Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1982, Jose Gelito Rodriguez and three others were involved in two separate shooting incidents on Hollywood Boulevard, resulting in the injury of Don Hill and the death of Kirk Bickford. Rodriguez was charged with assault with a deadly weapon and murder. In 1984, he pled guilty to second-degree murder, and the firearm enhancements were dismissed. The plea agreement was influenced by the lack of witnesses to identify Rodriguez as the shooter and his intoxication at the time, which could have reduced the charge to involuntary manslaughter. Rodriguez was sentenced to 15 years to life.Rodriguez later sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that he was not the actual shooter and that his intoxication could negate malice. The trial court appointed counsel and found a prima facie case for relief, leading to an evidentiary hearing. The People sought to admit Rodriguez’s statements from a 2011 letter to the Board of Parole Hearings and a 2016 Comprehensive Risk Assessment. Rodriguez objected, claiming the statements were coerced and unreliable hearsay.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County admitted the statements, finding them voluntary and reliable. At the evidentiary hearing, the court reviewed the evidence, including the probation report and testimony from Dr. Jill Hobel, who conducted the 2016 assessment. The court concluded that Rodriguez was the actual killer and denied his petition for resentencing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that the resentencing procedure under section 1172.6 is a postconviction process and not a criminal trial, thus not implicating the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The court found no error in admitting Rodriguez’s statements from the parole proceedings, as they were not compelled or involuntary. View "People v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Francisco Munoz Virgen and two codefendants were charged with murder and assault with a semiautomatic firearm. In the first trial, the jury could not reach a verdict on the charges, leading to a mistrial. Virgen and one codefendant were retried, while the other codefendant entered a plea agreement and testified for the prosecution. The second trial included testimony suggesting an uncharged conspiracy to assault the victim, during which the victim was shot and killed. The court instructed the jury on aiding and abetting and conspiracy principles, including the final paragraph of CALCRIM No. 400 and CALCRIM No. 416, which allowed for conviction of crimes occurring during the commission of the intended crime. The jury found Virgen guilty of second-degree murder but could not reach a verdict on the assault charge or the firearm enhancement.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County declared a mistrial on the assault charge and interpreted the deadlock on the firearm allegation as a not true finding. Virgen was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. On appeal, Virgen argued that the court's instructions allowed the jury to convict him of murder without finding he acted with malice and that the court should have instructed on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense. The People conceded that the court miscalculated Virgen's presentence custody credits.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, agreed with Virgen's contention that the jury could have convicted him of murder without finding malice aforethought due to the instructions given. The court concluded that the instructional error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and reversed Virgen's murder conviction, remanding the case for a retrial on that count. View "People v. Virgen" on Justia Law

Emiliano Gomez was found guilty by the trial court of multiple offenses, including stalking, criminal threats, and possession of a firearm and ammunition as a felon. The police found a flare gun in Gomez's possession, and based on an officer's testimony, the trial court convicted him of possessing a firearm as a felon under Penal Code section 29800, subdivision (a)(1). Gomez appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for possession of a firearm as a felon and that the statutes prohibiting felons from possessing firearms and ammunition violate the Second Amendment.The trial court found Gomez guilty on all counts except for possession of body armor. The court also found special allegations and aggravating factors true, sentencing Gomez to an aggregate term of four years in state prison. Gomez contended that the evidence was insufficient to prove the flare gun was a firearm designed to be used as a weapon, as required by section 16520, subdivision (a).The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that the prosecution needed to prove the flare gun was designed to be used as a weapon. The court found the evidence insufficient to support such a finding and vacated the conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon. The court also rejected Gomez's Second Amendment challenge to the statutory prohibitions on possession of firearms and ammunition by felons, citing the reasoning in People v. Anderson. The judgment was reversed, the conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon was vacated, and the case was remanded for resentencing. View "People v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Carlos Faustinos appealed from a trial court order that declined to act on his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.1. Faustinos had pled guilty to forcible rape and was sentenced to 16 years in prison. In 2023, he petitioned for resentencing, citing recent ameliorative sentencing laws, but the trial court stated it lacked jurisdiction to consider his motion.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County reviewed the case and issued an order stating it did not have jurisdiction to consider Faustinos's motion for resentencing. Faustinos then appealed this decision, arguing that the trial court had erred in its determination.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and dismissed the appeal. The court held that an order declining to act on a defendant’s unauthorized petition under section 1172.1 is non-appealable. The court explained that section 1172.1 does not entitle a defendant to seek relief, and a court is not required to respond to such a request. The court also noted that the recent statutory amendment allowing a trial court to act on its own motion under section 1172.1 does not affect the non-appealability of an order on a defendant’s unauthorized petition. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Faustinos's appeal and dismissed it accordingly. View "P. v. Faustinos" on Justia Law

Jose Manuel Cabada was convicted by a jury of second-degree robbery, evading an officer, and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. The charges stemmed from a series of events in May 2020, where Cabada stole a car, robbed a convenience store, and led police on a high-speed chase. During the robbery, Cabada intimidated the store clerk, demanded money and cigarettes, and threatened the clerk with a milk jug. He was apprehended after crashing the stolen car during the police chase.The Ventura County Superior Court sentenced Cabada to an aggregate term of 12 years and eight months in state prison. The court imposed the upper term for the robbery charge, doubled due to a prior strike, and consecutive terms for the other charges. Cabada's motion to dismiss his prior strike conviction was denied. He appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for the robbery conviction and seeking resentencing under Senate Bill 567.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, initially affirmed the judgment. However, the California Supreme Court directed the appellate court to reconsider the case in light of People v. Lynch and Erlinger v. United States, which addressed the standard for assessing prejudice in noncompliance with Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b), as modified by Senate Bill 567.Upon reconsideration, the appellate court concluded that any error in the trial court's reliance on aggravating factors not found by a jury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court determined that a jury would have found the aggravating factors true beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court's statements indicated it would have imposed the same sentence regardless. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the judgment. View "P. v. Cabata" on Justia Law

In 1991, Maurice Jackson was convicted of three first-degree murders, among other charges. The jury found true special circumstances for the murders of Johnny Castaneda and Timothy Treas, including robbery-murder, kidnap-murder, burglary-murder, and multiple murder. For the murder of Claudia Blackmon, the jury found true the multiple-murder special circumstance but not the robbery and burglary special circumstances. Jackson was sentenced to life without parole.Jackson filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that under current law, he could not be convicted of the murders. The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage for the Castaneda and Treas murders, relying on the jury’s special circumstance findings. For the Blackmon murder, the court issued an order to show cause but denied the petition without a hearing, finding Jackson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the trial record.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in denying the petition at the prima facie stage for the Castaneda and Treas murders. The appellate court held that the jury’s special circumstance findings did not conclusively establish that Jackson was guilty under a currently valid theory of murder, as the jury could have found him guilty based on aiding and abetting the underlying felonies rather than the killings themselves. The court reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded for a hearing to determine whether Jackson is guilty of these murders under current law.For the Blackmon murder, the appellate court agreed with both parties that the trial court’s failure to hold a hearing was erroneous and not harmless. The court remanded for a hearing to determine whether the evidence demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson is guilty of Blackmon’s murder under current law. View "P. v. Jackson" on Justia Law

In June 2021, the defendant, K.D., stole a car with a one-year-old child inside. She was charged with kidnapping, child abduction, and vehicle theft. K.D. has a moderate intellectual disability, confirmed by evaluations, which significantly impairs her cognitive and adaptive functioning. Despite her disability, she was found competent to stand trial after receiving competency training at the Porterville Developmental Center.The Mendocino County Superior Court initially denied K.D.'s request for developmental disability diversion, which would have allowed her to receive treatment instead of facing criminal prosecution. The court found her eligible for regional center services but expressed concerns about her ability to comply with diversion due to her extensive criminal history and lack of ties to the community. The court also noted that her developmental disability was not reasonably related to the charged offense and emphasized the seriousness of the crime.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court had abused its discretion by not properly considering whether K.D. would benefit from diversion-related treatment. The appellate court noted that the trial court failed to link the facts of the charged offenses to the fundamental question of whether K.D. would benefit from diversion. Additionally, the regional center did not provide a proper report or an individually tailored diversion program as required by law.The appellate court conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to hold a new diversion eligibility hearing. The trial court must ensure compliance with statutory requirements, including obtaining a proper report and proposed diversion program from the regional center. If K.D. is found to benefit from diversion and does not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety, she should be granted diversion. If she completes the diversion program satisfactorily, the charges will be dismissed. If not, her conviction will be reinstated. View "P. v. K.D." on Justia Law

Robert Arthur McIntosh, a Black man, sought the appointment of counsel to assist him in prosecuting a petition for writ of habeas corpus in superior court, raising claims under the California Racial Justice Act (RJA). He alleged that the San Diego District Attorney’s Office charged gang and firearm enhancements more frequently against Black individuals and imposed longer sentences on them compared to similarly situated individuals of other races. McIntosh supported his claims with statistical data and reports. The trial court denied his request for counsel, stating he had not made the prima facie showing required for an order to show cause (OSC).The trial court ruled that section 1473(e) of the Penal Code required a prima facie showing of a violation for the appointment of counsel and issuance of an OSC. McIntosh then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, for a writ of habeas corpus. The appellate court issued an OSC limited to whether McIntosh was entitled to appointed counsel under section 1473(e).The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, held that section 1473(e) imposes a duty on trial courts to assess the adequacy of the factual allegations in the habeas petition to determine if an indigent petitioner is entitled to appointed counsel, independent of the prima facie showing required for an OSC. The court found that the trial court erred by conflating these two inquiries. The appellate court exercised its discretion to construe McIntosh’s petition for writ of habeas corpus as a petition for writ of mandate and issued a writ directing the trial court to conduct the required inquiry to determine if McIntosh is entitled to appointed counsel. View "McIntosh v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A member of the public reported Gregory Kazelka for erratic driving, leading to a traffic stop by Officer Phillips of the California Highway Patrol. Kazelka admitted to drinking excessively and failed field sobriety tests. He underwent a preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) test, which showed a blood alcohol content above the legal limit. Kazelka was arrested, and a subsequent chemical breath test confirmed his intoxication. However, Officer Phillips did not provide the statutory admonition that the PAS test was voluntary.The California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended Kazelka’s license following an administrative hearing. Kazelka challenged the suspension in the Lake County Superior Court, which found that the PAS test results should have been excluded due to the lack of statutory admonition and reversed the suspension.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the statutory admonition was not a foundational requirement for the admissibility of the PAS test results. The court also determined that the exclusionary rule, typically applied in criminal cases, does not apply to administrative per se (APS) hearings. The court found that Officer Phillips’s failure to provide the admonition did not violate Kazelka’s constitutional rights and that the hearing officer did not act as both advocate and adjudicator, thus not violating due process.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision, directing the trial court to deny Kazelka’s petition for writ of mandate and reinstate the DMV’s suspension order. The DMV was awarded costs on appeal. View "Kazelka v. Cal. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

In 1997, Kenneth Griggs was convicted by a jury of forcible rape, forcible penetration with a foreign object, and false imprisonment. He admitted to having three prior convictions that were both strikes and serious felonies. The court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 35 years to life, including a determinate term of 10 years for two of the prior convictions.The Sacramento County Superior Court, on its own motion, recalled Griggs' sentence under section 1172.1 and scheduled a resentencing hearing. This decision was based on changes in the law that now allow courts discretion to strike five-year prior convictions, which were mandatory at the time of Griggs' original sentencing. The District Attorney appealed this recall order, arguing that it affected the substantial rights of the People.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the recall order was not appealable under section 1238, subdivision (a)(5). The court reasoned that the recall order did not affect the substantial rights of the People because it did not modify the judgment or render it invalid. The order merely set the stage for a resentencing hearing, where the court could potentially reimpose the same sentence. The appeal was dismissed because the recall order itself did not impact the enforcement of the judgment or the prosecution's ability to proceed with the case. View "People v. Griggs" on Justia Law