that the regulations ensure the youth offender parole scheme operates as intended by the Legislature. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "In re Nguyen" on Justia Law

Gabriel M., a minor, was charged with murder, robbery, and active gang participation. The juvenile court ordered his transfer to adult criminal court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707. Gabriel's counsel immediately informed the court of their intent to appeal the transfer and requested a stay of the criminal proceedings. The juvenile court initially granted the stay but later lifted it and transferred Gabriel, who was nearly 20 years old, to county jail. Gabriel then filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging the lifting of the stay and his transfer to county jail.The juvenile court had ordered Gabriel detained in juvenile hall, but upon the prosecution's motion, the court transferred him to criminal court. Gabriel's counsel requested a stay of the criminal proceedings, which the court initially granted. However, the court later lifted the stay and ordered Gabriel transferred to county jail, citing his age and the seriousness of the charges. Gabriel's counsel objected, arguing that the stay could only be lifted upon Gabriel's request and that his transfer to an adult facility required a petition under section 208.5, which had not been filed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that under section 801 and rule 5.770(e)(2), the juvenile court was required to stay the criminal court proceedings until the final determination of Gabriel's appeal and could only lift the stay upon Gabriel's request. The court also held that Gabriel's transfer to county jail without following the procedures set forth in section 208.5 was erroneous. The court granted Gabriel's petition, directing the juvenile court to reinstate the stay and vacate the order transferring him to county jail. The court allowed for the possibility of a new petition under section 208.5 to transfer Gabriel to an adult facility. View "Gabriel M. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Luis Armando Caratachea was convicted by a jury of 52 felony sexual offenses against four of his step-granddaughters, all minors under 14 years old. The majority of the charges involved one victim, Y.M., with additional counts involving other victims. One victim, Lilly, testified about an uncharged sexual offense that allegedly occurred in Mexico. Caratachea conceded the admissibility of this testimony and requested a jury instruction on its proper use. The trial court admitted the testimony and provided the requested instruction without conducting an analysis under Evidence Code section 352.The Superior Court of San Diego County admitted the testimony and read the instruction without performing a section 352 analysis. Caratachea argued that the court erred by not conducting this analysis sua sponte. The trial court also imposed consecutive sentences on all counts, believing it lacked discretion to impose concurrent sentences.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court held that neither Evidence Code section 1108 nor the Supreme Court's decision in People v. Villatoro required a sua sponte section 352 analysis before admitting the testimony or reading the corresponding jury instruction. The court found that the trial court had no sua sponte duty to exclude evidence or conduct a section 352 analysis without a request from the defense.However, the Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court mistakenly believed it lacked discretion to impose concurrent sentences for the lewd act convictions. The appellate court vacated the sentences on these counts and remanded the case for resentencing, directing the trial court to consider its discretion to impose concurrent sentences and to state its reasons if it chooses to impose consecutive sentences. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "People v. Caratachea" on Justia Law

Antonio German Armas was convicted of distributing and possessing child pornography. He was placed on two years of formal probation, set to expire on August 16, 2023. However, Armas violated the terms of his probation twice, leading to extensions of his probation, with the final expiration date set for June 9, 2024. Armas appealed the trial court's first order finding that he violated the terms of his probation.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County found that Armas violated his probation terms and imposed a suspended sentence of two years and eight months, reinstating formal probation with a new expiration date of January 20, 2024. Armas's appeal from this order was initially rejected as untimely, but he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was granted, allowing his appeal to proceed. Meanwhile, the trial court found another probation violation but reinstated probation instead of imposing the suspended sentence, extending the probation to June 9, 2024. Armas appealed this second order, which was affirmed by the appellate court.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. By the time of the review, Armas had completed his probation. The court held that the appeal was moot because Armas had already served his probation term, and any decision would have no practical effect. The court dismissed the appeal, noting that potential future consequences of the probation violation were too speculative to prevent a finding of mootness. The court relied on precedents that established that the completion of a probation term renders an appeal moot unless there are ongoing adverse collateral consequences, which were not present in this case. View "People v. Armas" on Justia Law

Tam Steven Nguyen committed various crimes at the age of 22 and was convicted in 2003 of attempted murder, kidnapping, and assault with a firearm. The jury also found true firearm allegations. He was sentenced to a determinate term of 14 years, an indeterminate term of 25 years to life, and a life term with the possibility of parole. While incarcerated, Nguyen earned various credits, including good conduct and educational merit credits. His minimum eligible parole date (MEPD) is set for February 2036, and his youth parole eligible date (YPED) is set for October 2026.Nguyen petitioned the trial court for a writ of habeas corpus in 2022, arguing that he should be allowed to use all earned credits to advance his YPED, not just educational merit credit. The trial court denied his petition. Nguyen then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, which summarily denied the petition. The California Supreme Court granted review, ordered the appellate court to vacate its order, and issue an order to show cause.The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and held that Nguyen's right to equal protection was not violated. The court found that youth and nonyouth offenders are not similarly situated for the purposes of the challenged regulations, as youth offenders have two parole eligibility dates (MEPD and YPED) while nonyouth offenders have only one (MEPD). The court also determined that there is a rational basis for the regulation, as it aligns with the legislative intent to provide youth offenders with a meaningful opportunity for release while maintaining a relatively fixed YPED. Consequently, the court denied Nguyen's petition for writ of habeas corpus. View "In re Nguyen" on Justia Law