Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Ashley Navarro and Goretti Cervera were in a relationship for approximately eight years. During and after their relationship, Cervera struggled with mental health issues, including borderline personality disorder, general anxiety, and major depressive disorder. In July 2018, after their breakup, Cervera attempted to confront Navarro at her workplace, leading to a violent incident where Cervera was found with a large kitchen knife and admitted to intending to kill Navarro. Navarro obtained an emergency protective order and a five-year domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Cervera. Cervera violated the DVRO in 2019 by contacting Navarro via email and text, leading Navarro to obtain a three-year criminal protective order.The Alameda County Superior Court initially issued the DVRO based on the 2018 incident, finding Navarro had a reasonable apprehension of physical harm. In May 2023, Navarro sought a permanent renewal of the DVRO, citing ongoing fear of harm due to Cervera's mental health issues and past behavior. Cervera opposed the renewal, claiming her mental health had stabilized and she had not contacted Navarro in four years. The trial court denied the renewal request, finding Navarro's fear of future abuse unreasonable and noting Cervera's improved mental health and lack of recent contact.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and found that the trial court abused its discretion. The appellate court held that the facts of the 2018 incident, combined with Cervera's violations of the DVRO, established a reasonable apprehension of future abuse. The court reversed the trial court's decision and directed it to grant the renewal request, determining whether the DVRO should be renewed for five or more years, or permanently. View "Navarro v. Cervera" on Justia Law

In June 2013, Los Angeles Sheriff’s deputies responded to a drive-by shooting where they found a man with multiple gunshot wounds who later died at the hospital. Javier Villagrana and his cousin, Jaime Chavez, were charged with the murder of Juan Vasquez, with gang and firearm enhancements. Villagrana pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter and admitted to gang and firearm use allegations, resulting in a 26-year prison sentence. Chavez also pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter and admitted the gang enhancement but did not admit to using a firearm.Villagrana later filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing he could not be convicted of murder under the amended laws. The trial court found he established a prima facie case and issued an order to show cause. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition, concluding Villagrana was ineligible for resentencing as he was the actual killer or a direct aider and abettor to the murder.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Villagrana was ineligible for resentencing. The court noted that Villagrana’s plea and admissions, including his use of a firearm and the gang-related nature of the crime, were sufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as either the actual shooter or a direct aider and abettor. The court rejected the argument that the trial court applied an erroneous standard of proof, affirming that the People had proven Villagrana’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under the new law. View "People v. Villagrana" on Justia Law

Trevon Bey was convicted by a jury of possession of a firearm by a felon and carrying a loaded firearm in public. The trial court dismissed a prior strike conviction and sentenced Bey to three years for each count, to be served concurrently. Bey appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly revoked his self-representation status, that his conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon violated his Second Amendment rights, and that California's concealed carry laws were unconstitutional under a recent Supreme Court decision.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially allowed Bey to represent himself but later revoked this status due to his disruptive behavior and failure to follow court rules. Bey repeatedly challenged the court's authority, disrespected the court, and disrupted proceedings, despite multiple warnings. The court appointed standby counsel to represent him, citing his inability to adhere to courtroom protocol.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Bey's self-representation status due to his continuous disruptive conduct. The court also found that Bey's conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon did not violate his Second Amendment rights, referencing recent Supreme Court decisions that upheld prohibitions on firearm possession by felons. Additionally, the court rejected Bey's challenge to California's concealed carry laws, noting that the unconstitutional "good cause" requirement was severable from the rest of the licensing scheme.The Court of Appeal agreed with both parties that the sentence for carrying a loaded firearm in public should be stayed under Penal Code section 654, as it was based on the same act as the possession charge. The court modified the judgment to stay the sentence on count 2 and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "People v. Bey" on Justia Law

Luis Mendez was charged with two misdemeanors in one case and several felonies and a misdemeanor in a separate case. The trial court found him mentally incompetent and suspended criminal proceedings in both cases. Mendez was committed to the State Department of State Hospitals for treatment. After his mental competency was restored, the trial court reinstated all charges and denied Mendez’s motion to dismiss the misdemeanor case.The Superior Court of Orange County initially suspended criminal proceedings in both cases and committed Mendez to the State Hospitals. Mendez’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss the misdemeanor case, arguing that section 1370.01 applied, which mandates dismissal of misdemeanor charges if the defendant is found mentally incompetent. The trial court denied the motion, stating that section 1370 applied because Mendez was charged with both felonies and misdemeanors.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1370 applies to defendants charged with felonies, even if misdemeanors are charged in a separate document. The court found that the trial court correctly applied section 1370, reinstated criminal proceedings after Mendez’s competency was restored, and denied the motion to dismiss the misdemeanor case. The court concluded that section 1370.01 applies only when a defendant is charged with misdemeanors exclusively. The petition for a writ of mandate/prohibition was denied. View "Mendez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 1995, Lamar Love was convicted of second-degree murder for the death of his son, Gary Love. Gary, who was cared for by his grandmother, Geraldine Thomas, sustained multiple injuries while in Love's care, culminating in his death from blunt force trauma to the abdomen. Love was charged with murder, child abuse, spousal abuse, assault with a deadly weapon, and dissuading a witness. The jury convicted him of second-degree murder, spousal abuse, and one count of child abuse resulting in death, while acquitting him of the other charges.Love appealed his conviction, but it was affirmed by the appellate court. In 2022, he filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that changes to sections 188 and 189 meant he could not be convicted of murder under the current law. The trial court denied his petition, noting that the jury was not instructed on felony murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, aiding and abetting liability, or any theory of imputed malice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that Love was ineligible for resentencing because he was convicted as the actual killer who personally harbored malice, not under any abrogated theory of liability. The jury instructions required a finding of express or implied malice for second-degree murder, and there was no basis for the jury to convict him using a criminal negligence standard from unrelated instructions. Thus, the court concluded that Love was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. View "People v. Love" on Justia Law

Lavell Calvin White was convicted of first-degree murder in 2018 based on a felony-murder theory, with a special circumstance finding that the murder occurred during a robbery. The jury found that White was a major participant in the felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP). White later petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which the trial court granted, reducing his sentence to a two-year determinate term for attempted second-degree robbery.The trial court's decision to grant White's petition for resentencing effectively overruled the jury's special circumstance finding. The court concluded that the jury's finding had no preclusive effect because the jury had not been properly instructed on the factors established in People v. Banks and People v. Clark. The People sought a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court's order and reinstate the original murder conviction and LWOP sentence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and granted the People's petition. The court held that the jury's special circumstance finding should have preclusive effect in the section 1172.6 resentencing proceedings. The court noted that the jury's finding, made after the Banks and Clark decisions, was binding and that the trial court erred in not giving it preclusive effect. The appellate court directed the trial court to vacate its order redesignating White's conviction and to reinstate the original murder conviction, special circumstance finding, and LWOP sentence. View "People v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2008, Eddie Arturo Bravo pleaded no contest to multiple charges, including rape and sex offenses involving a minor, in exchange for a 20-year prison sentence. The original judgment included a stayed enhancement for a prior prison term. In 2023, Bravo sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 after the Legislature eliminated certain sentencing enhancements. The trial court resentenced Bravo, striking the prison prior enhancement and other enhancements, but maintained the 20-year aggregate sentence.The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially imposed the agreed-upon 20-year sentence, which included upper terms for specific counts and concurrent middle terms for others. Bravo was paroled in 2022. Following legislative changes, Bravo requested resentencing, arguing for a reduced sentence based on his rehabilitation and lack of public safety risk. The trial court held a hearing, considered the arguments, and ultimately struck the stayed enhancement but maintained the original sentence length.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the fact the enhancement was originally stayed did not preclude resentencing under section 1172.75. The court found no reversible error in the trial court's resentencing decision. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that Bravo received a lesser sentence as required by section 1172.75 because the stayed enhancement was eliminated, even though the aggregate term remained the same. The court also found no error in the trial court's application of section 1385 or section 1170, and it upheld the decision to impose upper terms for certain counts. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Bravo" on Justia Law

In 2012, Jason Robert Hodge pleaded no contest to three felony counts of battery and assault with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to 21 years in prison. On January 5, 2024, Hodge filed two requests in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County: a motion for relief under the Racial Justice Act and a request for resentencing under section 1172.1. The trial court denied both requests in a single order on February 6, 2024, stating it declined to exercise its discretion to recall Hodge’s sentence.Hodge appealed the trial court's decision. His appellate counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo, raising no arguable issues, and Hodge filed a supplemental brief without addressing the appealability issue. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, requested briefing on the appealability of the trial court’s denial of Hodge’s request for resentencing under section 1172.1, considering the Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Loper.The Court of Appeal concluded that neither component of the trial court’s order was appealable. The court held that the trial court’s decision not to exercise its discretion to recall Hodge’s sentence did not affect Hodge’s substantial rights under section 1237, subdivision (b), because the trial court had no statutory obligation to act on Hodge’s request. Additionally, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Hodge’s motion under the Racial Justice Act, as incarcerated defendants whose convictions are final may only raise claims under that act in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "P. v. Hodge" on Justia Law

The petitioner was charged with first-degree murder. During the investigation, the prosecution informed the defense that one of the investigating officers had a sustained finding of dishonesty, and the officer’s department intended to release related records under Penal Code section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The defense counsel requested these records under the California Public Records Act (CPRA). Concurrently, the petitioner filed a Pitchess motion seeking additional Brady material from the officer’s personnel file. The trial court, after an in-camera review, found no additional Brady material and ordered the disclosure of the records related to the officer’s dishonesty, but issued a protective order limiting their dissemination.The petitioner sought an extraordinary writ of mandate to vacate the protective order, arguing that the records were nonconfidential and subject to public inspection under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The trial court had issued the protective order under Evidence Code section 1045(e), which restricts the use of disclosed records to the court proceeding.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court noted that Senate Bill No. 1421 amended sections 832.7 and 832.8 to make certain law enforcement personnel records, including those involving sustained findings of dishonesty, nonconfidential and subject to public disclosure. The court held that the trial court should not have issued a protective order for records that are nonconfidential under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). Consequently, the appellate court granted the petition for writ of mandate and directed the trial court to vacate its protective order concerning the records of the officer’s sustained finding of dishonesty. View "Banuelos v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Enrique Sanchez, the petitioner, sought a writ of mandate to vacate a trial court order directing the San Bernardino County Public Defender to assign a new attorney to represent him. This order was issued after evidence suggested that the deputy public defender currently assigned to Sanchez's case made racially charged remarks during plea negotiations, potentially violating the Racial Justice Act (RJA). Sanchez argued that the trial court's decision was an abuse of discretion.The trial court received a motion from the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence and evaluate the deputy public defender's conflict of interest. The motion included a declaration from the prosecutor detailing the deputy public defender's remarks, which implied racial bias. During a closed hearing, the trial court read the prosecutor's declaration to Sanchez and asked if he wanted the current public defender to continue representing him. Sanchez expressed his desire to retain his current counsel. However, the trial court later ordered the public defender's office to assign a new attorney, citing potential RJA issues and the risk of ineffective assistance of counsel.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing the deputy public defender. The appellate court noted that the RJA's provisions and the potential for implicit bias created an actual conflict of interest that the deputy public defender could not objectively investigate. Additionally, the trial court's decision to prevent potential future RJA claims and ensure adequate representation was within its discretion. The petition for writ of mandate was denied, and the stay on trial court proceedings was vacated. View "Sanchez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law