Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2011, a defendant was convicted in California of multiple sex offenses, including lewd acts on a minor and oral copulation with a child under ten. His sentence was enhanced due to a prior Michigan conviction for assault with intent to commit sexual penetration. Years later, he sought to have the enhancement removed under the new Penal Code section 1172.75, arguing that out-of-state convictions should not be considered sexually violent offenses under the new law. The trial court denied his request, concluding that the Michigan conviction was indeed a sexually violent offense, making him ineligible for relief.The Superior Court of Riverside County initially sentenced the defendant to a determinate 15-year prison term, plus an indeterminate term of 30 years to life, including a one-year enhancement for the prior Michigan conviction. The judgment was affirmed on appeal in 2012. In 2023, the case was revisited to determine eligibility for recall and resentencing under section 1172.75. The defendant argued that his Michigan conviction did not disqualify him from relief, but the court disagreed, finding that out-of-state convictions could still be considered sexually violent offenses.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that out-of-state convictions could be considered sexually violent offenses if they included all the elements of the offenses listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600(b). The court found that the Michigan conviction met these criteria, and thus, the defendant was not entitled to resentencing under section 1172.75. The order denying relief was affirmed. View "People v. Vicencio" on Justia Law

The case involves Tiree Austin Jarmel Hall, who was convicted by a jury of one felony count of inflicting corporal punishment or injury on a child (minor T.E.), one misdemeanor count of child abuse as to a different child (minor A.F.), and one misdemeanor count of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer. The trial court suspended the imposition of the sentence and placed Hall on probation with various terms and conditions. Hall appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements made by the two non-testifying children to police officers at the scene, claiming these statements were inadmissible under Crawford v. Washington and Ohio v. Clark.The Superior Court of Kings County initially found the children’s statements admissible under various hearsay exceptions and determined that the statements were not testimonial under Crawford. The court also found that Hall had forfeited his right to confront the witnesses by intentionally causing their unavailability, as evidenced by his actions and those of his domestic partner, Deanna English, who repeatedly refused to comply with subpoenas and made the children unavailable for trial.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and upheld the trial court’s rulings. The appellate court independently concluded that the children’s statements were not testimonial, as they were made during an ongoing emergency and were not intended to be used as trial testimony. Additionally, the court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that Hall had forfeited his confrontation rights by intentionally causing the children’s unavailability. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court did not err in admitting the children’s statements and rejecting Hall’s Sixth Amendment claims. View "People v. Hall" on Justia Law

In 2018, Wendall Porter Muhammad pled no contest to attempted murder after stabbing Moses Sow during an altercation. Muhammad admitted to inflicting great bodily injury on Sow and using a deadly weapon, a knife. He was sentenced to nine years in prison. In January 2023, Muhammad filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that changes to sections 188 and 189 meant he could not be convicted of attempted murder under current law.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Muhammad's petition, concluding he failed to establish a prima facie case for relief. The court determined there was no possibility Muhammad was convicted on a theory of liability that was no longer valid, as he was the direct perpetrator of the attempted murder.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the record of conviction conclusively established Muhammad was the sole and direct perpetrator of the attempted murder. The court noted that the preliminary hearing transcript and Muhammad's admissions during his plea supported this conclusion. Since the natural and probable consequences doctrine applies only to accomplices, and Muhammad acted alone, he was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6. The court also rejected Muhammad's procedural due process argument, stating that he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the record of conviction demonstrated his ineligibility for relief as a matter of law. View "People v. Muhammad" on Justia Law

In March 2011, Prentice Robinson was indicted by a grand jury for multiple criminal counts, including attempted murder, and admitted to using a firearm during the crime. He pleaded no contest to the charges and received a 22-year prison sentence. In January 2022, Robinson filed a petition for resentencing, arguing that the trial court erred in considering grand jury testimony. The People agreed that the grand jury testimony was inadmissible hearsay but disagreed on the proper remedy. The San Joaquin County District Attorney, as amicus curiae, argued that the grand jury transcripts were part of Robinson’s record of conviction and admissible under section 1172.6.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County denied Robinson’s petition for resentencing, finding that the grand jury transcripts were admissible and that Robinson was the direct perpetrator of the attempted murder. Robinson appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the grand jury testimony and that it violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) created a hearsay exception for evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial, including grand jury testimony. The court found that the grand jury proceedings were analogous to preliminary hearings and that the procedural safeguards in place ensured the reliability of the testimony. The court also held that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation did not apply to section 1172.6 hearings, as they are postconviction collateral proceedings. The court concluded that Robinson’s due process rights were not violated, as he had the opportunity to present new evidence and challenge the grand jury testimony at the evidentiary hearing. View "People v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In 2013, Ulysses Gonzalez entered a no-contest plea to two charges of domestic violence against two different victims and admitted to an enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury, as well as various prior convictions. He was sentenced to 15 years in state prison. Following the passage of Senate Bill 483, Gonzalez requested resentencing in 2022, arguing that his sentence should be reduced due to changes in the law. The trial court struck the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement, reducing his sentence by one year but denied further reduction.The Santa Clara County Superior Court initially sentenced Gonzalez to 15 years, including enhancements for prior convictions and great bodily injury. In 2022, Gonzalez sought resentencing under Senate Bill 483, which invalidated certain enhancements. The trial court struck one enhancement, reducing his sentence to 14 years but refused to reduce it further, citing aggravating factors and Gonzalez's conduct in prison.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in not applying the requirements of amended section 1170, subdivision (b), which mandates that aggravating factors must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or stipulated by the defendant. The appellate court held that the trial court improperly relied on unproven aggravating factors and failed to consider Gonzalez's childhood trauma as required by section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for resentencing, directing the trial court to apply the amended sentencing laws and consider all relevant factors. View "People v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Jose Nunez-Dosangos filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his ongoing detention in county jail pending trial on a charge of assault with a semiautomatic firearm. He was later released on his own recognizance after pleading guilty to a new charge of accessory after the fact, rendering his petition moot. However, the court decided to address the case due to its broad public interest and likelihood of recurrence. The petitioner had accrued presentence time-served and conduct credits exceeding the maximum potential sentence for the charged offense, and a probation report assessed him with a low risk of recidivism.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco initially denied bail and set the case for a preliminary hearing. The magistrate judge found insufficient evidence to show the petitioner knew of his co-defendant's intent to use the firearm, leading to the dismissal of the murder charge against him. The People refiled the murder charge, which was again dismissed by the trial court. The petitioner filed multiple motions for release, arguing his prolonged detention violated due process, but the trial court denied these motions, citing public safety concerns and the possibility of refiling the murder charge.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the petitioner's pretrial detention was excessive in relation to the government's public safety goals, constituting impermissible punishment in violation of due process principles. The court noted that the length of detention exceeded the maximum potential sentence and that the trial court erred in relying on the possibility of refiling the murder charge. The petition was ultimately dismissed as moot due to the petitioner's release. View "Nunez-Dosangos v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Tam Steven Nguyen committed various crimes at the age of 22 and was convicted in 2003 of attempted murder, kidnapping, and assault with a firearm. He was sentenced to a determinate term of 14 years, an indeterminate term of 25 years to life, and a life term with the possibility of parole. While incarcerated, Nguyen earned various credits, including good conduct and educational merit credits. These credits were applied to his minimum eligible parole date (MEPD) and youth parole eligible date (YPED), respectively.Nguyen petitioned the trial court for a writ of habeas corpus in 2022, arguing that he should be able to use all types of credits to advance his YPED, not just educational merit credit. The trial court denied his petition. Nguyen then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, which summarily denied the petition. The California Supreme Court granted review, ordered the appellate court to vacate its order, and issued an order to show cause.The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and held that Nguyen's right to equal protection was not violated. The court found that youth and nonyouth offenders are not similarly situated for the purposes of the challenged regulations, as youth offenders have two parole eligibility dates (MEPD and YPED) while nonyouth offenders have only one (MEPD). The court also determined that there is a rational basis for the regulation that limits the types of credits that can advance a youth offender's YPED, as it aligns with the legislative intent to provide a fixed and relatively stable parole eligibility date for youth offenders. Consequently, the court denied Nguyen's petition for writ of habeas corpus. View "In re Nguyen" on Justia Law

Fahim Anthony Multani appealed the trial court’s denial of his petition for compassionate release under Penal Code section 1172.2. Multani, diagnosed with stage IV lung cancer in 2014, had his cancer metastasize to his brain by 2017. Despite this, his cancer, caused by a specific gene mutation, has been successfully treated with targeted medication for seven years, showing no evidence of disease progression. Multani argued that his illness should be considered as having an end-of-life trajectory, making him eligible for compassionate release.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Multani’s petition, concluding that his illness did not currently have an end-of-life trajectory. The court noted that while Multani’s cancer was incurable, it was perfectly suppressed by his current treatment, and there was no evidence of disease progression. The court found that the term “end-of-life trajectory” required the illness to be actively progressing toward death, which was not the case for Multani.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the term “end-of-life trajectory” in section 1172.2 requires that the illness be progressing toward death, not merely incurable or expensive to treat. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Multani’s cancer, while serious and advanced, was not currently on an end-of-life trajectory due to its successful suppression by targeted medication. The court also noted that the legislative intent behind the statute did not support extending compassionate release to those whose illnesses are effectively managed and not actively progressing toward death. View "P. v. Multani" on Justia Law

Santiago Gonzalo Canales was convicted of lewd acts and continuous sexual abuse of children, specifically his stepdaughter and niece, both under the age of 14 during the abuse. Canales's niece testified that he molested her from ages seven to 13, while his stepdaughter testified that he began molesting her when she was about 11, including vaginal penetration. Canales denied all allegations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County convicted Canales on all counts and found true the multiple victims allegations. He was sentenced to 60 years to life in prison, consisting of four consecutive sentences of 15 years to life.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Canales challenged two jury instructions: CALCRIM No. 1120 and CALCRIM No. 252. The court upheld the use of CALCRIM No. 1120, stating it correctly reflected the statutory requirements for continuous sexual abuse, which did not necessitate a heightened mental state for "substantial sexual conduct." The court acknowledged an error in CALCRIM No. 252 but deemed it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of Canales's guilt. Canales's argument regarding the unanimity instruction was forfeited as he did not raise it during the trial.The court agreed with Canales and the prosecution that his sentence violated ex post facto principles because the One Strike law, which enhanced his sentence, did not apply to his offenses against his stepdaughter, which occurred before the law was amended to include continuous sexual abuse. Consequently, the court vacated Canales's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without applying the One Strike law. View "People v. Canales" on Justia Law

James Lamont Bagsby was convicted and sentenced to 107 years to life for violent crimes committed at age 15. After serving over 15 years, he petitioned for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d), which applies to juveniles sentenced to life without parole. Bagsby argued his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole, citing People v. Heard, which held that denying such juveniles the opportunity to petition for resentencing violates equal protection. The trial court agreed, granted his petition, and ordered his release, but stayed the release pending appeal.The People appealed, asking the Court of Appeal to strike down the section 1170(d) resentencing provision or reconsider Heard. They also contended the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence Bagsby and erred by ordering his release. Bagsby cross-appealed the stay order.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's orders. The court upheld Heard, finding no compelling reason to overturn it. The court rejected the People's arguments, noting that the Legislature had not repealed section 1170(d) despite amendments and that the trial court correctly applied Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391 retroactively, making Bagsby's judgment nonfinal and outside juvenile court jurisdiction. The court also found the stay order would expire upon remittitur, making Bagsby's release effective as of the original release date for custody credit purposes. View "P. v. Bagsby" on Justia Law