Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Diana Lovejoy, who was convicted of conspiring with her co-defendant, Weldon McDavid, to murder her ex-husband, Greg Mulvihill. She was also found guilty of attempted murder after McDavid shot and wounded Mulvihill. Several years after her convictions were final, she sought to be resentenced pursuant to current Penal Code section 1172.6, claiming that both convictions may have been based on a theory of imputed malice. The trial court disagreed and denied her petition for relief without an evidentiary hearing.The Superior Court of San Diego County affirmed Lovejoy's convictions. The court concluded that Lovejoy’s conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was necessarily based on a jury finding that she personally harbored an intent to kill, making her ineligible for relief under the statute. Lovejoy appealed this decision.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court concluded that Lovejoy's conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was necessarily based on a jury finding that she personally harbored an intent to kill, making her ineligible for relief under the statute. The court also found that Lovejoy's conviction for attempted murder was not based on a now-impermissible theory, i.e., the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Therefore, the court affirmed the order denying Lovejoy’s petition for resentencing. View "People v. Lovejoy" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances and an enhancement for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm causing great bodily injury or death. The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that his trial counsel exhibited racial bias towards him in violation of the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA) by advising him to use Ebonics and slang when he testified. He also contended that the trial court erred in imposing two sentence enhancements and a parole revocation restitution fine after sentencing him to life without the possibility of parole.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five, found that the defendant's trial counsel did not exhibit racial bias. The court noted that the counsel's advice to the defendant to "speak how you speak" when testifying was a valid tactical decision aimed at ensuring the defendant appeared authentic and genuine before the jury. The court also found that the defendant had not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel's advice indicated racial animus or bias towards him. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no violation of the RJA.The court also found that the defendant's claim that his enhancements should have been stricken was forfeited for failure to request that the trial court strike the enhancements under section 1385. However, the court agreed with the defendant and the People that the trial court improperly imposed a parole revocation restitution fine. The court modified the judgment to strike the parole revocation restitution fine and affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "P. v. Coleman" on Justia Law

In 2019, Miguel Garcia pleaded no contest to second degree robbery and possession of a firearm by a felon, admitting he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm. His 12-year sentence included seven one-year prior prison term sentence enhancements. At a resentencing hearing, the superior court dismissed the prior prison term enhancements but resentenced Garcia to the same 12-year sentence by imposing the firearm enhancement that had been previously stricken, finding Garcia continued to pose a threat to public safety. Garcia appealed, challenging the superior court’s finding that imposition of a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County had initially sentenced Garcia to 12 years, including seven one-year enhancements for prior prison terms. However, due to changes in the law, these enhancements were later deemed invalid and Garcia was resentenced. At the resentencing hearing, the court dismissed the prior prison term enhancements but maintained the 12-year sentence by imposing a previously stricken firearm enhancement, citing Garcia's continued threat to public safety.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Seven reviewed the superior court’s finding that reducing Garcia’s sentence would endanger public safety for an abuse of discretion. The court considered the nature of the offense, Garcia’s multiple prior felony convictions of increasing seriousness, his failure to appear for sentencing, and his participation in a prison riot in which he beat another inmate. The court found that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in its decision. However, the court directed the superior court to correct a clerical error in the abstract of judgment to reflect that Garcia was sentenced to a concurrent term of two years on count 2 for possession of a firearm by a felon. The court affirmed the resentencing order. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The case involves Sacramento Municipal Utility District (District) and David Kwan. The District opened an electrical service account for Kwan, which was later found to be diverting power to support a cannabis grow operation. The trial court held Kwan liable for aiding and abetting utility diversion and awarded treble damages plus attorney fees. Kwan appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove his knowledge of the power theft and challenging the monetary awards.Previously, the District filed a complaint against Kwan for power theft, conversion, and account stated. After a trial and a retrial, the court found Kwan liable for aiding and abetting utility diversion. Kwan claimed he was a victim of identity theft and had no connection to Sacramento. However, the District provided evidence contradicting Kwan's defense, including phone records, equipment purchases, and cash payments.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District, the court affirmed the trial court's decision. The court found substantial evidence that Kwan aided and abetted power diversion, including his purchase of equipment that could be used to grow cannabis, his phone calls to a Sacramento number, and cash deposits made during the period of power theft. The court also upheld the monetary awards, finding no error in the trial court's calculation of damages, its decision to treble damages, or its decision to award attorney fees. The court concluded that the District had established the fact of the proximately caused injury from the date of account creation with reasonable certainty. View "Sacramento Municipal Utility Dist. v. Kwan" on Justia Law

The defendant, John Fay, was living unhoused outside a public library when he got into a verbal altercation with Anthony Davis, who was intoxicated. The altercation escalated, and Fay punched Davis multiple times in the head. Davis died at the scene, with the cause of death being a combination of blunt head trauma and acute alcohol intoxication. Fay admitted to intending to hurt Davis but denied intending to kill him. A jury convicted Fay of second-degree murder.During the jury's deliberations, they were divided on how to apply the instructions on implied malice. The prosecutor argued that a defendant has the mental state for implied malice if he is aware that his conduct is dangerous to others, but does not "care if someone is hurt or killed." The court informed the jury that this statement was based on "case law decisions." Shortly afterward, the jury found Fay guilty of second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division One, Fay contended that the prosecutor's statement regarding the mental state for implied malice was a misstatement of the law, which the court erroneously accepted in its response to the jury's question. The court agreed with Fay, stating that the prosecutor's statement set the bar too low for implied malice, as it suggested that the mens rea for implied malice could be satisfied if the defendant acted with conscious disregard for harming another, rather than endangering life. The court found that the prosecutor's misstatement, combined with the court's endorsement of that misstatement, allowed the jury to apply an incorrect legal principle to the evidence and convict Fay on an invalid theory of law. The court concluded that these errors were not harmless and reversed the judgment. View "People v. Fay" on Justia Law

Monica Berlin was charged with felony stalking and six misdemeanors, including two restraining order violations and four protective order violations. In March 2020, the trial court suspended criminal proceedings and placed Berlin on mental health diversion. After successfully completing the diversion program, Berlin moved to dismiss the criminal charges in March 2022. However, the prosecution argued that the case could not be dismissed until the court awarded restitution. The court scheduled further proceedings on the motion to dismiss and the restitution issue.The trial court ruled in May 2022 that it had the authority to award restitution. Berlin's counsel objected, arguing that the court could not award restitution after the end of the period of diversion. After the court rejected her argument, Berlin's counsel stated that Berlin would prefer to withdraw from diversion and avoid a restitution award by winning an acquittal at trial. In August 2022, the trial court ordered Berlin to pay over $17,000 in restitution to the victim and the California Victim Compensation Board, dismissed the criminal charges, and ordered the case sealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Five reversed the trial court's restitution orders. The appellate court found that the trial court had ordered the restitution after the end of the statutory maximum two-year period of diversion, which was not permitted under the relevant statute. The statute only allowed the trial court to order restitution "during the period of diversion." Therefore, the trial court's restitution orders were reversed, but its other orders were affirmed. View "People v. Berlin" on Justia Law

The defendant, Takeya Lashay Koontzy, pleaded no contest to fleeing the scene of an injury accident and was placed on probation with the condition that she pay victim restitution in an amount to be determined. However, due to the victim's delay in providing documentation of her damages and failure to appear on multiple dates set for restitution hearings, the trial court did not determine the amount of restitution before the termination of Koontzy's probation. More than two years post-termination, the court ordered Koontzy to pay $86,306.12 in victim restitution. Koontzy argued that the trial court was without authority to modify the amount of restitution owed to the victim following the termination of probation.The trial court had suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Koontzy on formal probation for three years, including that she pay victim restitution in an amount to be determined. However, due to various delays, the amount was not determined until after the termination of Koontzy's probation. The prosecution sought a determination of restitution, and over Koontzy's objection, the trial court concluded it retained jurisdiction to modify the victim restitution order.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Five agreed with Koontzy's argument. The court held that the trial court erred in modifying the restitution order after the termination of Koontzy's probation. The court reasoned that the restitution order in this case was not issued pursuant to section 1202.4, because the victim's damages were not due to Koontzy's criminal conduct. Therefore, modification of the restitution order after termination of probation could not be based on the express retention of jurisdiction in section 1202.46. The court concluded that the restitution order was a condition imposed under section 1203.1, and it was subject to the limitations in section 1203.3 permitting modification of probation conditions only during the term of probation. Accordingly, the trial court was without authority to modify the restitution order following termination of probation. The trial court's restitution order was reversed. View "People v. Koontzy" on Justia Law

The defendant, Robert Wayne Cunningham, was convicted of provocative act murder and other offenses related to a 1995 shootout with the police. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, along with consecutive determinate sentences. The incident occurred when Cunningham and his accomplice, Soley, were under police surveillance due to suspicion of committing a series of armed robberies. The police followed them to a liquor store, where they committed a robbery. The police blocked their car, leading to a shootout initiated by Cunningham, which resulted in Soley's death and injuries to Cunningham and at least one police officer.Cunningham sought sentencing relief under Penal Code section 1172.6 but was unsuccessful. He appealed, arguing that provocative murder is based on the imputation of malice, which he claimed is now barred by the newly enacted Penal Code section 188, subdivision (a)(3). He also contended that the prosecutor's argument that he started the gun battle was equivalent to arguing the now discarded "natural and probable consequences" doctrine.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District disagreed with Cunningham's arguments. The court noted that provocative act murder has been a part of California law since the 1960s and that the legislature's failure to mention it in the new statute indicates it did not intend to discard this theory. The court also stated that the prosecutor's argument did not preclude the statute and that the jury's verdict was informed by the instructions given. The court cited a recent case, People v. Antonelli, where it held that the provocative murder doctrine survived recent legislative enactments. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, denying Cunningham's sentencing relief. View "People v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a bail bond forfeiture involving Florian Basica, who was charged with second-degree robbery. The North River Insurance Company (the surety) and Bad Boys Bail Bonds (the bail agent) posted a $60,000 bond for Basica's release. However, Basica failed to appear for his preliminary hearing, leading to the forfeiture of the bond. The bail agent sought an extension of the exoneration period, which was granted twice by the trial court. The appellants later filed a motion to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bail bond, arguing that the trial court did not declare the forfeiture in a timely manner.The trial court denied the appellants' motion and entered summary judgment against the surety. The appellants argued that the entry of summary judgment was premature and an act in excess of jurisdiction, citing dicta from People v. Granite State Insurance Co. They contended that the court's power to enter summary judgment begins on the day following the denial of the motion.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District disagreed with the appellants' argument. It found that the trial court had the authority to enter summary judgment when the bond is forfeited and the period specified in section 1305 has elapsed without the forfeiture being set aside. In this case, the bond had been forfeited, and the exoneration period had elapsed without the forfeiture being set aside by the time the trial court entered summary judgment. Therefore, the court acted within its jurisdiction in entering summary judgment. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "P. v. Basica" on Justia Law

The defendant, Noe Lezama, was initially charged with murder but later entered a plea to voluntary manslaughter in 2019. In 2022, he filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that the timing and factual basis of his plea should not preclude him from being eligible for resentencing. The trial court summarily denied his petition, concluding that legislative history confirmed that those who pled guilty to manslaughter after statutory amendments eliminated imputed malice theories of murder liability are not eligible for resentencing as a matter of law.Previously, the trial court had sentenced Lezama to a total of 13 years in prison for voluntary manslaughter and a gang enhancement. The prosecution had initially charged Lezama and another individual with murder and conspiracy to commit murder, alleging that they had killed a man with malice aforethought. However, in 2019, the prosecution and Lezama reached a plea agreement, and the original information was amended to add a count of voluntary manslaughter and modify a criminal street gang enhancement.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that the statutory language and defendant’s record of conviction confirmed that Lezama was not eligible for resentencing. The court noted that Senate Bill 1437, which took effect in 2019, amended the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. However, the court concluded that this did not apply to Lezama, who pled guilty to manslaughter after such theories had been eliminated by Senate Bill 1437. View "P. v. Lezama" on Justia Law