Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2018, Ivan Morales was found guilty of robbery and attempted premeditated murder, among other offenses. The jury found that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury during the robbery and attempted murder. The crimes occurred in 2016 when Morales and his friend Sergey Gutsu robbed an armored truck and shot an employee, Glenn, multiple times with an AK-47 semi-automatic rifle. Glenn survived the attack. Later that day, the police arrested Gutsu and Morales.The trial court found Morales guilty of the charges, and the judgment was affirmed in 2020. In 2022, Morales filed a petition to vacate the attempted murder conviction and for resentencing under former Penal Code section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). The trial court denied the petition, finding that Morales failed to make a prima facie claim for relief.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision. The court concluded that the jury's verdicts established all the factual findings necessary to support an attempted murder conviction under current law. The court noted that the jury found that the shooting of Glenn was an attempted premeditated murder and that Morales was the shooter. Therefore, the court held that Morales was not eligible for relief under section 1172.6. View "P. v. Morales" on Justia Law

Peter J. Meno was convicted of two counts of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated with ordinary negligence, one count of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) causing bodily injury, and one count of driving with a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.08 percent or more causing injury. The jury also found that Meno inflicted great bodily injury upon two separate victims. The trial court found that the convictions on the DUI counts were necessarily included offenses of the manslaughter counts. However, due to the associated enhancements, the potential sentence for the DUI counts was greater than that for the manslaughter counts. The court decided to dismiss the manslaughter counts and sentenced Meno to a combined term of eight years in prison.The Superior Court of San Diego County had previously heard the case. The trial court found that the DUI counts were necessarily included offenses of the manslaughter counts. However, due to the associated enhancements, the potential sentence for the DUI counts was greater than that for the manslaughter counts. The court decided to dismiss the manslaughter counts and sentenced Meno to a combined term of eight years in prison.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not err by dismissing the manslaughter counts and sentencing Meno on the DUI counts. The court also held that the trial court did not err by including additional terms for two great bodily injury enhancements on one of the DUI counts. The court affirmed the judgment and directed the trial court to prepare a new abstract of judgment to reflect its oral pronouncement of judgment. View "People v. Meno" on Justia Law

The case involves a minor, A.M., who was convicted as an adult for a murder committed when he was 14 years old. A.M. was a member of a local gang and was convicted of first-degree murder for killing a rival gang member, S.S. The jury found that A.M. had used a deadly weapon and committed the crime for the benefit of his gang. He was sentenced to 26 years to life in state prison.Years later, the superior court conditionally reversed the judgment and ordered a transfer hearing pursuant to Proposition 57, which prohibits trying a minor as an adult without a judicial determination of their fitness for juvenile court law. The juvenile court conducted the hearing, granted the district attorney’s motion to transfer A.M.’s case to criminal court, and reinstated the judgment. A.M. contended that his case should not have been transferred because he was 14 years old when he committed his crime.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, found that A.M.'s case was nonfinal when the superior court conditionally reversed the judgment. Therefore, Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391, which bars a juvenile court from transferring a 14- or 15-year-old to adult criminal court, applied. The court also agreed with A.M.'s contention that Assembly Bill 333 required striking the gang-murder special circumstance. The court reversed the order granting the district attorney’s motion to transfer A.M.’s case to criminal court and vacated the true finding on the gang-murder special circumstance. The court remanded the matter to the juvenile court with directions to enter a new order denying the district attorney’s motion and to hold a dispositional hearing treating A.M.’s murder conviction as a juvenile adjudication. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law

The case involves a juvenile, Jose R., who was declared a ward of the court and committed to a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) for a baseline term of three years with a maximum term of six years. This followed his admission, as part of a plea deal, that he had committed an assault with a semiautomatic firearm. The case arose from a shooting incident in which Jose and an adult man fired multiple gunshots, resulting in a victim's death. Initially, Jose was charged with first-degree murder, but the charge was later amended to assault with a semiautomatic firearm, which Jose admitted to.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Jose's motion to apply his precommitment custody credits to his baseline term, instead applying the 395 days of precommitment custody credits against the maximum term. Jose appealed this decision, arguing that the court erred in applying his precommitment custody credits to his maximum term instead of his baseline term.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Seven affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the lower court did not err in applying Jose's precommitment custody credits to the maximum term of confinement. The court based its decision on the clear statutory language in section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C), which states that precommitment custody credits must be applied against the maximum term of confinement. The court also rejected Jose's argument that the legislative scheme violated his right to equal protection of the laws. The court concluded that the legislative amendments did not violate equal protection principles, even if they resulted in less favorable treatment of precommitment credits. View "In re Jose R." on Justia Law

The case involves Crystal Graham, who was convicted of kidnapping to commit robbery, kidnapping during the commission of carjacking, second-degree robbery, and simple kidnapping. The crimes involved Graham and her co-defendant, Joe Navarro, luring a victim to a motel room, attacking him, stealing his wallet and keys, and kidnapping him. Graham was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life in prison with the possibility of parole.On appeal, the court reversed Graham's conviction for simple kidnapping and remanded the case for a mental health diversion eligibility hearing under Penal Code section 1001.36. This was due to amendments to the section that applied retroactively to her case. On remand, Graham's application for mental health diversion was denied by the trial court. The court considered the transcripts of her trial and resulting convictions when assessing her eligibility and suitability for diversion.Graham appealed again, arguing that the trial court erred by considering her trial transcripts and convictions in its decision. She also contended that the court erred in finding her ineligible and unsuitable for diversion. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found no error in the trial court's consideration of the trial transcripts and convictions. It also found substantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding that Graham posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if granted diversion and treated in the community. View "P. v. Graham" on Justia Law

The defendant, Aaron Sterling Gefrerer, was charged with two counts of robbery after he handed notes to bank tellers demanding $5,000. The notes read, “Don’t play.” Both tellers testified that they were afraid and complied with the demand. Gefrerer's defense strategy was to argue that he was not the perpetrator of the robberies, rather than disputing the nature of the crimes. Consequently, he did not request an instruction on the lesser included offense of grand theft, as it conflicted with his defense. The jury convicted Gefrerer on both counts.The Superior Court of Riverside County had previously heard the case, where Gefrerer was found guilty of both counts of robbery. His defense had conceded that the robberies took place but argued that the prosecution failed to prove that Gefrerer was the perpetrator.In the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, Gefrerer appealed his conviction, arguing that the court erred by not instructing the jury on grand theft as a lesser included offense of robbery. He contended that the bank's policies instructing tellers to comply with demands during robberies, along with his nonaggressive demeanor during the robberies, provided substantial evidence that required the court to instruct the jury on theft. The court disagreed, stating that substantial evidence did not exist to support a theft instruction. Furthermore, the court concluded that even if such evidence existed, the doctrine of invited error would bar Gefrerer’s argument that the court erred by not providing the theft instruction. The court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "People v. Gefrerer" on Justia Law

The case involves George Dennis Rounds, Jr., who appealed against the trial court's denial of his petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. In 1983, Rounds pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree murder and one count of attempted murder. He was sentenced to an indefinite term of 15 years to life, plus a concurrent definite term of seven years. In 2010, Rounds was found suitable for parole and was discharged from parole in 2014. Seven years after being discharged from parole, Rounds filed a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon.The trial court denied Rounds's petition, citing multiple factors that were not relevant to the statutory criteria for evaluating a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation. These factors included the nature of the underlying crime, the perceived unfairness to the victims of granting the petition, and Rounds's failure to plead guilty to a more serious charge. The court also claimed that Rounds had not taken responsibility for his conduct, based on an alleged inconsistency between his statements to the Board of Parole Hearings and those in his petition and at the hearing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three found that the trial court had abused its discretion. The appellate court concluded that the trial court had relied on factors not properly part of the statutory analysis, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case with directions to grant the petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. View "P. v. Rounds" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Darryn Mayberry, who was found ineligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 by the trial court. Mayberry was initially charged with second-degree robbery and had previously suffered a juvenile adjudication and a serious felony conviction, both of which qualified as strike convictions under the Three Strikes law. He also served two separate prison terms. Mayberry pled nolo contendere to the robbery charge and admitted both strike priors and both prior prison term enhancements. The sentencing court struck one strike prior and imposed a doubled upper term of 10 years. The court also pronounced that it was exercising discretion and staying imposition of the two one-year prison priors, making the total term 10 years in the Department of Corrections.The trial court reasoned that the original sentence was "illegal" due to the section 667.5, former subdivision (b) enhancements being imposed but stayed, the sentence was not appealed, and the court therefore did not have the "ability" to "go back in time and do anything about those illegal sentences." Mayberry appealed from that ruling.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District disagreed with the trial court's interpretation of Penal Code section 1172.75. The appellate court concluded that section 1172.75 applies to prior prison term enhancements that have been imposed and stayed. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for the trial court to recall Mayberry's sentence and resentence him in compliance with section 1172.75. The appellate court found that the trial court had erred in staying the two prior prison term enhancements, and that section 1172.75 statutorily conferred jurisdiction on the trial court to resentence Mayberry. View "P. v. Mayberry" on Justia Law

In 2013, a minor identified as A.M. was tried as an adult and convicted for first-degree murder of a rival gang member, which he committed at the age of 14. He was sentenced to 26 years to life in prison. In 2021, the superior court conditionally reversed the judgment and ordered a transfer hearing under Proposition 57, which prohibits trying a minor as an adult without a judicial determination of their fitness for juvenile court. The juvenile court conducted the hearing, granted the district attorney’s motion to transfer A.M.’s case to criminal court, and reinstated the judgment.A.M. appealed, arguing that his case should not have been transferred because he was 14 years old when he committed his crime. He also contended that Assembly Bill 333, which amended various provisions of Penal section 186.22, required striking the gang-murder special circumstance. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District agreed with both of A.M.’s contentions.The court held that Senate Bill 1391, which amended Proposition 57 to prohibit the transfer of 14- and 15-year-olds to adult criminal court, applied to A.M.'s case. The court reasoned that when the superior court conditionally reversed A.M.'s conviction and sentence, his case became nonfinal, and thus, Senate Bill 1391 applied. The court also held that Assembly Bill 333 applied retroactively to A.M.'s case, requiring the vacating of the jury's gang-murder special circumstance finding. The court reversed the order granting the district attorney’s motion to transfer A.M.’s case to criminal court, vacated the true finding on the gang-murder special circumstance, and struck the requirement for A.M. to register as a gang offender. The case was remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law

Diana Contreras Chagolla, under the influence of prescription painkillers, led California Highway Patrol (CHP) officers on a high-speed chase. The chase ended when Chagolla crashed her vehicle into a guardrail, blocking two lanes of traffic. Despite repeated orders from the CHP officers, Chagolla did not exit her vehicle for about 45 minutes. During this time, a four-vehicle collision occurred about half a mile to a mile away from Chagolla’s vehicle, resulting in the death of a driver. Chagolla was charged with murder and unlawfully causing death to a person while driving a motor vehicle in attempting to elude a peace officer, among other crimes.The trial court granted Chagolla's motion to set aside the information for the charges of murder and unlawfully causing death to a person while driving a motor vehicle in attempting to elude a peace officer. The People then filed a petition for mandate, arguing that the superior court erred in setting aside these charges. They requested the court to vacate its order and reinstate the charges.The Court of Appeal declined to order the requested relief. The court found that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing did not establish that Chagolla intentionally remained in her car after it crashed and knew that remaining in the vehicle would endanger the life of another. Without establishing these fundamental facts, the People could not show Chagolla’s act of remaining in her car proximately caused the victim’s death. Therefore, the court denied the People's request for relief. View "People v. Superior Court" on Justia Law