Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns Ryan Scott Warner, who was charged with the murder of Kayleigh S., the young daughter of his codefendant, Sara Lynn Krueger. The prosecution alleged that Warner either directly committed the murder or aided and abetted Krueger, with the sole theory presented to the jury being first degree murder by torture. The jury was not instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. In 2017, Warner was found guilty of first degree murder by torture and assault causing death of a child. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the special circumstance finding due to insufficient evidence of specific intent to kill but affirmed the murder conviction, finding ample evidence of intent to inflict extreme pain for a sadistic purpose.Following legislative changes enacted by Senate Bill No. 1437, which amended California’s murder statutes to eliminate certain forms of accomplice liability and imputed malice, Warner petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The Superior Court of Napa County denied his petition at the prima facie stage, concluding Warner had not shown he could not be convicted of murder under the amended statutes. Warner appealed, arguing the trial court improperly engaged in factfinding and that the jury instructions permitted conviction on an impermissible theory of imputed malice.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, independently reviewed the record and affirmed the denial of Warner’s petition. The court held that Warner was prosecuted and convicted solely under a theory of murder liability—first degree murder by torture—that remains valid after Senate Bill No. 1437. The jury’s findings necessarily established the required mental state for murder under current law, and Warner was not convicted under any theory affected by the statutory changes. Therefore, Warner is ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. View "P. v. Warner" on Justia Law

A man was charged with illegal possession of ammunition after police stopped a car in which he was a passenger late at night, citing a non-functioning license plate light and tinted windows. During the stop, officers asked both occupants if they were on parole or probation, ordered them out of the vehicle, and conducted pat searches, citing low lighting and baggy clothing as reasons. A search of a backpack near the passenger seat revealed ammunition and documents with the passenger’s name. The passenger, who had prior felony convictions, was arrested. During the encounter, officers used slang and whistled at both the passenger and two Latino men passing by.The Santa Clara County Superior Court initially denied the passenger’s motion under the California Racial Justice Act (RJA), finding he had not made a prima facie showing that the officers’ actions were motivated by racial bias. After the California Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ requiring reconsideration and a detailed ruling on all claims, the trial court again denied the motion, concluding that the allegations were conclusory or unsupported.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and held that the passenger had made a prima facie showing under the RJA. The court found that, when considering the totality of the facts—including expert testimony, statistical evidence, and the officers’ language and conduct—there was a substantial likelihood that law enforcement exhibited bias based on race, ethnicity, or national origin. The court clarified that at the prima facie stage, the trial court should not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations, but should accept the truth of the movant’s factual allegations unless they are conclusory or contradicted by the record. The appellate court issued a writ directing the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the RJA motion. View "Hernandez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2008, a jury convicted the petitioner of multiple serious offenses, including two counts of attempted first degree murder, three counts of attempted murder of police officers, infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant, and attempted arson. The trial court imposed a lengthy custodial sentence, including consecutive and concurrent life terms, as well as additional years for other offenses. The court also imposed an $8,000 restitution fine under Penal Code section 1202.4, ordered $1,700 in direct victim restitution, and assessed a court security fee.Following the conviction, the petitioner’s judgment was affirmed on direct appeal. Years later, the California Legislature amended the law to provide that restitution fines imposed under section 1202.4 become unenforceable and uncollectible after 10 years, and the portion of the judgment imposing such fines is vacated. The petitioner sought relief by filing a habeas corpus petition, arguing that the statutory vacatur of the restitution fine required a full resentencing and that habeas was the proper vehicle to effectuate this change.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, held that the statutory vacatur of the restitution fine under section 1465.9(d) does not trigger the full resentencing rule. The court reasoned that the statute only vacates the portion of the judgment imposing the fine, not the entire sentence, and does not affect the custodial components. The court further held that a postjudgment motion in the trial court, rather than a habeas petition, is the appropriate method to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the vacatur of the restitution fine. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was therefore denied. View "In re Mattison" on Justia Law

A man was charged with multiple sexual offenses, including forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, unlawful intercourse, and incest, all involving his 17-year-old immediate relative. The alleged incident occurred when the defendant stayed overnight at the victim’s home, entered her bedroom, and engaged in sexual acts without her consent. The victim testified about the charged incident and two prior uncharged incidents involving the defendant, one when she was eight years old and another a few weeks before the charged offenses. The defendant denied all wrongdoing and provided alternative explanations for his actions. The prosecution presented expert testimony on the psychology of child sexual assault victims and admitted evidence of the defendant’s statements during pretext phone calls.The Monterey County Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 17 years in prison, with sentences for unlawful intercourse and incest stayed. The defendant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for some counts, improper jury instructions regarding the definition of force, erroneous admission of uncharged acts, and ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to certain evidence and testimony.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, found that the trial court erred by granting the prosecution’s request to modify the pattern jury instructions on the definition of force, which misled the jury regarding an essential element of the forcible rape and forcible oral copulation charges. This error was deemed prejudicial, requiring reversal and remand for possible retrial on those counts. The court found sufficient evidence supported the convictions for unlawful intercourse and incest, and that other asserted errors were either harmless or did not constitute ineffective assistance. The convictions for unlawful intercourse and incest were affirmed, while the convictions for forcible rape and forcible oral copulation were reversed and remanded. View "P. v. Melgoza" on Justia Law

Raymundo Gomez was accused of committing lewd acts against three children at a public swimming pool. The key incidents involved Gomez allegedly bringing a 14-year-old boy’s hand into contact with his genitals and, separately, touching an eight-year-old girl, Katrina, on her buttocks and hip. The prosecution’s case against Gomez relied heavily on Katrina’s prior statements, including her preliminary hearing testimony and a forensic interview, as she did not testify at trial. Katrina’s mother objected to bringing her to court, citing concerns about the emotional impact on her daughter and her reluctance to have Katrina relive the experience in a courtroom setting.The Superior Court of San Diego County found Katrina unavailable to testify after hearing from her mother, who expressed that she did not want Katrina to participate further in the proceedings. The court allowed Katrina’s prior statements to be admitted at trial. The jury convicted Gomez of the offenses against Kane and Katrina but acquitted him of the offense against a third child. Gomez appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding Katrina unavailable and admitting her prior statements, thus violating his constitutional rights.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the prosecution failed to establish Katrina’s unavailability as a witness because the record did not show that her mother’s refusal to bring her to court was unequivocal or that all reasonable efforts to secure her testimony had been exhausted. The court found this error prejudicial and concluded that the admission of Katrina’s prior statements violated Gomez’s confrontation rights. As a result, the court reversed the convictions on all three lewd act counts and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "P. v. Gomez" on Justia Law

In 2010, police responded to an assault in which the victim reported being attacked and threatened due to his cooperation in a homicide investigation. The victim and a witness identified the defendant as one of the assailants. The defendant claimed self-defense, stating he confronted the victim over being called a “rat,” and that the victim emerged with a bat. The victim suffered significant injuries. In 2011, a jury convicted the defendant of multiple offenses, including assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, threatening a witness, and battery with serious bodily injury. The trial court found true several prior convictions, including two strikes, and imposed a sentence of 32 years to life, including enhancements for prior prison terms and great bodily injury.After the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified the defendant as eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, the Superior Court of Humboldt County recalled the sentence in 2022. The court appointed counsel and repeatedly continued the resentencing hearing to allow defense counsel to prepare a sentencing brief. Despite numerous continuances and the court’s admonitions, defense counsel failed to file any written argument or present substantial evidence in mitigation, ultimately making only a brief oral presentation at the hearing. The court struck the four one-year prison prior enhancements but otherwise reimposed the original sentence, and the defendant appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, held that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel at resentencing. The court found that defense counsel’s failure to file a sentencing brief or adequately present mitigating evidence or argument fell below professional standards and prejudiced the defendant, as there was a reasonable probability the court could have imposed a lesser sentence. The judgment was reversed and remanded for resentencing. View "People v. Guevara" on Justia Law

Five gang members were present in an alley in 1999 when two were shot, resulting in one death and one injury. A witness observed three young Hispanic males fleeing the scene. Six years later, Jaime Cesar Perez-Tinoco was arrested and admitted to being present but denied knowledge of any plan to kill. He was 18 at the time. In 2005, Perez was charged with premeditated murder, attempted premeditated murder, and gang participation, with additional gang and firearm allegations. At his 2006 trial, the jury was instructed on both direct aiding and abetting and the natural and probable consequences theory. Perez was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 50 years to life.The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. In 2022, Perez filed a petition under Penal Code section 1172.6, but later withdrew it. In 2024, he filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that his convictions were invalid under People v. Chiu due to the jury instructions. The Superior Court of Orange County granted habeas relief, vacating the premeditated murder and attempted murder convictions, and later vacated the gang-related convictions and enhancements based on changes to Penal Code section 186.22. The court gave the prosecution the option to retry the vacated charges or accept reductions. The prosecution did not retry the case or request a stay, and after 60 days, the court dismissed the vacated charges and enhancements, leaving only second degree murder and attempted murder (without premeditation) convictions.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that section 1172.6 did not preclude habeas relief for Chiu error, that the trial court properly vacated the gang-related findings due to retroactive statutory changes, and that dismissal of the vacated charges was proper because the prosecution failed to retry within the statutory period or seek a stay. The trial court’s orders were affirmed in full. View "People v. Perez-Tinoco" on Justia Law

Aniano Olea was convicted by a jury in 2009 of 25 counts involving violent acts against his spouse, Jane Doe 1, including torture, aggravated mayhem, inflicting corporal injury, assault with a deadly weapon, stalking, and dissuading a witness. The jury also found that Olea personally inflicted great bodily injury during one of the corporal injury offenses. The abuse spanned years and included physical violence, psychological control, and severe injuries to Jane Doe. Olea was sentenced to four consecutive indeterminate terms of seven years to life, plus a determinate term of 20 years, totaling 48 years to life in prison.After his conviction was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, Olea filed a petition in 2024 in Monterey County Superior Court seeking recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.1, citing changes in sentencing laws. He argued that his rehabilitation and changes in the law warranted reconsideration of his sentence. The trial court appointed counsel, reviewed Olea’s prison records, held a hearing, and ultimately declined to exercise its discretion to recall and resentence, finding the original sentence just given the severity of Olea’s conduct.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, first addressed whether the trial court’s denial of Olea’s petition was appealable. The court distinguished this case from others where no hearing was held, finding that the trial court’s actions affected Olea’s substantial rights and thus made the order appealable. On the merits, the appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to recall and resentence Olea, as the decision was reasoned and based on permissible factors. The order denying Olea’s resentencing petition was affirmed. View "People v. Olea" on Justia Law

A 25-year-old defendant was charged with multiple counts of attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon after allegedly attacking four individuals, all of whom were Black, with a metal pipe in Santa Monica. The attacks were accompanied by racial slurs and resulted in serious injuries to at least one victim. The defendant had a documented history of mental illness, substance abuse, and noncompliance with treatment, including leaving mental health facilities against medical advice and failing to take prescribed medication.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County considered the defendant’s motion for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, supported by a psychological evaluation indicating that his schizoaffective disorder was treatable and that he would not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if his symptoms were controlled with treatment. The prosecution opposed the motion, citing the defendant’s history of noncompliance and violence when untreated. After a hearing, the trial court granted diversion, ordering residential, medically assisted treatment and compliance with program rules, but made no express findings on whether the defendant would not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if treated in the community.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandate. The appellate court held that there was no substantial evidence to support the trial court’s implicit finding that the defendant would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if granted diversion. The court emphasized the lack of evidence that the defendant would comply with treatment in a community setting and noted his history of abandoning treatment. The appellate court granted the petition, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting diversion and to deny the motion. View "People v. Superior Ct. (Taylor)" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted in 2001 of attempted second degree murder, with additional firearm and gang enhancements, resulting in a sentence of 42 years to life. On direct appeal in 2003, the gang enhancement was stricken, reducing the sentence to 32 years to life. In 2021, the defendant sought resentencing under a statute that, at the time, did not apply to attempted murder. Subsequent motions for reconsideration and rehearing were filed, during which the trial court recognized a sentencing error: the defendant, who was not the actual shooter, should not have received the firearm enhancement after the gang enhancement was stricken. The court found the sentence appeared unauthorized but believed it lacked authority to correct it absent a habeas petition or a request from the district attorney or corrections department.The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied the defendant’s resentencing requests, finding he had not established a prima facie case for relief under the applicable statute. At a later hearing, the court acknowledged the sentencing error but concluded it could not act without a formal habeas petition or other postconviction relief mechanism, despite the prosecutor’s agreement that the sentence was excessive.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, held that a trial court has inherent authority to correct an unauthorized sentence at any time, regardless of whether a habeas petition is filed or whether the request comes from the defendant, the prosecution, or the corrections department. The court reversed the order denying resentencing and remanded the case with instructions to hold a prompt resentencing hearing. If the trial court finds the sentence is unauthorized, it must correct it. The court clarified that statutory limitations on resentencing do not bar correction of an unauthorized sentence. View "P. v. Cervantes" on Justia Law