Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around Gregory Terence Brown, who was charged with aggravated mayhem and assault with a deadly weapon. Initially declared incompetent due to a diagnosed mental disorder, Brown was later considered competent for trial. He requested pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, which was denied. Brown was subsequently convicted and sentenced.Brown appealed, arguing that the denial of his motion for mental health diversion was incorrect, and that amendments to section 1001.36 (effective after his conviction but before sentencing) should be applied retroactively, warranting reconsideration of his motion. The People argued that Brown waived his right to invoke the retroactivity of the amendments by failing to request reconsideration prior to sentencing.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, found that the trial court did not err in denying Brown's motion in 2022, but concluded that the amendments to section 1001.36 were retroactive. The court also determined that under the circumstances, Brown did not forfeit his right to invoke the retroactivity of the amendments by failing to request reconsideration. Accordingly, the court of appeal conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court for further consideration under the amended statute. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

The case involves Gail Dee Lew-Williams, as the surviving spouse and successor in interest of Wilbur Williams, Jr., M.D., and Wilbur Williams, M.D., Inc. (collectively, the Williams plaintiffs) and Sevana Petrosian and her associates Salina Ranjbar, Vana Mehrabian, and Staforde Palmer (collectively, the Petrosian defendants). The Williams plaintiffs accused the Petrosian defendants of embezzling approximately $11.5 million from the Corporation’s bank accounts. The trial court compelled the case to arbitration, but the Williams plaintiffs failed to initiate arbitration proceedings. As a result, the trial court dismissed the Williams plaintiffs’ claims against the Petrosian defendants.The Williams plaintiffs appealed, arguing that they did not have the funds to initiate the arbitration and that the trial court erred in compelling arbitration. The Petrosian defendants argued that the claims were properly dismissed because the Williams plaintiffs had the funds to arbitrate and should not be allowed on appeal to challenge the trial court’s order compelling arbitration before first arbitrating their claims.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, concluded that once a trial court has compelled claims to contractual arbitration, the court has “very limited authority with respect to [the] pending arbitration.” If a party fails to diligently prosecute an arbitration, the appropriate remedy is for the opposing party to seek relief in the arbitration proceeding. Therefore, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Williams plaintiffs’ claims against the Petrosian defendants for failure to prosecute. The court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the case. View "Lew-Williams v. Petrosian" on Justia Law

This case pertains to a defendant, Nicholas Beaudreaux, who was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted robbery. He is serving a 50-year sentence. Beaudreaux made two unsuccessful attempts to petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The trial court ruled that the denial of relief on his first petition, which was affirmed in 2020, forecloses relief. However, Beaudreaux appealed again, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Lewis and Senate Bill No. 775, which clarified the procedural law governing section 1172.6 resentencing proceedings. He claimed that the trial court erred at the prima facie stage of these resentencing proceedings by not appointing counsel and relying on substantive facts from this court’s 2011 opinion affirming his conviction. However, the court concluded that these errors were harmless. The dispositive question was whether, based on the record of conviction, it must be concluded that Beaudreaux was convicted as Drummond’s actual killer. The court believed so, and therefore, Beaudreaux's attempt to allege entitlement to section 1172.6 relief was refuted. The order dismissing Beaudreaux’s second petition for section 1172.6 relief was affirmed. View "P. v. Beaudreaux" on Justia Law

In this case, the People of the State of California filed a lawsuit against Holiday Liquor (owned by Abdul Jamal Sheriff and operated under Freetown Holdings Company) for public nuisance. The People claimed that the store had become a hub for illegal drug transactions, with customers and dealers using the store as a meeting point. The store was accused of tolerating loitering and drug dealing, lacking security, operating until 2 a.m., and selling alcohol in cheap single-serving containers.The trial court granted summary judgment for the People, ordering the store to hire guards, stop selling single-serving containers of alcohol, and take other measures to address the issue. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision.The court held that Holiday Liquor had indeed facilitated a public nuisance by failing to take reasonable measures to prevent the sale of illegal drugs on its property. The court ruled that the proprietor was aware of the illegal activities as he had been informed multiple times by the police. Despite this knowledge, he failed to implement recommended measures to mitigate the issue, such as hiring security guards, limiting operating hours, and ceasing the sale of single-serving alcohol containers. The ruling was based on the violation of sections 11570 et seq. of the Health and Safety Code (the drug house law), sections 3479 et seq. of the Civil Code (the public nuisance law), and sections 17200 et seq. of the Business and Professions Code (the unfair competition law). View "P. v. Freetown Holdings Co." on Justia Law

In a shootout following a high-speed car chase, the defendant, Mario Guadalupe Serrano, was convicted of 13 criminal counts, including two counts of premeditated attempted murder of a peace officer. After the trial court dismissed five of six firearm enhancements, it sentenced Serrano to a total determinate term of 35 years 8 months and a total indeterminate term of 30 years to life. On appeal, Serrano argued that there was insufficient evidence supporting the jury's finding of premeditation and deliberation, the trial court failed to exercise its discretion to consider striking the premeditation and deliberation findings, and the trial court erroneously attached the 20-year sentence for the firearm enhancement to his determinate term rather than his indeterminate term.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Five affirmed the judgment, with the exception of the last argument. It held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Serrano had committed premeditated attempted murder of two peace officers beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also found that the trial court did not err in failing to exercise its discretion to dismiss the jury’s findings of premeditation and deliberation because these findings constitute alternative penalties for the offenses rather than enhancements. However, the court agreed with Serrano's assertion that the trial court erred in orally pronouncing that the 20-year sentence for the firearm enhancement was attached to his determinate term. Therefore, the court remanded the case for the limited purpose of correcting the record to reflect that the 20-year sentence for the firearm enhancement was attached to Serrano's indeterminate term. View "P. v. Serrano" on Justia Law

In the case considered by the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District, Ropati Afatia Seumanu sought a certificate of appealability (COA) for nine claims in his habeas corpus petition. The petition was filed after the superior court dismissed his previously filed petition in a capital case. The court determined that it could issue a COA for one of the claims but declined to do so for the remaining eight.Seumanu had been convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping to commit robbery, and first-degree robbery, with special circumstances that led to a death penalty sentence. His appeal and subsequent habeas corpus petition were both unsuccessful. In 2022, Seumanu filed a new petition presenting nine claims not previously raised. The superior court dismissed the new petition as 'successive' under a specific provision of the Penal Code, meaning the claims were not new or different but rather repeated or supplemented those in the original petition.The appellate court found that the court orders regarding the habeas petition did not materially impair a fair adjudication of the case. The court determined that the ten-day time limit for granting or denying COA requests in the Court of Appeal was directory rather than mandatory. The court also agreed to appoint specific attorneys to represent Seumanu in his appeal.In terms of the specific claims, Seumanu argued that he was denied a fair penalty phase trial, that the trial court allowed the prosecution and defense to stipulate to the removal of potential jurors, and that the process of 'death qualifying' juries violated the rights of prospective jurors. The court found that the claims did not meet the requirements for relief or substantiality and upheld the superior court's dismissal.The court did grant a COA for a part of one claim which argued that a potential juror was improperly excused for cause which could result in a penalty retrial. However, for the remaining claims, the court found that Seumanu had not met the burden of demonstrating a substantial claim for relief or a substantial claim that the requirements of the relevant subdivision of the Penal Code had been met. As such, the court denied Seumanu's request for a COA for these claims. View "In re Seumanu" on Justia Law

In 1994, David D. McClelland pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to 15 years to life in a California state prison. In 2019, he filed for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.951, which provides a mechanism for defendants who were not the principal in a murder but were charged due to imputed malice. The court scheduled and rescheduled an evidentiary hearing multiple times at the request of both parties.In 2022, the prosecution responded to the order to show cause, planning to rely on the grand jury transcript and McClelland’s statements in Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation records as evidence. McClelland’s counsel requested the court not to consider certain hearsay testimony and argued the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.During a hearing in September 2022, the prosecution presented additional evidence, and McClelland's counsel requested the court to take McClelland's age at the time of the offense into consideration. McClelland's counsel then agreed to the court issuing a written ruling, and the court took the matter under submission. In November, the court denied the petition, ruling that McClelland was ineligible for resentencing as the evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that he aided and abetted the actual killer.McClelland appealed, arguing that he was denied due process because he was not present at the evidentiary hearing. The court disagreed, stating that the September hearing, in which all parties were present and evidence was presented, was the evidentiary hearing as per section 1172.6(d)(3). The court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "People v. McClelland" on Justia Law

In the appeal case presented, the defendants, Brian Terrell Hill and Clifford Jenkins, sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 for their convictions of first-degree murder and attempted murder. The defendants were initially convicted based on their involvement in the 1990 kidnapping and subsequent murder of Randy Burge and attempted murder of Kevin Thomas.The defendants contended that their petitions for resentencing were denied based on a felony murder theory related to kidnapping, which they argued violated ex post facto principles. They stated that at the time of the offense, kidnapping was not an enumerated felony under section 189, subdivision (a) to which felony-murder liability could be attached. However, the court rejected this argument, stating that section 1172.6 does not apply new law retroactively to make formerly innocent conduct criminal, but looks to whether a defendant could be convicted under current law.The court found substantial evidence supporting the lower court's determination that Hill intended to kill Thomas and was therefore guilty of attempted murder. Similarly, the court found substantial evidence supporting the lower courts' findings that both Hill and Jenkins were guilty of felony murder as major participants in the kidnapping who acted with reckless indifference to human life.Given these findings, the court affirmed the denial of Hill's and Jenkins' petitions for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. View "People v. Hill" on Justia Law

This case involves an appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, with the defendant, Richard Curtis Morris, Jr., appealing from the trial court's denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Morris was previously convicted on charges of first-degree murder with associated special circumstances of rape, robbery, and murder for financial gain. He argues that for a nonkiller to be convicted of first-degree murder under the amended felony-murder statute when the nonkiller acts with intent to kill, the prosecution must prove the nonkiller assisted the actual killer in the killing itself. According to him, the jury found that he aided an actor in committing the underlying felonies, which he claims is insufficient basis for denying a resentencing evidentiary hearing.The appeals court disagreed with Morris, holding that a person who, with an intent to kill, directly commits or aids and abets an enumerated felony in which a death occurs commits the actus reus necessary for felony murder under the amended felony-murder statute by acting in furtherance of the common design of the felony. The jury instructions and verdicts in this case establish the jury necessarily concluded Morris possessed an intent to kill during the commission of the underlying felonies and aided and abetted the actual killer in committing those felonies. By this ruling, the court affirmed that the record of conviction establishes, as a matter of law, that Morris is not eligible for resentencing. Therefore, the trial court was correct in its summary denial of the petition for resentencing without issuing an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary hearing. View "P. v. Morris" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Madera County, California, denying Francisco Carrillo's motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under section 1473.7 of the Penal Code. The motion was based on the claim that Carrillo did not meaningfully understand the adverse immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence.Carrillo, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of assault with a firearm following a trial. He was sentenced to serve 301 days in jail and granted formal probation for five years. However, when Carrillo later admitted to a probation violation and received an additional 90 days in jail, his total term of imprisonment exceeded one year, thereby qualifying his conviction as an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), leading to mandatory deportation.Arguing that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence, Carrillo filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under section 1473.7 of the Penal Code. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Carrillo failed to demonstrate that he suffered prejudicial error due to his lack of understanding, as he did not show a reasonable probability that he would have acted differently had he been aware of the immigration consequences.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's order but modified it to be without prejudice. This means that Carrillo could file another motion asserting grounds not raised in his initial motion. The appellate court agreed that Carrillo did not understand the potential immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence. However, it found that Carrillo failed to prove that this misunderstanding prejudiced his decisions at trial or during his sentencing hearing. View "People v. Carrillo" on Justia Law