Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In March 2023, J.D. was involved in two separate incidents at the Pacific View Mall. In the first incident, J.D. stole a cell phone from Mia M. while she was sitting with friends. Later that day, J.D. and three others attacked Priscilla E., taking her cell phone and assaulting her. Both incidents were captured on mall surveillance, and the victims identified J.D. as the perpetrator.The Ventura County District Attorney's office filed a juvenile petition in July 2023, charging J.D. with the theft of Mia's cell phone. J.D. admitted to the theft in February 2024 and was placed on probation. In March 2024, a subsequent petition was filed, charging J.D. with felony assault for the attack on Priscilla. J.D. filed a motion to dismiss the felony assault charge, arguing that the prosecution should have been aware of both offenses and that they should have been prosecuted together.The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the two incidents were separate and distinct, occurring at different times and locations. The court determined that the evidence needed to prove the assault on Priscilla did not overlap significantly with the evidence needed to prove the theft from Mia.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the offenses were not part of a singular transaction and that the prosecution was not required to join the charges in a single proceeding. The court found no significant overlap in the evidence and concluded that the Kellett rule did not apply, as the incidents were distinct in time, location, and nature. The judgment denying the motion to dismiss was affirmed. View "In re J.D." on Justia Law

Jon Woods, a workers' compensation attorney, was convicted of 37 felony counts of workers' compensation fraud. Woods had engaged in unlawful kickback and referral fee arrangements, referring copy and subpoena work to companies that provided financial benefits to him and his firm. This corruption affected the workers' compensation system, as the employer's insurance company had to cover the costs.The Superior Court of Orange County reviewed the case, where Woods was found guilty on all counts and received a four-year prison sentence. He was also ordered to pay $701,452 in restitution. Woods appealed, arguing that the Williamson rule precluded convictions on counts 5 through 37, and that the court erred in limiting his cross-examination of certain prosecution witnesses.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Woods that the Williamson rule applied, as his conduct fell under a more specific statute, Labor Code section 139.32, which criminalizes kickback schemes and is a misdemeanor. Therefore, the court reversed Woods's convictions on counts 5 through 37, the white-collar sentencing enhancement, and the restitution award based on these charges. However, the court found no error in the trial court's limitation of cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and affirmed the remainder of the judgment. View "People v. Woods" on Justia Law

In 2001, a jury convicted Kim H. Tang of first-degree murder and using a deadly weapon. The court found true that Tang had one prison prior, one serious felony prior, and one strike prior. Tang was sentenced to 50 years to life, plus a five-year serious felony enhancement and a one-year weapon enhancement. The court imposed and stayed a one-year enhancement for the prison prior. Tang appealed, and in 2002, the Court of Appeal modified the judgment to strike the prison prior enhancement.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Tang's motion for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, which was enacted to invalidate certain sentence enhancements. The court concluded that Tang was ineligible for resentencing because the prison prior enhancement had been stricken, not imposed.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that a stricken enhancement is not considered an imposed enhancement under section 1172.75, subdivision (a). Therefore, Tang was not eligible for resentencing under the statute. The court directed the trial court to issue an amended abstract of judgment reflecting that the enhancement was stricken. View "P. v. Tang" on Justia Law

Over a five-year period, Robert Michael Tafoya stalked and harassed E.R. in various ways. He frequently appeared at her workplace, left flowers on her car, followed her while shopping, made numerous Facebook posts claiming to be involved with her and the father of her children, and fraudulently applied for custody and visitation orders. Despite restraining orders, his behavior continued unabated, including attempts to pick up her children from school.Following a jury trial in the Superior Court of Riverside County, Tafoya was convicted of stalking, perjury, attempted child abduction, and filing false documents. He was sentenced to 25 years and eight months in prison. Tafoya appealed the convictions, arguing that his Facebook posts were protected by the First Amendment, there was insufficient evidence for the attempted child abduction conviction, and the perjury and false document convictions lacked false statements. He also appealed the restitution order, claiming the court used the wrong standard and lacked proper verification.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that Tafoya’s Facebook posts were not protected activity as they were part of a pattern of conduct that constituted a credible threat. The court found substantial evidence supporting the attempted child abduction conviction, noting that the visitation order was obtained by fraud and thus void. The court affirmed the convictions for stalking, attempted child abduction, and filing false documents. However, the court reversed the perjury conviction related to the restraining order (count 10) due to the lack of a false statement under penalty of perjury and remanded for resentencing. The restitution order was upheld, as the need for relocation expenses was justified by the record. View "People v. Tafoya" on Justia Law

Annette Gaylene Batten, who was convicted of first-degree murder in 1996 and sentenced to life in prison, was released on parole in August 2017. In December 2023, she admitted to two parole violations: driving under the influence and failing to inform her parole agent of her arrest. Consequently, the trial court revoked her parole and remanded her to the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and the jurisdiction of the Board of Parole Hearings for future parole consideration.The trial court's decision was based on Penal Code section 3000.08, subdivision (h), which mandates remand to the CDCR for parolees who violate conditions of lifetime parole. Batten argued that a statute enacted in 2020, which limits parole to three years for those released after July 2020, should apply to her, and that the disparity in treatment violates equal protection principles. The trial court, however, followed the existing law applicable to her case.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that rational basis review, rather than strict scrutiny, applies to Batten's equal protection challenge. The court found that there is a rational basis for treating inmates released before July 2020 differently from those released after that date. The Legislature could have reasonably decided that changing the terms of parole retroactively would undermine the Board's parole determinations. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's decision to remand Batten to the CDCR. View "People v. Batten" on Justia Law

Misael Padron, a Cuban citizen granted asylum in the United States, appealed the denial of his motion to vacate his conviction for carjacking, which he had entered pursuant to a no-contest plea. Padron argued that he did not understand the immigration consequences of his plea, which included mandatory detention, denial of naturalization, and near-certain termination of asylum and deportation. He provided evidence of his mental health challenges related to persecution in Cuba and claimed his defense counsel did not adequately inform him of the immigration consequences.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Padron’s motion, partly because he did not provide a declaration from his defense counsel and had signed a plea form acknowledging potential deportation. The court also noted that there was no alternative, immigration-neutral plea available to Padron.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Padron demonstrated error affecting his ability to understand the immigration consequences of his plea. The court found that Padron’s defense counsel did not adequately advise him of the mandatory immigration consequences, and Padron’s mental health challenges further impaired his understanding. The court also determined that Padron established a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea had he understood the consequences, given his strong ties to the United States and the severe impact on his asylum status.The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of Padron’s motion and remanded the case with instructions to vacate Padron’s conviction and permit him to withdraw his plea and enter a different plea. View "People v. Padron" on Justia Law

Carlos Faustinos appealed the trial court's order declining to act on his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.1. Faustinos had pled guilty to forcible rape in 2019 and was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment. In 2023, he petitioned for resentencing, citing recent ameliorative sentencing laws, but the trial court took no action, stating it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion.The trial court's decision was based on the fact that under section 1172.1, a defendant is not entitled to seek relief, and the court is not required to respond to such a request. The trial court's order declining to act on the petition is not an appealable order. This is consistent with longstanding precedent that orders responding to unauthorized motions invoking section 1172.1’s predecessor are not appealable.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial court's order is not appealable. The court explained that the right to appeal is determined by statute, and an order after a judgment in a criminal case is appealable only if it affects the substantial rights of the party. Since a defendant is not entitled to file a petition under section 1172.1, and the court is not required to respond, the trial court's order does not affect the defendant's substantial rights. The court also noted that a recent statutory amendment allowing a trial court to act on its own motion under section 1172.1 does not change the non-appealability of an order on a defendant’s unauthorized petition. View "People v. Faustinos" on Justia Law

David Wayne Gray was convicted by a jury of second-degree burglary of a vehicle, attempted second-degree burglary of a vehicle, conspiracy to commit theft, vandalism, and possession of burglar’s tools. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of five years and four months. Gray appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for second-degree burglary of a vehicle and attempted second-degree burglary of a vehicle.The Superior Court of Placer County declared a mistrial on the grand theft charge but found Gray guilty on all other counts. The court also found true the allegations of a prior strike and that Gray had served a prior prison term. Gray's motion to dismiss the prior strike was denied, and he was sentenced accordingly.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. Gray contended that cutting the locks on the exterior compartments of the trucks did not constitute entering the vehicles under Penal Code section 459. The court disagreed, referencing the legislative intent to treat entry into locked vehicles more harshly than simple theft. The court found that the locked compartments and bins on the trucks were analogous to a car trunk, which has been previously ruled as part of the vehicle's interior for burglary purposes. The court concluded that Gray's actions of cutting the locks to access the enclosed cargo areas and bins constituted entry into locked vehicles.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support Gray's convictions for second-degree burglary of a vehicle and attempted second-degree burglary of a vehicle. View "People v. Gray" on Justia Law

The case involves defendant Prospero Guadalupe Serna, who was found guilty by a jury of two misdemeanors: knowingly resisting arrest and willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer. The incident occurred when a California Highway Patrol officer encountered Serna walking within traffic lanes. Despite the officer's attempts to guide Serna to safety, Serna resisted multiple times, leading to his eventual detention with the help of additional officers. Serna's defense argued that his mental health issues should have been considered to negate the knowledge requirement for the offenses.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County reviewed the case, where Serna claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that his attorney failed to introduce his mental health records and did not request a jury instruction regarding mental defects affecting intent. The appellate division held that since the crimes were of general intent, evidence of mental disease was not admissible to show lack of specific intent. The court also noted a split in authority regarding whether the offense required actual knowledge that the person resisted was a peace officer.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case to resolve whether Penal Code section 148(a)(1) requires actual knowledge that the person being resisted is a peace officer. The court found the analysis in People v. Mackreth persuasive, which held that section 148(a)(1) does not require actual knowledge. Instead, it is sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known the person was a police officer. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the statute does not necessitate the defendant's actual knowledge of the officer's status. View "People v. Serna" on Justia Law

In 2001, Luis Olmos was convicted of murder and other crimes committed at age 17, receiving a 33-years-to-life sentence. In 2023, Olmos petitioned for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d)(1)(A), which allows juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) to seek resentencing. Olmos mistakenly believed his sentence was 41 years to life and argued it was the functional equivalent of LWOP. The trial court, also under the mistaken belief of a 41-years-to-life sentence, denied the petition, stating it was not equivalent to LWOP.Previously, a jury found Olmos guilty of first-degree murder, attempted premeditated murder, and assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury. The jury also found true the allegations of personal use of a deadly weapon and that a principal was armed with a firearm. The trial court sentenced him to 33 years to life. A prior appellate court modified the judgment by staying a sentencing enhancement and awarding presentence credit, but otherwise affirmed the conviction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court noted that section 1170(d)(1)(A) applies to juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP and, by extension, those with sentences functionally equivalent to LWOP. However, the court found that Olmos's 33-years-to-life sentence, which included eligibility for a parole hearing in December 2024, was not the functional equivalent of LWOP. The court compared Olmos's sentence to longer sentences in other cases and concluded it was not equivalent to LWOP. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of Olmos's petition for recall and resentencing. View "P. v. Olmos" on Justia Law