Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Kavonte Amarion Vaughn sought a writ of mandate to vacate an order denying his request for mental health diversion under California Penal Code sections 1001.35 and 1001.36. Vaughn was charged with two counts of second-degree robbery and one count of second-degree attempted robbery. The trial court found that Vaughn met the eligibility and suitability requirements for mental health diversion, including that he would not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety. However, the court denied the diversion, citing Vaughn's failure to make a "serious enough effort" to be deemed suitable for mental health diversion.The Los Angeles County Superior Court initially reviewed the case. Vaughn posted bail and underwent a psychological evaluation, which confirmed his mental health issues, including schizoaffective disorder and PTSD. Despite the trial court's acknowledgment of Vaughn's eligibility, it denied the motion for diversion, focusing on Vaughn's perceived lack of seriousness about his mental health treatment, particularly his failure to bring his medication bottles to the evaluation.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering the legislative goals of the mental health diversion law. The appellate court noted that Vaughn had made a prima facie showing of eligibility and suitability for diversion and that the trial court's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court emphasized that the trial court's discretion must align with the legislative intent to broadly apply mental health diversion to reduce recidivism and support public safety.The appellate court granted Vaughn's petition, directing the trial court to vacate its order denying mental health diversion and to grant the motion, barring any evidence of changed circumstances affecting Vaughn's suitability. The trial court must ensure that the recommended mental health treatment program meets Vaughn's specialized needs. View "Vaughn v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Wayne Jones was convicted of first-degree murder for the beating death of Michael Robinson. On January 11, 2020, Jones and Robinson were at a shopping center. Jones retrieved a stick attached to his bicycle, followed Robinson, and struck him in the head multiple times, causing severe injuries. Robinson was placed in a medically induced coma and underwent surgery. Despite initial signs of potential recovery, Robinson's family decided to withdraw life support based on his predicted quality of life and limited resources. Robinson died on January 16, 2020, and the medical examiner determined the cause of death was blunt force injuries to the head.The Superior Court of San Diego County found Jones guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced him to 25 years to life, plus one year for a weapon enhancement. Jones appealed, arguing that the withdrawal of life support broke the chain of legal causation, the prosecutor committed misconduct, there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation, and the trial court applied the wrong standard in denying his motion to reduce the verdict.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the withdrawal of life support was a dependent intervening cause of death, not an independent one, and thus did not absolve Jones of liability. The court found sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation, noting Jones's actions before and during the attack. The court also determined that the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments did not constitute misconduct and that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on causation. Finally, the court found no error in the trial court's denial of Jones's motion to reduce the verdict, affirming the conviction and sentence. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 2017, Michael Ingram was found to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) and committed to the State Department of State Hospitals (DSH) for an indeterminate term under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). In 2020, he filed a petition for conditional release, arguing he was not likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior if released under supervision and treatment in the community. The trial court denied his petition, and Ingram appealed, challenging both the trial court’s decision and the constitutionality of the SVPA’s conditional release provisions.The Superior Court of Sacramento County initially handled the case, where a jury found Ingram to be an SVP. Ingram then filed a petition for conditional release, which the trial court denied. The court found that Ingram had not made significant progress in his treatment program and that his risk to the community remained unchanged. The court also noted that while Ingram might receive better treatment in the community, the issue before the court was whether he could be safely released, not whether he could receive better treatment elsewhere.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding that substantial evidence supported the denial of Ingram’s petition. The appellate court noted that all experts agreed Ingram continued to meet the definition of an SVP and that he had not yet learned to control his sexually violent behavior. The court also found that Ingram’s proposed alternative conditional release program, which included 24/7, one-on-one supervision, was neither reasonable nor required by the SVPA. Additionally, the court rejected Ingram’s constitutional challenges, noting that these issues were not properly raised in the lower court and that Ingram lacked standing to challenge potential delays in finding housing for conditionally released SVPs. View "People v. Ingram" on Justia Law

In 2018, the defendant was sentenced to 12 years in state prison for multiple offenses, including shooting at an occupied vehicle and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. In 2022, the trial court recalled the sentence under Penal Code section 1172.75, struck a prior prison term enhancement, and resentenced the defendant to 11 years. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by imposing the upper term based on aggravating factors not found true beyond a reasonable doubt and claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to this.The Superior Court of Butte County initially sentenced the defendant to 12 years, citing multiple aggravating factors such as the defendant's prior criminal record and unsatisfactory performance on probation. Upon resentencing in 2022, the trial court struck the prior prison term enhancement but reimposed the upper term, resulting in an 11-year sentence. The defendant did not object to the reimposition of the upper term during resentencing.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that under section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), the trial court was not required to find aggravating factors true beyond a reasonable doubt if the upper term was previously imposed. The appellate court held that the trial court did not err in reimposing the upper term and that the defendant's counsel was not ineffective for failing to object, as there was no sound legal basis for such an objection. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's resentencing order. View "People v. Brannon-Thompson" on Justia Law

Two defendants, Phalon Amad Hall and Patrick Redman, were convicted of home invasion robbery and kidnapping, with additional gang-related sentencing enhancements. Hall was identified as one of the robbers, while Redman was accused of aiding and abetting by recruiting a robber, providing a firearm, and acting as the getaway driver. The case involved a violent home invasion where the victim, A.T., was beaten, forced to open a safe, and tied up while the robbers looted his house.In the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, both defendants were found guilty of home invasion robbery and kidnapping. The jury also found multiple sentencing enhancements to be true, including gang-related enhancements. Hall received a sentence of 15 years to life for robbery, while Redman was sentenced to 60 years to life. Both defendants appealed their convictions and sentences.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court reversed the kidnapping convictions, ruling that the movement of the victim within his home was not substantial enough to constitute kidnapping. The court also reversed the gang-related sentencing enhancements due to legislative changes that retroactively altered the definition and proof requirements for establishing a criminal street gang. The court affirmed the robbery convictions and other aspects of the judgment but remanded the case for complete resentencing in light of the reversals. View "People v. Hall" on Justia Law

In 2008, a jury convicted Travis Lanell Montgomery of multiple charges, including conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery, attempted robbery, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The trial court sentenced him to 61 years to life, which was later reduced to 26 years to life on appeal. In January 2024, Montgomery filed a declaration alleging racial bias under the California Racial Justice Act (RJA) and requested discovery of evidence to support his claims. The trial court treated this as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and denied it for failing to state a prima facie case for relief. The court also denied the discovery motion, citing lack of jurisdiction.Montgomery appealed the trial court's denial of his discovery motion, arguing that it was appealable as an order affecting his substantial rights. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, dismissed the appeal, stating that the trial court's order was not appealable. The court explained that a trial court order denying relief that it has no jurisdiction to grant does not affect a defendant’s substantial rights and is therefore not appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b).The Court of Appeal held that the RJA does not authorize a freestanding discovery motion; such a motion must be ancillary to an ongoing action or proceeding. Since Montgomery's petition for writ of habeas corpus was summarily denied, there was no pending proceeding in which the discovery motion could be considered. Consequently, the trial court correctly denied the discovery motion for lack of jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed, but Montgomery retains the option to file a new petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal, where he can renew his discovery motion. View "In re Montgomery" on Justia Law

In January 2008, Ignacio Ruiz, Jr., participated in an attack on rival gang members, resulting in one death. Ruiz, who was 16 at the time, was found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder, attempted murder, and street terrorism, with several gang and firearm enhancements. In August 2010, he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the murder charge, among other consecutive terms. Ruiz was resentenced in 2016, but his sentence remained nearly the same.Ruiz filed a petition for resentencing in March 2023 under California Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d), which allows individuals sentenced to life without parole for crimes committed as minors to seek resentencing after 15 years of incarceration. The Superior Court of Orange County denied the petition, calculating Ruiz’s incarceration period from his sentencing date in August 2010, and found he had not been incarcerated for 15 years.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Ruiz’s argument that his period of incarceration began in January 2008 when he was taken into custody, not from his sentencing date. The court interpreted the term "incarcerated" in section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A) to mean the time when Ruiz was first placed in jail, which was January 29, 2008. Since Ruiz had been continuously incarcerated since that date, he had been incarcerated for more than 15 years by the time he filed his petition in March 2023.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case for reconsideration of Ruiz’s petition for resentencing, instructing the lower court to consider the petition based on the correct interpretation of the statute. View "People v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

In 2000, the petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 15 years to life, plus an additional four years for a firearm enhancement. While serving this sentence, he was convicted in 2008 of aggravated assault by a prisoner and received a four-year determinate sentence under the Three Strikes law, to be served consecutively. In 2022, the petitioner was considered for parole under the Elderly Parole Program, which applies to inmates over 50 who have served at least 20 years. The parole board found him suitable for parole, but the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) required him to serve his four-year determinate sentence first.The petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Kings County Superior Court, arguing that he was entitled to immediate release and that his determinate sentence should not apply. The superior court denied the petition, ruling that the petitioner was ineligible for parole under the Elderly Parole Program because he had been sentenced under the Three Strikes law.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the Three Strikes exclusion under section 3055, subdivision (g), applies to prisoners who were convicted and sentenced under the Three Strikes law, even if they had already commenced serving a prison sentence. The court rejected the petitioner’s arguments, stating that his "current sentence" included the term imposed under the Three Strikes law, making him ineligible for early parole release under the Elderly Parole Program. The court also found that the legislative history confirmed this interpretation and that the case of In re Hoze did not apply because it did not address the Three Strikes exclusion. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "In re Brown" on Justia Law

Flor de Maria Mejia was involved in a hit-and-run accident where she struck a bicyclist, William McGill, with her van and fled the scene. The collision caused significant damage to her vehicle and injuries to herself. Shortly after the incident, a parking control officer observed Mejia driving the damaged van and later identified her as the driver. Mejia and her boyfriend subsequently burned the van. Mejia sought medical attention, claiming her boyfriend had assaulted her, but refused a rape examination. Evidence from the burned van and Mejia's social media messages linked her to the crime.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County convicted Mejia of fleeing the scene of an injury accident, resulting in a three-year prison sentence. The jury found her guilty of violating Vehicle Code § 20001, subd. (b)(2), and imposed a restitution obligation of $7,500. Mejia's defense included multiple inconsistent statements to the police and an attempt to shift blame to her boyfriend, Carter, who also testified at trial.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Mejia challenged the identification process, the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments, and the sentencing enhancement for personal infliction of great bodily injury. The court found the identification process was not unduly suggestive, and any assumed Griffin error (prosecutor's comment on Mejia's failure to testify) was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also addressed the prosecutor's improper comment during rebuttal, concluding that the trial court's immediate and forceful admonition to the jury mitigated any potential prejudice.The court upheld the jury's finding of the sentencing enhancement, stating substantial evidence supported the conclusion that Mejia's failure to render aid exacerbated McGill's injuries. The court affirmed the trial court's restitution order, finding no abuse of discretion. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "People v. Mejia" on Justia Law

Nathaniel DiMaggio filed a petition for writ of mandate to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his cellphone and tablet. DiMaggio argued that the Monterey County Sheriff’s Office exceeded the scope of the search warrant and that the trial court erred in finding the sheriff’s office acted in good faith. The Monterey County District Attorney contended that the sheriff’s office properly executed the search warrant and acted in good faith.The Monterey County Superior Court issued a search warrant authorizing the search of DiMaggio’s cellphone and tablet for evidence related to a sexual assault within a specific date range. During the search, the sheriff’s office found images of suspected child pornography, which were outside the specified date range. DiMaggio filed a motion to suppress this evidence, arguing it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court found that the sheriff’s office exceeded the scope of the warrant but denied the motion to suppress, applying the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and agreed with DiMaggio. The court found that the sheriff’s office knowingly exceeded the scope of the search warrant by including items without timestamps, which were not authorized by the warrant. The court held that the good faith exception did not apply because the actions of the sheriff’s office were not objectively reasonable and were part of a standard protocol that disregarded the warrant’s limitations. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to suppress and to enter a new order suppressing any evidence obtained outside the date and time limitations set forth in the search warrant. View "DiMaggio v. Superior Court" on Justia Law