Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in California Courts of Appeal
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Financial Casualty executed Geronimomendez's bail bond, promising to guarantee his appearance in court or pay $60,000. After Geronimomendez failed to appear, the court ordered the bond forfeited and signed and entered summary judgment against Financial Casualty on the bond. Financial Casualty argued that the judgment was void because the court failed to inquire into Geronimomendez’s ability to pay bail, as required by “Humphrey” (2018). Financial Casualty did not argue that the court failed to “enter” summary judgment as required by Penal Code section 1306, or that the bond should not be enforced under principles of unconscionability. The court denied the motion. The court of appeal affirmed. As reflected on the file-stamped order granting summary judgment, the trial timely entered judgment on the bond. Any failure by the trial court to consider Geronimomendez’s ability to pay bail, even if erroneous, did not void the bond or judgment entered thereon. The unconscionability claim was forfeited by Financial Casualty’s failure to raise it below and is meritless because it is directed at a judicial order rather than a contract. View "People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc." on Justia Law

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Defendant Jeffrey Lord, Sr. was convicted by jury of making criminal threats and obstructing an executive officer by threat or violence. The trial court placed him on probation for five years. He appealed, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for making criminal threats because the threat did not cause the victim sustained fear. He further sought to have his case remanded for resentencing in light of the new two-year limit on terms of probation for certain felonies. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed Lord’s conviction but reversed and remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Lord" on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order denying defendant's Penal Code section 1170.95 petition and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing under section 1170.95, subdivision (d). The court joined other Courts of Appeal in holding that, at the hearing contemplated by section 1170.95, subdivision (d), the People are required to prove to the trial court beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder on a theory of murder valid after SB 1437's enactment. Because the trial court did not apply this standard, the court remanded for a new hearing at which the People may seek to prove to the trial court beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the actual killer, aided and abetted the actual killer with the intent to kill, or was a major participant who acted in reckless disregard for human life. View "People v. Fortman" on Justia Law

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After a federal district court granted a petition for writ of habeas corpus triggering plaintiff's release from prison, he filed a claim with the Board, seeking compensation as a wrongfully convicted person. The Board denied the claim and plaintiff sought mandamus relief in the trial court, which upheld the board's determination.The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court should have granted the mandamus petition because the federal court's Schlup finding and the later grant of habeas relief that resulted in plaintiff's release from prison without retrial by the state amount to a finding of factual innocence that the Legislature intended to be binding, and to preclude holding a Board hearing. In determining otherwise, the court concluded that the Board did not accord the Schlup finding the significance it deserves and the Board construed Penal Code section 1485.55, subdivision (a) in a manner that undermines the Legislature's intent and effectively renders the statutory provision inoperative in practice. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the trial court to enter a new judgment reversing the Board's order denying plaintiff's compensation claim and directing the Board to recommend, pursuant to section 4904, that an appropriation be made and petitioner's claim paid. View "Larsen v. California Victim Compensation Board" on Justia Law

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CHP officers saw Walker’s vehicle weaving onto the shoulder and over the double yellow lines into opposing traffic. Two CHP patrol cars activated their lights and sirens. Walker “began to speed away.” The 24-minute, 18-mile pursuit and subsequent arrest were recorded on video. Walker reached speeds of 85 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone, crossed into oncoming traffic, and drove in the wrong direction on the highway. CHP placed a spike strip. Although all four of his tires began deflating, Walker drove more than three miles before stopping. After Walker pulled over, he complied with some commands but appeared extremely confused. A bag containing more than 11 grams of methamphetamine was found next to the driver’s seat. A sample of his blood contained methamphetamine at the highest level that could be accurately reported. A criminalist testified high doses of methamphetamine can cause “meth psychosis,” similar to schizophrenia.Walker was convicted of felony evasion of a peace officer (Vehicle Code 2800.2), misdemeanor DUI (23152(f)), and misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code 11377(a)). He admitted a prior serious felony conviction and was sentenced to a six-year aggregate term. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that reckless driving is a lesser included offense of felony evasion, that the court should not have admitted a recording of Walker’s statements, and that Walker’s counsel was ineffective. View "People v. Walker" on Justia Law

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A Milpitas Fire Department captain responded to Nunes’s house one afternoon based on a report of a “whole structure fire.” He saw no fire and no smoke. Neighbors standing outside stated they had recently seen smoke coming from the backyard. A police officer “pounded” on the house’s door. No one answered. The fire captain opened a gate and entered the backyard, where he smelled smoke in the air. He found no active fire but saw test tubes, chemistry equipment, and a homemade toy rocket that looked burned on the ground. The captain noticed a closed shed. No smoke was coming from it, nor did the smell of smoke seem to originate there. He opened the shed “to make sure everything is clear,” and saw a metal cabinet. The captain admitted there was nothing specific about the cabinet that made him think he should look inside: He opened the cabinet, saw unfamiliar bottled chemicals, and called the hazardous materials team.The police ultimately obtained a search warrant, based in part on those chemicals. After the search warrant was executed, Nunes was charged with numerous offenses for possessing explosives and explosive materials. Denying Nunes's motion to suppress evidence, the trial court concluded that the search was valid under the exigent circumstances exception. The court of appeal reversed. Opening the cabinet inside the shed, however prudent and well-intentioned, was not an action necessary to prevent imminent danger. View "People v. Nunes" on Justia Law

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In 2005, Magana was convicted of first-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury found that Magana had served four prior prison terms. Magana was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 50 years to life, consecutive to a determinate six-year term. The court of appeal rejected two prior prison term enhancements. On remand, the trial court issued a new determinate abstract of judgment, reflecting a four-year term, two years for being a felon in possession, and consecutive one-year terms for two prior prison term enhancements; a new indeterminate abstract reflected 50 years to life and also listed two prior prison enhancements, specifying that the “total term” was 50 years to life consecutive to four years and that two “prison priors” were dismissed.In 2019, CDCR notified the court that the abstracts contained technical errors. Magana filed a brief, indicating that the 2007 abstracts stated the “correct total term” but describing the upcoming hearing as a recall and resentencing under section 1170(d). Magana requested that the court exercise its previously unavailable discretion to dismiss the firearm use enhancement under Senate Bill 620 and dismiss the two remaining prior prison term allegations under Senate Bill 136, which limited prior prison enhancements to terms served for sexually violent offenses.The trial court declined to resentence Magana, then issued a new indeterminate abstract consistent with stipulations by the parties. The court of appeal dismissed an appeal. The trial court specifically indicated it was not recalling Magana’s sentence and had no jurisdiction to do so; the order denying Magana’s motion for a full resentencing was not an appealable order. View "People v. Magana" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of 19 felonies against several victims, including conspiracy to commit human trafficking, and numerous sex offenses, including 14 counts of rape. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his involvement in a lucrative and violent sex trafficking enterprise.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded that the conspiracy conviction for human trafficking did not violate the ex post facto prohibition. The court also concluded that California lacked jurisdiction over Counts 17 through 21, the rapes of Jane Doe 5 in North Carolina. The court reversed the convictions for counts 17 to 21, struck the court operations assessments and criminal conviction assessments attached to counts 17 to 21; and affirmed the remaining convictions, modifying the judgment to reflect a total sentence of 119 years, plus 15 years to life, in state prison. As modified, the court affirmed the judgment. The court directed the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward it to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. View "People v. Joseph" on Justia Law

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After defendant pleaded no contest to one count of felony stalking, he was denied mental health diversion under newly enacted Penal Code section 1001.36, which took effect shortly after his plea. Consequently, defendant was placed on probation for three years subject to various terms and conditions.The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in finding that defendant posed an unreasonable risk to public safety and thus abused its discretion in denying his request for mental health diversion. In this case, People v. Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th 440, compels reversal. The court explained that, while there is ample evidence that defendant terrorized a family with threats, his charges are not super-strike offenses; he poses a low risk to public safety in the uncontroverted opinion of two mental health professionals; there is no evidence he owned, possessed or had access to any weapons; and he was released on bond for more than two years without incident. Because the court reversed the judgment, and with it the order of probation, defendant's final argument that the probation order should be modified to strike the imposition of a monthly $100 probation fee is moot. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment finding a probation violation in this case where a video recording from a bodycam worn by a police officer depicted a visibly distraught woman reporting that her boyfriend had beat her up. The court explained that, although her statement qualifies as an "excited utterance" admissible under the hearsay rule, it is inadmissible at trial under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, as construed in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, if she is unavailable as a witness. However, the court reasoned that the right to cross-examination at a probation violation hearing is governed—not by the Confrontation Clause—but by due process.The court sided with People v. Stanphill (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 61, 78, and held that the admissibility of the bodycam video under the excited utterance exception satisfies the minimum requirements of due process applicable at probation violation hearings. The court explained that due process is about reliability, and the Confrontation Clause is about confrontation. Because the bodycam video is reliable enough to fall within the firmly rooted hearsay exception for excited utterances, the court concluded that the dictates of due process are satisfied. View "People v. Gray" on Justia Law