Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A man used a social media application to communicate with what he believed to be a minor. In reality, he was interacting with a law enforcement officer posing as a 14-year-old girl. Their exchange included plans to meet for sexual contact, and when he arrived at the agreed location, law enforcement apprehended him. Physical evidence found in his vehicle supported the allegation that he intended to engage in sexual activity. At trial, the defendant asserted that he did not know he was interacting with a minor and claimed he had deleted the relevant message thread, losing access to the initial messages where age was mentioned.The Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa, conducted the trial, where a jury found him guilty of meeting a minor for lewd purposes, contacting a minor for a sexual offense, and attempted lewd act upon a child. The trial judge sentenced him to probation. The defense argued that the jury instructions regarding mistake of fact were erroneous, specifically that they required any mistaken belief about the minor’s age to be reasonable. The prosecution conceded the instructional error but asserted it was harmless.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that a mistake of fact as to the minor’s age must be reasonable, when the charged offenses require only an actual belief due to their specific intent elements. The appellate court found the error was prejudicial, emphasizing that the jury might have credited the defendant’s testimony but was prevented from considering an unreasonable yet genuinely held belief. Consequently, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s judgment. View "P. v. Ismaiel" on Justia Law

After entering a no contest plea to charges including willful infliction of corporal injury and dissuading a witness, the petitioner was sentenced to four years’ probation and 60 days in county jail. She was referred to a work release program in lieu of serving her jail time. While participating, she discovered she was pregnant and could not complete her work assignment due to morning sickness. After providing proof of her pregnancy, the sheriff advised her not to return to the worksite because no light duty was available, and her case was sent back to the trial court for further action.The Contra Costa County Superior Court later considered her situation. At a hearing, the court found that she had not willfully violated the terms of the work release program but concluded that the alternative sentence was no longer feasible. The court ordered her to serve the remainder of her jail term in custody, denying her requests for re-referral to the program or a delayed surrender. The petitioner subsequently filed a habeas corpus petition with the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, asserting that her due process rights had been violated.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, held that individuals enrolled in work release programs in lieu of jail time possess a conditional liberty interest that cannot be revoked without due process. The court found that the trial court’s decision to remand the petitioner into custody was based on a factual finding—her unfitness for the program—that was unsupported by the evidence. As a result, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the matter with instructions to re-refer the petitioner to the work release program to complete any remaining days owed. View "In re Riley" on Justia Law

A man was apprehended after leading police on a high-speed chase in a stolen vehicle. When the vehicle was stopped, law enforcement found an AR-style firearm with an overall length of less than 30 inches on the passenger-side floorboard. The man was charged with several offenses, including driving or taking a vehicle without consent, fleeing a police officer while driving recklessly, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of an assault weapon. The information also alleged several aggravating factors related to his criminal history and conduct.In Contra Costa County Superior Court, a jury found the defendant guilty of all charges except receiving a stolen vehicle. The court, after a hearing, found true several aggravating factors and sentenced him to three years and four months, including concurrent terms for some offenses. The sentence for possession of an assault weapon was stayed under Penal Code section 654.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed three issues raised by the defendant: whether California’s ban on assault weapon possession violated the Second Amendment; whether sentences for taking a vehicle without consent and fleeing an officer should have been stayed as based on the same act; and whether the abstract of judgment accurately reflected custody credits. The court held that Penal Code section 30605 does not violate the Second Amendment because there was no evidence in the record that assault weapons covered by the statute are in common use by law-abiding citizens, as required by relevant Supreme Court precedent. The court also held that the two vehicle-related offenses involved separate criminal objectives and thus did not require a stay under section 654. However, the court agreed that the custody credits were miscalculated and directed the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment accordingly. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "People v. Crenshaw" on Justia Law

In 1995, a military veteran was convicted of assaulting and causing the death of his four-month-old daughter, resulting in a 15-years-to-life sentence for a violation of California Penal Code section 273ab. This was his first and only felony conviction, although he had a prior record of mostly DUI offenses. Nearly three decades later, in 2024, he petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.91, arguing that military service-related conditions—specifically traumatic brain injury and substance abuse—were not considered as mitigating factors at his original sentencing.The Superior Court of Solano County initially denied his habeas corpus petition, noting that relief was available through section 1170.91 and instructing him to file a separate resentencing petition. When he subsequently filed a formal resentencing petition under section 1170.91, the trial court summarily denied it without a hearing, stating he had failed to make a prima facie case for relief. The defendant appealed, asserting he was entitled to a public hearing on his petition and that his military-related conditions should have been considered.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that, even assuming the petition was sufficient to require a public hearing, any procedural error was harmless because the defendant was statutorily ineligible for resentencing. The court concluded that under section 1170.91, subdivision (c), individuals convicted of offenses listed as “super strikes” under section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv)—which includes the defendant’s conviction—are categorically excluded from resentencing relief. The court affirmed the denial of the petition, holding that the statutory exclusion applies regardless of whether the conviction was a first offense or resulted from the Three Strikes law. View "P. v. Harrison" on Justia Law

The defendant was residing at a hotel managed by the Department of Mental Health when the hotel’s general manager entered his room to deliver a meal. After discovering the entry, the defendant accused the manager of theft. This confrontation escalated when the defendant returned to the manager’s office and threatened him with a knife. As a result, charges were filed for assault with a deadly weapon and making criminal threats, with allegations of prior serious or violent felony convictions and aggravating sentencing factors.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss one of his previous strike convictions but later granted the prosecution’s request to dismiss one strike as inapplicable. The court bifurcated the trial on the prior conviction and aggravating factors. After the prosecution rested its case, the defendant stipulated to having a prior strike conviction and to the existence of aggravating factors, without being advised of his right to a jury trial on these issues or the penal consequences of his admission. The jury convicted the defendant of making criminal threats but could not reach a verdict on the assault charge. The court sentenced the defendant to the upper term, doubled under the three strikes law, based on his stipulation.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court erred by failing to advise the defendant of his constitutional rights—including the right to a jury trial—before accepting his stipulation to the prior conviction and aggravating factors. The appellate court found these errors prejudicial under the totality of the circumstances. While the conviction was affirmed, the sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. The People were allowed the option to retry the prior conviction and aggravating circumstances. View "P. v. Kinnear" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was charged in October 2022 with possession of child pornography, including an enhancement for possessing a large number of images involving very young minors. In February 2023, he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to probation, jail time under work release, and required to register as a sex offender. The defendant is a registered nurse, and after his conviction, the state Board of Registered Nursing began disciplinary proceedings to remove his license. He lost his job but later received support from his former employer and sought therapy and treatment.In September 2023, the defendant petitioned the Superior Court of Riverside County under Penal Code section 236.15 to vacate his conviction. He argued that his offense was a direct result of sexual violence he suffered as both a child and an adult, including repeated abuse and rapes. The petition was supported by a clinical director who opined that the defendant’s behavior was a “direct result” of trauma repetition linked to his history of sexual violence. After an evidentiary hearing in January 2024, the Superior Court granted the petition and vacated the conviction, leading to the dismissal of disciplinary proceedings against him.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court clarified the requirements for relief under section 236.15 and held that the abuse of discretion standard applies to appellate review. It found that, although the defendant suffered significant sexual violence, his later possession of child pornography was not a “direct result” of that victimization as required by the statute. The court emphasized that multiple contributing factors and the passage of time attenuated the causal connection. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order granting the petition and directed the lower court to deny the petition. View "P. v. S.H." on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, along with two codefendants, was involved in a series of crimes in 1983 that included kidnapping, robbery, sexual assault, and murder. The three men armed themselves and kidnapped two victims from a park, holding one victim in the trunk and sexually assaulting the other. Both victims were eventually shot in the head—one survived, the other was killed. The defendant admitted to participating in the crimes, including the use of a firearm, and pleaded guilty to first-degree murder, oral copulation in concert, and rape in concert as part of a plea agreement. In exchange, special circumstance allegations were dropped, and other counts were dismissed.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County originally sentenced the defendant to 27 years to life. Decades later, following the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, which limited felony-murder liability, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing he was not a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The Superior Court denied his petition, finding him ineligible for relief because he was a major participant and acted with reckless indifference. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, as required by recent case law.After an evidentiary hearing, which included testimony from a retired detective and the defendant’s own statements at a parole hearing, the Superior Court again denied the resentencing petition. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the record under the substantial evidence standard and affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling. The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was a major participant in the underlying felonies and acted with reckless indifference to human life, making him ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6. The order denying resentencing was affirmed. View "People v. Grandberry" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree murder with special circumstances, two counts of burglary, and one count of robbery, stemming from a 1986 home invasion burglary in which two victims were killed. The jury imposed the death penalty for each murder, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to death as well as a consecutive determinate term of seven years, which included a one-year enhancement for a prior prison term. The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in 1995, and subsequent federal habeas corpus petitions were denied.Years later, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified the defendant as potentially eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, because the one-year enhancement for a prior prison term was no longer valid under current law. The defendant requested a full resentencing, including the possibility of striking the special circumstance findings and modifying the death sentence. The People objected, arguing that section 1172.75 did not authorize resentencing of a death sentence, which could only be challenged by a writ of habeas corpus under section 1509. Despite the objection, the Ventura County Superior Court recalled the entire sentence, including the death penalty.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the matter. The court held that while Penal Code section 1172.75 authorized recall and resentencing for invalid prior prison term enhancements, it did not empower a trial court to recall or resentence a final, affirmed death sentence. The court found that such action would amount to a collateral attack on the judgment of death, which section 1509—enacted by voter initiative—explicitly reserves for habeas corpus proceedings. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order recalling the death sentence, affirmed the order as to the noncapital portions, and remanded for resentencing on those noncapital portions only. View "People v. Cain" on Justia Law

In 2008, the petitioner was convicted by a jury of multiple counts, including attempted first degree murder, attempted murder of police officers, infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant, and attempted arson. The trial court sentenced him to lengthy prison terms and imposed an $8,000 restitution fine under Penal Code section 1202.4, in addition to direct victim restitution and a court security fee. Over a decade later, the California Legislature enacted a statute making restitution fines imposed under section 1202.4 unenforceable and uncollectible after 10 years, and stating that the portion of the judgment imposing such fines is vacated.After the new law took effect, the petitioner sought relief in the Superior Court by filing a habeas corpus petition, arguing that the statutory vacatur of the restitution fine required a full resentencing. When this was denied, he filed a further petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two.The California Court of Appeal held that the statute’s vacatur of the restitution fine after 10 years does not entitle the petitioner to a full resentencing. The court reasoned that this change only affects the fine and does not alter the interdependent components of the aggregate prison term. Instead, the court concluded that the proper procedure for reflecting the vacated fine is to file a postjudgment motion in the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment, so it conforms to the judgment as modified by statute. The appellate court denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus, explaining that habeas relief was unavailable because an adequate legal remedy exists—a motion to correct the abstract of judgment in the trial court. View "In re Mattison" on Justia Law

In 1998, a jury convicted Travis Scott Frederickson of two counts of first-degree murder, found that he personally used a firearm, and found true a special circumstance of multiple murder. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Following changes in California law that gave courts discretion to strike certain firearm enhancements, Frederickson petitioned for resentencing. In 2024, Frederickson asked the Superior Court of Orange County to recall his sentence and resentence him under the amended law. The prosecution agreed that the court could resentence as to the firearm enhancement, but argued that the court could not take any action that would effectively strike or dismiss the special circumstance finding.The Superior Court, however, reduced Frederickson’s convictions from first-degree to second-degree murder and imposed sentences on those lesser charges, including firearm enhancements. The trial court explicitly stated it was not striking or dismissing the special circumstance findings, but rather vacating the first-degree murder convictions; since the special circumstance only attaches to first-degree murder, it no longer applied once those convictions were vacated. The court entered new judgments for second-degree murder and imposed sentences accordingly.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not violate Penal Code section 1385.1—which prohibits judges from striking or dismissing special circumstance findings—by vacating the first-degree murder convictions and resentencing on the lesser offenses under section 1172.1. The appellate court reasoned that when a conviction is validly vacated, the attached special circumstance falls away by operation of law, not by judicial action proscribed by section 1385.1. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Frederickson" on Justia Law