Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Alberto Lopez-Barraza was convicted of robbery and murder related to the 2011 killing of Jose Manuel de Jesus but was acquitted of conspiracy to commit robbery. He appealed the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that the trial court improperly relied on factual findings that conflicted with the jury's determination that he was not guilty of conspiracy.Initially, Lopez-Barraza and his co-defendants were charged with murder, conspiracy to commit robbery, and robbery, with additional allegations related to firearm use. Lopez-Barraza was found guilty of murder and robbery, but not conspiracy. His murder and robbery convictions were affirmed on appeal, but the special circumstance finding was reversed due to instructional error. On remand, the special circumstance was not retried, and Lopez-Barraza was resentenced to 25 years to life plus one year. In 2019, he filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6, which was denied by the trial court after an evidentiary hearing.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in denying the resentencing petition based on findings that Lopez-Barraza participated in planning and preparing for the robbery, which conflicted with the jury's acquittal on the conspiracy charge. The appellate court held that the trial court's reliance on these findings was improper and remanded the case for a new evidentiary hearing. The trial court was instructed not to rely on any evidence that contradicted the jury's verdict acquitting Lopez-Barraza of conspiracy. The order denying the petition was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "P. v. Lopez-Barraza" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendants, Kimesha Williams and Candace Townsel, were convicted by a jury of felony murder, robbery, and elder abuse. The victim, an 84-year-old woman, was attacked in a casino restroom, resulting in her death. The jury found that the murder occurred during the robbery and that the victim, who was over 70 years old, suffered elder abuse that caused her death. The trial court sentenced both defendants to life in prison without the possibility of parole.The defendants appealed on several grounds. They argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that force or fear was used in stealing the victim’s property. Townsel also contended that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that she aided and abetted the robbery and that she acted with reckless indifference to human life. Additionally, the defendants claimed that the trial court erred in the elder abuse jury instruction and that the suspended parole revocation fine should be stricken.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found that substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings that force was used in the robbery, that Townsel aided and abetted the robbery, and that Townsel acted with reckless indifference to human life. The court also concluded that any error in the elder abuse jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury’s other findings demonstrated that the defendants caused the victim’s injuries and death. Finally, the court agreed that the parole revocation fines should be stricken because the defendants were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.The court affirmed the judgments with directions to strike the parole revocation fines and issue amended abstracts of judgment. View "P. v. Williams" on Justia Law

Lori Anne Whipple was charged with first-degree murder and arson of property, with an additional allegation that the murder occurred during a robbery or attempted robbery. In November 2019, she was convicted on both charges, and the jury found that she was a major participant in the robbery or attempted robbery and acted with reckless indifference to human life. Whipple was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. She did not raise any issues regarding jury instructions in her direct appeal, which focused on the improper exclusion of evidence and sentencing. Her conviction was affirmed.Whipple later petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that the jury was not properly instructed on the felony murder theory as required by People v. Banks and People v. Clark. The trial court found her ineligible for relief and denied the petition.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court noted that Whipple's conviction occurred after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, which amended the felony murder rule and added section 1172.6. The court held that Whipple's failure to raise the instructional error in her direct appeal rendered the jury's findings conclusively valid. The court emphasized that findings made after Banks and Clark are generally conclusive and preclude a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6. Since Whipple's conviction was final and she did not demonstrate a significant change in the law or other basis for an exception, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of her petition for resentencing. View "P. v. Whipple" on Justia Law

John Benson was convicted of first-degree murder and other felonies related to the shooting death of Chloe Evans, a commercial sex worker, in Los Angeles on October 25, 2019. Witness Kiera Furlow identified Benson as the shooter, describing his gang affiliation and a distinctive tattoo. Benson was charged with multiple offenses, including murder, attempted murder, and firearm possession.In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Benson's first trial ended in a mistrial due to a hung jury. During the second trial, Furlow was reluctant to testify and had to be arrested to secure her appearance. She recanted much of her previous testimony, claiming fear of the police rather than Benson. Despite her recantation, the jury convicted Benson of first-degree murder, shooting at an occupied vehicle, shooting from a vehicle, and firearm possession, but acquitted him of the attempted murder of Joshua Ellis. Benson was sentenced to 120 years to life in prison.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Benson argued that the trial court erred in admitting gang-related evidence, granting a trial continuance, and failing to investigate a juror's potential bias. The appellate court found that the gang evidence was relevant to issues of identity, witness credibility, and motive. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a one-week continuance due to the prosecutor's family emergency. Additionally, the appellate court determined that Benson forfeited his claim regarding the juror's potential bias by not providing an adequate record for review. Lastly, Benson's claim of prosecutorial error during closing arguments was deemed forfeited due to his failure to object at trial.The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "People v. Benson" on Justia Law

In 2001, Phuoc Thien Luu, then 17, participated in an attempted home invasion robbery with three others. One accomplice shot the homeowner, who survived. Luu and another accomplice, Dung Van Nguyen, were charged with attempted murder and related crimes. Nguyen was found guilty of attempted murder and sentenced to 102 years to life plus 10 years. Luu was found not guilty of attempted murder but guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter and related crimes, receiving a sentence of 25 years to life plus 1.5 years.In 2022, both Luu and Nguyen filed petitions under Penal Code section 1172.6 for resentencing. The People conceded Nguyen was entitled to relief, and he was released. However, they argued Luu was ineligible because attempted manslaughter is not mentioned in section 1172.6. The trial court initially issued an order to show cause but later ruled Luu was statutorily ineligible for relief.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that excluding Luu from relief under section 1172.6, despite his conviction under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, led to an unjust and absurd result. The court held that a petitioner is eligible for relief under section 1172.6 if they were charged with attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted manslaughter. The court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case, directing the trial court to reissue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing. If the People cannot prove Luu's guilt under current laws, the court must resentence him with credit for time served. View "People v. Luu" on Justia Law

In 2006, a jury convicted the defendant of robbery and assault with a firearm, with enhancements for personal firearm use and prior convictions. The trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life for the robbery, 10 years for the firearm enhancement, and five years for a prior serious felony conviction, staying the sentence for the assault conviction. In 2024, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under the amended Penal Code section 1172.1, which the trial court dismissed, stating that the defendant was not entitled to file such a petition and that no authorized agency had recommended recall and resentencing.The defendant appealed the trial court's dismissal of his petition. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed whether the trial court's order was appealable. The court noted that under section 1237, subdivision (b), a criminal defendant can appeal any postjudgment order affecting their substantial rights. However, the court found that the trial court's order did not affect the defendant's substantial rights because the trial court had no statutory obligation to act on the defendant's request for recall and resentencing.The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's order dismissing the defendant's request for relief under section 1172.1 was not appealable. The court reasoned that since the trial court was not required to respond to the defendant's request, the order did not affect the defendant's substantial rights. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "P. v. Roy" on Justia Law

Anthony Frank Romane, Jr. was arrested for driving under the influence after being found unconscious in his car. He exhibited signs of intoxication and failed field sobriety tests. At the police station, he refused to submit to a chemical test after being read the Chemical Test Admonition. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) initiated proceedings to suspend his license for one year due to his refusal to submit to testing. Romane requested an Administrative Per Se (APS) hearing to challenge the suspension.The APS hearing was conducted by a single hearing officer, Trena Leota, who introduced three documents into evidence: the arresting officer’s sworn DS 367 form, the unsworn arrest report, and Romane’s driving record. Romane’s counsel objected, arguing that the hearing officer was acting as an advocate, violating due process as explained in California DUI Lawyers Association v. Department of Motor Vehicles. The hearing officer overruled the objections and admitted the documents. Romane’s bodyworn camera footage was also admitted into evidence. The hearing officer ultimately sustained the suspension of Romane’s license.Romane filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of San Diego County, arguing that his due process rights were violated because the hearing officer acted as both advocate and adjudicator. The superior court agreed and ordered the DMV to set aside the suspension unless a new hearing was conducted with separate individuals acting as advocate and adjudicator.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case and reversed the superior court’s decision. The appellate court held that the hearing officer did not act as an advocate but merely collected and developed evidence, which is constitutionally permissible. The case was remanded to the superior court to consider Romane’s contention that the evidence did not support the hearing officer’s findings. View "Romane v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

Calvin Glass, Jr. pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter of Jordan Luis with the personal use of a firearm and the attempted murder of Julius L. He was sentenced to 21 years in state prison. Glass later filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6, which was denied by the trial court for failure to state a prima facie case for relief. Glass argued on appeal that his guilty plea could not rule out imputed malice and that the trial court improperly considered matters outside the record of conviction.The Superior Court of San Diego County initially found Glass's petition facially valid, appointed him counsel, and set a hearing. The People argued that Glass was ineligible for relief because his record of conviction showed he was the actual killer and direct perpetrator of the attempted murder. The trial court ruled that Glass was ineligible for resentencing based on his sworn statements in the plea form and at the plea hearing, which indicated he was the killer. The court also referenced a prior opinion affirming Glass's judgment to corroborate its decision.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court agreed with the People that Glass's record of conviction indicated he was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. However, following the precedent set by People v. Patton, the court decided to remand the matter to the superior court. Glass was granted 30 days to supplement his petition with additional facts to support his claim. The order denying his resentencing petition was otherwise conditionally affirmed. View "People v. Glass" on Justia Law

In June 2021, the defendant, K.D., stole a car with a one-year-old child inside. She was arrested shortly after and found with the stolen items. K.D. admitted to taking the car and knowing the child was inside. She was charged with kidnapping, child abduction, and vehicle theft. K.D.'s defense counsel raised doubts about her competency, leading to evaluations that diagnosed her with a moderate intellectual disability. She was found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to the Porterville Developmental Center for treatment. After being declared competent in August 2022, K.D. requested developmental disability diversion.The Mendocino County Superior Court initially denied K.D.'s request for diversion, citing her lack of ties to the community, her criminal history, and concerns about her ability to comply with diversion requirements. The court also noted that K.D. had never received services from the regional center and had a history of probation violations. Despite acknowledging her developmental disability, the court concluded that her disability was not related to the charged offense and that she would not benefit from diversion.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court had abused its discretion by not properly considering the relationship between K.D.'s developmental disability and the charged offense. The appellate court noted that the trial court failed to ensure that the regional center provided a proper report and diversion plan tailored to K.D.'s needs. The appellate court conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new diversion eligibility hearing, instructing the trial court to comply with statutory requirements and consider whether K.D. would benefit from diversion. If K.D. satisfactorily completes diversion, the charges should be dismissed; otherwise, her conviction should be reinstated. View "People v. K.D." on Justia Law

Arthur Lee Henderson appealed the judgment entered after the Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6) concerning his attempted murder conviction. The court resentenced him on his remaining convictions for murder (with a felony-murder special-circumstance finding) and attempted robbery, imposing a life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) sentence. Henderson argued that the application of section 1385.1, which restricted the court's discretion to strike the felony-murder special circumstance, violated the ex post facto clauses of the California and United States Constitutions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially sentenced Henderson in 1988 to LWOP for first-degree murder, plus additional terms for attempted murder and attempted robbery. Henderson's petition for resentencing was partially granted, leading to the dismissal of his attempted murder conviction. However, the court maintained the LWOP sentence for the murder conviction, citing section 1385.1, which prohibits striking special circumstances in first-degree murder cases.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that the application of section 1385.1 at Henderson's 2023 resentencing did not violate ex post facto principles. The court reasoned that the resentencing under section 1172.6 was an act of legislative lenity, not a new criminal prosecution, and Henderson's new sentence was no more severe than the punishment prescribed at the time of his crimes. The court also found that the law of the case doctrine barred reconsideration of Henderson's petition for resentencing as to his murder conviction, as the Supreme Court's decision in People v. Curiel did not constitute a significant change in the law regarding direct aider and abettor liability.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, directing the Superior Court to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment accurately. View "People v. Henderson" on Justia Law