Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Troy Steward was charged with battery on a correctional officer, and he was committed to Atascadero State Hospital after being found not guilty by reason of insanity. Following the passage of Assembly Bill No. 103 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Assem. Bill 103), defendant filed a petition for a reduction of his commitment under newly enacted Penal Code section 1170.127, a statute which paralleled Three Strikes relief for those found guilty of a crime. The superior court denied defendant’s petition, concluding that Assembly Bill 103 was an unconstitutional amendment of Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. The Court of Appeal found Assembly Bill 103 did "not amend Proposition 36 to prohibit what Proposition 36 authorized or authorize what it prohibited: [w]hile Proposition 36 addresses the length of prison sentences for criminal defendants, Assembly Bill 103 addresses the length of commitment terms for NGI committees." The trial court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Steward" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping to commit robbery or a specified sex crime in violation of Penal Code section 209, subdivision (b) and three counts of sex offenses against a minor. As to the sex offenses, the jury found true the aggravated kidnapping circumstance of the One Strike Law, Penal Code, section 667.61, subd. (d)(2). Defendant was sentenced to three consecutive terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP).The Court of Appeal rejected defendant's contention that the aggravated kidnapping statutes are void for vagueness. However, the court agreed with defendant that the trial court was clear about why it chose consecutive rather than concurrent LWOP terms, and that its sole reason (the possibility of appellate relief on one or more counts) was not an appropriate basis for imposing consecutive terms. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing using the appropriate sentencing factors. The court also concluded that Penal Code section 1202.45(a) is inapplicable to defendant and struck the $10,000 parole revocation fine. Finally, the court agreed with the parties regarding the error in the abstract judgment, and instructed the trial court to reflect the correct sentencing statute, Penal Code section 667.61, when it issues a new abstract of judgment. View "People v. McInnis" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Court of Appeal's review in this case was whether the jury should have been allowed to consider defendant’s physical limitations in determining whether his belief in the need for self-defense was objectively reasonable. The case arose when defendant Jack Junior Horn shot Eugene Di Luigi following a dispute over Di Luigi’s dogs. Although defendant was charged with attempted murder, the jury acquitted him of that offense and found him guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter. Defendant’s sole contention on appeal was that the prosecutor misstated the law in closing argument by telling the jury his physical infirmities were immaterial to whether his belief in the need for self-defense was objectively reasonable. The Court of Appeal agreed and published its opinion to address the case law relied upon by the Attorney General, and also to illustrate how the mistake made by the prosecution here could be remedied. The Court concluded the trial court rectified the prosecutor’s misstatement by subsequently instructing the jury about the relevance of defendant’s physical infirmities on his claim of self-defense. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Horn" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours of January 5, 2013, J.D., defendants Jeffery Powell and Christopher Langlois, and a fourth person, J.P., forcibly entered the victim’s home and found him sleeping on a couch. Powell and Langlois and possibly J.D. beat the victim and the group then fled within 15 to 90 seconds after their entry. The victim died soon after the attack from a stab wound to the heart. The prosecution contended that Powell inflicted that wound. A jury found Powell and Langlois guilty of second degree murder, and first degree residential burglary. The jury found true the allegation that, during the commission of the crimes, Powell personally used a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced Powell to 16 years to life and Langlois to 15 years to life. Defendants raised a number of contentions alleging instructional and evidentiary error, and also asserted that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a request to discharge a juror. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed judgment. View "California v. Powell" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Angela Latten and two co-defendants drove to the California Department of Fish and Wildlife compound in Lewiston, California. They used a grinder to break the lock to the chain blocking the driveway, drove into the property, and entered five structures on the property: two evidence trailers, one housing marijuana and the other, oil-extraction tools; the warden’s garage housing an all-terrain vehicle and other tools; the fisheries shop housing metalworking tools and wading gear; and the fisheries mobile home housing offices. Defendant and one of her codefendants left shoe prints on top of a trailer, which they used to climb through a window to enter the fisheries mobile home. Defendant also left shoe prints in the warden’s garage. A witness, who lived on a property overlooking the compound, heard the grinder and saw a car with the silhouettes of three individuals inside drive into the compound. The witness later saw the car leave the compound and communicated that information to a 911 dispatcher when reporting the burglary. Around 30 minutes after the witness first reported the burglary, a Trinity County Sheriff’s deputy stopped a car matching the description provided by the witness which was several hundred yards from the compound with defendant and her codefendants inside. Defendant was ultimately convicted of five counts of burglary, one count for each of the five buildings. She appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presented against her at trial and her resulting sentences. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's convictions. View "California v. Latten" on Justia Law

Defendant Rebecca Thomas lived with her boyfriend codefendant Taylor Montgomery-Gutzman and her 22-month-old twins K. and B. In 2016, while defendant was out trying to buy heroin, K. stopped breathing and ultimately died. An autopsy of K. revealed he was strangled to death. B. also exhibited signs of distress and, upon a physical examination, it was revealed B. suffered from extensive internal injuries. Most of B.’s injuries were recently inflicted but some were several weeks old. Defendant and Montgomery-Gutzman were tried together for the murder of K. and abuse of B. Defendant claimed Montgomery-Gutzman inflicted all the injuries and she was unaware of his treatment of the twins. Montgomery-Gutzman claimed defendant was responsible. In his effort to show defendant was responsible, Montgomery-Gutzman introduced evidence defendant had a propensity to commit child abuse. Over defendant’s objection, the court admitted propensity evidence and instructed the jury it could use the propensity evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as to Montgomery-Gutzman’s guilt. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err by admitting propensity evidence nor did it confusingly instruct the jury on how it could consider the evidence. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected defendant’s remaining instructional error claims and her ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding her attorney’s performance at sentencing. View "California v. Thomas" on Justia Law

In 1988, defendant was convicted, pursuant to a guilty plea, of second degree murder. In 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, which was denied. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying him a jury trial to determine whether the People proved he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.The Court of Appeal followed the unanimous view of the several courts that have considered the question that the relief granted by Senate Bill No. 1437, in which section 1170.95 was included, is an act of lenity not subject to Sixth Amendment analysis. In this case, defendant was properly convicted of second degree murder under the law that was in effect at the time of his offense and when he entered his guilty plea. Defendant was not entitled to a jury trial and thus the court affirmed the trial court's order denying relief. View "People v. James" on Justia Law

A jury found Trampas Orey to be a sexually violent predator pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). The trial court ordered him committed to the California Department of State Hospitals (DSH) for an indeterminate term. Orey appealed the order of commitment. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding: (1) any error in admitting into evidence two photographs of victims was harmless; (2) the trial court did not err by admitting into evidence prison records and Coalinga State Hospital records reflecting statements concerning or attributed to Orey; (3) substantial evidence supported the order of commitment; (4) the trial court did not err by denying Orey’s motions, made pursuant to California v. Marsden 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970); (5) the trial court did not err by denying Orey’s request to give a special instruction on the issues of “volitional impairment” and “serious difficulty controlling sexually violent behavior”; (6) the SVPA did not violate equal protection, due process, the prohibition on ex post facto laws, and double jeopardy under either the federal or state constitution; and (7) there was no cumulative error. View "California v. Orey" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order denying the petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 and Senate Bill No. 1437. Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his petition at the second stage of section 1170.95 subdivision (c) analysis when the trial court ruled that, although the jury was presented with two theories of liability—one valid (implied malice) and the other invalid (second degree felony murder)—substantial evidence supported a jury finding that defendant committed the killing with malice aforethought, and he was therefore ineligible for relief as a matter of law.The court concluded that there is substantial evidence in the record to support a finding that defendant committed second degree murder on an implied malice theory, but that is not sufficient to preclude defendant from relief as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court remanded with directions to issue an order to show cause under section 1170.95, subdivision (c) and hold a hearing pursuant to section 1170.95, subdivision (d) to determine whether to vacate defendant's murder conviction and recall his sentence and resentence him. View "People v. DeHuff" on Justia Law

Carl Flores was convicted by jury of attempted premeditated murder with a 25-year-to-life gun enhancement. After trial, Flores admitted a prior serious felony, a prior prison term, and two prior strike offenses, which made him a third strike offender and exposed him to a life sentence under the “Three Strikes” law. At sentencing, the judge struck the prison prior and prior serious felony enhancements but nevertheless added them to the minimum term of Flores’s life sentence, to reach a total indeterminate term of 69 years. On appeal, Flores challenged the sentence, and raised a new question about the role of enhancements in third strike sentencing. If a trial court exercises its discretion to strike an enhancement under Penal Code section 1385 “in furtherance of justice,” may the enhancement still be used to increase the minimum term of the defendant’s life sentence under what is commonly called “Option 3” of third strike sentencing? To this the Court of Appeal concluded no: once a court exercises its discretion to strike an enhancement under section 1385 for sentencing purposes, the enhancement may no longer be used to increase punishment, whether as a separate determinate term to be served before the life sentence or as a means of lengthening the minimum term of the life sentence. The Court also found the trial judge in this case made the additional error of adding the enhancements twice to the minimum term of Flores’s life sentence. The other arguments Flores raised on appeal lacked merit. Judgment was affirmed but the matter remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Flores" on Justia Law