Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Tyrone Douglas was convicted of two nonviolent felonies and a violent felony. The trial court chose one of the nonviolent felonies as the primary offense, imposed sentence for that offense, imposed but stayed sentence on the other nonviolent felony offense, and imposed a consecutive term for the violent felony. After Douglas’s sentencing, California voters passed Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, which added section 32 to article I of the California Constitution. Douglas petitioned or habeas relief, challenging a regulation adopted by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) that limited the parole-consideration benefit of section 32(a)(1) to inmates who were convicted only of nonviolent felonies, thus excluding from early parole consideration anyone convicted of one or more violent felonies plus one or more nonviolent felonies (“mixed- offense inmates”). In support of his challenge to the CDCR regulation, Douglas cited In re Mohammad, 42 Cal.App.5th 719, review granted February 19, 2020, S259999 (2019), which held that because the unambiguous text of section 32(a)(1) provided for early parole consideration for inmates convicted of nonviolent felony offenses, regardless of whether they were also convicted of a violent offense, a mixed-offense inmate is eligible for early parole consideration under section 32(a)(1). Although the Court of Appeal found the language of section 32(a)(1) supported an interpretation that mixed-offense inmates were entitled to early parole consideration, such an interpretation would lead to absurd results the voters did not intend. Accordingly, the Court concluded that a person convicted of a violent felony offense and sentenced to state prison was ineligible for early parole consideration under section 32(a)(1). The petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "In re Douglas" on Justia Law

In two separate trials involving two different victims, juries found Defendant-appellant Michael Brugman guilty of three counts of corporal injury to someone with whom he had a dating relationship; three counts of violating a protective order; one count of assault with a deadly weapon; one count of making a criminal threat; one count of rape of an unconscious person; and one count of false imprisonment. The trial court found that the corporal injury counts were committed within seven years of a previous conviction for aggravated assault, some of the counts were committed while Brugman was out on bail, and that Brugman incurred a serious felony prior and a prison prior. The trial court sentenced Brugman to a prison term of 25 years, 8 months. On appeal, Brugman contended: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred in denying his request for a pinpoint instruction with respect to the count of assault with a deadly weapon; (2) insufficient evidence supported the convictions for assault with a deadly weapon and making a criminal threat; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by not striking Brugman’s prior strike, or the five-year enhancement for Brugman’s serious felony prior. Concluding that Brugman’s arguments lacked merit, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Brugman" on Justia Law

A riot occurred at Pelican Bay State Prison. Several correctional officers were seriously injured. The defendants were charged with torture, mayhem, assault by a state prisoner, and battery by a state prisoner on a nonprisoner. At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate dismissed the complaint. The trial court denied a motion to reinstate the complaint, finding the record was devoid of evidence that the defendants did any specific thing.The court of appeal reversed in part. Participation in a riot is a criminal offense; a previous agreement between the aggressors is not necessary. The evidence was sufficient to entertain a reasonable suspicion that the defendants committed the target crime of rioting in the yard of a maximum-security prison and that, taken as a whole, the riot involved the use of force or violence by numerous inmates against correctional officers who were significantly outnumbered. Given the particular circumstances of this prison riot and the scope of force and violence used, a person of ordinary prudence could have entertained a reasonable suspicion that mayhem, battery, and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury were reasonably foreseeable, and hence natural and probable, consequences of the target crime of riot. View "People v. Abelino" on Justia Law

Defendant Scott Pettigrew challenged his conviction for the first degree murder of Mimie Cowen, contending substantial evidence did not support the jury’s finding that the murder was premeditated, and the trial court erred prejudicially by instructing the jury with a standard “flight” instruction that it could consider defendant’s postarrest suicide attempts as evidence of a consciousness of guilt. In addition, defendant argued there was no evidence to support the trial court’s implied finding that he had the ability to pay a $514.58 “booking fee,” and the court erred when calculating presentence credits to be applied to his state prison sentence of 25 years to life. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded defendant’s conviction for first degree murder was supported by substantial evidence of premeditation. In addition, because there was no evidence defendant fled to avoid arrest or tried to escape from custody, the Court agreed with defendant that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight. However, the Court concluded the error was harmless. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court concluded the trial court’s order imposing a “booking fee” without finding defendant had the ability to pay, if error, was harmless. And the Court accepted the State’s concession that defendant was entitled to an additional 21 days of presentence credit. Because the Court found no reversible error, judgment was affirmed as modified to accurately reflect defendant’s presentence custody credits. View "California v. Pettigrew" on Justia Law

On December 18, officers stopped a pickup truck that was driving at about 35 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone, while straddling the white line. Southard emerged and ran; officers tased and arrested Southard. On December 25, Southard and his minor son were passengers in a car driven by Bonde that was stopped because the license plate lights were not working. Officer Krueger recognized Southard and was aware of the December 18 incident. Bonde’s license came back as suspended but Krueger did not cite him. Krueger requested backup. Southard refused orders to exit the car and was verbally aggressive. After several bites by a police dog and strikes with an officer’s baton, three officers tased Southard and pulled him out of the car.Southard was convicted of seven counts of obstructing a peace officer and forcible resistance of an officer—charges that require the People to prove the officers were acting lawfully—and one misdemeanor count of possession of methamphetamine. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court committed prejudicial error when it gave a special instruction based on language from an appellate opinion that acted to remove the lawful performance element of the resisting charges and gave CALCRIM No. 250 that acted to remove the knowledge element of the charged offenses. The court “reminded” trial courts of the danger of instructing a jury with language from an opinion that has nothing to do with jury instructions. View "People v. Southard" on Justia Law

After a jury convicted defendant of two counts of making criminal threats in violation of Penal Code section 422, subdivision (a), the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on probation for five years. On appeal, defendant argues that his conviction must be reversed, claiming the denial of mental health diversion and the wholesale exclusion of the psychiatrist's testimony was erroneous and prejudicial.In the published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the matter with instructions for the trial court to conduct a new hearing to consider defendant's eligibility for mental health diversion. The court noted that, in the event defendant is again found ineligible for diversion, the trial court may conduct a new trial on the criminal threats charges. View "People v. Moine" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's finding that defendant qualified as a sexually violent predator (SVP) and commitment of defendant to state hospital for treatment and indeterminate confinement.As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that defendant did not forfeit his due process challenge where defendant objected to the delay and thus a federal constitutional claim regarding the deprivation of a timely trial is preserved even if no motion to dismiss is filed. On the merits, the court reached the same conclusion weighing the Mathews factors as it did with the Barker factors: defendant's right to due process was not violated. The court explained that any risk of an erroneous deprivation of defendant’s liberty was reasonably mitigated by the procedural requirements of the Sexually Violent Predator Act. Furthermore, the state's compelling interest in protecting society from the risk defendant posed to it is entitled to significant weight and tips the scales in favor of the court's finding that defendant was provided with all the process that he was due. View "People v. Tran" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant David Curry was convicted by jury of robbery. Before the trial court sentenced him to state prison for 40 years to life and imposed various costs, defendant sought to file a motion for mental health diversion pursuant to Penal Code section 1001.36. The trial court ruled the motion was untimely and did not consider it. On appeal, defendant contended: (1) the trial court erred by denying as untimely his request for mental health diversion; (2) if the diversion request was untimely, trial counsel provided ineffective assistance; and (3) the trial court violated due process principles by imposing costs without determining defendant’s ability to pay. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant’s first contention and conditionally reversed the judgment with instructions for the trial court in considering defendant’s eligibility for mental health diversion. The Court's holding mooted defendant’s second contention. The Court disagreed with defendant’s due process challenge to costs imposed. View "California v. Curry" on Justia Law

Rivera pleaded no contest to second-degree murder and admitted a prior strike in exchange for the dismissal of special-circumstances allegations. In 2017, he was sentenced to 35 years to life in prison. Penal Code sections 188 and 189 subsequently limited liability for murder under the doctrines of felony murder and natural and probable consequences, and established a procedure, Penal Code 1170.95, for eligible defendants to petition to have their murder convictions vacated and be resentenced. The trial court denied Rivera’s petition for section 1170.95 relief, finding that Rivera failed to make a prima facie showing of eligibility because he “entered a plea to second-degree murder with malice” and nothing in the record of conviction supported the conclusion that the murder was “anything other than an intentional killing in which [he] harbored such malice.” The court of appeal reversed. A defendant who entered a plea to murder “with malice aforethought” is not categorically incapable of making a prima facie showing under section 1170.95(c). Such a plea is not necessarily an admission that the crime was committed with actual malice. A defendant who stipulated to a grand jury transcript as the factual basis of the plea may make a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief by identifying a scenario under which he was guilty of murder only under a now-invalid theory, even if the record of conviction does not demonstrate that the indictment rested on that scenario. View "People v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason Andahl appealed a July 2019 judgment revoking his probation and executing a prison sentence of seven years eight months imposed in 2018 when he was first placed on probation. The sentence included two prior prison term enhancements of one year under Penal Code section 667.5 (b). Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) amended section 667.5 (b) to limit qualifying prior prison terms to those served for sexually violent offenses, which defendant’s prior offenses were not. The parties did not contest that Senate Bill 136 was retroactive under In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (1965). On appeal, defendant claimed he was entitled to the benefit of Senate Bill 136 under the California Supreme Court’s decision in California v. McKenzie, 9 Cal.5th 40 (2020). The Attorney General responded that McKenzie did not govern because the 2018 order at issue here suspended the sentence’s execution, as opposed to its imposition, and was therefore a final judgment for retroactivity purposes. The Court of Appeal concluded that by virtue of the retroactive change in the law, defendant’s one-year enhancements were unauthorized and must be stricken. View "California v. Andahl" on Justia Law