Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury convicted him on a charge of resisting an executive officer with force or violence, defendant-appellant Cory Braden, Jr. requested mental health diversion pursuant to Penal Code section 1001.36. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held he was ineligible for that section’s “pretrial diversion” because he did not request diversion before trial began. The Court disagreed with California v. Curry, 62 Cal.App.5th 314 (2021), which held that such a request could be made until entry of judgment. Therefore, the Court concluded the trial court properly denied his request to be considered for diversion, and affirmed. View "California v. Braden" on Justia Law

The prosecution pursued alternative theories of first-degree murder liability at Secrease’s 1998 trial, arguing that Secrease could be convicted as a direct perpetrator based on his statements, or, alternatively, as an aider and abettor based on his participation in the carjacking plan and his knowledge that a co-conspirator was armed and willing to use violence. The jury found Secrease guilty of both first-degree murder and carjacking, without specifying the basis for the murder conviction. It found the felony-murder special-circumstance allegation true but found not true two firearm use allegations. The court of appeal affirmed the convictions but remanded; the trial court failed to consider a discretionary reduction of the sentence to 25 years to life based on Secrease’s youth. On remand, Secrease was again sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. The court of appeal affirmed.In 2018, Senate Bill 1437 changed the law relating to accomplice liability for murder. Secrease’s subsequent resentencing petition, Penal Code section 1170.95, was summarily rejected. The court of appeal remanded. A felony-murder special-circumstance finding by the jury that convicted Secrease in 1998 did not bar him from pleading a prima facie case for section 1170.95 resentencing relief as a matter of law. No court has ever determined whether the felony-murder special-circumstance finding rendered against Secrease meets the minimum standards of personal culpability enunciated in precedent. He is entitled to that determination before his section 1170.95 petition may be denied summarily. View "People v. Secrease" on Justia Law

In 2008, Murray was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a first-degree special circumstance murder he committed when he was 22 years old. In 2020, Murray unsuccessfully sought a Franklin hearing, contending he was eligible for a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051. The court cited section 3051(h), “people sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for crimes committed when they were at least 18 years of age but no more than ‘25 years of age or younger are not eligible for youth offender parole hearings.” The court of appeal affirmed.Meanwhile, Murray sought habeas corpus relief, asserting an equal protection violation, arguing that section 3051(h) violates his right to equal protection by affording juvenile LWOP offenders (those under 18 at the time of their offense) a youth offender parole hearing while denying youthful LWOP offenders (those 18-25 years old at the time of their offense) a hearing. The court of appeal denied relief. There is a rational basis for distinguishing between juvenile and youthful LWOP offenders; children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. The court joined “others in encouraging the Legislature to revisit where it has drawn the line.” View "In re Murray" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of various sexual offenses arising out of a single act of rape of an 11-year-old girl. The trial court imposed a term of 25 years to life on the rape count, and imposed but stayed terms of 25 years to life on the lewd and lascivious act count and 15 years to life on the aggravated sexual assault count.The Court of Appeal concluded that defendant was not entitled to a statutory rape instruction where the trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct on statutory rape because there was no substantial evidence to support a finding that the offenses were committed without the use of force or fear. The court agreed with the parties that either the rape conviction or aggravated sexual assault of a child by means of rape conviction must be vacated. The court further agreed that the aggravated sexual assault conviction must be vacated because the rape count carries the longer prison term. The court also concluded that no errors reduced the prosecution's burden of proof on counts 1 and 3 in the second trial. Accordingly, the court vacated the aggravated sexual assault conviction and affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

McCloud has been convicted of 17 sexually violent crimes against six different victims. The offenses against the first five victims were committed in 1979. The first victim was a 10-year-old girl. McCloud was paroled in 1991; seven months later, McCloud broke into the home of a 69-year-old woman and sexually assaulted her. In 2011, a jury determined McCloud was a sexually violent predator (SVP). He was committed to the custody of the Department of State Hospitals (DSH). McCloud has been continuously incarcerated or institutionalized since 1991. In 2015, McCloud unsuccessfully petitioned for conditional release without DSH concurrence, with court-appointed counsel and an independent evaluator.In 2019, McCloud, representing himself, filed another petition for conditional release under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6608, without DSH concurrence. His exhibits showed McCloud had a current diagnosis under DSM-5 of “Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder, Nonconsenting Females,” and indicated that McCloud remained a danger to the health and safety of others. McCloud had discontinued his participation in the sexual offense treatment program and had declined to participate in an interview for his evaluation. McCloud, who was born in 1954, noted that “studies have concluded that recidivism rates decrease significantly among older male sex offenders” and discounted the other information. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of his petition without a hearing. Court-appointed counsel and a court-appointed expert would likely have made no difference. View "People v. McCloud" on Justia Law

J.R. told Napa County Officer Adams that she was assaulted by her ex-boyfriend, Stewart. J.R. “seemed hysterical” and said Stewart threatened to “bash her face in using his head,” then as the argument continued, he “headbutted her in the face.” Adams did not notice visible injuries. A witness stated that Stewart threatened to “beat her down,” then unsuccessfully attempted to punch J.R., and immediately headbutted her in the face. Another witness saw Stewart headbutt J.R. Stewart told Adams that he and J.R. were dating and had a five-year-old daughter together. He denied any physical altercation. Stewart stated that J.R. threatened to “put him in jail.” Stewart was cooperative and calm.Stewart pleaded no contest to felony assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury; other charges were dismissed. Stewart was placed on three years’ probation. The court of appeal held that Stewart is entitled to a one-year reduction in his probation period. While his appeal was pending, Assembly Bill 1950 amended Penal Code 1203.1(a), to limit felony probation to a maximum term of two years, absent circumstances not applicable here; the court determined that the amendment applies retroactively. Given Stewart’s history of alcohol and drug abuse, mental health issues, and commission of a domestic violence offense, a probation condition prohibiting marijuana use is reasonably related to future criminality and not disproportionate. View "People v. Stewart" on Justia Law

A trial court denied Robbie Viehmeyer’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, a petition based on the contention that Viehmeyer was eligible for early parole consideration under subdivision (a) of section 32 to article I of the California Constitution. While being pursued on foot by two police officers, Viehmeyer fired a semiautomatic pistol four times directly at the head of one of the officers. Viehmeyer was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter with an enhancement for personal use of a firearm, assault with a firearm on a peace officer with enhancements for personal use and personal discharge of a firearm, possession of a firearm by a felon, and the unlawful taking of a vehicle. For purposes of sentencing, the trial court selected assault with a firearm on a peace officer as the primary offense. Viehmeyer served the full term for the primary offense, which section 32(a) defined as “the longest term of imprisonment imposed by the court for any offense, excluding the imposition of an enhancement.” Viehmeyer remained incarcerated on the sentences imposed on the personal discharge of a firearm enhancement, the counts for possession of a firearm and unlawful taking of a vehicle, and for the sentencing enhancements for prior convictions. Viehmeyer argued that, pursuant to section 32(a), he was eligible for early parole consideration and relied on In re Mohammad, 42 Cal.App.5th 719 (2019), review granted Feb. 19, 2020, S259999 (Mohammad), to support that argument. The Attorney General contended Viehmeyer was not eligible for early parole consideration because of (1) the conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter, which is a violent felony under Penal Code section 667.5(c) by virtue of the use of a firearm in its commission, and (2) the personal discharge of a firearm enhancement attendant to the assault conviction. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Attorney General and denied relief. View "In re Viehmeyer" on Justia Law

Defendants Gerquan Clark and Anthony Brown robbed three men at gunpoint. Defendants were tracked to a local retail store using a phone app on one of the cell phones they had stolen. At a showup, one of the victims identified both defendants, and another identified Clark. At trial, both victims identified Clark as the man who pointed the gun at them, and one victim identified Brown as the other man. Police never found the gun. At trial, defendants asserted the prosecution had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the object used during the robbery was a real gun. Nonetheless, a jury found defendants guilty of three counts of robbery in the second degree with firearm enhancements. Additionally, the jury found each defendant guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon. The trial court sentenced Clark to an aggregate term of 21 years and Brown to an aggregate term of 12 years. On appeal, defendants claimed their felon in possession of a firearm convictions and the firearm enhancements had to be reversed because: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Clark’s prior uncharged act involving possession of a firearm pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101 (b); and (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct in urging the jurors to use that prior uncharged act as propensity evidence. Brown separately claimed: (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct in vouching for the prosecution and disparaging defense counsel; and (4) that cumulative error required reversal. The Court of Appeal reversed the convictions of felon in possession of a firearm as to both defendants and all firearm enhancements, finding the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Clark’s prior uncharged act pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101 (b), and the evidentiary error was prejudicial as to the felon in possession of a firearm count and the firearm enhancements. Because the possession conviction and firearms enhancements were reversed, the Court did not reach defendant’s allegations the prosecutor committed misconduct. As for Brown’s separate prosecutorial misconduct claim, the Court concluded the prosecutor committed misconduct in vouching for the prosecution and disparaging defense counsel, but these instances of misconduct did not prejudice Brown. Brown’s cumulative error contention was meritless. Finally, because of Senate Bill 136 (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, sec. 1), the Court struck Brown’s prior prison term enhancement and remanded for resentencing as requested by the parties. View "California v. Clark" on Justia Law

Defendant Daniel Clapp plead no contest to concealing the true extent of his physical activities and abilities from his employer, the Department of the California Highway Patrol (CHP), and the State Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF). Consistent with a resolution negotiated by the parties, the trial court granted defendant three years’ probation, and as a condition of probation, ordered him to pay restitution. Following a hearing, defendant was ordered to pay $30,095.68 to SCIF for temporary disability benefits and $81,768.01 to CHP for benefits wrongfully obtained. He was also ordered to pay $1,350 and $70,159 to SCIF and CHP respectively for investigative costs. Defendant appealed the restitution award as to investigation costs contending that, as public investigative agencies, neither SCIF nor CHP was entitled to reimbursement for the costs of investigating his claim. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that as direct victims of defendant’s fraud, both CHP and SCIF were indeed entitled to restitution for investigative costs incurred in an effort to justify discontinuance of payments and recoup money defendant fraudulently obtained. View "California v. Clapp" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal agreed with petitioner that Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (h), which excludes One Strike offenders from the procedures for youth offender parole hearings, violates his right to equal protection of the laws because such procedures are generally available to similarly situated offenders and no rational basis exists to deny them to One Strike offenders. Therefore, the court concluded that petitioner is entitled to a youth offender parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration. The court's determination renders moot his argument that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. View "In re Woods" on Justia Law