Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Gerardo Arvizu Velador was charged with battery on a peace officer, resisting or obstructing a peace officer, and reckless driving. His counsel requested a competency evaluation, and proceedings were suspended pending this determination. While the competency evaluation was ongoing, Velador's counsel filed a motion for mental health diversion, supported by various reports and records indicating Velador's mental health issues.The trial court granted the motion for mental health diversion before determining Velador's competency, which led the People to appeal to the appellate division of the Riverside County Superior Court. The appellate division upheld the trial court's decision, concluding that the court had jurisdiction to grant mental health diversion even while the competency determination was pending. The appellate division reasoned that the statutes governing mental health diversion and competency did not require a competency determination before granting diversion.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case to settle the legal question. The court affirmed the appellate division's decision, holding that a trial court can grant mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36 before resolving a defendant's competency to stand trial. The court found that the statutory language of section 1001.36 and the competency statutes allowed for diversion regardless of the defendant's competency status. The court also determined that the suspension of criminal proceedings under section 1368 did not preclude the trial court from considering and granting diversion. The decision emphasized that diversion could be granted to both competent and incompetent defendants, aligning with legislative intent to provide alternatives to incarceration for individuals with mental health disorders. View "People v. Velador" on Justia Law

Nancy Wood, an indigent homeless woman, was residing in Mile Square Park in Fountain Valley, near the hospital where she received treatment for cancer and heart disease. The City of Fountain Valley, which had no homeless shelter at the time, sought to prohibit her from living in the park, citing violations of city ordinances. Wood argued necessity as a defense, claiming her health conditions required her to stay near the hospital.The City initially filed a criminal complaint against Wood, where she was represented by appointed counsel. While the criminal case was pending, the City also filed a civil lawsuit for nuisance against her. In the civil case, Wood, representing herself, again argued necessity. The trial court conducted the proceedings remotely due to COVID-19 restrictions. Despite Wood's claims that she had not received the City's trial exhibits, the court proceeded, ultimately finding her culpable for public nuisance and issuing an injunction prohibiting her from residing in the park. Shortly after the civil judgment, Wood was acquitted in the criminal case.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by not staying the civil case pending the outcome of the criminal case. The appellate court noted that the simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings placed an unfair burden on Wood, especially given her indigent status and lack of legal representation in the civil case. The court also found that the trial court failed to consider all relevant evidence, including Wood's necessity defense, in issuing the injunction. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions for the trial court to reconsider the propriety of the injunction, taking into account Wood's acquittal in the criminal case and all relevant equitable factors. View "People v. Wood" on Justia Law

The case involves Mario Rodriguez, who was prosecuted for several felonies in late 2016. Twice, the trial court found him incompetent to stand trial, leading to his commitment to the State Department of State Hospitals. His first commitment lasted 119 days, and his second began on May 16, 2019. After being treated, Rodriguez was certified as restored to competency on January 9, 2020. However, his new trial counsel requested a continuance for the restoration hearing, which was delayed multiple times due to various reasons, including the COVID-19 pandemic.The trial court denied Rodriguez's motion to dismiss the charges, which argued that his commitment exceeded the two-year limit under Penal Code section 1370(c)(1). Rodriguez then sought writ review in the Court of Appeal, which initially ruled that the two-year limit had not been exceeded. The California Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that the period between the filing of the certificate of restoration and the court’s ruling on it is included in the two-year limit. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeal to determine if the two-year limit was exceeded and, if so, the appropriate remedy.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the two-year limit under section 1370(c)(1) may be tolled for delays attributable to the defense. The court found that delays requested by Rodriguez’s counsel, including those for continuances and writ litigation, should be attributed to him. Excluding these delays, Rodriguez’s total commitment period was calculated to be 664 days, leaving 66 days remaining on the two-year limit. Consequently, the court concluded that the two-year limit had not been exceeded and denied Rodriguez’s petition for writ of prohibition or other equitable relief. View "Rodriguez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves Santiago Gonzalo Canales, who was convicted for lewd acts and continuous sexual abuse of children. Canales sexually abused his stepdaughter and niece for over a decade, both of whom were under the age of 14 during the abuse. He was charged with four counts, including lewd acts on his niece and continuous sexual abuse of his niece and stepdaughter. The trial lasted eight days, and the jury convicted Canales on all counts, sentencing him to 60 years to life in prison.Canales appealed his convictions, challenging two different jury instructions. He argued that the first instruction did not identify the correct mental states for the offense of continuous sexual abuse. The court upheld the instruction, stating that it was in line with the presumption of mandatory culpability. Canales's second challenge was to another instruction, which the court assumed was given in error, but held that the error was harmless. Canales also forfeited a third challenge. However, on his fourth point, the court agreed with both parties that Canales must be resentenced.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District affirmed Canales's convictions, vacated his sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing without applying the One Strike law. View "People v. Canales" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who, during an encounter with police officers, reached into his car, pulled out a gun, took a shooting stance, aimed the gun at an officer, and pulled the trigger. The gun was unloaded. The defendant was charged with resisting officers by the use of force or violence under Penal Code section 69, subdivision (a). The defendant argued that he could not be convicted of this charge because his gun was unloaded and, therefore, he could not have committed an assault, which he claimed was a necessary element of the charge.The trial court disagreed, finding that the defendant's actions constituted violent conduct that impeded the officers' efforts to perform their duties. The court found that the defendant's actions fell within the scope of section 69, subdivision (a), even though his gun was unloaded. The court convicted the defendant and sentenced him to seven years and four months in prison.On appeal, the defendant argued that assault is a necessarily included lesser offense of resisting an officer under section 69, subdivision (a), and since his gun was unloaded, he could not have been convicted of assaulting the officers and, therefore, could not have been convicted of the greater offense of resisting an officer by the use of force or violence. The appellate court rejected this argument, finding that the language of section 69, subdivision (a) does not require the defendant to have actual physical contact with the officer. The court affirmed the defendant's conviction but remanded the case for resentencing due to an error in the trial court's sentencing decision. View "People v. Morgan" on Justia Law

In 2018, Josue Ramos pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting attempted murder, carjacking, and criminal street gang activity. In 2023, he filed a petition for resentencing of his attempted murder conviction, arguing that he was charged under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, which had since been changed. He claimed that he accepted a plea offer instead of going to trial, where he could have been convicted of attempted murder, and that he could not presently be convicted of attempted murder due to changes in the law.The trial court denied Ramos's petition at the prima facie stage, concluding that he was statutorily ineligible for resentencing relief because he admitted to aiding and abetting the attempted murder with specific intent to kill. Ramos appealed, arguing that the factual admissions in his guilty plea did not conclusively establish he was statutorily ineligible for resentencing relief.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three affirmed the trial court's decision. The court found that Ramos had not made a prima facie case for resentencing relief under Penal Code section 1172.6. The court concluded that Ramos's admission that he aided and abetted the attempted murder with specific intent to kill conclusively established all of the elements for attempted murder under a direct aiding and abetting theory of liability. Therefore, the court held that Ramos was statutorily ineligible for resentencing relief on his attempted murder conviction. View "People v. Ramos" on Justia Law

In 2016, Richard Anthony Rodriguez pleaded guilty to attempted murder and admitted a prior strike for assault with a deadly weapon with great bodily injury. The incident involved Rodriguez firing a shot at a car containing his ex-girlfriend and another individual, though no one was injured. In 2021, Rodriguez petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6, arguing that he lacked specific intent to kill. His petition was denied after an evidentiary hearing.Rodriguez's petition for resentencing was based on the argument that the trial court failed to act as an independent fact finder, applied the wrong burden of proof, and violated his federal constitutional due process rights. He contended that if the trial court had properly weighed the evidence and held the prosecution to the correct standard of proof, there is a reasonable probability he would be found not guilty of attempted murder because he lacked specific intent to kill.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, disagreed with Rodriguez's arguments. The court noted that Rodriguez's guilty plea admitted every element of attempted murder, making any evidence contradicting his admission irrelevant. The only issue to be determined was whether intent was imputed to him because he aided and abetted an accomplice in a different crime, or whether he was the sole perpetrator whose intent was personal to him. Once it was shown Rodriguez was the undisputed sole perpetrator, the trial court correctly found his intent to kill was personal and denied relief. The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision. View "People v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The case involves Kyle Andrew Williams, who was convicted for attempted murder and sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Williams argued that he was ineligible for resentencing as he was prosecuted and convicted as the direct perpetrator of the attempted murder. The trial court denied his petition, basing its decision partly on transcripts from Williams' preliminary hearing and plea colloquy.On appeal, Williams contended that the court erred in denying his petition at the prima facie stage by engaging in impermissible factfinding based on the preliminary hearing transcript and change of plea. He further argued that neither his plea nor his counsel’s stipulation to a factual basis for the plea rendered him ineligible for resentencing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the record of conviction did not establish Williams' ineligibility for resentencing as a matter of law. The court found that the trial court had engaged in premature judicial factfinding based on the preliminary hearing transcript and change of plea colloquy. The court held that neither the information nor Williams' plea established his ineligibility for resentencing as a matter of law. The court also held that the preliminary hearing transcript did not establish Williams' resentencing ineligibility. The court concluded that the preliminary hearing transcript did not conclusively establish that Williams was convicted of attempted murder under a valid theory. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Christopher Lee Cofer, who was sentenced concurrently in five separate cases as part of a negotiated disposition. The trial court did not award presentence custody credits in all the cases for all the days Cofer was in actual custody, citing a previous decision in People v. Jacobs.The trial court proceedings involved five criminal cases that were resolved together. Cofer was charged with various crimes including vehicle burglary, possession of burglar's tools, driving without a license, and grand theft of personal property. He resolved all five cases by plea agreement and was sentenced to a six-year term in one case and concurrent terms in the other cases. Cofer filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging the calculation of presentence custody credits.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District disagreed with the trial court's reliance on the Jacobs decision. The appellate court concluded that when a defendant is sentenced concurrently at a single hearing to resolve multiple cases that were not previously the subject of a judgment of conviction or probationary disposition, Penal Code section 2900.5 requires the trial court to apply presentence credits for all periods of actual custody toward all of those concurrent sentences. The judgment was reversed and the matter was remanded for the limited purpose of recalculating defendant’s presentence custody credits. View "People v. Cofer" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Milton Jonas Arias Molina, was charged with special circumstances murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and street terrorism. During the preliminary examination, Molina and his two co-defendants were required to share a single Spanish-language interpreter. Molina sought relief after the trial court denied his motion to dismiss based on the failure to provide him with his own interpreter throughout the preliminary examination.The charges arose from a homicide that occurred in October 2018. The Santa Cruz County District Attorney charged Molina and his two co-defendants with murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and street terrorism. The complaint also alleged two special circumstances—that the murder was committed by means of lying in wait and that the murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang—along with various other firearm and gang sentencing enhancements.The preliminary examination was conducted in 13 sessions over the course of 15 months. During the first day of the preliminary examination, Molina’s counsel objected that the hearing would be conducted with a single interpreter for all three defendants. The prosecutor also voiced her concerns about the lack of interpreters. The magistrate stated that he intended to proceed with the hearing, with the understanding that if any of the defendants needed to speak with counsel, he would interrupt the proceedings to permit that.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District concluded that the failure to provide an individual interpreter for Molina at his preliminary examination reasonably might have affected the outcome. The court issued the writ of mandate instructing the trial court to vacate its order denying Molina’s motion to dismiss and enter a new order granting that motion, without prejudice to the Santa Cruz County District Attorney refiling the charges and conducting a new preliminary examination. View "Molina v. Superior Court" on Justia Law