Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Crystal Graham, who was convicted of kidnapping to commit robbery, kidnapping during the commission of carjacking, second-degree robbery, and simple kidnapping. The crimes involved Graham and her co-defendant, Joe Navarro, luring a victim to a motel room, attacking him, stealing his wallet and keys, and kidnapping him. Graham was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life in prison with the possibility of parole.On appeal, the court reversed Graham's conviction for simple kidnapping and remanded the case for a mental health diversion eligibility hearing under Penal Code section 1001.36. This was due to amendments to the section that applied retroactively to her case. On remand, Graham's application for mental health diversion was denied by the trial court. The court considered the transcripts of her trial and resulting convictions when assessing her eligibility and suitability for diversion.Graham appealed again, arguing that the trial court erred by considering her trial transcripts and convictions in its decision. She also contended that the court erred in finding her ineligible and unsuitable for diversion. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found no error in the trial court's consideration of the trial transcripts and convictions. It also found substantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding that Graham posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if granted diversion and treated in the community. View "P. v. Graham" on Justia Law

The defendant, Aaron Sterling Gefrerer, was charged with two counts of robbery after he handed notes to bank tellers demanding $5,000. The notes read, “Don’t play.” Both tellers testified that they were afraid and complied with the demand. Gefrerer's defense strategy was to argue that he was not the perpetrator of the robberies, rather than disputing the nature of the crimes. Consequently, he did not request an instruction on the lesser included offense of grand theft, as it conflicted with his defense. The jury convicted Gefrerer on both counts.The Superior Court of Riverside County had previously heard the case, where Gefrerer was found guilty of both counts of robbery. His defense had conceded that the robberies took place but argued that the prosecution failed to prove that Gefrerer was the perpetrator.In the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, Gefrerer appealed his conviction, arguing that the court erred by not instructing the jury on grand theft as a lesser included offense of robbery. He contended that the bank's policies instructing tellers to comply with demands during robberies, along with his nonaggressive demeanor during the robberies, provided substantial evidence that required the court to instruct the jury on theft. The court disagreed, stating that substantial evidence did not exist to support a theft instruction. Furthermore, the court concluded that even if such evidence existed, the doctrine of invited error would bar Gefrerer’s argument that the court erred by not providing the theft instruction. The court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "People v. Gefrerer" on Justia Law

The case involves George Dennis Rounds, Jr., who appealed against the trial court's denial of his petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. In 1983, Rounds pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree murder and one count of attempted murder. He was sentenced to an indefinite term of 15 years to life, plus a concurrent definite term of seven years. In 2010, Rounds was found suitable for parole and was discharged from parole in 2014. Seven years after being discharged from parole, Rounds filed a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon.The trial court denied Rounds's petition, citing multiple factors that were not relevant to the statutory criteria for evaluating a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation. These factors included the nature of the underlying crime, the perceived unfairness to the victims of granting the petition, and Rounds's failure to plead guilty to a more serious charge. The court also claimed that Rounds had not taken responsibility for his conduct, based on an alleged inconsistency between his statements to the Board of Parole Hearings and those in his petition and at the hearing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three found that the trial court had abused its discretion. The appellate court concluded that the trial court had relied on factors not properly part of the statutory analysis, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case with directions to grant the petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. View "P. v. Rounds" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Darryn Mayberry, who was found ineligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 by the trial court. Mayberry was initially charged with second-degree robbery and had previously suffered a juvenile adjudication and a serious felony conviction, both of which qualified as strike convictions under the Three Strikes law. He also served two separate prison terms. Mayberry pled nolo contendere to the robbery charge and admitted both strike priors and both prior prison term enhancements. The sentencing court struck one strike prior and imposed a doubled upper term of 10 years. The court also pronounced that it was exercising discretion and staying imposition of the two one-year prison priors, making the total term 10 years in the Department of Corrections.The trial court reasoned that the original sentence was "illegal" due to the section 667.5, former subdivision (b) enhancements being imposed but stayed, the sentence was not appealed, and the court therefore did not have the "ability" to "go back in time and do anything about those illegal sentences." Mayberry appealed from that ruling.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District disagreed with the trial court's interpretation of Penal Code section 1172.75. The appellate court concluded that section 1172.75 applies to prior prison term enhancements that have been imposed and stayed. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for the trial court to recall Mayberry's sentence and resentence him in compliance with section 1172.75. The appellate court found that the trial court had erred in staying the two prior prison term enhancements, and that section 1172.75 statutorily conferred jurisdiction on the trial court to resentence Mayberry. View "P. v. Mayberry" on Justia Law

In 2013, a minor identified as A.M. was tried as an adult and convicted for first-degree murder of a rival gang member, which he committed at the age of 14. He was sentenced to 26 years to life in prison. In 2021, the superior court conditionally reversed the judgment and ordered a transfer hearing under Proposition 57, which prohibits trying a minor as an adult without a judicial determination of their fitness for juvenile court. The juvenile court conducted the hearing, granted the district attorney’s motion to transfer A.M.’s case to criminal court, and reinstated the judgment.A.M. appealed, arguing that his case should not have been transferred because he was 14 years old when he committed his crime. He also contended that Assembly Bill 333, which amended various provisions of Penal section 186.22, required striking the gang-murder special circumstance. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District agreed with both of A.M.’s contentions.The court held that Senate Bill 1391, which amended Proposition 57 to prohibit the transfer of 14- and 15-year-olds to adult criminal court, applied to A.M.'s case. The court reasoned that when the superior court conditionally reversed A.M.'s conviction and sentence, his case became nonfinal, and thus, Senate Bill 1391 applied. The court also held that Assembly Bill 333 applied retroactively to A.M.'s case, requiring the vacating of the jury's gang-murder special circumstance finding. The court reversed the order granting the district attorney’s motion to transfer A.M.’s case to criminal court, vacated the true finding on the gang-murder special circumstance, and struck the requirement for A.M. to register as a gang offender. The case was remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law

Diana Contreras Chagolla, under the influence of prescription painkillers, led California Highway Patrol (CHP) officers on a high-speed chase. The chase ended when Chagolla crashed her vehicle into a guardrail, blocking two lanes of traffic. Despite repeated orders from the CHP officers, Chagolla did not exit her vehicle for about 45 minutes. During this time, a four-vehicle collision occurred about half a mile to a mile away from Chagolla’s vehicle, resulting in the death of a driver. Chagolla was charged with murder and unlawfully causing death to a person while driving a motor vehicle in attempting to elude a peace officer, among other crimes.The trial court granted Chagolla's motion to set aside the information for the charges of murder and unlawfully causing death to a person while driving a motor vehicle in attempting to elude a peace officer. The People then filed a petition for mandate, arguing that the superior court erred in setting aside these charges. They requested the court to vacate its order and reinstate the charges.The Court of Appeal declined to order the requested relief. The court found that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing did not establish that Chagolla intentionally remained in her car after it crashed and knew that remaining in the vehicle would endanger the life of another. Without establishing these fundamental facts, the People could not show Chagolla’s act of remaining in her car proximately caused the victim’s death. Therefore, the court denied the People's request for relief. View "People v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Tara Shawnee Pritchett, who was on probation for two misdemeanor offenses. In September 2021, a detective conducted a warrantless search of Pritchett's room, believing she was on searchable probation. The search resulted in the discovery of U.S. currency and what was believed to be fentanyl. Pritchett was subsequently charged with one felony count of possession for sale of a controlled substance. However, Pritchett moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search, arguing that her probation had been automatically terminated by Assembly Bill No. 1950 (AB 1950), which limited the maximum term of probation for most misdemeanor offenses to one year.The trial court granted Pritchett's motion to suppress the evidence. It concluded that Pritchett's probation had automatically terminated when AB 1950 became effective on January 1, 2021, several months before the search. The court also ruled that the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply, leading to the dismissal of the charge against Pritchett.The People appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District. They argued that the trial court erred in concluding that Pritchett's probation had terminated automatically due to AB 1950. They also contended that the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule should apply because the detective had made objectively reasonable efforts to determine Pritchett's probation status.The appellate court agreed with the People's latter contention and reversed the trial court's decision. The court found that the detective had acted in objectively reasonable good faith by relying on court records to verify Pritchett's probation status prior to conducting the search. The court concluded that applying the exclusionary rule in this case would not serve its purpose of deterring unlawful police conduct. Therefore, the court directed the trial court to set aside the order granting Pritchett's motion to suppress and to enter a new order denying the motion. View "People v. Pritchett" on Justia Law

The defendant, Takeya Lashay Koontzy, pleaded no contest to fleeing the scene of an injury accident and was placed on probation with the condition that she pay victim restitution in an amount to be determined. Due to the victim’s delay in providing documentation of her damages and failure to appear on multiple dates set for restitution hearings, the trial court did not determine the amount of restitution before the termination of Koontzy’s probation. More than two years post-termination, the court ordered Koontzy to pay $86,306.12 in victim restitution.Koontzy argued that the trial court was without authority to modify the amount of restitution owed to the victim following the termination of probation. She relied on People v. Martinez to argue that the court’s jurisdiction to do so was not extended by Penal Code section 1202.461 because the restitution was not for losses incurred “as a result of the commission of a crime.”The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District agreed with Koontzy, distinguishing the present case from their decision in People v. McCune, in which there was no dispute that the restitution was properly imposed under section 1202.4. The court concluded that the trial court erred in modifying the restitution order after termination of Koontzy’s probation. The court reasoned that the restitution order in this case was for losses due to the accident rather than losses due to Koontzy’s criminal conduct in leaving the scene. Thus, the trial court was not authorized to impose the restitution obligation under section 1202.4. Because the order was not imposed under section 1202.4, section 1202.46 did not provide a basis to extend jurisdiction to modify restitution following termination of probation. Instead, the restitution order was a condition imposed under section 1203.1, and it was subject to the limitations in section 1203.3 permitting modification of probation conditions only during the term of probation. The trial court’s April 2023 restitution order was reversed. View "P. v. Koontzy" on Justia Law

The case involves David Arias, who was convicted of two counts of sexual abuse against a minor. During the trial, the defense challenged the prosecutor's use of a peremptory strike against a prospective Black female juror. The trial court ruled that a prima facie case of discrimination was established, but accepted the prosecutor's reasons for the strike without further discussion. Arias was convicted and sentenced to 15 years to life in prison.The trial court's decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District. The appellate court found that the trial court's denial of the defense's challenge to the prosecutor's peremptory strike was improper. The prosecutor's reasons for the strike did not withstand scrutiny. The appellate court concluded that the record lacked sufficient evidence on which the trial court could have reasonably relied to accept the prosecutor's reasons for striking the juror without further probing and explanation. As a result, the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision. View "P. v. Arias" on Justia Law

The case involves a minor, Randy C., who was stopped by police for driving a car with illegally tinted windows. During the stop, the officer smelled unburnt marijuana and observed a marijuana blunt on the passenger's lap. The officer conducted a search of the vehicle, finding a handgun in the glove compartment and an AR-15 firearm in the trunk. Randy C. was subsequently charged with multiple felony offenses, including possession of an assault weapon by a minor and possession of a concealed firearm and ammunition in a vehicle by a minor. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing there was no probable cause to search the vehicle.The juvenile court denied Randy C.'s motion to suppress the evidence. Following this ruling, Randy C. admitted to the felony offenses charged, and the remaining counts were dismissed pursuant to a negotiated plea deal. The juvenile court declared wardship and committed Randy C. to juvenile hall for 274 days with 55 days of credit for time served. Randy C. appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the search and seizure conducted by police were unlawful.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The court held that the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle based on the smell of unburnt marijuana and the observation of a marijuana blunt in the passenger's lap, which was considered an open container of marijuana in violation of the law. The court rejected Randy C.'s argument that the marijuana blunt was not an "open container" within the meaning of the law, concluding that the paper wrapping enclosing the marijuana presented no barrier to accessing the marijuana, thereby facilitating its consumption. View "In re Randy C." on Justia Law