Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was charged with vehicle theft and receiving stolen property. He pled no contest to misdemeanor vehicle theft, and the court placed him on three years of probation, reserving the issue of victim restitution. The prosecutor did not inform the court or the defendant of a $440 restitution claim submitted by the victim before the probation period ended. The court did not order the defendant to pay any specific restitution amount during his probation.The defendant's probation expired without any restitution order being issued. He then filed a petition for dismissal under Penal Code section 1203.4, asserting he had fulfilled all probation conditions. The probation department supported his petition, confirming he met all terms and no victim restitution was ordered. However, the prosecutor objected, claiming the defendant still owed $440 in restitution. The trial court denied the petition, citing the reserved restitution.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that the defendant fulfilled all probation conditions since no specific restitution amount was ordered during his probation. The court emphasized that reserving restitution is not equivalent to ordering payment of a specific amount. The court also noted that the prosecutor's failure to pursue the restitution claim during the probation period meant the defendant was not responsible for any unpaid restitution. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's order denying the defendant's petition for dismissal. View "People v. Daffeh" on Justia Law

In 1987, Michael Hill was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death. Hill maintained that the murders were committed by Michael McCray, whose statements to the police incriminated both himself and Hill. McCray did not testify at trial, invoking his privilege against self-incrimination, but his statements were admitted under the hearsay rule. Decades later, Hill discovered that the prosecution had failed to disclose a promise not to prosecute McCray for his involvement in the case. Hill filed a habeas corpus petition alleging violations of Brady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois.The trial court dismissed Hill’s claims, finding he failed to establish a prima facie case. The court concluded that the evidence against Hill was overwhelming and that the failure to disclose the non-prosecution agreement did not undermine confidence in the verdict. The court also found that Hill did not plead that false evidence was presented to the jury, as required under Napue.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found that Hill established a prima facie case for both Brady and Napue violations. The court noted that McCray’s testimony at the preliminary hearing was misleading and that the prosecution’s suppression of the non-prosecution agreement allowed McCray to assert his privilege against self-incrimination, leading to the admission of his statements without cross-examination. The court concluded that the suppressed evidence was material and could have affected the jury’s verdict. The court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing the trial court to issue an order to show cause. View "In re Hill" on Justia Law

The case involves a shooting incident that occurred around midnight on October 7, 2020, in San Francisco. The victim, who was intoxicated, was walking home when a white SUV approached him. After a brief interaction, the SUV drove away, but the victim made an obscene gesture, prompting the driver to return and fire two shots, one of which hit the victim's leg. The police later found a nine-millimeter Luger cartridge case at the scene. Six days later, officers located a white Mercedes SUV matching the description, arrested Raymond Tidd, and found a loaded gun and a similar cartridge in the vehicle.In the Superior Court of San Francisco, Tidd was charged with attempted murder, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle. He pled guilty to additional firearm possession charges. At trial, the prosecution presented expert testimony from a firearms toolmark analyst, Jacobus Swanepoel, who claimed that the cartridge case found at the scene matched a test-fired cartridge from Tidd's gun. Despite the defense's objections, the trial court allowed this testimony. The jury convicted Tidd of assault with a firearm and discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle but could not reach a verdict on the attempted murder charge.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court had abused its discretion by admitting Swanepoel's testimony without sufficient evidence of its reliability. The court noted that Swanepoel's method lacked objective standards and was based on subjective judgment without supporting studies or validation. Consequently, the court held that the admission of this expert testimony was prejudicial and reversed the judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "People v. Tidd" on Justia Law

In 2017, a minor admitted to two counts of assault with intent to commit rape and was initially placed in a Level B program. Due to multiple probation violations, the juvenile court later committed him to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) in 2019. After being discharged from DJJ in April 2023, the juvenile court imposed a probation condition requiring the minor to register as a sex offender under Penal Code section 290.008. The minor appealed, arguing that this requirement violated his equal protection rights because it treated him differently from minors who committed similar offenses after the juvenile justice realignment, which closed DJJ and transferred responsibilities to county facilities.The Superior Court of Sacramento County upheld the probation condition, rejecting the minor's equal protection argument. The court found that the sex offender registration requirement did not involve a loss of liberty and thus did not implicate a fundamental right, applying the rational basis standard of review. The court reasoned that the Legislature could have determined that minors in county facilities have a lower risk of recidivism due to more effective treatment, justifying the differential treatment.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the rational basis standard applied because the sex offender registration requirement did not involve a fundamental right or suspect classification. The court found that a rational basis existed for the differential treatment, as the Legislature could have reasonably concluded that minors already in DJJ custody posed a higher risk of recidivism and required continued registration to protect public safety. Thus, the court found no equal protection violation and affirmed the dispositional order. View "People v. I.B." on Justia Law

In 1997, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder with a firearm enhancement and sentenced to 15 years to life, plus an additional 10 years. In January 2020, he filed a petition under former section 1170.95, which was summarily denied. In January 2023, he filed a motion for relief under section 745 of the California Racial Justice Act (RJA), claiming racial bias in his conviction and sentence. The trial court denied the motion, citing improper service and failure to state a violation of the RJA.The defendant appealed, arguing that he made a prima facie case for a hearing under section 745 and that the denial violated his equal protection rights. The People contended that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion and that the denial was not erroneous. The defendant countered that his motion was authorized under section 745, subdivision (b).The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the defendant's motion was prematurely filed under the RJA’s phased-in retroactivity provisions. Specifically, the court noted that the defendant's case fell within the last phase of eligibility for relief, commencing January 1, 2026. As a result, the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to consider the motion, rendering its order void. The appellate court vacated the trial court's order and dismissed the appeal. View "People v. Vigil" on Justia Law

In 2005, Gerardo Lopez was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances of committing the murder during a robbery and kidnapping. The prosecution's theory included felony murder. In 2022, Lopez petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6, arguing that changes in the law should apply to his case. The trial court denied his petition at the prima facie stage, citing the jury's findings that Lopez had the specific intent to kill and was engaged in the kidnapping, which disqualified him from resentencing.The Superior Court of Orange County found that the jury's special circumstance findings, which included Lopez's specific intent to kill, precluded him from relief under section 1172.6. The court noted that the jury instructions required a finding of specific intent to kill for the kidnapping special circumstance, and thus, Lopez was not convicted under any imputed malice theory.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that under section 189, subdivision (e)(2), a participant in a felony who has the intent to kill is liable for murder without needing to assist in the killing itself. The court concluded that the jury's findings that Lopez committed kidnapping with the intent to kill met the requirements of section 189, subdivision (e)(2), making him ineligible for resentencing. The court affirmed the postjudgment order, agreeing that Lopez's petition was correctly denied at the prima facie stage. View "People v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Jermaine Randy Howard was convicted of second-degree murder after shooting a man at an unlicensed nightclub in San Jose. Howard claimed he acted in self-defense, but the jury rejected this defense. Before sentencing, Howard filed a motion alleging the prosecutor violated the California Racial Justice Act (RJA) by questioning him about his connection to East Palo Alto, which he argued was racially biased. The trial court denied the motion, finding Howard failed to make a prima facie showing of an RJA violation, and sentenced him to 19 years to life in prison.Howard appealed, arguing the trial court erred in denying his RJA motion and that the prosecutor's cross-examination and closing arguments violated the RJA and his due process rights. He also contended that the jury instructions misstated the law regarding murder, imperfect self-defense, and heat of passion, cumulatively prejudicing his defense.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in concluding Howard had not made a prima facie showing of an RJA violation regarding the prosecutor's cross-examination about East Palo Alto. The appellate court conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on Howard's RJA motion. The court rejected Howard's claims of instructional error, finding the jury instructions correctly stated the law and did not mislead the jury about the prosecution's burden of proof.The appellate court's main holding was that Howard made a prima facie showing of an RJA violation, warranting a hearing on his motion. The court conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, affirming the conviction and sentence otherwise. If the trial court denies relief on remand, the judgment will be reinstated; if relief is granted, further proceedings will follow. View "People v. Howard" on Justia Law

The defendant pled no contest to making criminal threats and admitted to a prior serious felony. Under a negotiated agreement, the trial court imposed and suspended an eight-year prison sentence, placing him on a two-year term of formal probation. Nearly two years later, the probation department filed a petition alleging the defendant violated probation by failing to contact the department for three consecutive months. The trial court revoked probation and ordered the defendant to serve the previously suspended sentence.The Superior Court of Tehama County initially placed the defendant on probation in February 2021, with a two-year term starting from that date. The court credited him with 228 days for time served in county jail. In January 2023, the probation department filed a petition to revoke probation, which the court granted after the defendant admitted to the violation. The court terminated probation and imposed the suspended eight-year sentence.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The defendant argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke probation in 2023 because his probation term should have ended in July 2022, considering the 228 days credited for time served. The appellate court rejected this argument, stating that there is no legal basis for reducing a probation term by the time already served in custody. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to terminate probation, given the defendant's repeated failures to report to probation. Additionally, the appellate court found no ineffective assistance of counsel and agreed that the abstract of judgment should be corrected to reflect the proper conviction assessment.The appellate court affirmed the judgment with directions to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect a $30 conviction assessment pursuant to Government Code section 70373. View "People v. Dauterman" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of 20 counts of oral copulation by duress and sodomy by duress against an employee, Jane Doe. The relationship began consensually but evolved into a coercive and abusive dynamic. The defendant required Doe to perform daily oral and anal sex, threatening her employment and pay if she refused. Doe testified that she initially participated willingly but later felt compelled due to the defendant's escalating control and threats.The Santa Clara County Superior Court sentenced the defendant to 60 years in prison, with consecutive lower terms of three years for each count. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its jury instructions on duress and the reasonable mistake of fact defense. He also contended that the court improperly allowed Doe to testify about his state of mind and that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not err in its instructions on duress, finding that the prosecution's theory of duress was supported by the evidence of the defendant's control and threats. The court also upheld the reasonable mistake of fact instruction, consistent with established precedent requiring the defendant's belief in consent to be reasonable. The court found no abuse of discretion in allowing Doe's testimony about the defendant's state of mind, as it was based on her observations and experience. Finally, the court rejected the defendant's claim of cruel and unusual punishment, concluding that the 60-year sentence was not disproportionate given the nature of the offenses and the defendant's conduct.The judgment was affirmed. View "P. v. Guenther" on Justia Law

In 2018, the defendant was sentenced to 12 years in state prison for multiple offenses, including shooting at an occupied vehicle and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. In 2022, the trial court recalled the sentence under Penal Code section 1172.75, struck a prior prison term enhancement, and resentenced the defendant to 11 years. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in imposing the upper term based on aggravating factors not found true beyond a reasonable doubt and claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to the reimposition of the upper term.The Superior Court of Butte County initially sentenced the defendant to 12 years, considering his criminal history and the severity of his offenses. The court found that the circumstances in aggravation outweighed those in mitigation. In 2022, the same court struck the prior prison term enhancement but maintained the upper term for the other offenses, resulting in an 11-year sentence.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that under section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), the trial court was not required to find aggravating factors true beyond a reasonable doubt if the upper term was previously imposed. The appellate court held that the trial court did not err in reimposing the upper term and that the defendant's counsel was not ineffective for failing to object, as there was no sound legal basis for such an objection. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's resentencing order. View "P. v. Brannon-Thompson" on Justia Law