Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1998, Khyle Armando Briscoe, then 21, participated in a robbery with Shaun P. During the robbery, Briscoe and Shaun P. both had guns. A struggle ensued, resulting in Ben P., the robbery victim, fatally shooting Shaun P. Briscoe was charged with first-degree murder, robbery, and burglary, with firearm-use enhancements and a special circumstance of murder during a robbery and burglary. A jury convicted Briscoe on all counts, and he was sentenced to life without parole.Briscoe filed a motion in 2022 for a parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051, which allows certain youth offenders to seek parole but excludes those sentenced to life without parole for special circumstance murder. He argued that this exclusion violated equal protection under the California and U.S. Constitutions. The trial court denied his motion, adhering to the majority view that section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Briscoe appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court noted that section 3051’s exclusion of youth offenders sentenced to life without parole for special circumstance murder was previously upheld in People v. Hardin. However, Briscoe raised a narrower challenge, arguing that excluding youth offenders sentenced under section 190.2, subdivision (d) for special circumstance murder, while including those convicted of first-degree felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(3), violated equal protection. The court agreed, finding no rational basis for treating these equally culpable offenders differently.The court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case for a Franklin proceeding and a section 3051 parole hearing, holding that section 3051’s exclusion of youth offenders sentenced under section 190.2, subdivision (d) for murder during a robbery or burglary violated equal protection. View "People v. Briscoe" on Justia Law

The petitioner sought resentencing on his voluntary manslaughter conviction under section 1172.6 of the Penal Code. He had entered a plea to voluntary manslaughter in 2019, after the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437, which eliminated certain theories of murder liability. The petitioner argued that his plea should be reconsidered because he could have faced attempted murder liability under a now-invalid theory had he gone to trial.The Tulare County Superior Court initially charged the petitioner with murder and attempted murder, along with firearm and gang allegations. In 2019, as part of a plea deal, the petitioner pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter, and the remaining charges were dismissed. He was sentenced to 11 years in prison. In 2022, the petitioner filed for resentencing under section 1172.6, but the trial court denied the petition, stating that he was ineligible because he entered his plea after the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the petitioner was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 because he entered his plea after the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437, which had already eliminated the imputed malice theories of murder liability. The court noted that section 1172.6 is intended to provide relief for specific convictions obtained under now-invalid theories of liability, not for dismissed charges. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the petitioner could not show he could not presently be convicted of murder due to changes in the law, as required by section 1172.6. View "People v. Gallegos" on Justia Law

In March 2010, the defendant pled guilty to two counts of attempted murder and actively participating in a criminal street gang, resulting in a 22-year prison sentence. Approximately 12 years later, he filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The trial court admitted statements the defendant made during a parole risk assessment interview and testimony from a parole hearing, ultimately denying the petition.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County initially handled the case, where the defendant's petition for resentencing was reviewed. The trial court admitted the parole hearing transcript and the defendant’s statements from the comprehensive risk assessment, despite objections from the defense counsel on grounds of hearsay and constitutional violations. The court found that the defendant’s statements demonstrated an intent to kill and denied the petition for resentencing.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The defendant argued that his statements and testimony from the parole proceedings should be subject to use immunity and were involuntary. The appellate court held that statements made in preparation for, and during, a parole hearing are not subject to use immunity under the reasoning of People v. Coleman and related authorities. The court also found that the statements were not involuntary, as the defendant was advised of his rights and chose to participate. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting the statements and testimony, affirming the order denying the petition for resentencing. View "People v. Zavala" on Justia Law

The case involves Edward Wayne Reid, who was charged with two crimes against Jane Doe: assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and willfully inflicting corporal injury upon a domestic partner resulting in a traumatic condition. Jane testified that Reid grabbed her by the throat, applied pressure, caused her difficulty in breathing and swallowing, and made her feel dizzy. A deputy corroborated Jane's account, noting she reported seeing stars and feeling faint during the incident.The magistrate at the preliminary hearing found probable cause for the assault charge but dismissed the domestic violence charge, stating there was no evidence of a "traumatic injury." The People refiled the information with both charges, and Reid moved to dismiss the domestic violence charge again. The trial court granted Reid's motion, agreeing with the magistrate's assessment.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing provided a rational ground for assuming Reid inflicted corporal injury upon Jane through choking, which resulted in a traumatic condition as defined by the statute. The court emphasized that the statutory definition of a traumatic condition includes impeding normal breathing or circulation of blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck. The court found that Jane's difficulty in breathing and feeling dizzy or faint met this definition.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order dismissing the domestic violence charge and remanded the case with directions to allow Reid to withdraw his plea to the assault charge. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the charge of willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition. View "P. v. Reid" on Justia Law

In 2009, the defendant was convicted by a jury of multiple charges, including two counts of robbery, attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, two counts of assault with a firearm, discharging a firearm at an occupied building, unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful possession of ammunition, and actively participating in a criminal street gang. He was sentenced to a total of 90 years and four months in prison. The judgment was affirmed on appeal in 2010.In October 2023, the defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which allows for retroactive relief for certain convictions under amended murder laws. The Superior Court of Riverside County held a status conference and a hearing on the petition. The defendant was not present, but counsel was appointed to represent him. During the hearing, the prosecutor argued that the jury instructions from the original trial, which were based on direct aiding and abetting, precluded the defendant from relief. The defense counsel agreed with the prosecutor's recitation of the jury instructions. The court summarily denied the petition without reviewing the record of conviction or any documentary evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court failed to conduct the necessary inquiry mandated by section 1172.6, subdivision (c), which requires a review of the record of conviction to determine a petitioner's eligibility for relief. The appellate court concluded that the trial court's summary denial of the petition was inadequate and that the appellate court should not perform the trial court's function of reviewing the record in the first instance.The appellate court reversed the order denying the petition and remanded the case to the trial court to conduct the requisite proceedings under section 1172.6, subdivision (c). The court did not take a position on whether the defendant ultimately made a prima facie claim for relief. View "P. v. Gallardo" on Justia Law

Marquishon Hughey and Dequon Dillard were convicted of kidnapping and second-degree robbery after they, along with an accomplice, entered an AT&T store in Camarillo, California, and forced three employees to move to a back safe room at gunpoint. The employees were then ordered to load phones into bags. The defendants were sentenced to 12 years in state prison, including a two-year, out-on-bail enhancement.The Ventura County Superior Court found the defendants guilty of simple kidnapping, a lesser included offense of aggravated kidnapping, and second-degree robbery. The court determined that the movement of the victims was more than incidental to the robbery, as it increased the risk of physical and psychological harm by removing the victims from public view and placing them in a confined space.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case and affirmed the kidnapping convictions. The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that the movement of the victims was not merely incidental to the robbery. The movement increased the risk of harm and psychological trauma, as the victims were moved to a hidden area, which decreased the likelihood of detection and increased the danger inherent in a victim’s foreseeable attempts to escape. The court also noted that the defendants could have committed the robbery without moving all the employees to the back room.However, the appellate court stayed the two-year, out-on-bail enhancements because there was no evidence that the defendants were convicted of the primary offense in Tulare County, which is required to impose such an enhancement. The judgments were otherwise affirmed. View "People v. Hughey" on Justia Law

In 2006, the defendant and other gang members robbed two men at gunpoint in a Denny’s restroom. During the robbery, a friend of the victims, Armand Jones, entered and resisted, leading to a chase outside. Shots were fired, resulting in Jones' death and another person being wounded. The defendant was charged with murder, attempted murder, robbery, and other related offenses. The prosecutor conceded the defendant did not shoot the victims but argued he was guilty of felony murder for participating in the robbery and attempted murder as a natural consequence of the robbery.The jury convicted the defendant on all charges, including special circumstances that the murder was committed during a robbery and to further gang activities. The trial court sentenced him to life without parole, and the convictions were affirmed on appeal. In 2022, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that the jury's findings did not meet the new requirements for felony murder liability under Senate Bill 1437, which narrowed the scope of vicarious liability for murder.The Superior Court of Orange County summarily denied the petition, citing the jury's finding that the defendant acted with intent to kill. The defendant appealed, arguing that the record did not conclusively establish his ineligibility for resentencing. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred in its denial. The appellate court held that the defendant must have assisted the actual killer in committing the murderous act, not just the underlying felony, to be liable under the revised felony murder rule. The court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's entitlement to resentencing. View "People v. Kelly" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with three felonies related to firearm and ammunition possession. During a traffic stop, police officers discovered a loaded handgun in his vehicle. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the traffic stop was unduly prolonged and pretextual, and dismissed the case.The Sonoma County Superior Court found that the traffic stop was pretextual and unduly prolonged, as the officers could have issued the citation at the gas station where they first observed the defendant. The court also noted that new legislation would make pretextual stops illegal, although this law was not yet in effect. The court concluded that the stop was designed to allow time for a canine unit to arrive and conduct a search, which it deemed unreasonable.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court's finding of an unduly prolonged stop was unsupported by substantial evidence. The appellate court noted that the traffic stop began when the vehicle was pulled over, not when the officers first observed the defendant. The court found that the time taken to write the citation and conduct the canine search was within the normal duration for such activities. Additionally, the court clarified that the new Vehicle Code section 2806.5, which prohibits pretextual stops, was not in effect at the time of the stop and does not alter the federal constitutional analysis regarding pretextual stops. The appellate court reversed the trial court's order suppressing the evidence and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "People v. Valle" on Justia Law

In 2018 and 2019, a minor, J.S., committed a series of serious crimes, including seven street robberies, two burglaries, an attempted robbery resulting in murder, and the drugging and sexual assault of a 14-year-old girl. J.S. was 16 and 17 years old at the time of these offenses. The People filed an 18-count petition against J.S., including charges of murder, robbery, burglary, and sexual assault, and sought to transfer him to adult criminal court.The juvenile court in Ventura County conducted a transfer hearing and found that J.S. was not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system's jurisdiction, which would expire when he turned 25. The court considered J.S.'s criminal sophistication, previous delinquent history, and the gravity of the offenses. Despite evidence of J.S.'s participation in rehabilitation programs and expert testimony suggesting potential for rehabilitation, the court concluded that the severity and premeditated nature of his crimes, along with his behavior in custody, indicated a need for prolonged treatment and supervision beyond the juvenile system's capacity.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the juvenile court's decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court affirmed the transfer order, agreeing that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's findings. The appellate court emphasized that it does not reweigh evidence or substitute its discretion for that of the trial court. The court found that the juvenile court had appropriately considered the statutory criteria and expert testimony, and its conclusion that J.S. was not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system was supported by clear and convincing evidence. View "People v. J.S." on Justia Law

Luis Alfonso Martinez was convicted of multiple counts of sexual abuse against a minor, Jane Doe, who was the daughter of his long-term girlfriend. The abuse began when Doe was around seven years old and continued for several years. Martinez was found guilty of attempted sexual penetration of a child under 10, sexual penetration of a child under 10, continuous sexual abuse of a child, lewd acts upon a child under 14, and lewd acts upon a child under 14 by use of force, duress, and fear. The jury also found aggravating factors, including the victim's vulnerability and Martinez's abuse of a position of trust.The Superior Court of Riverside County sentenced Martinez to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life, plus a determinate term of 21 years and four months. Martinez appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that the charges were in the alternative, leading to multiple convictions that violated Penal Code section 288.5, subdivision (c). He also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the conviction of lewd acts by force, fear, or duress, and claimed the trial court abused its discretion in responding to a jury question about the definition of "sexual penetration."The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, agreed that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on alternative charges was prejudicial error. The appellate court decided to remand the case for a hearing to determine which counts to vacate, rather than ordering a new trial or deciding which counts to dismiss itself. The court found sufficient evidence to support the conviction for lewd acts by force, fear, or duress, noting Martinez's position of authority and the victim's fear. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's response to the jury's question, as the response correctly stated the law and did not prejudice Martinez.The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "P. v. Martinez" on Justia Law