Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a defendant, Haadi Bolourchi, who was convicted of driving under the influence of a drug and bribing an executive officer. The defendant was pulled over by Officer Kevin Finerty for vehicle code violations. The officer noticed signs of intoxication and conducted several field sobriety tests, which Bolourchi failed. Bolourchi admitted to smoking cannabis the day before and was arrested. Officer Finerty requested Bolourchi to submit to a blood test, but Bolourchi insisted that a warrant be obtained first. Bolourchi also offered Officer Finerty $1,000 to let him go, which was interpreted as a bribe.In the trial court, Bolourchi was convicted of driving under the influence of a drug and bribing an executive officer. The court suspended the imposition of sentence, placed Bolourchi on three years’ probation, and ordered a jail term of 180 days. Bolourchi appealed, arguing that the court erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 2130, an instruction that states a defendant’s refusal to submit to a chemical test as required by California’s implied consent statute may show consciousness of guilt.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that a motorist's refusal to cooperate in the taking of a blood test unless a warrant is first obtained can be used as an adverse inference of consciousness of guilt in a DUI trial. The court found no instructional error in the use of CALCRIM No. 2130 and rejected Bolourchi's argument that he had a constitutional right to demand a warrant before submitting to a blood draw. The court concluded that while the Fourth Amendment required police to obtain a warrant to conduct a blood draw, Bolourchi could still face an adverse inference at his trial on a DUI charge as a cost of refusing a blood test. View "People v. Bolourchi" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Benito Gonzalez, who was convicted for continuous sexual abuse of a child. The defendant, who is terminally ill, applied for compassionate release under Penal Code section 1172.2, which creates a presumption in favor of recalling sentences for medically incapacitated or terminally ill inmates unless they pose an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike based on their current physical and mental condition. The trial court denied the defendant's request for compassionate release, finding that he posed an unreasonable risk due to lack of evidence of rehabilitation from his prior super strike offense.The trial court's decision was based on the defendant's past crime and lack of rehabilitation. The court did not consider the defendant's current physical and mental condition, which is a requirement under section 1172.2. The court also did not place the burden on the prosecution to prove that the defendant posed an unreasonable risk, which is contrary to the presumption in favor of recall under section 1172.2.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that the trial court did not properly apply section 1172.2. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring the defendant to show he had rehabilitated himself and by not considering the defendant's current physical and mental condition. The appellate court also held that the victim proximity restriction under section 3003, subdivision (f) does not apply to the defendant because he will not be released under state jurisdiction. The court directed the trial court to recall the defendant's sentence in accordance with section 1172.2. View "P. v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The case involves Tarrell Ivory Boyd, a defendant who was serving a 27-year prison sentence. Nearly 17 years into his sentence, Boyd moved for a new sentencing hearing, arguing that his custody and conduct credits had been miscalculated at his original sentencing. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, awarding Boyd seven more days of credits. Boyd appealed, arguing that the original error warranted a full resentencing to consider the effect of ameliorative sentencing laws passed since his original sentencing hearing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two found that the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to consider Boyd’s freestanding motion given that his sentence has long been made final. The court held that in order to establish jurisdiction for a postjudgment claim that credits were improperly calculated at sentencing, an inmate must file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court vacated the trial court’s order, which was void from the start. However, given the circumstances, the court treated Boyd’s purported appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, granted the petition, and modified the sentence to reflect the undisputed credits. The court rejected Boyd’s claim that he is entitled to a full resentencing. View "People v. Boyd" on Justia Law

The case involves David Gonzalez, who was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 75 years to life. Gonzalez had used a firearm in the commission of the murder, which added a term of 25 years to life to his sentence under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d). This was Gonzalez's third appeal, with the previous two resulting in remands to the trial court to consider sentencing issues in light of new statutory provisions.The trial court had previously declined to dismiss the firearm enhancement, which Gonzalez argued was an error as the court applied an improper legal standard. The court had determined that dismissing the enhancement would "endanger public safety," a decision Gonzalez contended was based on his current danger to society rather than considering the potential danger at the time of his possible release.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, agreed with Gonzalez. It found that the trial court had applied an erroneous legal standard by focusing on Gonzalez's current danger to society rather than the potential danger upon his release. The court held that the trial court should have considered the date on which Gonzalez could be released if the firearm enhancement was dismissed and the fact that the release would be subject to a review by the Board of Parole Hearings and the Governor. The court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. View "People v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

In 1999, Sylvester Williams was convicted of indecent exposure with a prior conviction and sentenced to 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law, plus an additional two years for two prior prison term enhancements. In 2012, Williams filed a petition for recall of sentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. The trial court denied Williams’ petition after finding that he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. In 2023, Williams sought relief for his newly invalid prior prison term enhancements, arguing that he was entitled to be resentenced to a maximum sentence of six years as a “two-striker” under the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act. The trial court agreed and resentenced Williams to six years, struck the two prior prison term enhancements, and deemed the sentence satisfied.The People appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act when resentencing Williams under section 1172.75 due to invalid prior prison term enhancements. They contended that by doing so, the court bypassed the public safety inquiry required by section 1170.126 of the Three Strikes Reform Act, and that section 1172.75 thereby constitutes an improper amendment of the Three Strikes Reform Act.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District agreed with the People. It held that applying the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act to reduce a defendant’s indeterminate life term to a determinate term when the defendant is being resentenced under section 1172.75 due to an invalid prior prison term enhancement unconstitutionally amends the resentencing procedure and requirements set forth in section 1170.126 of the voter-approved Three Strikes Reform Act. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order resentencing Williams to a six-year term and to hold a new resentencing hearing at which Williams’s sentence of 25 years to life is reinstated. View "People v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In April 2017, Israel Ackerman engaged in a verbal altercation with Anthony K., left, and later returned to stab Anthony four times. Ackerman was found unconscious in the apartment, and Anthony, bleeding profusely, walked to a fire station. At trial, Ackerman argued self-defense. A jury convicted him of attempted voluntary manslaughter, among other crimes, and found true allegations that Ackerman personally inflicted great bodily injury. His sentence included a three-year term for the enhancement. Ackerman appealed, arguing that the law prohibits trial courts from imposing a great bodily injury sentencing enhancement where the crime of conviction is attempted voluntary manslaughter.Ackerman's original sentence was appealed, and while it was pending, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation recommended he be resentenced, citing a case that prohibited application of a great bodily injury enhancement to a charge of manslaughter. The trial court disagreed with the recommendation, finding that the case did not apply to attempted manslaughter. The court reasoned that great bodily injury was not necessarily an element of attempted manslaughter, unlike completed manslaughter. The court then resentenced Ackerman to 15 years in custody.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California affirmed the judgment. Ackerman argued that the law does not authorize the addition of a great bodily injury sentencing enhancement when the crime of conviction is attempted voluntary manslaughter. The court disagreed, stating that the interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review. The court found that the plain language of the statute exempts only the completed crimes of murder and manslaughter, violations of certain sections, and crimes where infliction of great bodily injury is an element of the offense. The court concluded that actual infliction of great bodily injury is not an element of the crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter, as it is for all other kinds of manslaughter. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Ackerman" on Justia Law

In 2018, Ivan Morales was found guilty of robbery and attempted premeditated murder, among other offenses. The jury found that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury during the robbery and attempted murder. The crimes occurred in 2016 when Morales and his friend Sergey Gutsu robbed an armored truck and shot an employee, Glenn, multiple times with an AK-47 semi-automatic rifle. Glenn survived the attack. Later that day, the police arrested Gutsu and Morales.The trial court found Morales guilty of the charges, and the judgment was affirmed in 2020. In 2022, Morales filed a petition to vacate the attempted murder conviction and for resentencing under former Penal Code section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). The trial court denied the petition, finding that Morales failed to make a prima facie claim for relief.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision. The court concluded that the jury's verdicts established all the factual findings necessary to support an attempted murder conviction under current law. The court noted that the jury found that the shooting of Glenn was an attempted premeditated murder and that Morales was the shooter. Therefore, the court held that Morales was not eligible for relief under section 1172.6. View "P. v. Morales" on Justia Law

Peter J. Meno was convicted of two counts of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated with ordinary negligence, one count of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) causing bodily injury, and one count of driving with a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.08 percent or more causing injury. The jury also found that Meno inflicted great bodily injury upon two separate victims. The trial court found that the convictions on the DUI counts were necessarily included offenses of the manslaughter counts. However, due to the associated enhancements, the potential sentence for the DUI counts was greater than that for the manslaughter counts. The court decided to dismiss the manslaughter counts and sentenced Meno to a combined term of eight years in prison.The Superior Court of San Diego County had previously heard the case. The trial court found that the DUI counts were necessarily included offenses of the manslaughter counts. However, due to the associated enhancements, the potential sentence for the DUI counts was greater than that for the manslaughter counts. The court decided to dismiss the manslaughter counts and sentenced Meno to a combined term of eight years in prison.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not err by dismissing the manslaughter counts and sentencing Meno on the DUI counts. The court also held that the trial court did not err by including additional terms for two great bodily injury enhancements on one of the DUI counts. The court affirmed the judgment and directed the trial court to prepare a new abstract of judgment to reflect its oral pronouncement of judgment. View "People v. Meno" on Justia Law

The case involves a minor, A.M., who was convicted as an adult for a murder committed when he was 14 years old. A.M. was a member of a local gang and was convicted of first-degree murder for killing a rival gang member, S.S. The jury found that A.M. had used a deadly weapon and committed the crime for the benefit of his gang. He was sentenced to 26 years to life in state prison.Years later, the superior court conditionally reversed the judgment and ordered a transfer hearing pursuant to Proposition 57, which prohibits trying a minor as an adult without a judicial determination of their fitness for juvenile court law. The juvenile court conducted the hearing, granted the district attorney’s motion to transfer A.M.’s case to criminal court, and reinstated the judgment. A.M. contended that his case should not have been transferred because he was 14 years old when he committed his crime.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, found that A.M.'s case was nonfinal when the superior court conditionally reversed the judgment. Therefore, Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391, which bars a juvenile court from transferring a 14- or 15-year-old to adult criminal court, applied. The court also agreed with A.M.'s contention that Assembly Bill 333 required striking the gang-murder special circumstance. The court reversed the order granting the district attorney’s motion to transfer A.M.’s case to criminal court and vacated the true finding on the gang-murder special circumstance. The court remanded the matter to the juvenile court with directions to enter a new order denying the district attorney’s motion and to hold a dispositional hearing treating A.M.’s murder conviction as a juvenile adjudication. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law

The case involves a juvenile, Jose R., who was declared a ward of the court and committed to a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) for a baseline term of three years with a maximum term of six years. This followed his admission, as part of a plea deal, that he had committed an assault with a semiautomatic firearm. The case arose from a shooting incident in which Jose and an adult man fired multiple gunshots, resulting in a victim's death. Initially, Jose was charged with first-degree murder, but the charge was later amended to assault with a semiautomatic firearm, which Jose admitted to.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Jose's motion to apply his precommitment custody credits to his baseline term, instead applying the 395 days of precommitment custody credits against the maximum term. Jose appealed this decision, arguing that the court erred in applying his precommitment custody credits to his maximum term instead of his baseline term.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Seven affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the lower court did not err in applying Jose's precommitment custody credits to the maximum term of confinement. The court based its decision on the clear statutory language in section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C), which states that precommitment custody credits must be applied against the maximum term of confinement. The court also rejected Jose's argument that the legislative scheme violated his right to equal protection of the laws. The court concluded that the legislative amendments did not violate equal protection principles, even if they resulted in less favorable treatment of precommitment credits. View "In re Jose R." on Justia Law