Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2016, Richard Anthony Rodriguez pleaded guilty to attempted murder and admitted a prior strike for assault with a deadly weapon with great bodily injury. The incident involved Rodriguez firing a shot at a car containing his ex-girlfriend and another individual, though no one was injured. In 2021, Rodriguez petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6, arguing that he lacked specific intent to kill. His petition was denied after an evidentiary hearing.Rodriguez's petition for resentencing was based on the argument that the trial court failed to act as an independent fact finder, applied the wrong burden of proof, and violated his federal constitutional due process rights. He contended that if the trial court had properly weighed the evidence and held the prosecution to the correct standard of proof, there is a reasonable probability he would be found not guilty of attempted murder because he lacked specific intent to kill.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, disagreed with Rodriguez's arguments. The court noted that Rodriguez's guilty plea admitted every element of attempted murder, making any evidence contradicting his admission irrelevant. The only issue to be determined was whether intent was imputed to him because he aided and abetted an accomplice in a different crime, or whether he was the sole perpetrator whose intent was personal to him. Once it was shown Rodriguez was the undisputed sole perpetrator, the trial court correctly found his intent to kill was personal and denied relief. The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision. View "People v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The case involves Kyle Andrew Williams, who was convicted for attempted murder and sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Williams argued that he was ineligible for resentencing as he was prosecuted and convicted as the direct perpetrator of the attempted murder. The trial court denied his petition, basing its decision partly on transcripts from Williams' preliminary hearing and plea colloquy.On appeal, Williams contended that the court erred in denying his petition at the prima facie stage by engaging in impermissible factfinding based on the preliminary hearing transcript and change of plea. He further argued that neither his plea nor his counsel’s stipulation to a factual basis for the plea rendered him ineligible for resentencing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the record of conviction did not establish Williams' ineligibility for resentencing as a matter of law. The court found that the trial court had engaged in premature judicial factfinding based on the preliminary hearing transcript and change of plea colloquy. The court held that neither the information nor Williams' plea established his ineligibility for resentencing as a matter of law. The court also held that the preliminary hearing transcript did not establish Williams' resentencing ineligibility. The court concluded that the preliminary hearing transcript did not conclusively establish that Williams was convicted of attempted murder under a valid theory. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Christopher Lee Cofer, who was sentenced concurrently in five separate cases as part of a negotiated disposition. The trial court did not award presentence custody credits in all the cases for all the days Cofer was in actual custody, citing a previous decision in People v. Jacobs.The trial court proceedings involved five criminal cases that were resolved together. Cofer was charged with various crimes including vehicle burglary, possession of burglar's tools, driving without a license, and grand theft of personal property. He resolved all five cases by plea agreement and was sentenced to a six-year term in one case and concurrent terms in the other cases. Cofer filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging the calculation of presentence custody credits.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District disagreed with the trial court's reliance on the Jacobs decision. The appellate court concluded that when a defendant is sentenced concurrently at a single hearing to resolve multiple cases that were not previously the subject of a judgment of conviction or probationary disposition, Penal Code section 2900.5 requires the trial court to apply presentence credits for all periods of actual custody toward all of those concurrent sentences. The judgment was reversed and the matter was remanded for the limited purpose of recalculating defendant’s presentence custody credits. View "People v. Cofer" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Milton Jonas Arias Molina, was charged with special circumstances murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and street terrorism. During the preliminary examination, Molina and his two co-defendants were required to share a single Spanish-language interpreter. Molina sought relief after the trial court denied his motion to dismiss based on the failure to provide him with his own interpreter throughout the preliminary examination.The charges arose from a homicide that occurred in October 2018. The Santa Cruz County District Attorney charged Molina and his two co-defendants with murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and street terrorism. The complaint also alleged two special circumstances—that the murder was committed by means of lying in wait and that the murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang—along with various other firearm and gang sentencing enhancements.The preliminary examination was conducted in 13 sessions over the course of 15 months. During the first day of the preliminary examination, Molina’s counsel objected that the hearing would be conducted with a single interpreter for all three defendants. The prosecutor also voiced her concerns about the lack of interpreters. The magistrate stated that he intended to proceed with the hearing, with the understanding that if any of the defendants needed to speak with counsel, he would interrupt the proceedings to permit that.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District concluded that the failure to provide an individual interpreter for Molina at his preliminary examination reasonably might have affected the outcome. The court issued the writ of mandate instructing the trial court to vacate its order denying Molina’s motion to dismiss and enter a new order granting that motion, without prejudice to the Santa Cruz County District Attorney refiling the charges and conducting a new preliminary examination. View "Molina v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant, Haadi Bolourchi, who was convicted of driving under the influence of a drug and bribing an executive officer. The defendant was pulled over by Officer Kevin Finerty for vehicle code violations. The officer noticed signs of intoxication and conducted several field sobriety tests, which Bolourchi failed. Bolourchi admitted to smoking cannabis the day before and was arrested. Officer Finerty requested Bolourchi to submit to a blood test, but Bolourchi insisted that a warrant be obtained first. Bolourchi also offered Officer Finerty $1,000 to let him go, which was interpreted as a bribe.In the trial court, Bolourchi was convicted of driving under the influence of a drug and bribing an executive officer. The court suspended the imposition of sentence, placed Bolourchi on three years’ probation, and ordered a jail term of 180 days. Bolourchi appealed, arguing that the court erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 2130, an instruction that states a defendant’s refusal to submit to a chemical test as required by California’s implied consent statute may show consciousness of guilt.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that a motorist's refusal to cooperate in the taking of a blood test unless a warrant is first obtained can be used as an adverse inference of consciousness of guilt in a DUI trial. The court found no instructional error in the use of CALCRIM No. 2130 and rejected Bolourchi's argument that he had a constitutional right to demand a warrant before submitting to a blood draw. The court concluded that while the Fourth Amendment required police to obtain a warrant to conduct a blood draw, Bolourchi could still face an adverse inference at his trial on a DUI charge as a cost of refusing a blood test. View "People v. Bolourchi" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Benito Gonzalez, who was convicted for continuous sexual abuse of a child. The defendant, who is terminally ill, applied for compassionate release under Penal Code section 1172.2, which creates a presumption in favor of recalling sentences for medically incapacitated or terminally ill inmates unless they pose an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike based on their current physical and mental condition. The trial court denied the defendant's request for compassionate release, finding that he posed an unreasonable risk due to lack of evidence of rehabilitation from his prior super strike offense.The trial court's decision was based on the defendant's past crime and lack of rehabilitation. The court did not consider the defendant's current physical and mental condition, which is a requirement under section 1172.2. The court also did not place the burden on the prosecution to prove that the defendant posed an unreasonable risk, which is contrary to the presumption in favor of recall under section 1172.2.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that the trial court did not properly apply section 1172.2. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring the defendant to show he had rehabilitated himself and by not considering the defendant's current physical and mental condition. The appellate court also held that the victim proximity restriction under section 3003, subdivision (f) does not apply to the defendant because he will not be released under state jurisdiction. The court directed the trial court to recall the defendant's sentence in accordance with section 1172.2. View "P. v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The case involves Tarrell Ivory Boyd, a defendant who was serving a 27-year prison sentence. Nearly 17 years into his sentence, Boyd moved for a new sentencing hearing, arguing that his custody and conduct credits had been miscalculated at his original sentencing. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, awarding Boyd seven more days of credits. Boyd appealed, arguing that the original error warranted a full resentencing to consider the effect of ameliorative sentencing laws passed since his original sentencing hearing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two found that the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to consider Boyd’s freestanding motion given that his sentence has long been made final. The court held that in order to establish jurisdiction for a postjudgment claim that credits were improperly calculated at sentencing, an inmate must file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court vacated the trial court’s order, which was void from the start. However, given the circumstances, the court treated Boyd’s purported appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, granted the petition, and modified the sentence to reflect the undisputed credits. The court rejected Boyd’s claim that he is entitled to a full resentencing. View "People v. Boyd" on Justia Law

The case involves David Gonzalez, who was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 75 years to life. Gonzalez had used a firearm in the commission of the murder, which added a term of 25 years to life to his sentence under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d). This was Gonzalez's third appeal, with the previous two resulting in remands to the trial court to consider sentencing issues in light of new statutory provisions.The trial court had previously declined to dismiss the firearm enhancement, which Gonzalez argued was an error as the court applied an improper legal standard. The court had determined that dismissing the enhancement would "endanger public safety," a decision Gonzalez contended was based on his current danger to society rather than considering the potential danger at the time of his possible release.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, agreed with Gonzalez. It found that the trial court had applied an erroneous legal standard by focusing on Gonzalez's current danger to society rather than the potential danger upon his release. The court held that the trial court should have considered the date on which Gonzalez could be released if the firearm enhancement was dismissed and the fact that the release would be subject to a review by the Board of Parole Hearings and the Governor. The court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. View "People v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

In 1999, Sylvester Williams was convicted of indecent exposure with a prior conviction and sentenced to 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law, plus an additional two years for two prior prison term enhancements. In 2012, Williams filed a petition for recall of sentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. The trial court denied Williams’ petition after finding that he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. In 2023, Williams sought relief for his newly invalid prior prison term enhancements, arguing that he was entitled to be resentenced to a maximum sentence of six years as a “two-striker” under the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act. The trial court agreed and resentenced Williams to six years, struck the two prior prison term enhancements, and deemed the sentence satisfied.The People appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act when resentencing Williams under section 1172.75 due to invalid prior prison term enhancements. They contended that by doing so, the court bypassed the public safety inquiry required by section 1170.126 of the Three Strikes Reform Act, and that section 1172.75 thereby constitutes an improper amendment of the Three Strikes Reform Act.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District agreed with the People. It held that applying the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act to reduce a defendant’s indeterminate life term to a determinate term when the defendant is being resentenced under section 1172.75 due to an invalid prior prison term enhancement unconstitutionally amends the resentencing procedure and requirements set forth in section 1170.126 of the voter-approved Three Strikes Reform Act. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order resentencing Williams to a six-year term and to hold a new resentencing hearing at which Williams’s sentence of 25 years to life is reinstated. View "People v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In April 2017, Israel Ackerman engaged in a verbal altercation with Anthony K., left, and later returned to stab Anthony four times. Ackerman was found unconscious in the apartment, and Anthony, bleeding profusely, walked to a fire station. At trial, Ackerman argued self-defense. A jury convicted him of attempted voluntary manslaughter, among other crimes, and found true allegations that Ackerman personally inflicted great bodily injury. His sentence included a three-year term for the enhancement. Ackerman appealed, arguing that the law prohibits trial courts from imposing a great bodily injury sentencing enhancement where the crime of conviction is attempted voluntary manslaughter.Ackerman's original sentence was appealed, and while it was pending, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation recommended he be resentenced, citing a case that prohibited application of a great bodily injury enhancement to a charge of manslaughter. The trial court disagreed with the recommendation, finding that the case did not apply to attempted manslaughter. The court reasoned that great bodily injury was not necessarily an element of attempted manslaughter, unlike completed manslaughter. The court then resentenced Ackerman to 15 years in custody.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California affirmed the judgment. Ackerman argued that the law does not authorize the addition of a great bodily injury sentencing enhancement when the crime of conviction is attempted voluntary manslaughter. The court disagreed, stating that the interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review. The court found that the plain language of the statute exempts only the completed crimes of murder and manslaughter, violations of certain sections, and crimes where infliction of great bodily injury is an element of the offense. The court concluded that actual infliction of great bodily injury is not an element of the crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter, as it is for all other kinds of manslaughter. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Ackerman" on Justia Law